

The political consequences of military operations in Indonesia 1945-99 : a fieldwork analysis of the political power-diffusion effects of guerilla conflict

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SCHOOL OF POLITICS
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES

**The Political Consequences of
Military Operations in Indonesia
1945-99**

*A fieldwork analysis of the political power-diffusion effects
of guerrilla conflict*

David J. Kilcullen FRGS

Dissertation submitted in the University of New South Wales
In fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

2000

CANDIDATE'S STATEMENT

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis.

I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.

D. J. Kilcullen

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ABSTRACT

Problem Investigated

This dissertation is a study of the political effects of low-intensity warfare in Indonesia since 1945. In particular, it examines the interaction between general principles and contextual variables in guerrilla conflict, to determine whether such conflict causes the diffusion of political power.

Analysis of insurgent movements indicates that power structures within a guerrilla group tend to be regionalised, diffuse and based on multiple centres of roughly equal authority. Conversely, studies of counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques indicate that successful COIN depends on effective political control over the local population. This tends to be exercised by regional or local military commanders rather than by central authority. Based on this, the author's initial analysis indicated that one should expect to see a diffusion of political authority from central leaders (whether civilian or military) to regional military leaders, when a society is engaged in the conduct of either COIN or guerrilla warfare.

The problem investigated in this dissertation can therefore be stated thus:

To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect?

Procedures Followed

The procedure followed was a diachronic, qualitative, fieldwork-based analysis of two principal case studies: the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-1962 and the campaign in East Timor 1974-1999. Principal research tools were:

- Semi-structured, formal, informal and group interviews.
- Analysis of official and private archives in Australia, Indonesia, the Netherlands and the UK.
- Participant observation using anthropological fieldwork techniques.
- Geographical analysis using transects, basemapping and overhead imagery.
- Demographic analysis using historical data, cartographic records and surveys.

Research was conducted in Australia, Indonesia (Jakarta and Bandung), the Netherlands (The Hague and Amsterdam) and the United Kingdom (London, Winchester, Salisbury and Warminster). Fieldwork was conducted over three periods in West Java (1994, 1995 and 1996) and one period in East Timor (1999-2000).

General Results Obtained

The two principal case studies were the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-62 and the campaign in East Timor since 1974.

The fieldwork data showed that low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 did indeed demonstrate the political power-diffusion effect posited by the author. This effect was triggered by the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, which itself flowed from crises generated by processes of modernisation and change within Indonesian society from traditional hierarchies to modern forms of social organisation. These crises were also affected by events at the systemic and regional levels of analysis – the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by Japan, the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis and increasing economic and media globalisation. They resulted in a breakdown or weakening of formal power structures, allowing informal power structures to dominate. This in turn allowed local elites with economic, social or religious influence and with coercive power over the population, to develop political and military power at the local level while being subject to little control from higher levels. This process, then, represented a power diffusion from central and civilian leadership levels to local leaders with coercive means – most often military or insurgent leaders.

Having been triggered by guerrilla operations, however, the direction and process by which such power diffusion operated was heavily influenced by contextual variables, of which the most important were geographical factors, political culture, traditional authority structures and the interaction of external variables at different levels of analysis. Topographical isolation, poor infrastructure, severe terrain, scattered population groupings and strong influence by traditional hierarchies tend to accelerate and exacerbate the loss of central control. Conversely good infrastructure, large population centres, good communications and a high degree of influence by nation-state and systemic levels of analysis – particularly through economic and governmental institutionalisation – tend to slow such diffusion. Moreover, while power may be diffusing at one level of analysis (e.g. nation-state) it may be centralising at another (e.g. into the hands of military leaders at local level).

Analysis of the Malayan Emergency indicates that, in a comparable non-Indonesian historical example, the same general tendency to political power diffusion was evident and that the same broad contextual variables mediated it. However, it would be premature to conclude that the process observed in Indonesia is generally applicable. The nature and relative importance of contextual factors is likely to vary between examples and hence additional research on non-Indonesian examples would be necessary before such a conclusion could be drawn. Further research on a current instance of guerrilla operations in Indonesia is also essential before the broader contemporary applicability of these findings can be reliably demonstrated.

Major Conclusions Reached

Based on the above, the theses developed to answer the initial problem can be stated thus:

The command and control (C²) structures inherent in traditional, dispersed rural guerrilla movements that lack access to mass media or electronic communications tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders.

If COIN or Internal Security Operations are conducted, two factors will operate. First, there will be an increase in the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Second, where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, there will be an increase in control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders. Where the central government is civilian or has interests divergent from the military's, the first of these factors will dominate. Where the government is military or has interests largely identical to those of the military, the second factor will be dominant.

The process of power diffusion can thus be summarised as follows:

A crisis driven by processes of societal change or by external causes, leads to the outbreak of violence, one facet of which may include guerrilla operations. If guerrilla operations do occur, the C² structures inherent in such operations give a high degree of autonomy and independence to local military leaders.

The same (or a contemporaneous) crisis produces a breakdown of formal power structures, causing organisations to fall back upon informal power structures.

The nature of these informal power structures is determined by geography, political culture, patterns of traditional authority within the society and the degree of interaction of systemic/regional factors with local events.

Thus the guerrilla operations and the concomitant breakdown in formal power structures form the *trigger* for political power diffusion. The precise nature and progress of this diffusion is then *determined* by contextual variables.

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PREFACE

Conduct of Field Research

This dissertation is grounded in fieldwork methodology. This methodology and the sources employed are discussed in detail in Appendix 1 (see page 186).

However, before proceeding to the results of the study, it is necessary to document the manner in which it was conducted. This is important because, although presented in this dissertation within a discursive analytical framework, in fieldwork terms the thesis developed through iterative and heuristic analysis. In essence, therefore, the dissertation is an extended piece of historical and anthropological detective work and in order to understand the results obtained it is necessary to bear in mind the process of research undertaken.

It should also be noted that Appendix 1, Methodology and Sources (see page 186) provides a full and detailed discussion of both the fieldwork methodology itself and the handling and recording of source material. This preface does not seek to duplicate that discussion, but rather to provide a chronological framework for the dissertation.

The two principal case studies were those of West Java and East Timor.

West Java Case Study

The West Java case study was conducted between June 1995 and December 1996, in Australia, the United Kingdom, Indonesia and the Netherlands. Initial research concentrated on documentary sources in Australian and British archives. In the field phase, fieldwork was conducted in three modules. The first module comprised informal, semi-structured and formal interviews in Jakarta, Bandung, Garut and the surrounding rural sub-districts. The second module consisted of archival research and supporting interviews in Jakarta and Bandung and the third module was a terrain study of the Garut basin. Table 0.1 summarises the oral history interviews conducted; while the topographical fieldwork is discussed in Appendix 3 (see page 195). Follow-up research and interviews were conducted in The Hague and in the archives of the State War Archives (*Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie*, RVO) Amsterdam.

East Timor Case Study

The East Timor case study was conducted in 1999-2000. It seemed initially that access to the Timorese population without interference would be impossible and travel within East Timor would be subject to unworkably restrictive security constraints. Therefore, fieldwork would have been impracticable and its results likely to be tainted by duress. This changed suddenly when the militia and TNI in East Timor commenced a campaign of violence, destruction and forced relocation of the population following the pro-independence vote in

the 30 August 1999 UN-sponsored referendum. Australia committed peace-enforcement forces to the region and the author deployed as an infantry company commander with the first wave of Australian combat troops into Timor on 20 Sep 99. The author was responsible for patrolling and security operations along the West Timor border and within the case study area and was thus able to speak with many local people and to travel and analyse extensively. This provided the opportunity for detailed fieldwork including terrain analysis, cultural observation and iterative political analysis from September 1999 to January 2000. It also provided sufficient access and time to develop close relationships with key respondents in the case study area.

Research comprised preliminary archival study in Australia and fieldwork in Dili, Balibo, Ermera and the surrounding district. Fieldwork consisted of participant observations, terrain studies and 119 formal, semi-structured and informal interviews with local people, militia, TNI, Falintil, FSP, CNRT and UN personnel. Extensive field notes were taken on terrain, culture, political structure and military operations, using standard ethnographic methodology based on participant observation. The same semi-structured interview and modified iterative PRA techniques were applied as for the West Java case study (see page 186). A summary of interviews is at Table 0.2.

From the above it can be seen that the conduct of the East Timor case study was, perforce, rather different from that applied in West Java. Where the first study relied on oral history, terrain analysis and standard PRA techniques (see page 186), the second study consisted in the main of participant observation, semi-structured and iterative interviews, terrain studies and fieldwork expeditions. The two principal factors influencing methodology for this case study were ethics and security. Ethically, there was an obligation for the author to declare a research interest in the situation, in addition to the obvious professional and moral interest in the situation of the local people. Permission was sought from traditional leaders and interview respondents, to analyse and publish the results of fieldwork. From a security perspective, as a military officer on active service the author was subject to the Official Secrets Act, which prevents information learned in the course of official duties from being disclosed. This restriction was overcome by seeking clearance from unit security officers and by the fact that the author was not employed as an intelligence or civil affairs officer.

For a detailed discussion of methodological principles and techniques, linguistic procedures and sources, see Appendix 1.

Table 0.1
Interview Summary – West Java

Category	Percentage	Remarks
Location	%	<i>n</i> = 50
Jakarta:	20.0	Majority of interviews from Garut region due to length and intensity of Garut fieldwork. Non-Indonesian locations London, Warminster, Winchester (UK); Amsterdam, The Hague (Netherlands)
Bandung and district:	18.0	
Garut and district:	48.0	
Other Indonesian:	2.0	
Other Non-Indonesian:	12.0	
Ethnic Group	%	<i>n</i> = 45 (due to group and follow-up interviews)
Javanese:	20.0	Interviews focused on Sundanese and Javanese respondents, with a significant proportion of other Indonesians (Sumatran, Moluccan, Chinese and Arab). Non-Indonesian respondents included Dutch, British and Australians.
Sundanese:	42.2	
Indonesian Arab:	2.2	
Indonesian Chinese:	4.4	
Other Indonesian:	11.0	
Dutch:	4.4	
Other Non-Indonesian:	15.4	
Political Orientation	%	The majority of respondents claimed to be pro-Indonesian government, with the next largest group claiming to be undecided or neutral. Avowedly pro-DI respondents were relatively rare, while the unknown grouping includes non-Indonesian respondents.
TNI/Indonesian Govt	44.4	
Ex-DI/TII or Sympathisers	13.3	
Neutral/Undecided	28.8	
Unknown	13.5	
Age Group	%	Older respondents dominated. This is unsurprising as the research was conducted 24 years after the end of the campaign and hence only those aged 35+ had reliable direct memory of it. Older respondents (60+) tended to be key players in the events of the campaign, although two non-Indonesians are included, a former British officer who served in the area and a Dutch academic.
0-20:	11.1	
20-40:	33.3	
40-60:	31.1	
60+:	24.5	
Gender	%	The interviews are biased toward male respondents. Female respondents were generally older, more influential women within villages or affluent women within towns. Consequently the views of ordinary village women are significantly under-represented.
Female:	17.8	
Male:	82.2	
Type of Interview	%	The majority of interviews were semi-structured using PRA, with fewer informal interviews and only 4.4 % formal interviews. This again reflects the focus of fieldwork on the Garut area, a field environment.
Informal:	11.1	
Semi-Structured:	84.5	
Formal:	4.4	
Occupation Group	%	Interviews were evenly spread between local government officials and military (all local or regional), village traders/shopkeepers and farmers. Urban lower/middle class groups were under-represented in the fieldwork.
Government / Military:	40	
Village Trade/Agriculture:	42.2	
Diplomatic/Media:	11.1	
Academic:	6.7	
Language	%	Interviews in Indonesian were conducted by the author without interpreters. Interviews in Sundanese were interpreted into Indonesian, usually by other villagers or <i>lurah</i> .
Bahasa Indonesia:	80.0	
Bahasa Sunda:	8.9	
English:	11.1	

Note: The principal source of bias evident in the interview data is gender bias (82.2% in favour of male opinion). In the other variables, the dataset is evenly spread when the duration and intensity of local village fieldwork in Garut region is taken into account. The importance of female opinion is difficult to gauge with precision: women of the appropriate age group tended to be shy about speaking with a younger male researcher. There were no female leaders of any note on either side in the insurgency, nor were female troops employed on either side. However, the critical importance of women as opinion-formers within village politics must not be overlooked. Jackson's (1972, 1980) research from the 1960s (which was collected by a gender-balanced team) was used to supplement the scarcity of female opinion in the present fieldwork data.

Table 0.2
Interview Summary – East Timor

Category	Percentage	Remarks
Location		<i>n</i> = 119
Balibo & district:	78.16	Majority of interviews from Balibo region due to length of author's residence in Balibo and surrounding district and frequency of contact with local people compared to other locations.
Dili & district:	7.56	
Ermera & District:	8.40	
Maliana & District:	5.88	
Ethnic Group		<i>n</i> = 204 (due to group interviews)
Ena/Belu:	22.50	Respondents evenly spread between major Timorese ethnic groups for case study area. Overall Timorese respondents dominated – 63.75% compared to 36.25% for all other respondents. Other Indonesian respondents were from Flores, Sumatra and West Timor. Other Non-Indonesian respondents were from Italy, New Zealand, Nepal, Germany, Bangladesh and Malaysia.
Makassae:	21.25	
Quémac:	20.00	
Javanese:	12.50	
Other Indonesian:	5.00	
Australian:	10.00	
Other Non-Indonesian:	8.75	
Political Orientation		<i>n</i> = 204
TNI/Indonesian Govt	5.88	Majority of respondents were politically uncommitted (IDPs, ordinary local people), whereas only 15.68% of East Timorese interviewed had formal allegiance to political groupings (Falintil, Militia, CNRT or FSP). 12.25% of respondents were from external agencies (TNI, Indonesian govt, UN or Interfet).
Militia	6.37	
Falintil	3.43	
CNRT/FSP	5.88	
UN/Interfet	6.37	
Uncommitted	72.07	
Age Group		<i>n</i> = 204
0-20:	4.90	The vast majority of respondents were aged 20-60 years. The 40-60 year age group was dominated by CNRT/FSP leaders and IDP or village elders. An additional 6.8% was made up of children and older people.
20-40:	73.11	
40-60:	20.09	
60+:	1.90	
Gender		<i>n</i> = 204
Female:	10.41	The interviews are heavily biased toward male respondents, because all formal positions of power within CNRT, FSP, Falintil, TNI, UN and Interfet were held by males. The only significant input of female views was from IDPs.
Male:	89.59	
Type of Interview		<i>n</i> = 119
Informal:	38.26	The majority of interviews were semi-structured using PRA techniques, with a significant proportion of informal interviews and only 11.3 % formal interviews. This reflects prevailing field research conditions.
Semi-Structured:	50.44	
Formal:	11.30	
Language		<i>n</i> = 119
Indonesian:	78.94	Interviews in Indonesian were conducted by the author without interpreters. Interviews in Tetum were interpreted into Indonesian, usually by FSP or IDPs. Interviews in English were principally with UN and Interfet personnel.
Tetum:	7.90	
English:	13.16	

Note: Sources of bias evident in the interview data are gender bias (89.6% in favour of male opinion) and age group bias (73.1% in the 20-40 year age group). Both factors may contribute to an elite bias in the data, as they favour those in leadership positions or educated under the Indonesian system, as against lower strata of village society. To counteract this, sources of non-elite and female opinion were sought from collections of interviews such as Winters (1999) and Turner (1992). It should also be noted that the high proportion of respondents not formally committed to any political grouping (72.07%) indicates that non-elite opinion was taken into account in data. This may serve to counteract the identified bias to some degree.

NOTE ON TRANSLATION

One of the principal advantages of this study over previous political studies of conflict in Indonesia is that it works extensively from Indonesian-language sources.

This is true not only of field sources, which represent more than 4300 hours of interviews and discussion in Indonesian, Sundanese and Tetuñ, but also of documentary sources, all of which (unless otherwise indicated in the text) were translated from the original by the author. The designator 'AT' is applied after each translation to indicate the author's translation from the original. The author's linguistic qualifications are given at Appendix 1.

Appendix 1 describes the linguistic methodology applied, as well as the use of check-translators and assistant interpreters for some interviews in Sundanese and Tetuñ.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.

Clausewitz, *On War*, I.1.24

Introduction

Background

Conflict takes place within a context. This context incorporates cultural, political, historical and geographical dimensions. This is obvious but often forgotten when political scientists attempt to derive general principles or theories about such conflict.

And yet, it is clear, such general principles do exist. This is most obvious when one considers the prevalent forms of conflict at the turn of the twenty-first century – insurgency and counter-insurgency. Insurgency combines the features of ‘political commerce’ and warfare; it blurs Clausewitz’s distinction, quoted above, into a continuum. It is clear from even a cursory examination that many insurgent tendencies and behaviours recur, regardless of time, place or culture.

This is the question at issue in this dissertation: do general principles exist to explain the political effects of insurgency? Is there a set of general laws that drive the progress of insurgency, regardless of context? Conversely, is all politico-military conflict merely an expression of local particular circumstance, what Isaiah Berlin would call a cultural incommensurable? Clearly the answer lies somewhere in between, but where? What are the general political effects of insurgency and how are they influenced and modified by context?

To answer this question, one must examine a concrete, particular example in the light of general theoretical propositions, to see how the two interact. The example chosen in this study is Indonesia.

A number of Southeast Asian countries have been ruled at some time, directly or indirectly, by their armed forces. Some observers place Indonesia into this category, characterising it (at least up until the fall of the Suharto government) as a thinly-veiled albeit relatively benevolent military dictatorship. Despite the fall of Suharto in May 1998 the armed forces’ control over every aspect of Indonesian life remains, in 2000, both comprehensive and deeply ingrained.

However, to define Indonesia as a military dictatorship is a gross oversimplification. Indonesian political culture is indeed authoritarian and the

Armed Forces (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, ABRI)¹ have played a central role in government. However, this role has changed over time and its origins are such that a significant segment of Indonesian society sees ABRI's role in politics as a legitimate and essential stabilising factor in national development.² The slogan *asal rakyat, milik rakyat, bagian rakyat* (from the people, for the people, of the people) gives an indication of the perceived closeness of the armed forces and the general population. It also highlights the conflation of government, military and popular identity in the minds of many Indonesians.³

Moreover, Indonesia is in a state of political flux. Perceptions of the legitimacy and role of the armed forces are altering as part of socio-cultural and political change. Consequently, in using Indonesia as an example of low-intensity conflict, it is essential to understand and take into account the specific circumstances of the archipelago and its history.

In specific terms, the problem the dissertation seeks to answer is this:

To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect?

The method used is a diachronic analysis⁴ using fieldwork and participant observation, grounded by textual and archival research. The study commences

¹ Indonesian military abbreviations used in this dissertation are listed in full in the Glossary (see page 215 below).

² The term 'praetorianism', originated by David Rapoport, describes the phenomenon wherein a nation's armed forces, while perhaps not governing directly, influence the selection and behaviour of government in their own interests. Further, Eric Nordlinger argues that 'military officers become praetorian soldiers when they threaten or use force to enter or dominate the political arena... Thus praetorianism (or military intervention) occurs when officers more or less overtly threaten to carry out a coup unless certain demands are met, when they stage an unsuccessful coup, when a coup brings about or prevents the replacement of the government by another group of civilians and, most important, when the officers themselves take control of the government' (Nordlinger 1977, 3). The detailed analysis by MacFarling (1994) applies this concept to the development of civil-military relations in Indonesia and provides a valuable theoretical discussion of civil-military relations and of the concept of cohesion, which will be referred to as appropriate in this dissertation. For MacFarling's application of the concept to Indonesian political development see MacFarling (1994, 27 et. seq.).

³ This slogan, which was often quoted to the author during his service as a military training team adviser with the Indonesian Infantry School and with KOSTRAD in 1994/95, is commonly used to indicate the inseparability of ABRI's interests from those of the Indonesian people. MacFarling (1994) quotes the same slogan and although his translation (Risen from the People, Owned by the People, Part of the People) is more grammatically accurate, the choice of English translation used here and adopted by Indonesian Army officers in the field is interesting, as it indicates the implicit allusion to the words of the United States Constitution contained in this slogan.

⁴ A diachronic analysis is one that examines changes in key characteristics or variables over time – in this case a period of 50 years. Because quantitative research methods in the social sciences tend to produce synchronic analysis – 'snapshots' or frozen pictures of the state of various variables at a given moment – the conduct of diachronic analysis usually involves either the

by reviewing the theoretical and historical literature on insurgency and deriving theses which operationalise the general principles of political power diffusion under the stress of guerrilla operations. It then applies the theses to two case studies, to determine their validity and the degree to which contextual variables influenced them. The first case study examines the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java during the period 1948-62. The second study analyses guerrilla operations in East Timor during the period 1974-1999. This focus on military operations *per se* and their effects on political development, is an original approach to this problem. Previous studies have emphasised the nature and development of civil-military relations in Indonesia as an explanatory tool for ABRI's role⁵. By contrast, this dissertation examines the military operations themselves and is the first study to consider the question of whether and to what extent they contributed to a redistribution of political power over time.

Moreover, this study is the first to present a fieldwork-based analysis of the events of 1999 in East Timor and of the subsequent intervention by UN-sponsored peace enforcement troops leading to the defeat of the militia and the stabilisation of the independent UN-mandated territory of East Timor.

Aim

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the thesis.

Historical Context

The Indonesian War of Independence, fought against the Dutch from 1945 to 1949, led to the creation of the modern Indonesian unitary republican state. It stimulated the transformation of Indonesia, begun by the Dutch, from a collection of geographically isolated and culturally discrete ethno-linguistic groupings into one nation with a common aim and united outlook. This process is far from complete and indeed Indonesia at the turn of the 21st century is more fragmented than at almost any time since 1945; nevertheless, the period 1945-65 saw the creation of an Indonesian national identity which sought, for the first time, to transcend inter-insular differences.

This process of national integration was often violent and it involved military operations against the former colonial power, separatist movements and politically-motivated insurgencies. These military operations were of two types. First, guerrilla operations were conducted against the Dutch, Malaysians, Portuguese, Timorese and British. Second, counter-insurgency operations were undertaken against separatist movements, communists and dissident groups. Guerrilla operations were aimed at the eviction of the colonial government, the expansion of the Republic, the overthrow of what was considered the neo-colonial puppet state of Malaysia and the undermining of a potentially

iterative conduct of several synchronic analyses, or the use of qualitative methods. As discussed below, this study uses a combination of qualitative methods (using anthropological and geographical techniques), iterative research techniques and historical data to generate a diachronic dimension.

⁵ See, for example, Cribb (1991), Crouch (1988), Lowry (1993), MacFarling (1994) and Sundhaussen (1982).

Communist enclave in East Timor. Counter-insurgency operations were intended to maintain national cohesion and the authority of the central government. This period of simultaneous, internal and external low-intensity warfare is unique amongst the armed forces of Southeast Asia and hence it is unsurprising that ABRI's political role during the period was also unique.

Many Asian armed forces originated as insurgents and became involved in counter-insurgency operations later in their history. The Vietnam People's Army (VPA) is a case in point. Originating as a Marxist guerrilla force, the Viet Minh – later the VPA – fought an insurgent campaign against the French, culminating in the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1954. In concert with the southern-communist led People's Liberation Armed Forces, the VPA then conducted guerrilla operations against the Republic of South Vietnam, which was supported by the United States (Nguyen 1983, 8). This led to independence in 1975. Thus for its first 30 years the VPA was primarily an insurgent force and it only began to conduct large scale counter-insurgency operations once it had established the independent state of Vietnam. Counter-insurgency operations during the 1980's against the Khmer Rouge represented a departure from the traditional types of warfare waged by the VPA, namely insurgency and conventional mid-intensity conflict (Nguyen 1983, 239). The sharpness of this transition is clear from this account of the liberation of South Vietnam:

The offensive and general uprising of the population in the Mekong River delta [in 1975] can be categorised as follows. First, it was a combination of military attack with on-the-spot mass uprisings as in Tra Vinh, Soc Trang and Vi Thanh. While the local armed forces attacked and occupied targets in the town the masses rose up and encircled the enemy...Secondly, the population rose up to destroy the enemy's ruling apparatus even before our armed forces entered a town...Thirdly, agitation among the enemy ranks combined with mass uprisings compelled the enemy to surrender before the arrival of the Liberation Army...[After the conclusion of the campaign and the capitulation of South Vietnam] in re-establishing order and security in newly-liberated areas, it was necessary first of all to track down and capture all remnants of the enemy army and administration who refused to give up and were trying to dodge re-education. Particularly with regard to FULRO (United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races) – the reactionary organisation set up by the French and later funded by the Americans to oppose the Vietnamese revolution in the Central Highlands – it was necessary to capture or eliminate the ringleaders and call on the rank and file to return to their families (Hoang, 1992, 244-246).

The VPA developed from popular uprising and insurgency, to partisan warfare (the use of irregular forces to support regular conventional operations) to counter-insurgency. In the case of Vietnam the internal counter-insurgency was completed by 1978, just in time to face a major intervention and counter-insurgency in Cambodia and conventional war with China⁶.

⁶ Hoang is disingenuous in regard to FULRO. The United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (*Front Unifié de Liberation des Races Opprimés*) was in fact formed by Montagnard leaders in the central highlands, who had fled into Cambodia following the unsuccessful Montagnard revolt against the South Vietnamese Government in September 1964, which was in part inspired by the Vietnamese Communists and partly by the Royalist Cambodian *Deuxième Bureau* and the

This is the dominant paradigm for the development of armed forces in states founded by armed revolution. Among numerous other examples, this pattern can be identified in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Cuba, Iran and Yemen. China, Burma, Mexico and the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea also exhibit some characteristics of this sequence. The model can be stated as follows: a revolutionary army conducts insurgency against an occupying or colonial power, undergoes a process of regularisation and professionalisation as part of the campaign of liberation, then turns its attention inward once liberation is achieved to secure the territory of the newly-acquired state by means of counter-insurgency and internal security operations.

ABRI (specifically, TNI-AD⁷) exhibits very different characteristics. It has simultaneously been involved in both guerrilla and counter-insurgency warfare from its creation. This is an important distinction and as will be argued its political consequences have been significant. Even during the War of Independence, whilst fighting as a guerrilla force against the Netherlands East Indies Army (*Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger*, KNIL) the Indonesian forces were simultaneously engaged in quelling a Communist armed uprising at Madiun in Central Java, dealing with opposition by the armed forces of Dutch-sponsored states within the Republic's territory and fighting a counter-insurgency against Islamic insurgents in Aceh and West Java. Again, in the 1950s, ABRI was simultaneously involved in guerrilla operations against Dutch forces in West New Guinea and in counter-insurgency against an array of Muslim, separatist and leftist insurgents throughout its territory (Pauker 1963, vi). In the 1960s, guerrilla operations continued against the Dutch in West New Guinea and were initiated against the British and Malaysians in Brunei, Malaya and Sarawak. Simultaneously, counter-insurgency operations continued against separatist movements and in the suppression of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI).

This situation of near-continuous warfare, involving simultaneous guerrilla campaigns against external powers and internal counter-insurgency, had far-reaching and important effects on ABRI's development as a military and political entity and on the development of the Indonesian political system as a whole. Thus Indonesia provides a particularly good opportunity to determine

French SDECE. While the French and Cambodians initially sought to establish the Montagnard leaders in opposition to the South Vietnamese Government in the central highlands, Cambodian and Vietnamese communists were also involved in supporting FULRO (Petersen 1988, 93-95). After their victory in South Vietnam, the DRV conducted COIN operations against FULRO in both Vietnam and Cambodia until its eventual capitulation in 1993.

⁷ Many researchers have been confused by Indonesian military terminology. The term ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, Indonesian Armed Forces) was used from 1945 until 1998 to designate the Army, Navy, Air Force and National Police. Conversely the term TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, Indonesian National Army) was and is used to designate the three armed services alone, not including the police. It is often used in conjunction with service designators (e.g. TNI-AD, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Darat*: TNI Ground Forces i.e. the Army). Since 1998 the National Police have been separated from ABRI under reforms designed to heighten the independence of law-enforcement agencies from military control.

whether general principles can be identified in the political effects of insurgency and counter-insurgency.

Relevance

The practical relevance of this analysis lies in the fact that the lessons to be drawn from the Indonesian example may be applicable to other nations within the Asia-Pacific – notably Papua New Guinea (PNG) where the guerrilla war in Bougainville was marked by an increasing reluctance of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force to obey the commands of its nominal civilian masters (King, in Clements 1992, 86-87), culminating in the 1997 Sandline Affair in which the PNGDF took direct military action against the government in order to neutralise a mercenary group hired by the Prime Minister.

In a conceptual sense, the relevance of this analysis to an understanding of political power diffusion in low-intensity warfare is also apparent. By analysing the political effects of specific military operations, this dissertation provides explanatory tools for the effects of warfare on politics. The ability to predict the effects of warfare is likely to be limited, because of the large number and significant influence of situational factors – the context referred to on page 1. However, by understanding the context for Indonesia, this analysis provides a baseline for understanding contextual elements in future conflict environments. In the field of conflict studies, as in the field of counter-insurgency theory, there has not been a previous attempt to derive a model of political power-diffusion in low-intensity conflict. While, as will be seen, there is a clear need for further detailed analysis of this question, this study goes some way toward filling that conceptual gap.

Thesis

This dissertation, then, aims to answer the following question:

To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect?

To answer this question, the author developed the following propositions (the process of derivation is discussed below):

The command and control (C²) structures inherent in guerrilla warfare tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders.

The conduct of COIN or Internal Security Operations tends to increase the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local political leaders and at the expense of central leaders, whether political or military.

If both types of operations occur simultaneously or close together, then there will be a diffusion of power from the centre to the regions and from civilian to military leaders.

To test these propositions, the two longest and most intensive insurgencies in Indonesian history were analysed: the *Darul Islam* revolt in West Java and the campaign in East Timor. These examples were chosen because, while they

occurred in very different geographical, cultural, historical and political contexts, they shared some striking similarities on a military level. They also coincided with a growth in the political power of military leaders, as compared with that of civilian leaders and therefore appear to support the historical assumptions of the thesis.

The dissertation is structured into five chapters. Chapter Two presents the theoretical and historical context of the study and aims to show why the theses advanced above appear *prima facie* to be valid. Chapters Three and Four present the principal case studies and refine the thesis. Chapter Five summarises the conclusions from fieldwork and identifies the key contextual variables which demonstrate the central tenets of the thesis in the Indonesian example. It further refines these conclusions by comparison with a non-Indonesian instance of insurgency.

In summary, this dissertation analyses the political power-diffusion effects of military operations in Indonesia since 1945. Before analysing specific case studies, however, there is a requirement to demonstrate the theoretical and historical basis of the thesis. This is the task of the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

...war responds to a certain series of scientific laws. Guerrilla warfare as a phase of war must be ruled by all of these; but besides, because of its special aspects, a series of corollary laws must also be recognised...Though geographical and social conditions in each country determine the mode and particular forms that guerrilla warfare will take, there are general laws that hold for all fighting of this type.

Ernesto "Ché" Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 1961

Introduction

The previous chapter stated (on page 6) three theses on the effect of guerrilla warfare on political power diffusion. Before proceeding with the analysis it is necessary to show why, *prima facie*, they appear to be valid and therefore worth testing through fieldwork.

Aim

The aim of this chapter is to present the evidence in support of the initial thesis. It does so by reviewing in turn the theoretical and historical literature relevant to this question. However, it should be noted that the theses – and in particular the concept of a political power-diffusion effect of guerrilla operations – were originated by the present author on the basis of personal observation and a survey of the theoretical and historical literature. The concept itself does not appear in a developed form in any of this literature. However, the literature survey presented in this chapter serves to confirm it.

Counter-insurgency Theory

This section draws upon the theories of insurgency and counter-insurgency that have developed in such profusion since the 1950s, in order to examine the key assertions advanced in the thesis. These are (1) that the command and control (C²) structures inherent in guerrilla warfare tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders and (2) that the conduct of COIN or Internal Security Operations tends to increase the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local political leaders and at the expense of central leaders, whether political or military.

Definitions of Insurgency and Counter-insurgency

Before the analysis can proceed its terms must be defined. Milton Osborne, writing in 1970, notes the political bias inherent in many Western analyses of insurgency. He argues Western analysts have found it hard to accept that in some situations 'their own penchant for gradual and constitutional change may have little relevance for the people of the country in which a revolt or revolution takes place':

....At first glance and to those who are not committed to revolutionary change, the need to support established governments against armed challenge seems almost a self-evident proposition. The prospect of holding a different attitude conjures up visions of anarchy for most observers. Yet one is entitled to ask whether unswerving attachment to a principle of support for established governments is not in need of considerable qualification in the case of much of the Third World and not merely Southeast Asia ...Western observers whose own states provide them with a reasonable degree of governmental probity and economic satisfaction find remarkably little difficulty in arguing that the underprivileged and disadvantaged of Asia should work to obtain their goals through those orderly processes which have only been a part of the European world for an historically brief period (Osborne, 1970, 137-143).

This lack of objectivity is apparent throughout the theoretical literature. Ivan Galula, paraphrasing Clausewitz, defines insurgency as 'the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means'. Further, he describes it as a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step-by-step, to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order (1964, 3-4). Galula's definition is derivative and oriented toward Maoist-style protracted Revolutionary War⁸, but it highlights the philosophical difficulty in defining this type of conflict: the influence of political and ethical paradigms on the analyst's perception of conflict.

The Australian *Joint Services Glossary* defines insurgency as 'a condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government, which falls short of civil war' (ADFP101). This definition lacks utility because it is informed by a parliamentary-democratic paradigm where insurgency takes place against a *constituted* (implicitly legitimate) government, by an *insurrectionist* movement that is (by implied contrast) illegitimate. This paradigm is clearly vulnerable to subjective political interpretation.

For example, Dutch writers might argue that the Indonesian War of Independence was a subversive insurgency. While it is certainly true that its tactics were irregular guerrilla warfare, it is by no means clear that it was 'a revolt against a constituted government'. Indonesians would argue that the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) government forfeited legitimate sovereignty over the archipelago when it capitulated to the Japanese in 1942 and that because the Japanese administration conducted an orderly transfer of power to the Republic in 1945, the Republic and not the NEI government was the constituted government of Indonesia. Similarly, the definition of 'civil war' is open to dispute - how far must a conflict escalate before it becomes a civil war?

The British Army defines insurgency as 'The actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversive propaganda and military pressure aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change' (1996, A-2). Again, this definition is politically problematic: it assumes the existence of a functioning

⁸ Also known as 'Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare' and a quite distinct subset of the guerrilla operations analysed in this dissertation.

state against which the insurgency is directed and the terms 'forcing' and 'intimidate' imply a lack of political legitimacy for the insurgent movement.

The most satisfactory definition for the current study was proposed by the French military theorist Gabriel Bonnet in 1958. Arguing from a historical analysis of revolutionary warfare and from recent experience in Indochina, Bonnet asserted that 'la guerre révolutionnaire consiste de l'application des irrégulier méthodes de guerre à la propagation d'une idéologie ou système politique' (1958, quoted in Fall 1964, 373) – which may be paraphrased as 'insurgency is the use of irregular warfare to propagate an ideology or political system'. This definition avoids implicit value-judgements and the assumption of illegitimacy in the insurgent movement.

Similar difficulties arise in defining counter-insurgency. Ian Beckett defines it as 'the range of military, political and socio-economic measures adopted by security forces in response to the outbreak of revolutionary guerrilla warfare or insurgency' (Beckett 1988, 6). Likewise, the Australian Army *Fundamentals of Land Warfare* defines it as follows:

The term counter-insurgency is used to describe operations against a dissident faction that has the support or acquiescence of a substantial part of the population. This faction may have instigated the commission of widespread acts of civil disobedience, sabotage and terrorism, together with guerrilla warfare to overthrow the government (1993, 9).

The *Joint Services Glossary* defines counter-insurgency as 'those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions undertaken by a government to defeat a subversive insurgency'. The equivalent British publication is identical, except for the absence of the word 'subversive'.

All of these definitions imply – perhaps unconsciously – that insurgency is morally and politically reprehensible, whereas counter-insurgency is the morally justifiable response of a legitimate government to the threat of subversion. Moreover, these definitions derive from the definition of insurgency – as can be seen, each definition of counter-insurgency is essentially 'whatever is done to oppose insurgency' – thus begging the original question 'What is insurgency?'

By contrast, Keegan and Holmes (1985) prefer to replace this oppositional paradigm with the single entity of 'irregular warfare', in which insurgency and its countermeasures are two sides of one coin:

There are two distinct aspects to irregular warfare. Firstly, it is the classic weapon used by populations against occupying armies or oppressive rulers and in this context it has been lent new importance by the writings and examples of such figures as Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevara and Carlos Marighela. Secondly, regular armies have produced their own specialists in irregular warfare, for use against either a guerrilla opponent or a conventional enemy (Keegan and Holmes 1985, 241).

This definition appears to offer a way out of the difficulty. Combined with Bonnet's definition it provides an alternative paradigm, namely that insurgency is the use of irregular warfare to propagate an ideology, while counter-insurgency is the use of irregular warfare to *prevent* its propagation. However, this is only a partial definition. It focuses on one aspect of COIN (the employment of counter-guerrillas and irregular indigenous troops under the control of cadres or special forces) and ignores the range of psychological, political, civic and military actions which may be taken apart from such measures.

All of this shows that both the terms 'insurgency' and 'counter-insurgency' are imprecise and often influenced by considerations of political legitimacy. Nevertheless, they have such wide currency in military and political analysis that it would be unnecessarily confusing to discard them entirely. Rather, the terms will be used in this study to indicate the range of actions taken to oppose an insurgent movement, rather than to imply a greater or lesser degree of political legitimacy on each side of the conflict. Following military practice, the abbreviation 'COIN' will be used for 'counter-insurgency'.

Guerrilla Operations

This analysis is concerned with the political effect of a particular form of warfare – guerrilla operations – rather than the political underpinnings of insurgency theory *per se*.

This is immediately clear if one considers that not all insurgencies are guerrilla campaigns⁹. The Communist insurrection in Greece after the Second World War, Franco's intervention at the start of the Spanish Civil War and the Russian Revolution are obvious examples of insurgents adopting conventional military organisations and tactics to overthrow an existing regime. Moreover, not all guerrilla campaigns are insurgencies – Lawrence's experience of partisan warfare in Palestine is examined below (on page 15) and there is a long tradition of guerrilla operations in support of regular forces. Apart from the well-known Soviet and Yugoslav examples of the Second World War, the German campaign under Paul von Lettow Vorbeck in East Africa is a classic instance of guerrilla warfare in support of non-revolutionary objectives (Beckett 1988, 62). Similarly, the Chindits in Burma – while strictly long-range penetration rather than guerrilla forces – relied on the supporting guerrilla campaign by Kachin and Karen tribespeople operating against the flanks and rear of the Japanese and themselves supported the activities of regular forces in the Imphal-Kohima battles (Masters 1961, 154; O'Brien 1987, 114-5).

Again, there are many definitions of guerrilla warfare. The most concise is that adopted by the British Army in 1996: 'military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly

⁹ Although the term *guerrilla*, Spanish for 'small war', is of comparatively recent date (having been applied to the insurgent and partisan operations against Napoleon's army in the Peninsular War), the phenomenon of guerrilla warfare – as amply demonstrated in the literature – is as old as warfare itself.

indigenous forces' (1996, A-3). This definition incorporates the *military* elements of guerrilla operations, while not injecting a political dimension into their conduct. Thus this definition is most appropriate for the present study, because it is concerned with guerrilla operational techniques and the political effects that flow from them, rather than with specific political war aims.

The main concern of this analysis, then, is not political legitimacy and revolt, but rather the political effects that flow from the application of guerrilla operational techniques. Whether a particular campaign was an 'insurgency' is immaterial – what matters is that operational techniques were applied which (as will be argued) had certain effects on the political and military development of the state. These operational techniques can be characterised as essentially irregular, applied by small, lightly-equipped forces relying on the support of the civilian population, against a numerous, well-armed professional enemy lacking significant popular support. Tactics include infiltration, ambush, raid, sabotage and assassination; aims are limited and political, designed to pressure an opponent in the international or domestic political arena.

In summary, it is difficult to define insurgency or counter-insurgency in terms that are neutral with regard to political legitimacy. However, based on the definitions surveyed, the following may be proposed:

Insurgency is the use of irregular warfare to propagate an ideology or political system.

Counter-insurgency is the application of political, economic, social and military measures to oppose the military propagation of an ideology or political system.

Guerrilla operations are military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

In this study, the term 'guerrilla operations' will be used to indicate that the guerrilla nature of the operations conducted – rather than their insurgent characteristics – invokes the peculiar C^2 systems that tend toward decentralisation and diffusion of political power. The term counter-insurgency


(COIN) will be retained, on the understanding that it refers to operational techniques of internal security rather than to issues of political legitimacy.¹⁰

Having defined the essential terms, it is necessary now to show how the theses can be operationalised in order to explain particular phenomena.

Theories of Guerrilla Organisation

Studies of guerrilla movements show that their power structures are regionalised, diffuse and based on multiple centres of roughly equal authority.

Figure 2. 1
Power Structure Stereotypes



O'Neill (1990) identifies three principal power configurations: *hierarchical*, where authority is clearly delineated from top to bottom; *pyramidal*, where there are multiple centres of roughly equal power, possibly with an acknowledged

¹⁰ Given the adoption of the term 'Guerrilla Operations' in preference to 'insurgency', it may seem appropriate to replace the notion of counter-insurgency with that of 'counter-guerrilla operations'. It is certainly true that COIN exists only because of the need to suppress an existing insurgency and therefore, to a greater or lesser extent, it 'mirrors' the guerrilla insurgent. However, the term 'counter-guerrilla' has a specific military-political meaning which would be misleading in this instance. It refers to the sub-set of COIN whereby indigenous forces are used by the security forces to operate as guerrillas within the insurgents' base areas. Examples are the Rhodesian use of 'pseudo-gangs' in the 1970s, the *Groupements Commandos Mixte Aeroportés* of the Indochina War, the *contras* of Nicaragua and the *harka* and *maghzen* employed by the French in Algeria. For the purposes of this study, however, all of the social, psychological, political, economic and military means of countering guerrilla insurgency are to be analysed and therefore the notion of counter-guerrilla operations – while forming part of the analysis – is too limiting to be applied generically.

overall leader; and *segmentary*, where the structure is 'marked by a diffusion of power to local groups that act autonomously' (O'Neill 1990 61). These are illustrated in Figure 2.1. Although O'Neill's definition of power is problematic, his classification is useful for this study.¹¹

Although no previous analyst has stated the proposition in precisely these terms, it is clear from the literature that most theorists of insurgency have identified the same phenomenon posited in this study – namely, that the control of central leaders over regional commanders is less effective in a guerrilla environment than in conventional warfare. One of the earliest expressions of this in 20th century writing is Lenin's article *Partisanskaya Voina* (Partisan Warfare) of 1906:

It is said that guerrilla acts disorganise our work...It is not guerrilla actions which disorganise the movement, but rather the weakness of a party which is incapable of taking such actions *under its control*. Our complaints against guerrilla warfare are complaints against our Party weakness in the matter of an uprising. What we have said of disorganisation also applies to demoralisation. It is not guerrilla warfare which demoralises, but *unorganised*, irregular, non-party guerrilla acts. ...We fully admit criticism of diverse forms of civil war from the standpoint of *military expediency* and absolutely agree that in *this* question it is the Social-Democratic practical workers in each particular locality who must have the final say (Lenin 1965, 219-220, Lenin's italics).

Lenin argues that, unless controlled by a central political organisation, guerrilla warfare is characterised by decentralisation, demoralisation and disorganisation; however this results from the political structure of the party (a contextual variable) rather than the nature of conflict itself. Consequently he emphasises the requirement to bring guerrilla activity firmly under Party control: 'our organisations must be trained, must be reconstructed in conformity with the lessons of experience to be equal to this task'(Lenin 1965, 223). While not exhaustive, the following examples demonstrate that decentralised command and control systems are highly typical of guerrilla warfare.

The guerrilla phase of the Boer War illustrates the diffusion of power inherent in the conduct of guerrilla operations. In the first, conventional phase of the war an effective central government authority, based in Pretoria, raised and dispatched a conventional military force – complete with artillery, transport, commissariat and combat arms – to conduct delaying operations against the British advance. Despite early successes, this phase of the war led eventually to a British victory, the capture of Pretoria and the exile of the Boer government into Portuguese territory. The second, guerrilla phase of the war saw a rapid

¹¹ O'Neill is borrowing concepts from political anthropology, in particular from the Manchester School studies in British Central Africa by Gluckman and others in the 1940s and 1950s and from the intensive fieldwork by Balandier, Evans-Pritchard, Fortes and Beattie in the *maghreb* in the 1950s (Balandier 1970, 11). These concepts are of great utility for the study of patterns of political authority and traditional political systems within modernising societies and will be referred to as appropriate later in the argument.

disintegration of control by the Boer governments, with independent and uncoordinated commandos conducting guerrilla operations throughout British and Boer territory alike. It could be argued that the cause of disintegration was defeat and the capture of the Boer capital and hence the decapitation of the hierarchical command structure, rather than any inherent tendency toward decentralisation in guerrilla operations. But this is not borne out by eyewitness accounts, of which the most important (that of Deneys Reitz) indicates that the decision to abandon conventional operations and adopt guerrilla tactics was consciously taken by the Transvaal and Free State governments *while they still retained effective control* over their forces. On the government's escape to Delagoa Bay, attempts were made to maintain control over the commando columns, but these were not effective. The Boer structure in the guerrilla phase was pyramidal, with commandos under Smuts and De Regt operating as roughly co-equal centres of power, independent of control by the Boer government-in-exile. Numerous smaller groups also operated completely independently, in a segmentary political structure based on family, religious and local administrative allegiances (Reitz 1994; Pimlott 1988, 19).

T.E. Lawrence, analysing the Arab Revolt during the First World War, noted the pyramidal structure of the Arab Army. Allegiance was given by the rank-and-file primarily to tribal leaders and only loosely by tribal leaders to the traditional/religious leadership of Feisal of Mecca (Lawrence 1935, 46). Indeed, allegiance to the ideal of a united pan-Arab nation was almost non-existent.

... they being irregulars were not units, but individuals...the process was to set up ladders of tribes, which should provide a safe and comfortable route from the sea bases to the advanced bases of operations....It was impossible to mix or combine tribes, since they disliked or distrusted one another. Likewise the men of one tribe could not be used in the territory of another. In consequence, another canon of orthodox strategy was broken by following the principle of the widest possible distribution of force....Consequently the Arab army had no discipline, in the sense in which it is restrictive, submergent of individuality, the lowest common denominator of men....there were no lines of communication or labor troops....Here the ideal was to make the ranks a happy alliance of commanders in chief (Lawrence, in Laqueur 1971, 131-137).

Lawrence's experience was in fact that of partisan warfare¹², rather than revolutionary insurgency. The term 'partisan warfare' describes the operations of an irregular guerrilla force in concert with a regular army, where the partisan force attacks the flanks and rear of the enemy to support conventional operations by the regular force. Such partisan operations are one of the most traditional and orthodox methods of warfare and have been common since at least the early 1800s. They are distinguished from revolutionary insurgency by the presence of a regular army and the integration of the irregular force into its overall plan of action. The Arab Army, operating to secure the Eastern flank of

¹² See Clausewitz (1976, 483) for a discussion of the orthodox distinction between partisan and insurgent operations. See also Keegan and Holmes (1985, 241-248) on the cooperation between regular and partisan forces in Spain, Russia and Yugoslavia and Orlov (1964, 164-183) for a discussion of partisan operations in Russia and Spain.

Allenby's coastal thrust through Palestine, was a classic example of such partisan warfare at the operational level of war¹³. Further, it should be noted that despite military successes, the Arab Revolt failed to attain its political objectives and that the Arab peoples remained politically fragmented along localised, regional and tribal lines (Pablo 1958, 3). This again indicates the tendency toward localised fragmentation of political power which appears to be a constant in guerrilla operations. Indeed, despite enormous differences in terrain, population density and historical background, the Arab insurgent campaign – like the guerrilla phase of the Boer war – was typified by decentralisation and localised C².

Conversely, the Irish Republican Army in the 1920s exhibited an initially segmentary structure, with autonomous Brigades operating in different regions, following their own methods without effective central control. As the campaign progressed, the IRA became pyramidal in structure. The organisation developed from the grass-roots upward, with flying columns coalescing into Brigades and finally – late in the campaign – into the First Southern Division of the IRA (Barry 1981, 154; 175). While this may appear to have been a hierarchical structure, it actually remained pyramidal, with Brigade and Column commanders in each region acting on their own initiative in support of their own local power base. The IRA General Headquarters in Dublin, while nominally controlling the IRA as a whole, in fact functioned as a specialised urban insurgent wing focussing on political agitation, propaganda, espionage and urban terrorism (Barry 1981, 105; Younger 1979, 17). The civil war that followed the signing of the London peace treaty in 1921 reflected the rift between central and regional leaders of the nationalist movement and the inability of the central political leadership to control regional military leaders. Indeed, its immediate cause was the refusal of regional military forces under De Valera to accept the peace treaty negotiated by the central political leadership (O'Connor 1975, 196). By contrast, the modern republican movement in Northern Ireland exhibits a segmentary structure, with a great diffusion of political power to independent and mutually antagonistic groups such as the Official IRA, PIRA, Real IRA, INLA and numerous smaller splinter groupings. The Loyalist paramilitaries are even more strongly segmentary, with a profusion of politically and militarily independent groups. These sometimes work against each other's interests, as occurred in August 1996 and July 2000

¹³ The levels of warfare recognised in traditional western military thinking are the strategic level (the overall direction of wars in support of national objectives) the operational level (the conduct of campaigns to support strategic objectives) and the tactical level (the fighting of battles to achieve operational objectives). Modern military thinking further sub-divides these into numerous categories such as grand and minor tactics, military-strategic and national-strategic levels and so on. It further recognises that actions at one level of war can have implications at other levels – particularly in counter-insurgency or revolutionary warfare. For example, a minor tactical action in an insurgency may have strategic implications as well as operational implications. Examples are the contact at Motaain in October 1999 which although a minor skirmish changed the operational ground-rules for the INTERFET campaign in East Timor and the battle of Ap Bac in 1963 which convinced the US that an advisor-led approach to the insurgency in Vietnam was unworkable. For a cogent discussion of the application of strategic considerations in guerrilla warfare, see Mao (May 1938).

(amongst numerous other occasions) with the outbreak of internecine killings between the extreme and moderate elements of the paramilitary movement.

Despite their relative cohesion compared to other insurgent movements, communist guerrillas – particularly in South-East Asia – have often resorted to decentralised, locally-controlled action. Richard Clutterbuck emphasises the decentralised nature of Maoist guerrilla warfare, while also noting the critical importance of the geographical characteristics of the theatre of operations:

The two strategies [Leninist urban revolution and Maoist protracted insurgency] are in fact the reverse of each other. In the urban strategy the revolutionaries seize the centres of government and industry and then the arteries of communication – railways and telecommunications – so that the government outposts, denied sustenance through root and branch, wither on the vine. In the rural strategy the revolutionaries work from the twigs down the branches until the trunk and roots die from lack of sustenance from the foliage. Either strategy can be successful, although the environment – the relative importance of town and country to the economy, the state of communications, the distances, the terrain, the attitude of the public and availability of secure bases – may give one strategy a better chance than the other (Clutterbuck 1977, 34).

Mao himself in his 1938 lectures *On Protracted War* repeatedly emphasised the requirement for broad central direction and unity of forces engaged in guerrilla war. At the same time, he understood the decentralised nature of tactical decision-making by local commanders within broad direction:

...regular forces can conduct guerrilla warfare when dispersed and mobile warfare when concentrated, as the Eighth Route Army has been doing...In favourable circumstances, we should employ the principle of concentration of forces and in unfavourable circumstances that of their dispersion. As for the relationship of command in campaigns, we should apply the principle of centralized command in the former and that of decentralized command in the latter. These are the basic principles of field operations for the War of Resistance Against Japan (Mao 1967, 173; 177).

In other words, Mao advocates dispersed guerrilla war using decentralised C² arrangements when faced with unfavourable conditions and concentrated mobile warfare using centralised C² arrangements when circumstances are favourable. Mao's analysis is explicitly limited to the Sino-Japanese War and is not a general theory of protracted war, despite the attempts of later Western (and Asian) thinkers to portray it as such¹⁴. However, the stage of his model that corresponds to insurgency is the second stage, the Strategic Stalemate, in which the enemy seeks to hold and maintain security within a given territory rather than to acquire more territory. In this stage, Mao argues, guerrilla warfare is primary at the tactical and operational level, although it will always remain secondary at the strategic level. Therefore, for Mao, the application of decentralised C² is axiomatic.

¹⁴ See for example, Lederer and Burdick (1959, 126-128), Cross (1989, 98-100) and Fall (1994, 373)

Mao's *Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla Warfare* (May 1938) is his most detailed exposition of this argument. In it, he addresses command relationships as one of the critical questions applicable to guerrilla warfare:

...Since guerrilla units are a lower level of armed organization characterized by dispersed operations, the methods of command in guerrilla warfare do not allow as high a degree of centralization as in regular warfare. ...A highly centralized command is in direct contradiction to the great flexibility of guerrilla warfare and must not and cannot be applied to it. However, guerrilla warfare cannot be successfully developed without some centralized command. ...Hence, as opposed both to absolute centralization and to absolute decentralization, the principle of command in guerrilla war should be centralized strategic command and decentralized command in campaigns and battles. Centralized strategic command includes the planning and direction of guerrilla warfare as a whole by the state, the co-ordination of guerrilla warfare with regular warfare in each war zone and the unified direction of all the anti-Japanese armed forces in each guerrilla zone or base area. Centralization, however, stops at this point and it would likewise be harmful to go beyond it and interfere with the lower levels in matters of detail like the specific dispositions for a campaign or battle. For such details must be settled in the light of specific conditions, which change from time to time and from place to place and are quite beyond the knowledge of the distant higher levels of command. This is what is meant by the principle of decentralized command in campaigns and battles (Mao 1967, 107-110).

Thus Mao argues that decentralisation is an essential and valid method of guerrilla C² at the operational and tactical levels ('campaigns' and 'battles' respectively) but that there must be a framework of centralised political and strategic direction. Elsewhere in the same passage, Mao emphasises that decentralisation is essential at formation and unit level, but that within units discipline and professionalism must be continuously enhanced to allow the development of insurgent armies into regular forces.

This development of insurgent forces into regular forces is important to this dissertation and consequently it is valuable to consider Mao's thoughts on the issue of 'localism':

To transform guerrilla units waging guerrilla warfare into regular forces waging mobile warfare, two conditions are necessary -- an increase in numbers and an improvement in quality. Apart from directly mobilizing the people to join the forces, increased numbers can be attained by amalgamating small units... In amalgamating small units, we must, on the one hand, guard against localism, whereby attention is concentrated exclusively on local interests and centralization is impeded and, on the other, guard against the purely military approach, whereby local interests are brushed aside. Localism exists among *the local guerrilla units and local governments, which are frequently preoccupied with local considerations to the neglect of the general interest, or which prefer to act each on its own because they are unaccustomed to acting in larger groups*. The commanders of the main guerrilla units or of the guerrilla formations must take this into account and adopt the method of *gradual amalgamation of part of the local units*, allowing the localities to keep some of their forces and expand their guerrilla warfare; the commanders should draw these units into joint operations and then bring about their amalgamation without breaking up their original organization or reshuffling their cadres, so that the small groups may integrate smoothly into the larger group. ...As against localism, the purely military approach represents the wrong viewpoint held in the main forces by those who are

bent on expanding their own strength and who neglect to assist the local armed units. They do not realize that the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare means not the abandonment of guerrilla warfare, but the gradual formation, in the midst of widespread guerrilla warfare, of a main force capable of conducting mobile warfare, a force around which there must still be numerous guerrilla units carrying on extensive guerrilla operations. These guerrilla units are powerful auxiliaries to the main force and serve as inexhaustible reserves for its continuous growth (Mao 1967, 107-108, italics added).

This often-observed structure of communist insurgent movements – that of main, regional and local force units, each responsive to a different level of the political organisation but working in concert within a broad strategic framework – can thus be seen as a method of managing the centrifugal political forces unleashed by local, decentralised, dispersed guerrilla operations¹⁵. However such a policy relies on unity within the guerrilla movement at all levels, based on a common ideology, something conspicuously lacking in many guerrilla movements.

Lenin's negative view of the 'disorganisation' inherent in decentralisation, quoted earlier, highlights the antagonism with which Soviet military-political theorists regarded spontaneous insurgent action. The key Bolshevik military thinker of the revolutionary period was Leon Trotsky. Trotsky identified the same issue of decentralisation and localisation as Mao. However, where Mao's solution is to assuage the desire of local leaders to retain forces for their own use, by gradually amalgamating *part* of their forces into regional units and then into main force units, leaving them with local forces to employ at their own disposal, Trotsky's solution is characteristically draconian. Unlike Mao, Trotsky does not explicitly state his theory of guerrilla C². The closest approach to such a general statement is his article 'Guerrilla-ism and the Regular Army' of July 1919:

While war, generally speaking, has as its aim the overthrow of the enemy, *small-scale war* ('guerrilla') has the task of causing difficulties to the enemy and doing him damage. From the angle of the organising of operations, small-scale war is characterised by a large degree of independence of the separate units. Semi-spontaneous insurgent actions such as we have seen in the Ukraine always include a guerrilla element. But guerrilla-ism by no means always signifies the action of spontaneously- arisen unarmed or poorly armed detachments. Guerrilla warfare can be a method of operation for thoroughly well-formed mobile units which, for all the autonomy they enjoy, are strictly subordinate to an operational headquarters...I repeat, one must not confuse a rebellion that lacks military experience with guerrilla warfare as such. In the one case we have groups that rebel in a semi-spontaneous way, quite chaotic, organised and armed somehow or other and aiming their blows gropingly. In the other case we have properly-organised units, everything well-thought-out down to the last detail...(Trotsky, July 1919).

Trotsky deliberately uses the pejorative term 'guerrilla warfare' to distinguish popular insurgency – which Soviet thinking accepted as a necessary evil only – from partisan warfare (*partisanskaya voina*) in which decentralised irregular

¹⁵ For a discussion of the Vietnamese version of this structure and its tactical employment in the field, see Hoang (1992), McNeill (1984) and Petersen (1988).

detachments operated under centralised party control. The same problem identified by Mao – the development and regularisation of insurgent groups into a professional army – is also considered by Trotsky:

Our Red Army arose from Red Guard detachments and rebel peasant detachments, which only later were brought together for more or less thorough formation in the rear. The Red Guard and peasant detachments were able to achieve successes only in the period of the first stormy revolutionary upsurge of the working masses, when general confusion and dismay reigned among the almost unarmed possessing classes. Unified operational leadership could be given to the Red Guard and rebel detachments only to an extremely limited degree...In that period the command could not itself set independent operational tasks and was, in the main, not free to choose the direction of its blows: it could only unify to a certain extent the pressure exerted by the detachments (Trotsky, July 1919).

Trotsky's proclamations, as Chairman of the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, indicate clearly that he (and his colleagues at the central level of Soviet political leadership) regarded this as a necessary and temporary evil and not as a sound basis for operations:

A regime of *strict, unwavering discipline* must be established in the army. In some units of the Third Army there are still surviving the habits of guerrilla-ism and atamanism, the practice of discussing combat orders and on various pretexts failing to carry them out. Direct responsibility must be imposed on commissars and commanders for the fulfilment of combat orders (Order No. 90, 23 Apr 1919).

The term *ataman*-ism relates to the activities of traditional, local popular leaders in inciting and leading insurgency within their own areas and was regarded with such antagonism by the Soviet authorities that the entire 1919 Red Army campaign against Denikin in the Ukraine was halted until the local forces (termed 'bandits' by the Soviet leadership) could be absorbed or annihilated – even though these very forces were themselves also fighting Denikin:

...the Soviet power has made it its principal task of the present moment to cleanse the Ukrainian land of all rebel atamans and bandits. Power in the Ukraine must belong only to the united Ukrainian peasantry and working class. Their will is expressed through the All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets and the All Ukraine Central Executive Committee. There can be only one armed force in the Ukraine—the Red Army, created by the will of the working masses of the Ukraine. There is no room for any bands, any guerrilla detachments, any atamans, *bathos*, bandits and thugs. ...In the first period of Soviet power, a lot of bands flourished in Great Russia. They were all annihilated long ago: their guiltiest members were shot and the rest are expiating their crimes in places of detention. The same fate awaits the bandits of the Ukraine. Firm, reliable units have been sent to all parts of the Ukraine, with the task of finding and collecting arms, catching deserters and exterminating bands (Trotsky, April 1919).

Like Mao, Trotsky recognises the problem of 'localism'. Unlike Mao's solution of tiered control and gradual assimilation, the Soviet approach was to insist on firm centralised direction:

The detachments of the revolutionary committees are too much infected with 'local' spirit. 'Local' limitedness is expressed above all in the fact that the commanders of these detachments do not try sufficiently hard to establish communications to their left and right and behind them and have an extremely negligent attitude regarding their duty to report. This makes it extremely difficult to unify the forces and their leaderships. The commander of every detachment... must look on his detachment not from the standpoint of defending his junction or his settlement but from that of the common task... Each detachment is merely a link in a common chain. Therefore, first and foremost—liaison and proper, precise reporting. Attachment to the locality also finds expression in lack of the required initiative. An uyezd detachment waits patiently for the White cavalry to descend upon its uyezd, so as to repulse it on the spot. This will not do at all (Trotsky, September 1919 – Trotsky's italics).

Alexander Orlov, one of the chiefs of Soviet Intelligence in the 1920s and 1930s, in his handbook on intelligence and guerrilla warfare displays the same attitude – that decentralisation is a necessary evil only and that strict discipline and party control are essential¹⁶. His account of guerrilla operations in the Spanish Civil War also reflects the emphasis Russian theorists have traditionally placed on the coordination of guerrilla actions with those of the regular armed forces (Orlov 1964, 165-183).

From the foregoing examples it is clear that guerrilla warfare does have a general tendency toward decentralisation and disorganisation, despite being heavily influenced by the context of each individual campaign. As has been shown, many twentieth-century guerrilla movements were decentralised, loose structures in which central leaderships – political or military – were unable to control the actions of regional commanders. Some guerrilla campaigns (such as the Boer War, the Malayan Emergency and the Arab Revolt) saw increasing decentralisation, while others (such as the campaigns in Ireland, Viet Nam and China) saw increasing centralisation, regularisation and professionalisation from an initially segmentary or decentralised base. The reasons for these different tendencies over time will be analysed later in this study; in the meantime, the examples demonstrate that by comparison to other forms of military/political organisation, a guerrilla movement is decentralised and loosely-controlled and that it exhibits a tendency to the diffusion of control from central to local leaders.

Counter-Insurgency

Conversely, studies of COIN techniques indicate that an essential element of successful COIN is effective political control over the local population. This

¹⁶ This preference for centralised party control over all aspects of military endeavour reflects, to an extent, the principles of communist party organisation itself – echoing Lenin's argument (page 14). The principle of 'democratic centralisation' which was adopted at the Third International in 1921 and influenced communist organisational thinking at least until the late 1970s, forms the basis for this party organisation. Although it accepts the necessity for decentralised execution, it emphasises centralised leadership, control and direction of all aspects of party activity. See Comintern (1975) *Thesis on the Organization and Structure of the Communist Parties*, adopted at the 3rd Congress of the Communist International in 1921, Mass Publications, Calcutta.

control tends to be exercised by regional commanders rather than a central authority.

For example, as early as 1896 Calwell identified 'control of the populace' as an essential prerequisite for success in 'small wars', as such operations were then known. He further identified that the use of local populations to provide security for key installations and areas was politically effective and tactically economical (Calwell 1896, 275). In the 1930's, the US Marine Corps – based on extensive experience of COIN operations in the Philippines, Latin America and the Caribbean – published the most thorough and well-analysed doctrine of counter-insurgency then extant and stated that:

The difficulty of immediate control and personal influence is even more pronounced and important in small wars, *on account of the decentralised nature of these operations*. This fact is further emphasised because in small wars we are dealing not only with our own forces but also with the civilian population...the military force of the government is generally small, ill-equipped and poorly trained; not infrequently *a part, if not all of it, proves to be disloyal in a political crisis*....As little local responsibility as possible to accomplish the mission should be assumed [by the USMC] while the local government is encouraged to carry its full capacity of responsibility. *Any other procedure weakens the sovereign state, complicating the relationship with the military forces* and prolonging the occupation (USMC 1940, 17-28, emphasis added).

From these early indications of the tendency to decentralised military control over the local population in COIN, theorists of the 1950s and 1960s developed considerably more sophisticated views on the issue. Clutterbuck (1977) argues that the principal difference between the successful British strategy in Malaya and the unsuccessful US strategy in Vietnam was the control and protection of the local population. The British established a network of local police posts covering every village and focussed their efforts on defeating the local communist political and logistic elements. In contrast, the US in Vietnam focussed on direct confrontation with the insurgent main force and North Vietnamese regular forces:

The government won the war in Malaya in the 1950s firstly because they provided adequate protection for the people in the form of a police post in every village; secondly because this gave that element of the population which did not want a communist victory, or was apathetic and wished to be rid of the war, sufficient confidence to be prepared to give information. By concentrating on the supply organisation, the Special Branch provided a means of harnessing this intelligence and the army used it to eliminate the guerrillas at their point of conflict with the people. [Conversely] at no time in South Vietnam was there a system of police posts in every village as had been established in Malaya. This meant that government officials and their families were completely unprotected at night from the cadres and from the embryonic guerrilla units themselves, which were able to live quite freely in the villages (1977, 42-44).

Clutterbuck, like many British theorists, is perhaps rather unjustifiably smug about the British success in Malaya in contrast to the US failure in Vietnam. The Malaya campaign is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. However, it is clear that

Clutterbuck recognises the importance of population control measures in COIN and their conduct by local security forces rather than at the direction of centralised political leaders.

On a similar note, the US Air Force theorist John Pustay, writing in the 1960s, gives particular emphasis to the need for control over the populace.¹⁷

...reforms at local levels can bring more people directly into the political activities relevant to the pursuit of counter-insurgency warfare....emphasis should be placed upon incorporating them into militia and paramilitary defense units... It will be remembered that the villages in the outlying areas usually contain the bulk of the population. These...operations should seek to strengthen the government's control over loyal villages. More importantly, they must seek to challenge the partial control which the insurgents hold over villages in the twilight zone that exists at some distance from the government's strategic centres (Pustay 1965, 84-96).

Pustay describes a village-based system, in which control over the population by local military leaders is cemented through joint military-civil administrative bodies at every level. Pustay's paradigm is a Western one, in which the armed forces are a professional hierarchical body working to the directives of an authoritative central government. However, it is clear that effective control over the population – as envisaged in his theory of COIN – is exercised primarily by local military commanders, rather than by central authority.

Susan Carruthers, whose analysis focuses on propaganda and media perception in COIN, shows that local military commanders effectively control the local media:

...a pattern is discernible from the examples of Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus: what had been an inadequate information office at the outset was overhauled (with varying speed) in tandem with the appointment of a tougher Governor or High Commissioner. Even where this 'supremo' was not himself a military man, the military were simultaneously given a higher profile in the counter-insurgency and thus had greater powers over the release of news and more contact with the media (Carruthers, 1995, 266).

Alf Heggoy's analysis of the French campaign in Algeria shows a similar pattern, in which the military adopted many functions of civil government to control the populace, including 'the SAS system, under which soldiers were assigned to fulfil administrative duties that would normally have been performed by civilians' (Heggoy 1972, 263). Further, this control over the local population was administered by local/regional military leaders, not by the central French government. As the campaign lengthened and public opinion in France began to falter, a rift developed between central and local leaderships, both political and military. This led to an attempted seizure of power by

¹⁷ Of the American armed services, the US Air Force was the most advanced in its thinking on COIN operations throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. This was partly through the influence of Project Rand on Air Force analysis and also through the personal involvement of senior Air Force personnel in COIN campaigns in the Philippines and Indochina in the early 1950s.

elements of the French forces in the regions – and subsequent suppression by the central government (Heggoy 1972, 263).

Colonialism and Levels of Analysis

It is appropriate now to consider the impact of colonialism on power diffusion during guerrilla operations. After all, the campaigns in Malaya and Algeria occurred in colonial environments where there was not only a centre-periphery relationship between regional commanders and central leadership within the colonial government, but also between the colonial government itself and the metropolitan central government. Thus, for example, in Malaya political power became centralised in the hands of a military supremo in Kuala Lumpur. Depending on the level of analysis applied, this may be seen as a centralisation of power within Malaya, or a diffusion of power away from the central (London) political leaders to a regional military leader.

Similarly, the phenomenon of local military control over the local population may be seen as simply a characteristic of colonialism, in particular the colonial regimes conducting COIN after the Second World War (Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Indonesia, Indochina and the Philippines, for example) or as a survival of colonial administration into the methods of newly-independent states. For example, the *kiap* or patrol officer system, in which Australian colonial officers administered large remote regions in New Guinea through decentralised, mobile administrative tours independent of central control, could be seen as such a system – particularly when, during the Second World War, it was modified into the ANGAU organisation and used to enforce military and internal security control over the populace.

This factor is particularly complex, as it is strongly context-specific and it will be examined more fully in Chapter 5. At this point it is sufficient to note that analysis at the nation-state level may sometimes yield a different result from analysis at the level of a colonial-metropolitan relationship. Indeed, as is argued in Chapter 5, the interaction of external variables has a critical influence on power diffusion, so that generalisation from specific examples may depend upon roughly similar conditions at each level of analysis, not merely at the nation-state or sub-national levels¹⁸.

Historical Background

Harold Crouch argues that the Indonesian Army began to take control of the nation in the late 1950's:

¹⁸ The levels of analysis in international politics are generally agreed to be systemic (relating to global political events and the international system), regional (relating to the political systems of regions such as Western Europe or Southeast Asia) and nation-state (relating to the political analysis of individual countries). In this analysis the author also uses the term sub-nation-state, relating to the political analysis of elements within a state. This is also sometimes called the 'intra-state' level of analysis. Also, with reference to colonial systems, the colonial level of analysis is sometimes applied. It is preferable to deal specifically with the metropolitan-colonial relationship, as it can have simultaneous effects at several levels of analysis. In this sense it is a form of centre-periphery relationship as described by Myrdal (1963).

The Indonesian Army had acquired a political orientation and political interests at the time of the revolution against the Dutch. Later, after the introduction of martial law in 1957, the Army and the other branches of the armed forces became deeply involved in politics, civil administration and economic management..(Crouch 1978, 23).

Crouch is not alone in this assessment. Yong Mun Cheong, Donald K. Emmerson and Soedjati Djiwandono all accept the concept that the Army's rise to power occurred in three phases: a period of growing economic power but little political power in the 1950's, a more influential political role from 1957 to 1965 and direct control after 1965 (Emmerson, 1992). A 1960 study by Guy Pauker for the Rand Corporation stated that

Halfway through its first decade of Independence Indonesia seemed to be heading toward democracy...Today the situation is far otherwise...The part the military plays in public life has increased considerably since 1955 and particularly since the declaration of martial law in 1957 (Pauker 1960, iii-iv).

Even granted that what Pauker means by 'democracy' is American-style representative government, he clearly does not perceive the Indonesian Army as possessing significant control over the population before about the mid-1950s. As will be seen, however, a review of the historical literature indicates that such influence began to develop much earlier.

A more sophisticated view is that of David Jenkins, who argued (1984) that the rise of the army to political power in the 1950s and 1960s occurred in four phases. First, during the revolutionary period (1945-49) the army developed a shared perception of itself, to the effect that

[TNI] was created by the Indonesian people, not by civilian political leaders. The notion that the army emerged from the people, that it fought for independence alongside the populace (even when the civilian political leaders had "surrendered") and that it had participated extensively in nominally "civilian" matters during that time was to give birth to the idea that the armed forces were justified in playing an extensive role in nonmilitary affairs (Jenkins 1984, 1).

In Jenkins' second phase, which corresponded with the period of Parliamentary Democracy (1949-57), consolidation and integration occurred within ABRI, in which Nasution and the other ex-KNIL officers now forming the core leadership of TNI sought to modernise, down-size and professionalise the Armed Forces. In Jenkins' view, this second phase saw no major additional inroads by the military into the process of government, although the army (sometimes through internecine conflict as in the 17 October Affair of 1952) achieved a somewhat greater degree of integration.

In the third phase,

...with the outbreak of the regional rebellions and the declaration of martial law (events which coincided with and marked the death knell of liberal-style parliamentary democracy), military leaders acquired enormous powers in the non-

military sector, powers they were not at all loath to use in their quest both to "improve" the working of the system and further their own political and economic interests. In these two years [1957-59], military leaders abandoned any willingness to accept civilian ideas of the army being an apolitical instrument of the state and took their place alongside President Sukarno as one of the two main pillars of the government, with their *bête noire*, the electorally popular Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) just outside the government. This dramatic enhancement of the army's influence in society was legitimised first by martial law and then by General Nasution's doctrines of the dual function (*dwi-fungsi*) (1984, 2).

In the fourth phase, 1959-65, the Army 'extended and defended' its position of political influence, but was increasingly influenced by Sukarnoist ideology and pressured by the PKI. Simultaneously, it was involved in insurgency and COIN across the archipelago. This phase culminated in the coup attempt of 1965, which provided a pretext for the total liquidation of the PKI by the Army and its seizure by 1966 of uncontested political control over Indonesia.

Jenkins' analysis shows a pattern in the chronology of ABRI's rise to power. Jenkins does not himself identify this pattern (it is outside the intent of his analysis). However, his data indicate that the development of military influence in Indonesian politics was not smooth and continuous, but rather occurred in a series of 'surges' of rapid development interspersed with periods of stabilisation and consolidation. As Table 2.1 indicates, these surges coincided with major insurgency and COIN operations by TNI, while periods of consolidation corresponded with a relative absence of either insurgent or counterinsurgent operations.

Table 2.1
Periods of Surge and Consolidation
in TNI Influence over Indonesian Politics

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Characteristics Of TNI Political Power</u>	<u>System of Govt</u>	<u>Insurgencies</u>	<u>Counter-Insurgencies</u>
1945-50	Rapid Development	Presidential, then parliamentary, then military rule after capture of political leaders	1945-6 against British 1947/1948 against Dutch 1949 against Dutch	1948 against PKI 1948-50 against DI/TII 1950 against APRA and BFO remnants
1950-1957	Consolidation	Parliamentary multi-party democracy	Limited uncoordinated ops against Dutch in Irian by non-TNI groups. No significant insurgency in progress.	Limited uncoordinated ops against DI/TII, hampered by interference of Masyumi. No significant success against DI/TII.
1957-63	Rapid Development	Martial Law, then single-party Guided Democracy and direct Presidential rule	Co-ordinated insurgency against Dutch in Irian – major national campaign co-ordinated by regional HQ (Suharto) in Maluku. Sponsorship of TNKU revolt in Brunei.	Co-ordinated ops against PRRI/Permesta, DI/TII in West Java and Sulawesi.
1963-June 1964	Consolidation	Presidential rule	Increasing domestic political competition with PKI - no major insurgent ops.	Limited internal security ops in Sumatra and Kalimantan – no major COIN ops.
June 1964 – Jan 1966	Rapid Development	Increasingly unstable presidential rule, then coup and military suppression, then military-presidential rule.	Insurgency against British/Malaysians in Borneo, Singapore and Malaya, conducted by regional HQ in Sumatra.	COIN against British infiltrators in Sumatra and Kalimantan, PGRS/Paraku elements in Borneo, PKI throughout archipelago.

This correlation between major COIN/insurgency campaigns and rapid development in ABRI's political influence begs the question as to whether a causal relationship exists between the two. As shown (see page 14 *et seq.*), insurgency tends toward decentralisation and localisation, while COIN leads to control of the civil populace by local military leaders independent of central (civilian) political direction. Therefore, theoretical and historical data support the view that, where COIN and insurgency are conducted at the same time or close to each other, political power will flow from central to regional and from civilian to military leaders.

Is this the case in Indonesia? This question can only be answered by detailed analysis of Indonesian examples. This is the task of the next two chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN WEST JAVA

Whatever social scientists might desire, there are some social phenomena whose impact is immediate and profound, even decisive, but whose significance cannot be assessed until well after their occurrence; and one of these is surely the eruption of great domestic violence.

Clifford Geertz, *The Politics of Meaning*, 1972

INTRODUCTION

This is the first of two case studies examining guerrilla operations in Indonesia since 1945. This case study analyses the effects of guerrilla operations – both insurgency and counter-insurgency – in West Java. It applies the thesis as articulated in the last chapter to a specific historical and political situation. As explained above (at page 6) the problem examined in this dissertation is:

To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does guerrilla warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect?

The three propositions to be tested in the study are:

The command and control (C²) structures inherent in guerrilla warfare tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders.

The conduct of COIN or Internal Security Operations tends to increase the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local political leaders and at the expense of central leaders, whether political or military.

If both types of operations occur simultaneously or close together, then there will be a drain of power from the centre to the regions and from civilian to military leaders.

Aim

The aim of this case study is to analyse the political effects of warfare in West Java since 1945. Guerrilla activity in the province since 1945 has been centred on – but not restricted to – the Darul Islam¹⁹ insurgency of the period 1945-62 and the ultimately successful efforts by the Indonesian National Army (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, TNI) to suppress it. In particular, the rural sub-district (*Kabupaten*) of Garut, East of Bandung in the Priangan Highlands, was studied, along with the surrounding mountainous areas. Geographical and historical

¹⁹ Darul Islam (loosely, 'Islamic State' or 'World of Islam') is the general term used for this uprising. The military arm of the insurgency is generally known as the Indonesian Islamic Army or *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (TII). The official Indonesian term for the insurgency is DI/TII/SMK, to distinguish S.M. Kartusuwiryo's revolt in West Java from the unrelated DI insurgencies in Aceh and South Sulawesi during the same period.

data from the Japanese occupation and the War of Independence are also important to the study, although less central than the Darul Islam insurgency itself and as necessary the guerrilla actions associated with the suppression of the PKI in 1965-66 are discussed. By analysing the West Java case, data are generated to validate the initial theoretical propositions.

Geographical Overview

To understand warfare and its political effects in West Java since 1945, it is necessary first to understand its spatial context. This incorporated both physical and human geography and the terrain and infrastructure studies at Appendix 3 analyse these spatial and demographic aspects. They are omitted from the main body of the dissertation to maintain the continuity of the argument. Nonetheless they form an essential element of the analysis and should be read in detail.

The spatial context of guerrilla operations in West Java is important for two principal reasons. First, so much of military activity is terrain-driven that, unless terrain and climate are fully understood, the causes of social or political phenomena may be obscured. What may appear *prima facie* to be politically significant phenomena may turn out to be caused by topographic or demographic factors, rather than by the political consequences of military operations. This problem of distinguishing universal aspects of conflict from their geographic and demographic context, indeed, lies at the root of this dissertation, as has been discussed (see page 1). Second, in applying the conclusions from this case study to other situations, one must account for the action of geographical variables upon political and military processes.

General features of the case study area are illustrated at Map 1, reproduced at the end of the dissertation.

Political Culture

A useful explanatory tool which will be referred to in both the West Java and East Timor studies is the notion advanced by Almond and Verba of political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963). It is appropriate to discuss this concept before analysing the West Java fieldwork. These researchers classified individuals in a political culture into three categories: *parochials*, *subjects* and *participants*. *Parochial* individuals lack awareness of political institutions and issues, or political processes. They are unaware of major interest groups or policies, do not perceive that they have any ability to influence the political process and have no interest in doing so. They are often illiterate members of isolated rural communities and are involved in pre-industrial forms of economic production. O'Neill argues that parochial individuals will avoid involvement in any form of political activity, including insurgency (O'Neill 1990, 64; Almond and Verba, 1963).

Subjects are aware of the political process but are not active in shaping policy and do not perceive their political orientation or actions as significant. In O'Neill's view,

...subjects are not motivated to become active participants in day-to-day political processes. What they want is better judicial, economic and social treatment. If this is achieved by astute government reforms, they may defect from the insurgency and revert to their generally passive roles (O'Neill 1990, 64).

Participants are politically sophisticated, aware of national and regional political institutions and processes, conscious of policies and issues in the political debate and show an active desire to shape policy. They are often intellectuals or members of social elites. If their desire to participate in the political process is blocked, they may become leaders of insurgent movements. An example (to be discussed in Chapter 5) is the Malayan Communist Party, whose principal source of recruits during the Malayan Emergency was the disgruntled student population of Singapore's secondary schools. These educated Chinese were denied participation in the ethnic-Malay dominated administrative and political systems and sought expression of their desire for political participation through the insurgency (Laqueur 1977, 291).

Historical Overview

In order to understand the political and military factors at work in West Java since 1945, it is essential to understand the immediately preceding period of war and occupation. This first section of the case study therefore presents a historical overview of events in the province of West Java since the fall of the Netherlands East Indies.

The fall of the Netherlands East Indies

At the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) were already weak. Holland had been occupied by the Nazis since June 1940; the government had fled to London and morale among the European population of the NEI was low, with no hope of help from the metropolitan Netherlands. Dutch forces in-theatre were seriously inadequate against the Japanese threat, although it had been expected since the Japanese takeover of French Indochina in 1940:

The Dutch-controlled army in Java consisted of about 25,000 men organised in four regiments, each of three battalions and a very little artillery... For several years the little army of the Netherlands East Indies had been in process of expansion... The Indies Army depended chiefly on the homeland for its officers, for cadres of European soldiers and for equipment. In 1940-41 the proportion of Europeans to Indonesians in the Army was reduced until it was about one in forty (Wigmore, 1957, 442).

Salim Said estimates that by the Dutch surrender on 8 March 1942 there were approximately 20 Indonesian officers and 20 000 other ranks within the KNIL (Said 1991, 9). Clearly, although they might have been effective in a guerrilla role, such a small number of troops could not pose a serious conventional threat to the well-armed Japanese, who numbered in the hundreds of thousands.

As well as this numerical weakness, the colonial troops were trained only for a police role. The Dutch had finally pacified the whole territory of the NEI only in 1939 (Palmier, 1962) and most troops were employed on internal security duties. The Australian CGS, General Sturdee, considered that 'the Dutch forces in Java "should be regarded more as well-equipped Home Guards than an Army capable of undertaking active operations in the field" ' (Wigmore 1957, 445).

A further weakness was the complete lack of support from the local population. General Ter Poorten, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief in Java, admitted at a conference with Australian officers that 'guerrilla warfare would be impossible because of the great hostility of the Indonesians toward the Dutch' (Wigmore 1957, 502). The truth of this assertion can be seen by the fact that neither the Netherlands Indies Intelligence Service, nor the British clandestine warfare agency SOE, were able to mount a single successful covert operation in Sumatra or Java during the entire war (Trenowden, 1978).

'As General Imamura remarked, "The greatest defeat of the Dutch resulted from the fact that they could not win the Indonesian people as their allies". The colonial government could not expect from their colonised people the willingness to fight a guerrilla war. On the other hand, it was easy for the Japanese to activate a people's guerrilla movement against them as happened at Atjeh in 1942' (Nasution 1953, 24).

It is thus not surprising that, after only a few weeks, the NEI surrendered to the Japanese on 8 March 1942. Native members of the KNIL were disarmed and although debarred from service in the Japanese-sponsored youth and paramilitary organisations, were not systematically persecuted. Naturally the Japanese imprisoned or executed all European members of KNIL along with the Allied Forces and the entire European civilian population was interned.

The Japanese Occupation

The development of the TNI and, indeed, of the Indonesian State was profoundly affected by the Japanese occupation. Japanese command and control (C²) arrangements were particularly influential. The Japanese High Command considered that the eastern islands of Indonesia were best controlled by the Imperial Navy, which needed them as a firm base for operations against Australia and could control the large areas of sea in the region. Simultaneously the 25th and 16th Armies, which had advanced separately into Sumatra and Java after the fall of Singapore, were left to administer the two densely populated western islands. Thus, Indonesia was in fact under three Japanese administrations, not one.

This policy divided Indonesia into three areas, each of which pursued different policies. The mobilizing of Indonesians - a policy the Dutch avoided - applied only in areas controlled by the Japanese Army and principally in Java. Thus, PETA [the Japanese-sponsored Indonesian military force] existed in Java but not in East Indonesia. This is one reason why the battles for independence were fought mainly in the former Japanese Army-controlled areas (Said 1991, 8).

Dahm (1970) emphasises the fact that Indonesian nationalists were unhappy with the regionalisation and local decentralisation that this involved:

The nationalists...were alarmed most of all by the way in which the unity of the country was jeopardised by administrative measures. Java was occupied by the Sixteenth Army; Sumatra formed part of the command of the Twenty-Fifth Army, stationed at Singapore; while Borneo, Celebes and the whole Eastern part of the archipelago were administered by the Japanese southern fleet, with its headquarters at Makassar. The division of the archipelago into areas of military and naval command had been decided before the war. The Japanese main objective was to exploit the natural resources of the islands as quickly and fully as possible and thus to reduce the burden which the war imposed on the homeland. Areas which were more sparsely populated and difficult of access were assigned to the navy, while the army took control of densely populated regions where it was necessary to recruit a labour force (Dahm 1970, 83).

Despite this apparent three-way split of Indonesia, because of over-population in Java and under-population in Eastern Indonesia, the vast majority of the population was controlled by the Japanese Army. Indeed the Japanese Navy (2nd Southern Fleet) controlled only 10.5 million people (17.8% of the overall population) while the army controlled the remaining 82.2%. Indeed, Lieutenant General Imamura, commander of the 16th Army in Java controlled 40.8 million people or 69% of the population and consequently the policies and activities of the Japanese on Java are of great significance.²⁰ In addition, Japanese regional commanders had great autonomy and independence from higher direction, particularly in matters of politics. A very obvious example of this is Vice-Admiral Maeda, Naval Liaison Officer to HQ 16th Army, who actively sponsored and supported the Independence movement without clearance from any higher authority and indeed at times without Imamura's knowledge (Dahm 1970, 84; 99-100).

The Japanese were initially welcomed and admired by Indonesians, but this euphoria quickly faded as the local people realised that the Japanese had simply substituted themselves for the Dutch and were much harsher.

One of the most significant effects of Japanese occupation was the cementing of local military control over the civilian population. Dutch colonial control had been tight in some areas, but the further from the centre the looser it became. In the main, it was exercised by brigades (local 20-man posts) of the colonial police, working as patrol bases in major villages and towns (NEI Handbook 1920, 269-272). This was enhanced by the Japanese into the system known as *Rukun Tetangga* (RT), loosely translated as 'Neighbourhood Watch' and still an important element of the Indonesian internal security system. The term *Rukun*

²⁰ Dahm's figures are based on the most recent census, that of 1930. While the population is likely to have grown significantly in the period to 1942, the already-existing overpopulation of Java (315 persons per km² compared to 8 per km² in Eastern Indonesia) means that the figures for proportion of the population probably remain valid (see Dahm, 1970: 84).

Tetangga was a translation of the Japanese *Tonari Gumi*²¹. This in turn was based on the long-extant Japanese systems of *Gonin-gumi* and *Junin-Gumi*, which imposed upon neighbourhood units of four to five households the collective responsibility for preventing and informing the authorities of criminal acts (Djawa Gunseikanbu 1944, 3)²². While in Indonesia the neighbourhood unit consisted of 10 to 20 families, the *Tonari-Gumi* system operated identically to its Japanese prototype.

The Japanese military government established the system efficiently within the most populated areas of Java and slightly less efficiently in the outer areas, by mid-1944. However, this was an Army initiative and in the areas of Eastern Indonesia controlled by the Imperial Navy no such regulations applied. It was established 'principally as a means of transmitting the government's wishes to the people, conversely so that the government may be aware of the people's situation. Also [to act] in the areas of neighbourhood security, distribution of goods, assistance to the families of heroes at the front, or those who have died...' (Djawa Gunseikanbu 1944, 3 – AT). In other words, the system was a means of coercion, propaganda, information collection, aid distribution and control over the population. Importantly, this control was to be exercised by regional and local Japanese Army and Police commanders, subject only to broad central guidance from the military government.

The Japanese attempted to link *Tonari Gumi*²³ with the ancient Javanese tradition of *gotong royong* or mutual assistance. However, they argued, during the period of Dutch occupation this principle had been ignored and the *Tonari Gumi* system would place it on a soundly organised and efficient footing. The system was established by local military commanders and was intended to act as 'the lowest level of local government, responsive to the local military commander and through him to the Japanese Military Government' (Djawa Gunseikanbu 1944, 3 – AT). Indeed *Putera*, the nationalist political organisation headed by Sukarno, was specifically prohibited from establishing branches at village level to prevent competition with the military government (Dahm 1970, 89). Instead, in addition to *Tonari Gumi*, local leaders within each neighbourhood were to form committees known as *Aza Jokai*, which were to conduct monthly coordination meetings under the direction of the village military commander (*Ku-cho*). Based on this system, village chiefs underwent indoctrination from

²¹ Japanese characters have been rendered throughout this dissertation by the use of standard *kanji* orthography, except (as in the case of words such as *kempetai* or *kamikaze*) where the author felt that an alternative spelling would be better known to English-speaking readers.

²² This information is taken from the Japanese Military Government pamphlet *Pemberitahoean Tentang Soesoenan Roekoen Tetangga* of April 1944, the original decree establishing the RT system in Java. the author was able to examine this document in the IC-RVO in Amsterdam and extracts from it quoted in the text are the author's translation from the Indonesian version. Both the Japanese and Indonesian versions are reproduced in Appendix 4.

²³ In this study the Japanese term *Tonari Gumi* will be used to denote the wartime RT system, whereas the Indonesian translation *Rukun Tetangga* will be solely applied to the equivalent system established by the Republic after independence.

February 1944 onward (Ricklefs 1993, 203). Amongst other things, the regulation establishing the system stated that:

Once *Tonari Gumi* and *Aza Jokai* have been established, all existing organisations in that area (for example village agricultural associations, neighbourhood fire brigades) are as far as possible to be brought under the control of the *Tonari Gumi* and *Aza Jokai*. Moreover the *Tonari Gumi* and *Aza Jokai* are to be controlled by the *Ku-cho*²⁴. Thus this structure, as the lowest level of government, is to work under the control and guidance of the *Ku-cho*. In addition, in all its activities it is to serve devotedly the military government. *Tonari Gumi* and *Aza Jokai* are the lowest level of the executive....the decision as to how and where to establish *Tonari Gumi* and *Aza Jokai* in each area is to be left to the regional military headquarters [*Shu-chokan*] and police commander [*Tokubetsu Si-cho*] (Djawa Gunseikanbu 1944, 4-7 - AT from the Indonesian).²⁵

Japanese control of the postal services and the establishment of radio stations also assisted in the control of information flow to the Javanese. The Japanese postal service (*Kokusai Denki Tsusinkyoku*) controlled the Indonesian postal service and trained Indonesians in its operations. In addition, a radio station was established at Dayeuhkolot approximately seven kilometres from Bandung, which became very important for Japanese communications and the transmission of propaganda to the population. Many of the Indonesians trained by the Japanese later died defending the radio station against the returning Allies. Indeed, many of the radio technicians were involved in *Radio Gerilya*, which as the name implies was an underground guerrilla radio station established during the war of independence, with communications to Republican groups in the archipelago (Fieldnote J53/P/4).

Thus, by late 1944 the local civilian population were controlled directly by local Japanese military and police leaders, without tight control over these leaders by the central Japanese military government. Moreover, the central Indonesian civilian political leaders were excluded from the day-to-day administration of Indonesia. The colonial *Volksraad* had been criticised as lacking any political clout with the NEI Governor General. The Central Advisory Committee (*Tjua Sangi-In*) to which Sukarno, Hatta, Mansur and the other central political leaders belonged was even less influential and merely functioned to legitimise the decisions of the *Gunseikan*. These would then be implemented in decentralised fashion and with great local variation and autonomy by local military commanders through *Tonari Gumi* (see Dahm 1970, 88; 90-91). The

²⁴ Village military commander, equivalent to the commander of a *Koramil* in the modern Indonesian system.

²⁵ Although some researchers (for example Dahm and Ricklefs) have speculated on the origins of the RT system, no previous analyst has quoted these Japanese documents at length – possibly because of linguistic difficulties in accessing them and the fact that they are held in a separate section from other Indonesian wartime documents in the IC-RVO archives in Amsterdam. For this reason they remain little known and have, to the author's knowledge, been referred to only once by a previous analyst. However, the author's research has shown that the RT system was Japanese in origin and as will be demonstrated it had profound effects on the development of governmental and coercive institutions in the new state. The original document is consequently reproduced in Appendix 4.

significance of this Japanese system for Indonesian political development at the local level cannot be overstated. Many analysts have remarked on the propensity of Javanese people to join and be controlled by organisations of this nature and have ascribed, variously, to the Indonesian government and to the Netherlands East Indies the system of neighbourhood control. But as the archival evidence shows the Japanese originated the system and it was then spread from Java to outlying areas during the War of Independence and subsequently²⁶. Its utility for military control over the civilian population at the local level is enormous. As will be seen in analysing the Darul Islam revolt of the 1950s, the Indonesian government applied it as quickly as possible to all new areas brought under the control of the Republic.

Outside Java, the administration was even more decentralised. In these areas, provincial and local councils had been set up in preference to a central body such as the *Tjuo Sangi-In*. In Aceh the 25th Army relied on indigenous leaders of the pre-war independence movement and Islamic organisations. Conversely, in areas controlled by the Imperial Navy local indigenous chiefs were used as figureheads responsible to local Japanese commanders (Dahm 1970, 108; see also page 85 below).

The Japanese left Dutch colonial law in force except where it conflicted with Japanese military law. However, to diminish Western influence on the population they banned the use of Dutch and English, while encouraging Indonesian. This banning of foreign books made higher education virtually impossible throughout the war. Japanese propaganda was disseminated by *wayang*, movies, drama and especially radio, as noted on page 34 above. Because of a shortage of radio sets and to prevent the population listening to Allied broadcasts, a network of loudspeakers was set up in the villages and *kampungs* of Java (Ricklefs 1993, 201-2).

The Japanese also established auxiliary civil defence (*keibodan*) and auxiliary police (*Tokubetsu Keibotai*) units in each district, under the control of local police chiefs. They also created the 'police youth', an armed police force which supported the Japanese military police or *Kempetai*. These police auxiliaries were locally raised and operated only in their own areas. In particular:

Every *desa* and every part of a municipality [Japanese *ku*, equivalent to the modern *kecamatan*] has a body of *Keibodan*, in general cases headed by chief of *desa* or chief of a *ku*...in the municipalities and *sen* [*kabupaten*] [t]here are police-stations directed by chiefs of police stations, in other cases directed by the *sen-cho* [*bupati*]...in accordance with the authority of the police. In the several districts of Djawa there are *Tokubetsu Keibotai*...consisting of Indonesian groups and Chinese groups, which are chosen from the *Keibodan* and the inhabitants of the districts. This body is established with the intention to assist directly the police in its task of maintaining the peace and order in the district, municipality or local ressort [sic] (HQ 16th Army,

²⁶ Fieldwork data indicate that most Indonesians are unaware of the RT system's origins. Most analysts and local people appear to be of the view either that it was established by the Dutch colonial authorities and later retained by the Republic, or conversely that it was initiated by the Republic itself in the 1950s (see below, Fieldwork Results).

Java, 1945 – 1945 English translation from Japanese source by Netherlands Expeditionary Forces Intelligence Service).

These auxiliary police forces were established, therefore, under the control of local commanders within the Japanese military government and operated on a local basis only. While the Japanese commanders remained in place at each level, these bodies therefore exhibited a hierarchical C² arrangement, with both political and paramilitary guidance being given by the Japanese on a regional basis. However, the organisation quickly became segmentary as soon as the Japanese were removed from the structure after their capitulation.

Neither *Keibodan* nor *Tokubetsu Keibotai* were armed with firearms. The Japanese estimated their numbers in August 1945 as approximately 1,286,813 in *Keibodan* with 12,185 Chinese and 135,342 Indonesians in *Tokubetsu Keibotai* (HQ 16th Army 1945, 12-13). A significant number of trained paramilitary personnel – 1.4 million people – was therefore operating in Java without central direction from the time of the Japanese surrender. Notosusanto emphasises the significance of this, arguing that these organisations ‘retained their [internal] organisational unity while disavowing their subordination to the Japanese authorities’ (1980,45). Given the regional and localised nature of these organisations, the ‘disavowal’ of subordination to the Japanese meant that in effect they were operating independently of any higher direction.

The auxiliary police were unarmed and operated under Japanese direction until the surrender. However, the greatest contribution of the Japanese occupation was the creation of PETA, the first military force in the modern history of Indonesia that was officered and controlled by Indonesians themselves. In December 1943, the Japanese began to recruit auxiliaries (*Heiho*); the Volunteer Army for the Defence of the Fatherland (Japanese *Giyugun Shido Bu*, Indonesian *Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air*, PETA), in Java; and the Volunteer Army (*Boei Giyugun*) in Sumatra. A Japanese officer involved with their control stated under interrogation in 1946 that:

The Japanese idea to strengthen defensive power in cooperation with the Indonesians was intensified, as the outlook for the Japanese Army became blacker. I believe that all the staff of the Japanese Army agreed with this idea. The Japanese Army had the following intentions: on the one hand, it was their fundamental intention of operations to win over 50 million Indonesians to our side and on the other hand to station the concentrated strength of the two Japanese brigades on the decisive fronts while the Volunteer Army held the other fronts...The Japanese brigades were not sufficiently equipped, so we had no alternative but to make up the shortage of arms with those seized from the Dutch Army [in 1942]. As regards manpower, it was made up to full strength by using Indonesian volunteers whom we called *Heiho*. In short, the Volunteer Army [i.e. PETA and *Boei Giyugun*] was intended as a fighting power to complete operations, while *Heiho* was regarded as an element of the Japanese Army (Interrogation Report Javint 3199, SEATIC Detachment 23rd Indian Division, Java, Jan 46)

PETA was an infantry force comprising initially 35 battalions in Java, increased to 55 at the end of August 1944 and 66 by December 1944. Dahm asserts that

PETA was dominated by Islamic organisations. Indeed, its first overall commander (a figurehead position) was Kasman Singodimedjo, former leader of *Muhammadiyah* (Dahm 1970, 94). Three additional battalions were formed in Bali in late June 1944 (HQ 16th Army 1945, 2-3). Each battalion was commanded and officered by Indonesians, with a leavening of Japanese cadre staff. The total PETA strength in August 1945 was estimated as 37,479 in Java and Bali. PETA's tasks were intended to be rear area defence and security, coastal surveillance and construction. HQ 16th Army claimed disingenuously that PETA was completely disarmed without incident on 19 August 1945; as discussed in the next section (see page 43 below), the reality was rather more complex. Further, Japanese officers interrogated by the British in 1946 indicated that PETA had also been trained for a guerrilla role (Javint 3132/3 1946, 4).

By contrast to PETA, *Heiho* was established in May 1943 and by August 1945 a total of 24,873 personnel were serving in Java and a further 2,504 were serving in Timor (HQ 16th Army 1945, 4)²⁷. Unlike PETA, which was a territorial military force for local service under Japanese commanders, *Heiho* volunteers formed part of the Japanese Army as individuals. Consequently, *Heiho* served wherever Japanese Army units served, including Eastern Indonesia. By contrast, PETA only existed in regions *administered* by the Japanese Army, principally Java. *Heiho* mostly served in the 16th Army, but approximately 15,000 *Heiho* volunteers also served in West New Guinea, Sumatra, Halmahera, Banda, Sumatra, Malaya, Siam, Indochina and Burma (HQ 16th Army 1945, 4). Of these most had returned to Java by early 1946.

Besides PETA and *Heiho*, numerous other paramilitary and youth organisations were established by the Japanese. Foremost among these was the *Jawa Hokokai* or national service association, headed by the Japanese Military Governor (*Gunseikan*) but of which Sukarno was the most prominent public figure (Ricklefs 1993, 203). Membership was compulsory for all Indonesians over 14 and 'aim[ed] at securing the people's voluntary assistance to the thorough penetration of Military Administration into every class and layer of the nation' (Sukarno, quoted in HQ 16th Army 1945, 6). These youth organisations, including the *Suishin-tai* or *Barisan Pelopor*, students' organisations, the *Jibakutai* or *Barisan Berani Mati* and auxiliary air-raid, fire and police organisations were numerous and segmentary. Also, in December 1944 the Japanese founded the *Kaikyo Seinen Teishin-tai*, or *Hizbullah*, under the leadership of Masyumi as an Islamic paramilitary force.²⁸ This conflicts with later claims by both republican

²⁷ The Japanese account from which these figures are taken is intentionally ingratiating with the Allies, as it was produced to demonstrate their compliance with the surrender terms. However, the same account states that the *Heiho* volunteers serving in Timor were not Timorese but mostly Javanese (IC-RVO 005117).

²⁸ The *Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia* (Masjumi) was founded by the Japanese in November 1943 in an attempt to harness Indonesian Islam to the Japanese war effort by sponsoring the notion of a Japanese *jihad*. Masyumi remains a significant force in Indonesian political life to this day, despite periods of marginalisation. It will be discussed in more detail later in the Darul Islam case study. The Islamic claim of armed opposition to Japanese rule is based on the revolt of Kjai Zainal Mustafa in January 1944, at Tasikmalaya in the Priangan Mountains near Garut

and Darul Islam leaders that *Hizbullah* (and the similar organisation *Sabilillah*) were anti-Japanese guerrilla organisations formed spontaneously under Masyumi leadership and operating against the Japanese at the end of the war. Rather, *Hizbullah* was intended as a reserve to PETA. Thus, a very large number of Indonesians were involved in Japanese-sponsored paramilitary or military groupings, operating under a local, segmentary C² structure with loose or ineffective control from the Japanese. The Japanese estimated membership of these organisations at the surrender as follows:

Table 3.2
Strength of Japanese-Sponsored
Military and Paramilitary Organisations, 1945

Organisation	Strength	Remarks
<i>Barisan Pelopor</i> (<i>Suishintai</i>)	80 000	Arms not supplied by Japanese; home made weapons.
<i>Barisan Berani Mati</i> (<i>Jibakutai</i>)	50 000	Arms not supplied by Japanese; home made weapons.
<i>Hizbullah</i> (<i>Kaikyo Seinen</i> <i>Teishin Tai</i>)	50 000	Origin disputed.
Student Service Corps	50 000	
Young Men's Associations	500 – 600 000	Local groupings often under broad sponsorship by <i>Jawa Hokokai</i> – these formed the ' <i>pemuda</i> ' of the war of Independence
<i>Keibodan</i>	1, 286 813	
PETA	37 479	Of whom 20, 490 were armed and with 6.8 million rounds of ammunition at Oct 1945
<i>Heiho</i> Java	24 873	Of whom only 10 000 had weapons.
<i>Heiho</i> outside Java	15 000	
Total:	2,094 075 – 2,194 075	

Source: HQ 16th Japanese Army, *Explanations Regarding All Kinds of Armed Bodies*, Oct 1945 (IC-RVO document No. 005117). Note: These figures must be regarded as indicative only, as there are numerous internal inconsistencies in both the Japanese source and its English translation.

These forces were wholly officered by Indonesians, although Japanese military advisers were present at higher or lower levels depending on the type of organisation. Indonesian officers were commanders up to and including battalion level within PETA, for example (Notosusanto 1980, 74). British Intelligence noted in January 1946 that:

...the Japanese attached to [PETA], including civilians, were very interested in Indonesian independence and it seems quite possible they were connected with Indonesian extremist youth [*pemuda*]...after the surrender, it was said that Ichiki Tatsuo had received official intimation from 16 Army HQ to join the Indonesians and foment resistance against any European troops coming to Java (Interrogation Report Javint 3132/3, SEATIC Detachment 23rd Indian Division, Java 21 Jan 46).

(later the key base area for Darul Islam). This traditional Islamic leader rebelled against the Japanese with 500 followers. Although the revolt was crushed within a few days, it indicated the initial unpopularity of Masjumi as well as the ability of Nahdatul Ulama and other traditionalist Islamic groups in West Java to mobilise political and military support for an Islamic state. In this sense Zainal's revolt was rightly seen as a forerunner of the Darul Islam insurgency of the 1950s (see Dahm 1970, 92; Ricklefs 1992, 207).

This speculation perhaps reflects the difficult British experience in fighting Japanese-trained *pemuda* in January 1946, rather than hard evidence of Japanese sponsorship *after* the capitulation. However, it is clear from their actions in 1944 and 1945 that the Japanese PETA advisers were often very supportive of Indonesian independence, whether inside or (in some cases) outside the Japanese political construct of the 'Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere':

....about July-August 1944, the Japanese CinC issued an order promising the independence of Indonesia in the near future. In response to this announcement, we began, in training the Giyugun [i.e. PETA], to inculcate the idea that Giyugun was the army for Indonesian independence. As a result of these lessons, however, those [officer] cadets who were not well educated misunderstood and supposed that independence had already been granted, which caused us considerable difficulties in the training (Interrogation Report Javint 3132/3, SEATIC Detachment 23rd Indian Division, Java 21 Jan 46; 6).

With the realisation that the Japanese were going to lose the war and that, therefore, there was a real possibility that the Dutch would attempt to return, these Japanese-trained military forces became increasingly restless. Meanwhile, the youth organisations (*pemuda*), began to turn the paramilitary and political skills they had learned from the Japanese against the occupiers. The extremely harsh repression of a PETA rebellion at Blitar in East Java in 1945 prevented any direct challenge to Japanese authority before the surrender²⁹. The strategy of the civilian political leaders – especially Sukarno, who owed his position to the Japanese and expected them to grant Indonesia independence in the near future – also confirmed that a non-military approach was their preferred option.


The foregoing discussion of the Japanese occupation can be summarised thus:

- As the author's analysis of archival material showed, the Japanese established tight and effective control over the local population through the *Tonari Gumi* system and the various service associations and administrative groups. These organisations relied for their direction upon the local or regional Japanese Military Government at each level, rather than their own hierarchical structure. Consequently, on the removal of the Japanese from the

²⁹ The Blitar rebellion, along with Kyai Zainal Mustafa's Islamic revolt at Tasikmalaya, was one of only two significant instances of armed revolt against the Japanese during the occupation in Java (there were numerous other examples in Eastern Indonesia). On 1 Feb 45 an entire battalion of PETA under the command of Lieutenant Supriyadi, mutinied (with modern weapons) against the Japanese. This rebellion was savagely suppressed, but indicated a growing unrest and independence from Japanese control of the mass paramilitary and youth organisations (Dahm 1970, 98-99). The revolt has assumed symbolic, almost mythically important significance in the Indonesian collective memory of the Second World War – shown by the election of Supriyadi *in absentia* (and almost certainly *post mortem*) as commander of TNI in 1945. In addition, the literary classic *Perburuan* (*The Fugitive*) by the great Indonesian novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer, is set against this background and has contributed significantly to its mythologisation. Somewhat ironically, Pramoedya's work was banned in Indonesia throughout the author's period as a language student and as an advisor to TNI. It is still regarded as rather subversive.

structure the formal power structure became 'plastic'³⁰ or easily altered, as the cementing influence of Japanese control was removed. Thus these organisations became segmentary. They then tended to act independently without central direction. This is expressed graphically in Figure 3.1

Figure 3.1
Effect of Japanese Surrender on Indonesian Organisations



- The Japanese established numerous military and paramilitary organisations, each responsive to a local or regional territorial commander belonging to either the Japanese Police or the Japanese Army. These organisations were not united by a central strategic or political directive, but rather were controlled by Japanese cadre staff at each level. Consequently, these organisations also became segmentary on the surrender of the Japanese. The same effect of 'plasticisation' depicted in Figure 3.1 is also applicable to these organisations.
- The Japanese command structure in Java was pyramidal and military commanders operated at every level without central political direction and with only broad directive military control. In Indonesia as a whole it was segmentary, with three separate administrations operating independently in the former NEI territory. This same segmentary/pyramidal organisational C² culture (as distinct from the organisational structure itself) was transmitted

³⁰ See below (page 172) for a detailed discussion of the concept of 'plasticisation' of power structures.

through *heiho*, PETA and the paramilitary groups to the newly created Indonesian armed groups.

- The civilian political leaders were marginalised by the Japanese in the day-to-day government and administration of Indonesia. Despite their importance as symbolic figures within the Independence movement, these leaders had no opportunity to develop an executive power base or administrative backing of their own. The authoritarian political culture of Dutch colonialism and the Japanese occupation was thus the only political experience for the vast majority of Indonesians at the declaration of Independence.

From this it can be seen that the Japanese, without necessarily intending such an outcome, had laid the organisational foundations for a highly decentralised military/paramilitary command structure, within an authoritarian political culture, in the newly-independent Republic. There was a plethora of armed and unarmed organisations numbering millions of individuals trained to various standards of proficiency and imbued with Japanese-indoctrinated offensive spirit. However, these groups had no loyalty to a central military command, let alone to a centralised civilian leadership. This then was the situation on the eve of the Japanese surrender.³¹

The Declaration of Independence

As the Pacific War ended, the civilian political leaders in Jakarta looked to the Japanese for a smooth, peaceful transition of power to an Indonesian republic. In fact, this had been promised by the Japanese as early as 1942. Although in 1943 the Japanese had intended to annex Indonesia, by July 1944 the pressure of events in the Pacific War forced them to promise a measure of independence in an attempt to encourage Indonesian support for the war effort. The establishment of the Independence Preparatory Committee (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, PPKI) in August 1945 implied that Indonesians had only to wait and their independence would be given them without a fight.

The Japanese-sponsored military and paramilitary forces (see page 36 *et seq.*) and the politically inspired *pemuda* also trained by the Japanese, held various opinions on whether to fight for independence. Although these opinions varied according to the personalities and political orientation of each group, most military organisations and *pemuda* groups held the opposite view to that of the older political leaders. Certain *pemuda* regarded the civilian leadership as collaborationist pawns of the Japanese. They believed that if Indonesians did not seize independence themselves, the Dutch could argue – as they

³¹ The analysis presented here, of the effect of Japanese command and control on the post-surrender Indonesian organisations is original in the sense that no other researcher has identified these factors or their influence. This can be attributed to the lack of a general understanding of the *Tonari Gumi* system and its effects. Despite this, the author's results are generally compatible with those of other analysts such as Dahm (1970) Anderson (1972a), Benda (1958) and Ricklefs (1993), in that their analyses identify the same phenomena as the present research, without providing an equivalent causal explanation.

subsequently did, in any case – that the Republic was a Japanese puppet state: a creation of Tokyo and hence not a legitimate government. This, in turn, would threaten Indonesian independence from the Netherlands.

Thus, as early as August 1945, there were deep divisions within the segmented political and military structures of the new Republic at every level. The question of whether to declare independence or wait for the Japanese was resolved only when Sukarno and Hatta were kidnapped by the *pemuda*. The declaration of independence on 17 August 1945 was thus partly a response to strong pressure from radical youth. Left to his own devices, Sukarno might not have proclaimed independence, relying instead on the Japanese to fulfil their promise. The *pemuda*, on the other hand, perceived that '...the Japanese Empire had lost the War and had surrendered to the Allies. But its military forces stationed in Indonesia could be said to be still intact. Furthermore at the time of their capitulation they received an order from the Allies to maintain the status quo. Status quo meant Indonesia remaining a colony' (Notosusanto 1980, 15). Thus, they wished to oppose the Japanese militarily, to demonstrate the Republic's independence from Japanese influence and to prevent Japanese pre-emptive suppression of the new government.

The Formation of TNI

The segmentary organisational structure of the Indonesian military and political leadership is clearly apparent in the events surrounding the formation of the national army. An official Indonesian account states:

At its session of 19 August 1945, the PPKI decided to form a national army. This decision was reversed at the following session and, on 23 August 1945, the formation of a People's Security Agency (*Badan Keamanan Rakyat*, BKR) was announced, as part of the Agency for the Assistance of Families of War Victims (*Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang*, BPKKP). *Pemuda* who were ex-members of PETA, *Heiho* etc., were quick to enlist in the BKR, but not all the *pemuda* agreed with its establishment. Rather, they supported the formation of a National Army. These dissident groups formed 'struggle organisations'. In general, these were *pemuda* who were already members of the underground resistance movement during the Japanese occupation, or were affiliated with particular religious or political groups (TNI 1975, A – AT).

The 'particular religious and political groups' referred to were Muslim and Communist organisations. The 'struggle organisations' (*strijdtorganisatie* or *badan perjuangan*) fought alongside the newly formed National Army. However, they retained their political and military independence and, as will be seen, often pursued conflicting policies.

The political leadership were reluctant to establish an Army because they feared provoking the Allies and the Dutch into military action against the Republic:

It is known that Sukarno and his friends – the older generation – before and even after the formation of his cabinet, were not only afraid of the Japanese but also of the Allied armies. This was because they already knew – from Allied radio

broadcasts – that they were the first target of the incoming Allies, especially the Dutch re-occupation troops. By not having an Army, Sukarno and his friends were hoping to show the Allies that they were not the Japanese collaborators the Dutch had portrayed them as (Said 1991, 12).

The *pemuda*, on the other hand, had urged the immediate formation of a national army. The PPKI's decision to form the BKR was a compromise solution designed to mollify the *pemuda* while still preserving the appearance that Indonesia was a state without an army.

Fighting against the Japanese began to break out in September and October 1945, mainly carried out by the *pemuda* and motivated by a desire to seize Japanese weapons before they could be handed over to the Allies. This occurred spontaneously, without any direction or support from the Republican government and, according to Salim Said (1991,13), it followed a similar pattern in most areas. Initially a *pemuda* delegation would approach a Japanese post to negotiate surrender terms. Usually the Japanese refused to negotiate, whereupon the *pemuda* would intimidate the Japanese by organising and arming the local civilian population. This often convinced them to yield, although in some cases (for example at Surabaya and Malang) heavy fighting was necessary to force the Japanese to hand over their weapons.

By mid October 1945 there were 150 000 trained *pemuda* and 10 000 weapons in Sumatra, 10 000 in West Java and 30 000 in East and Central Java. There is no reason to suspect that the Republican central leadership did not understand the importance of this development. But the leadership pursued 'a systematic policy of disregarding the military and concentrating on diplomacy instead, a policy that proved detrimental' (Said 1991, 14).

Thus, on the one hand, a large number of independent, segmentary military and paramilitary organisations had arisen directly from the population without the support and indeed with the opposition of the civilian political elite. These organisations had armed and organised themselves and begun carrying out military operations without any direction from the newly established government. At the same time, local military leaders had used the existing Japanese system to organise the local population to achieve their aims. The people had supported the local military rather than the central civilian leadership. The only effective power being exercised at this early period was, in fact, by local elites – both traditional and military, albeit a decentralised and segmentary structure which – because of the plasticisation of formal power structures after the removal of the Japanese from the administrative organisation – was not readily distinguishable from the population itself.

Operations Against the Returning Allied Forces

As we have seen, the Armed Forces of the Republic had brought themselves into being without direction from the civilian political leadership. Operations against the returning NEI forces demonstrate a similar pattern of military

independence from higher political control, coupled with a high degree of local control over the civil population.

As already demonstrated (see page 31 above), the development of the Indonesian Nationalist movement was influenced heavily by the Japanese pattern of occupation in 1942. Similarly, operations against the Dutch were influenced by Allied C² arrangements after the Japanese surrender. During the war, the Allies had divided Indonesia into two operational areas. Sumatra formed part of South-East Asia Command (SEAC), under Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, while the rest of Indonesia came under the jurisdiction of General Douglas Macarthur's South-West Pacific Area (SWPA). On 15 August 1945, Mountbatten assumed responsibility for a greatly enlarged SEAC, including all of Indonesia except Timor, which remained in SWPA (Mountbatten 1963, 282). Discussions between Mountbatten and the C-in-C Allied Land Forces SWPA, General Sir Thomas Blamey, led to the decision that 'the Australian area of responsibility should include all the Netherlands East Indies east of and exclusive of Lombok, plus Borneo, New Guinea...and adjacent islands. It was agreed that the British would progressively extend the area under their control in the Indies until the responsibility of Australia was limited to Timor and Western New Guinea' (Long 1963, 553).

Troops of the 23rd Indian Division landed in Java on 29 September and began to take control of the Japanese-occupied areas. Their mission was to ensure the Repatriation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (RAPWI) and then hand over as soon as possible to the Dutch civil authorities, represented by the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA). On 13 September, Mountbatten's headquarters had instructed units within SEAC that it was essential to deal only with the Japanese, to give the Indonesian Nationalists no grounds for saying that their claim to independence was recognised by the occupying forces (Long 1963, 567).

Australian forces in Indonesia followed a similar policy, although Australian units tended to be more tolerant of nationalist activities. Blamey's policy was expressed in a proclamation, which was circulated throughout the Islands:

The forces of the United Nations have decisively defeated the Japanese by land, sea and air and the whole Japanese nation has unconditionally surrendered to the United Nations...By command of General Sir Thomas Blamey, Allied commander in this area, the Netherlands East Indies laws, with which you are familiar, will be applied and enforced by the Officers of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration now present in your country, subject only to any further orders which the Allied Commander may be obliged, in the interests of good order, to issue (Long 1963, 567).

As already noted (see page 42) the Indonesian political leaders attempted to portray the Republic as a nation without an Army, in the hope of making any attempt at repression by force diplomatically unpalatable for the Dutch. The *pemuda*, on the other hand, continued to attack Japanese forces and seize their weapons, even under the noses of NICA and the Allies. Large nationalist

demonstrations were held; NICA and RAPWI officials were harassed and sporadic fighting took place both in Java and in the outer islands. The Japanese had agreed under the surrender terms to preserve order until the Allies could take over control. Nevertheless, in Jakarta 'armed bands of Indonesians were roaming the town and were intimidating the APWI in their camps; but as soon as [the Allied Commander] impressed on the Japanese authorities their responsibilities in this matter, they moved more troops into Batavia [Jakarta], set up road blocks and resumed control of the town' (Mountbatten 1963, 283).

As has already been shown, by the time the Allies and NICA commenced landing in Indonesia, a large number of independent armed groups had armed and organised themselves without direction from the political leaders. As Nasution (1953) emphasises, this gave the Indonesians considerably more combat power than the Dutch or the Allies could bring to bear in Indonesia, given their commitments in other areas such as Burma, French Indochina and Malaya. The political leadership was certainly aware of this, but remained reluctant to take military action.

Because of its reluctance to act promptly and decisively in the first few days after the declaration of independence, the government therefore lost control over the armed forces. It also lost the opportunity of presenting itself as a cohesive body of political and military power to the Allies and later to the Dutch. The Indonesian revolution was thus marked by segmented leadership. On the one hand was the civilian leadership under politicians who had been active in the Nationalist movement long before the Japanese invaded Indonesia. On the other were the military organisations (some under the leadership of traditional elites, some led by ex-KNIL or PETA officers and many under *pemuda* leadership) that emerged in the political arena as a result of the Japanese policy of mobilisation. Each of these groups had its own policies and ideas about defending the Republic and maintaining Indonesian independence (Said 1991, 15). As during the Japanese occupation, the civilian leaders had a high degree of prestige and symbolic value but very little executive authority at the regional or local levels. Thus the executive marginalisation of the civilian leaders under the Japanese was continued after the surrender.

By contrast, as operations against the Dutch developed, particularly during the Dutch Police Actions of 1947 and 1948³², the Indonesian military leadership began to develop a high degree of control over the civilian population. Nasution points out that:

³² The principal Dutch military actions in the War of Independence were intensive combined arms assaults covering a wide area and resulting in rapid military success against Republican conventional forces. They occurred in July 1947 and December 1948. These offensives are referred to in Indonesian usage as 'Dutch military aggressions' (*agresi militer Belanda*). Dutch sources refer to the same incidents as Police Actions I and II (*Actie Politionele I en II*). While appearing to favour the Dutch interpretation of events, the term 'Dutch Police Actions' has become widely accepted amongst English-speaking historians and the author has chosen to use it throughout this dissertation.

...We organised a military form of guerrilla government, consisting of administrative units at village level (*desa*), [sub-district] (*onderdistrik*), regency (*kabupaten*) territory (*daerah*) and provinces (*gubernuran*), each headed by a military commander who was also chief of the total guerrilla administration in that area and who operated with full support from the civilian bodies. ...All government affairs were 'guerrilla-ised' - the judicial courts and police, the levying of war taxes, information services, public health, education, manufacturing, communications, etc. ...Our guerrilla government using specially trained workers, known as territorial cadres, took care that the foundation, that is, the people, remained intact and in good morale (Nasution 1953, 26).

Nasution also states that 'every guerrilla area was engaged in an autonomous political and economic war'. Thus, on the one hand the military were segmented into numerous autonomous groups acting without and indeed in the early stages, contrary to direction from the central political leadership. On the other, the military exercised a high degree of control over the local people. The control of information services and communications noted by Nasution is important, because it indicates that there was little direct communication between central political leaders in Yogyakarta and the local population in the areas controlled by the Republic. Rather, information reached the people through the filter of the 'territorial cadres at every level who stimulated and guided the people...' (Nasution 1953, 29).

In a similar vein, Sloan (1971) argues that the Republican C² system was pyramidal at best:

...the lack of a modern communications system made it exceedingly difficult for the High Command in Djakarta to exercise supervision among the disparate troops throughout the archipelago. Therefore, each army commander was often free from higher authority and the allegiance of his troops often took the form of a father-son relationship instead of a general commitment to a national armed service. This close-knit relationship coupled with the inability of the Djakarta staff to exercise effective control gave provincial field commanders a wide degree of freedom of action...The father-son relationship, reinforced by tribal [sic] considerations, resulted also from economic considerations (Sloan 1971, 38).

It would therefore be incorrect to suggest that the military leadership was united and highly cohesive while the political leadership was not. In fact, both were segmented into numerous factional groups. In the case of the military leaders, there was a clear distinction based on background: those who had attended the Dutch military academy or had served in KNIL formed one faction within TNI; PETA-trained leaders and *pemuda* formed separate groups and the independent 'struggle organisations' followed their own independent political and military policies. One early indication of the military leaders' disinclination to accept direction from Jakarta was the appointment of General Sudirman as Commander-In-Chief.

The political leadership had appointed as C-in-C Urip Sumoharjo, an ex KNIL officer of Javanese aristocratic extraction who had taken no active part in the anti-Japanese resistance. When appointed in October 1945, Urip faced several difficulties, especially the factionalisation of the Army and the lack of political

direction. As a former KNIL officer, Urip relied on ex-KNIL personnel such as Nasution. This worked well in West Java where there were a large number of ex-KNIL troops available. In Central Java, however, Sudirman – an ex-PETA battalion commander – had gained a following due to his seizure and distribution of arms from the Japanese in September 1945. Thus, the PETA-KNIL division led to suspicion and lack of cooperation among Army leaders. At the same time, Urip was faced with a chronic lack of direction from the political leaders:

While fighting against the incoming Allies was raging throughout Java, the central government in Jakarta had its own policy towards the Allies, whom it did not regard as an enemy. By befriending the British, Jakarta was hoping to isolate the Dutch, who had already been 'smuggled in' [i.e. in the form of NICA detachments] by the Allies. The battle of Surabaya was a good example of the confusion at that time. The Jakarta government was working hard to stop the fighting, when the Army headquarters at Yogyakarta mobilised its entire force to fight in Surabaya...It was because of this quandary that the headquarters found itself in – being sandwiched between a government whose policy was contrary to its, on one side and the former PETA officers, who were reluctant to obey its orders, on the other side – that led Urip to the conclusion that a special military conference in Yogyakarta was needed (Said 1991, 31).

At this military conference, held on 11 November 1945, Urip lost control: he was shouted down by the assembled ex-PETA officers (a contributing factor was his old age and his inability to speak fluent Indonesian - he spoke perfect Dutch and Javanese, but the younger PETA and Pemuda officers spoke almost exclusively in Indonesian). Sudirman was elected as *Panglima Besar* (C-in-C); he took control of the Army, in clear defiance of the government's appointment of Urip. The political leaders had no option but to accept the decision.

Thus at the start of the War of Independence, the Republic had inherited a decentralised, localised, segmentary administrative structure tied in at every level to local and regional military commanders. While these commanders had been part of a unified Japanese force, the Japanese army's organisational unity had imposed an administrative unity on Indonesia. Once the Japanese were removed from these organisations, however, the formal power structures became plastic and informal power structures dominated. Moreover, the military force was itself factionalised and segmentary, with commanders at different levels and in separate locations belonging to different organisations and pursuing widely different policies based on varying political viewpoints. The central political leaders had been important symbolic figures with limited administrative or governmental influence under the Japanese. They remained figureheads riding above this chaotic administrative system and influencing it only by exhortation and rhetoric rather than by direct or centralised executive authority³³.

³³ In Javanese cosmology and state theory, it is indeed the role of the gods and the king to rise above the turmoil of government and politics, serenely influencing it by example, exhortation and prestige rather than by direct intervention. It is tempting to equate Sukarno's behaviour in office and indeed Suharto's later behaviour patterns, with this traditional god-king model; certainly the behaviour of the civilian leaders at this time appears to conform to it.

The War of Independence

The War of Independence from 1945 to 1949 comprised lengthy periods of negotiation interspersed with short, relatively intense periods of fighting (CIA 1953a, 2). Indeed, in this sense the period of the War of Independence is to some extent a microcosm of the overall surge/stabilisation pattern described in the previous chapter (see page 27). Periods of stabilisation and consolidation were followed by rapid change and development in Republican C² structures and in the relationship between political and military leaderships. It is useful to conceptualise the war as occurring in four phases, while recognising that this is a later insight not necessarily mirrored by contemporary perceptions.

In the first phase, the Allied Forces under Mountbatten, accompanied by Netherlands forces, attempted to regain control over the NEI. The Battle of Surabaya was the main battle of this period and was fought between the newly established Indonesian Republican Army (*Tentara Republik Indonesia*, TRI) and British troops of the 23rd Indian Division. This phase of conflict between the Indonesians and British, while the Dutch built up their strength, ended on 15 November 1946 with the initialling of the Linggajati Agreement. In this agreement, the Dutch recognised the Republic as the *de facto* authority in Java and Sumatra. Both governments agreed to the establishment of a federal United States of Indonesia, within an Indonesian-Netherlands Union headed by the Queen of the Netherlands.

The second phase commenced at midnight on 20 July 1947, when Dutch armoured and amphibious forces attacked the territory ceded to the Republic as part of the Linggajati Agreement. This action, known by the Dutch as the First Police Action and by Indonesians as the First Dutch Aggression, was militarily successful. Within two weeks, Dutch tanks, armor and infantry were holding most of the chief cities and towns in West and East Java, had obtained some control over the communication links between them and occupied all the Javanese deepwater ports. Republican forces withdrew to the hills and mountains and the [Republican] government established itself in...Yogyakarta' (Jones 1971, 106). Within days, however, India and Australia placed the matter before the UN Security Council. The Dutch ignored a Security Council resolution calling for a negotiated settlement and continued pacification operations. The UN then established a Committee of Good Offices, with one Dutch-appointed member (Belgium), one Indonesian nominee (Australia) and one member (the USA) selected by Belgium and Australia. An agreement sponsored by this committee was reached on the USS Renville in January 1948. Under the Renville Agreement, the Republic retained one third of Java, elections were to be held under UN supervision to determine the future status of Indonesia and Dutch military operations were to cease.

In the third phase, disunity among the Indonesian military and political leadership assumed disastrous proportions. Sutan Sjahrir, the socialist Prime

Minister installed in the 'Silent Coup' of 1946³⁴, had been forced out because he had negotiated the unpopular Linggajati agreement. Now his successor, Amir Sjarifuddin, was voted out because of his perceived responsibility for the Renville Agreement. Communist elements under Musso and Alimin began to undermine the new government of Dr Hatta and rival military forces developed including 'a government army, a Communist/Left Wing army (PKI/FDR) and a neutral army'. Fighting broke out amongst these rival military groups, culminating when Communist forces seized the town of Madiun in Central Java on 18 September 1948. TNI under General Sudirman crushed the rebellion completely, in a bloody operation lasting two months.

Taking advantage of this chaos, the Dutch initiated the fourth phase of the war, known as the Second Police Action/Second Dutch Aggression. This surprise attack began on 18 December 1948 and was as militarily successful as the First Police Action. The Republican capital of Yogyakarta was immediately overrun. Dutch forces numbering 130,000 quickly captured the Republican political leaders, while TNI (now united after the suppression of the Madiun rebellion) was forced into guerrilla operations in the interior. The inability of the Dutch forces to pacify the countryside led to protracted and inconclusive COIN operations. In mid-1949, US pressure and the threat of withholding Marshall Plan aid forced the Dutch to release the Republican leaders and hold talks on a transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. The Round Table Conference in The Hague agreed to the transfer of sovereignty, which took place on 30 December 1949.

A British analysis of the war emphasises that Dutch military success, unsupported by diplomatic measures, ultimately led to failure given the opposition of world opinion:

Although the Dutch gave *de facto* recognition to the Republic, they soon attempted to undermine and isolate it. Finally, unburdened by yearnings to come to terms with Indonesian nationalism, they launched two punitive expeditions against the new state. In strictly military terms, the two Dutch Police Actions, as they are known, were successful. In political terms they were disastrous; indeed, they appear to have been launched without regard for the possible political consequences. Certainly, the Dutch did not regard them as a prelude to constructive political progress in agreement with the Nationalists. In simpler terms, the two Police Actions were an attempt to bypass Indonesian nationalism. Although the Dutch captured the principal Indonesian leaders during the second action, they had not destroyed the republican army, which carried on the fight from the hills and jungles. Nor had they reckoned with the pressure of world opinion. The force of mere opinion might, indeed, have been ignored, but the pressure of the United States, both within and outside the United Nations, could not. In the end, the Dutch released the captured leaders and invited them to a round table conference at The Hague, in September 1949. The main outcome of this conference

³⁴ See Anderson (1972b) for a detailed description of this incident, in which the initial presidential cabinet system established under the 1945 Constitution, having proved unworkable was replaced by a parliamentary cabinet formed by the majority party in the consultative assembly, in this case the Indonesian Socialist Party under Sjahrir.

was the Dutch recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over the territories of the former NEI, although not over Dutch New Guinea (Crozier 1960, 122-123).

The Darul Islam Movement

Within the broader conflict, West Java was experiencing a 'war within a war' in the form of the Darul Islam insurgency. Darul Islam, with its military wing the Indonesian Islamic Army (*Tentara Islam Indonesia*, DI/TII) was a regionally based Islamicist insurgency. Its aim was the creation of an Islamic state of Indonesia, based on Q'uranic *sharia* law. This brought it into conflict with the secular Republic and led to guerrilla warfare in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.³⁵ The most intense and protracted insurgency occurred in West Java from 1948 to 1962, under the charismatic leadership of Sekarmaji Marijan Kartusuwiryo.

During the 1950s, DI/TII controlled most rural areas in West Java and dominated the numerous forested hill features described in detail in Appendix 3 (see page 195). Official Indonesian sources deny that DI/TII ever occupied towns or villages on a permanent basis, but admit that 'one could say that every hill feature visible from the city of Bandung was held by the DI insurgents' (Sjarifuddin 1962, 17 - AT). A French source from the same period claimed that DI 'has remained for several years master of West Java to all intents and purposes, has its own army, police and tax collectors and controls the working of the oil fields' (Robequain 1958, 426).

The insurgency can be divided into three phases. In the first phase, a three-cornered contest (*perang segitiga*) developed between the Dutch, DI/TII and TNI. During this phase the Dutch forces (KNIL and the *Koninklijke Landmacht*, KL) controlled the towns, lowlands and population centres, whereas DI/TII and TNI competed for control over the mountain areas and the rural population. Generally, DI/TII had the upper hand against both its opponents.

This fact is clearly illustrated by a Dutch Intelligence Service situation map for January 1949, which shows the Garut valley floor as a 'regularly administered area where more or less normal conditions apply'. (This map is reproduced in Appendix 4 – see page 214). With the exception of the forested highland area immediately west of Garut, this was considered a DI, rather than TNI area. The G. Guntur feature and the valley floor north from Garut to Sumedang were considered an area which, although mainly government-controlled, suffered 'a high degree of DI terror and terror from other extraneous fighting groups [*strijdgroepen*]'. The same applied to the G. Galunggung/Malangbong area on the eastern side of the valley while G. Galunggung itself was considered a DI base area. Throughout the entire area of the case study, no TNI activity was noted (NEFIS, 1949 - AT).

³⁵ Jenkins argues that the clash between TNI and DI/TII, particularly during the period of the War of Independence, further sharpened the already existing cleavage between *santri* and *abangan* streams in Indonesian political culture. This was particularly the case in regard to perceptions of the appropriate relationship between Islam and the State (Jenkins 1984, 6).

During the second phase, from 1950 until 1959, DI/TII dominated almost all rural areas in the province, while TNI controlled only the major lowland towns and some rural areas during daylight hours. DI/TII controlled the mountains, the local rural population and the night. A sophisticated shadow government developed in the DI/TII areas, paralleling the Republic at every level and exercising effective administrative control. In this sense, DI/TII established a complex parallel hierarchy³⁶ (O'Neill 1990,95). Karl D. Jackson comments on the same hierarchy:

In addition to military forces, the Darul Islam organised a civilian administration duplicating the central government structure at all levels, extending even down to the village level. The provision of elaborate civil and military structures may have been one key to the attractiveness of the Darul Islam as a movement because it offered bureaucratic office or military command to men who for lack of secular education and administrative experience would not have been employed by the Republic (Jackson 1980, 15).

During this phase the insurgency spread to Aceh, Sulawesi and certain parts of Central Java. Apart from some early successes, the TNI response was largely ineffective until 1959, because of political instability at the central government level and lack of co-ordination between local military commanders within the province (Jackson 1980, 13; Disjarah TNI 1985, 117-18; Puspenad 1959, 6). According to a secret CIA assessment of 1953, a further limitation was that, during the period of Parliamentary Democracy, Masjumi exercised its influence within each coalition cabinet to prevent military suppression of the DI/TII (CIA 1953b, 5).

In the third phase of the campaign (from the end of 1959) political cohesion improved within the central government and the cabinet instability of the Parliamentary Democracy period was replaced by stable, direct presidential control through the Guided Democracy system. Moreover, martial law had given TNI closer control over the civilian population, while the splitting of military territories into smaller KODAM had reduced the independence of regional military commanders (Sundhaussen in Schiffrin 1976, 178). Better cooperation between local TNI commanders and the development of a specific COIN doctrine led to a series of successful pacification operations, forcing the insurgents into sanctuaries in the hills around Garut. The insurgents' parallel hierarchy was disrupted as 'liberated areas' were constricted and their response was to declare Total Guerrilla War (*Perang Gerilya Semesta*) and to launch an indiscriminate terror campaign against local villages, seeking popular support through coercion. This failed, as the TNI tactic of *pagar betis* (see page 65) protected local people against DI/TII terror and gave them an opportunity for revenge through participation in cordon and search operations.³⁷ Using these

³⁶ The term *hierarchies parallèles* was originated by the French in Indochina and corresponds roughly to Templer's notion of 'competition for government' as developed during the Malayan Emergency. The Indonesian equivalent of this concept is the idea of *pemerintahan gerilya* (guerrilla government).

³⁷ Indonesian government sources tend to emphasise the barbarity and terror of DI/TII methods. Indeed, almost the entire museum section on the revolt in the Musium Mandala Wangsit

tactics, the sanctuary areas were cleared of insurgents in 1961-3 (See Figure 3.2). With the capture and execution of Kartusuwiryo in mid-1962, the insurgency quickly collapsed.

Previous Studies of the Insurgency

The DI/TII insurgency has not been thoroughly analysed, either by western or by Indonesian non-military researchers. By far the most rigorous and detailed study is that of Karl D. Jackson. Jackson conducted research in the poorer neighbourhoods (*kampung*) of Bandung and the Garut valley, in 1968-9. Research was conducted by a team of eight Indonesian students under Jackson's direction and after a broad initial survey his investigations focused on three villages: one pro-DI/TII, one pro-government and one neutral. Jackson's research tools were quantitative, using questionnaires and follow-up interviews. He examined the insurgency in the context of the transition in West Javanese society from traditional authority structures to the shorter-term, opportunistic relationships characteristic of modern society. He concluded that:

The political and social world of village East Priangan [i.e. Garut and Tasikmalaya districts] and *kampung* Bandung remains fundamentally a setting in which authority flows from personal, rather than institutional, group or ideological resources. Power is derived from the constellation of loyal followers surrounding and acknowledging the superiority of particular leaders as a result of each follower's personal, face-to-face, reciprocal relationship with his leader (Jackson 1971, 389).

Once villagers moved to the city, however, traditional authority relationships were gradually replaced by patron-client relationships, then by modern urban relationships. Jackson argues that civil war, insurgency or disaster, where village elites are decimated, will lead to a transition from traditional authority to more limited relationships. This will be accentuated if the central government can take over some of the economic and social support functions previously performed by the traditional elite (Jackson, 1971).

Jackson also examined power structures in the Garut valley and the way they changed once migrants moved to Bandung. Although in his 1971 study he did not specifically address the effects of military operations on these relationships, it is clear that casualties to village and religious elites disrupted traditional authority structures across the region. Accelerated movement of the rural population to the city, caused by DI/TII activities, also hastened the process. This allowed military and government leaders (in practice often the same individuals) to cement their control over the area.

Siliwangi in Bandung is devoted to photographs of burned and mutilated victims of DI/TII. However, it should be noted that such 'primitive' behaviour was not limited to DI/TII. For example, Ben Anderson gives a graphic description of fighting in Surabaya on 12 October 45 during which Republican *pemuda* ceremonially drank the blood of Japanese troops (Anderson, 1972, 155).

Jackson's *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion* (1980) is a comprehensive re-analysis of the results of his earlier fieldwork, with essentially the same aim. His conclusions are similar:

The major finding of this volume is that political integration among the Sundanese depends on a system of traditional authority relations animating village life and connecting each village with the world of regional and national politics existing outside the village gate. Virtually all Sundanese villagers are organised into networks of dyadic, personal, diffuse, affect-laden and enduring superior-subordinate relationships. Although these relations are social and economic in origin, they can have profound political implications when a particular traditional authority figure, or the village elders as a group, become involved in extra-village politics (Jackson 1980, xix).

Jackson examined nineteen villages in a preliminary study and three primary villages in a deeper analysis. This showed that the key determinant of village allegiance was not religious or political ideology, but 'the personal relationships established before the Indonesian revolution between the chief elders of each village and the political figures in nearby towns who came to represent competing factions in the Indonesian independence movement' (Jackson 1980, xx).

Somewhat earlier than Jackson, the Indonesian journalist and political commentator Pinardi carried out a study of the Garut, Tasikmalaya and Ciamis districts in 1963. His aim was to survey the effects of the DI/TII insurgency on the area and the local people. He found that there had been extensive physical destruction, social dislocation and damage to traditional attitudes and values. There was a general sense of cultural dislocation in the region. In addition, Pinardi examined several villages as informal case studies. The village of Cibugel, on the boundary between Garut and Sumedang district, was a main research location for Pinardi and he conducted several interviews there.³⁸

Pinardi illustrates the political effects on the area immediately after the insurgency. Moreover, as an Indonesian he had an intimate knowledge of local conditions and language and better access to local informants. Conversely, he is clearly a much less impartial source than Jackson. It is clear from Pinardi's description that the traditional authority relationships to which Jackson refers were severely disrupted during the insurgency and had been replaced by the territorial military organisation of TNI. Indeed, by the time of Pinardi's research in 1963 TNI had gained control over almost every aspect of village life. For example, villagers in Sukamaju, to the East of Garut, were still very distrustful

³⁸ Pinardi is a generally unreliable source. His research methods were haphazard and his data often corrupt. For example, he states that Cibugel was attacked and completely destroyed by the insurgents 50 times and that 1400 brick dwellings were destroyed on the first occasion (Pinardi 1964, 200). He also states in one place that the village was destroyed on 23 October 1959 and in another place that this took place on 23 November 1961. In fact, the author's fieldwork confirmed that the village was overrun and sacked on only one occasion, on 23 October 1959. In addition, until the late 1960s the village consisted of bamboo and *atap* huts, never numbering more than 150 buildings and consequently his earlier assertion is unfounded (Fieldnote J22/Sak/1). This is one of several examples of imprecise factual reporting or methodology which qualify the usefulness of Pinardi's work.

of outsiders and interviews were conducted in the presence of government and military officials (Pinardi 1964, 208).

W.F. Wertheim's 1956 study of modernisation in Indonesia emphasised the traditionalist, rural elements in Darul Islam's appeal. While his factual details – particularly dates – are often inaccurate, his conclusions generally support Jackson's and are compatible with other contemporary analyses. Arguing that the DI/TII was led by traditionalist religious teachers, he concludes that

One may detect a protest against both the incursions of a money economy and the growing influence of a class of modern intellectuals and near-intellectuals. The traditional leaders of village society are embittered at a process which is gradually robbing them of their authority. They are able to gather a following of poor peasants who fear their age-old way of life endangered by processes they cannot understand and who are increasingly resentful of what they feel to be an exploitation by the ruling class, which is mostly of *priyayi* origin....this longing for a Paradise Lost is embodied in a fictitious [sic] 'State of Islam' (Darul Islam) as opposed to the present Republic, which is held to be governed by a class of urban unbelievers' (Wertheim 1956, 228).

While Wertheim's analysis of the traditionalist aspects of DI/TII was strongly supported by the author's 1995-96 fieldwork data, his theory does not explain why one particular group of villagers should have chosen to support DI/TII when others did not. Nor does it explain why modernisation resulted in armed conflict in this particular instance. Jackson's results partially explain this, in that he shows how modernisation and traditionalism formed an underlying motivation for the insurgency. Jackson also showed that the personal loyalty of villagers to traditional elites who had repudiated the Republic provided the impetus to the guerrilla conflict.

The other main documentary evidence on the DI/TII insurgency is from military studies carried out in the late 1960s and 1970s. These will be referred to as appropriate in discussing the fieldwork results, but in general they are balanced in their assessment of DI/TII activities and TNI's successes and failures. They do not openly discuss the changing relationship between the central political leadership, local government officials and local military commanders. However, important deductions can be drawn from comments in the official literature.

For example, both official histories of the DI/TII campaign mention the decision by Ibrahim Adjie, West Java military district commander, to hand over S.M. Kartusuwiryo to the central government after his capture on 4 June 1962 (Disjarah TNI-AD 1985, 150; Disjarahdam VI/Siliwangi, 1979). This was not an administrative formality: Adjie was making a clear acknowledgement of Jakarta's authority over the West Java military district, something that his predecessors had not formally done.³⁹ Indeed, the Defence Minister had complained in 1959 that:

³⁹ Adjie was in fact well known for exhibiting a greater degree of loyalty to President Sukarno than the majority of his peers. Indeed, in 1964 he had the phrase *Bung Karno adalah pemimpinku*

It has been commonplace in the various operational areas for local commanders to take independent unilateral action. This method of operation, which is static and lacks a central plan, has clearly allowed both time and space for the development of guerrilla bands and government-in-opposition. The initiative has been held by the enemy, who have greater mobility, allowing them to attack as they please (Puspen AD 1959, 6 - AT).

The defence minister's concerns are illustrated by the history of the elite Army Para-Commando Regiment (*Resimen Para-komando Angkatan Darat*, RPKAD). This unit was formed in April 1952 (without the approval of Army Headquarters) as a special unit of the Siliwangi Division by its commander, COL Alex Kawilarang. Its role was long-range penetration against DI/TII. Kawilarang recruited his own training staff and appointed as the first commander of the unit a naturalised Dutch ex-officer of the KNIL, an associate of Kawilarang's from the KNIL parachute training school at Cimahi. The unit was only integrated into the national Special Forces organisation in March 1953, after it had been in existence for almost a year. RPKAD was employed against DI/TII, PRRI and Permesta, while simultaneously engaging in operations against the Dutch in Irian Jaya and the British in Malaysia (*Kompas*, 16 April 1997). From this, it is clear that the formation, employment and deployment of the unit originated with regional military leaders rather than central leaders, civil or military. The history of RPKAD is hence markedly different from that of most other special operations units in the world, which have almost always originated from central military leaderships based on political direction⁴⁰. RPKAD, significantly, was the forerunner of the Special Forces Command, (*Komando Pasukan Khusus*, KOPASSUS). KOPASSUS has always been largely independent of central military control and, as will be described (see page 110), this had disastrous results in Timor in the late 1990s.

In summary, previous studies of the insurgency provided a framework for the author's fieldwork results, emphasising the importance of traditional authority relationships, social structures and political culture.

FIELDWORK RESULTS

Traditional Authority and Political Culture

The results of the author's fieldwork in West Java in 1995-96 tend to support Jackson's contention that traditional authority patterns were the principal

(Bung Karno is my leader) written into the *Caturlaksana*, the 'four principles' by which all officers in the Siliwangi division were required to govern their behaviour (Jenkins 1984, 3).

⁴⁰ Examples are the US Special Forces, raised in 1961 on specific political direction from President Kennedy; the Special Operations Executive, raised on Churchill's direction in 1940; the South Vietnamese Special Forces (*Luc Luong Dac Biet*, LLDB) raised on direction from President Ngo Dinh Diem and numerous other instances.

influencing factor in the political development of Darul Islam.⁴¹ The Kartusuwiryo family was part of the West Javanese traditional elite, claiming descent from Raden Pateh, a figure of the local Sundanese nobility known for his piety and opposition to external rule. Kartusuwiryo's personal following formed the core of the rebel movement. For example, his personal prestige in the area of Malangbong (his wife's home town) ensured this was one of the strongest centres of DI/TII activity and was pacified last by TNI (Sjariffudin 1962, 16). Kartusuwiryo's wife and eldest son still live in the village. They were unwilling to speak directly to the author about the insurgency. However, during an interview they referred to the struggle of Prince Diponegoro against the Dutch in the 1830's and sought to link their own activities with the tradition of Islamic resistance to non-Javanese secular interference (Fieldnote J18/Ad/1). As part of a traditional elite and as founder of the Sufah institute near Garut in 1937, Kartusuwiryo therefore drew on a long tradition of Islamic insurgency in the Garut region⁴².

In his study of protest movements in rural Java in the colonial period, Sartono Kartodirdjo argues that 'the geographical and economic isolation of the traditional peasant community tended to make it...a bulwark of tradition' (Kartodirdjo 1973, 6). This conservatism took the form of xenophobia, religious absolutism and nativism. The traditional religious elite was able to coopt this conservatism for political ends:

This elite was in fact a major symbol of the traditional order and enjoyed a high standing amongst the rural population. At the village level, it frequently assumed political leadership. Popular belief in their supernatural attributes and magical capacities allowed the religious leaders to exercise charismatic power and by means of such religious institutions as the *pesantren* (village religious school) and the *tarekat* (mystical brotherhood) they could often control the village communities to a considerable degree (Kartodirdjo 1973, 7).

Major revolts against secular authority in West Java were led by local religious elites in Cimareme, Garut, in 1918; Banten in 1926; and Sukamanah in 1944 (Fieldnote J103/P/17). Kyai Zainal Mustafa's revolt against the Japanese at Tasikmalaya has already been noted. These revolts were smaller and less intense than DI/TII, but showed a similar pattern of political authority wielded by local, religious elites, over a politically and culturally traditional peasant society.

⁴¹ This section is primarily based on the results of the author's fieldwork in West Java in 1995 and 1996. It does not exclusively report the results of that fieldwork, however. Where appropriate to the argument secondary sources are adduced for emphasis or comparison.

⁴² In his theological emphasis on *sufi* (a form of Islamic mysticism) Kartusuwiryo also represented a very traditional Sundanese approach to Islam, as distinct from the more modern forms influenced by Middle Eastern culture which are currently prevalent in Aceh, Sulawesi and some other centres of Islam in Indonesia. This reinforces the orthodox, traditionalist nature of DI/TII belief, which in common with Sunni mystical practice emphasised the importance of the *hadith*, the body of Islamic tradition separate to the *q'uran* and which is rejected by more 'fundamentalist' (i.e. modernising) elements within the Shia tradition. Principal geographical areas of Sunni influence are Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The author's 1996 fieldwork showed that the DI/TII insurgency led to a split in the traditional religious elite. Some *kyai* (religious teachers) supported DI/TII, while those who did not were targeted for assassination by the insurgents (Fieldnote J16/IT/1). This in-fighting amongst the religious elite had a profoundly disruptive effect on traditional authority structures in the rural areas and drastically reduced the legitimacy of Darul Islam in the eyes of local village populations. Similarly, as Jackson has shown, personal patron-client relationships within traditional authority structures are stronger than almost any non-ideological challenge. However, when a villager is forced to choose between a traditional elite and a traditional ideology, a great deal of stress and conflict is generated. Many of Jackson's respondents in his 1968 Garut valley study were unable to state categorically whom they would support in such a situation (Jackson 1973, 387).

As an example of this, one respondent during the author's fieldwork (IT⁴³, a woman of 60 from the village of Tarogong, North of Garut) the daughter of an *ulama* (local religious teacher), stated that her father had been asked to join DI/TII but refused and was then targeted for assassination. He survived and local villagers credited this to his miraculous powers (*ilmu gaib*). This gave him great authority in the local community and by the end of the campaign, the Tarogong area was strongly anti-DI/TII (Fieldnote J16/IT/1). Thus, DI/TII terror had backfired by forcing local people to choose between loyalty to the *ulama* and adherence to DI/TII demands. Where religious obligation coincided with loyalty to the traditional *village* elite, it was strong enough to overcome demands based on religious obligation from *outside* the village.

Jackson does not emphasise concrete examples to address changes in a village's political loyalty following decapitation of the traditional authority group. However, he does theorise that 'the systematic slaughter of village leaders can create such intense feelings of physical insecurity that individuals and groups will perceive the insurgents, rather than the central government, as the superior source of protection' (Jackson 1980, 16). The author's fieldwork results tended to indicate that where this occurs the village will reorganise its political structure by forming a new authority group, which may lead in turn to a shift in loyalties. Darul Islam initially showed a talent for well-targeted political assassination. However, towards the end of the campaign indiscriminate assassination had serious negative effects on DI/TII popular appeal. The reaction of Cibugel villagers to this indiscriminate terror, for example, was to become more stubbornly loyal to the Republic (Fieldnote J22/Sak/1).

Using the classification of political culture proposed by Almond and Verba (see above page 29), Darul Islam was led by *participants*, while its lower strata

⁴³ Names of local Indonesian and Timorese respondents in the fieldwork data are expressed as code letters to ensure the privacy and safety of individuals who gave information confidentially. Respondents' names are available on request provided that good intent can be shown and confidentiality guaranteed. The reliability and authoritative basis for respondents' information are shown in Table 0.1 and 0.2 in the preface (see page ix).

showed a generally *subject*-oriented political culture. The leadership comprised members of the Islamic religious elite, who had been denied a controlling voice in the new nation because of the decision to form a secular Republic of Indonesia. Jackson's comment on the DI parallel hierarchy, quoted earlier, emphasises this. S.M. Kartusuwiryo himself had been a leader in *Sarekat Islam*, an associate of Sukarno and a member of the Japanese-controlled *Djawa Hokokai* during the occupation. Early in the War of Independence, he was disillusioned with the secularist Republican Government, but still willing to participate in the political process. Indeed, he was offered the post of Defence Minister in the second Sjariffudin cabinet but declined, as he was committed to the development of Darul Islam's forces in West Java (Sjariffudin 1962, 6). This may seem to be treasonable activity – declining a post with one's national armed forces because one is too busy raising one's own – but in the conditions of the time it was not so. As has been shown, there were numerous multifarious groups fighting the Dutch and even the regular TNI was neither formed by the central civilian government nor (often) acting on its direction. Thus, it is not certain that Kartusuwiryo considered himself an enemy of the Republic at this stage. However, when the Republic abandoned West Java to the Dutch after the Renville Agreement and consolidated its forces in Central Java, Kartusuwiryo's avenue to participation was blocked. Had he stayed loyal to the Republic, he would have lost his personal support base. He therefore established an independent state, army and policies of his own. Again, it should be remembered that there were at least a dozen other states in the Indonesian archipelago at this time, of which the Republic was only one – and not the strongest. The longevity and robustness of the Darul Islam in the face of increasing Republican hegemony *after* the War was perhaps its main offence in the eyes of the Republic, rather than its initial opposition or independence.

The rank-and-file membership of DI consisted principally of members of the traditional authority group of a particular leader, or *pesantren/tarekat* members whose allegiance was ideological. They thus exhibited a *subject* political culture, in which their perception of the political process was mediated through the personal views of their traditional leaders and the esoteric appeal to theological ideology. Although aware of the broader political process, they sought to influence it only as members of a political grouping directed by their traditional-religious leaders.

Within West Java, some villages demonstrated a *parochial* political culture and preferred to be left alone as much as possible, while many other villages exhibited a *subject* political culture. Thus, when TNI appeared to abandon West Java to the Dutch in 1948, a large number of villages swung to the DI/TII side seeking protection. Conversely, indiscriminate DI/TII terror during the 'Total Guerrilla War' phase of the insurgency turned many of these *subject* villages to the government side. On a day-to-day basis, the overall allegiance of villagers to TNI or DI/TII forces was probably influenced by the attitudes of leaders within the traditional authority structure identified by Jackson.

By comparison, the Mau-Mau insurgency in Kenya during the same period was spread by superstition and fear generated by traditional shamanistic ceremonies. There was an element of this in Darul Islam also, as has been noted above. For example, Kartodirdjo emphasises that the cultural climate of peasant revolt in Java was likely to include fetishism (the use of amulets and talismans), a cult of invulnerability, the worship of saints and prognosticism. He also notes the prominence of religious institutions in insurgent organisations in Java (Kartodirdjo 1973,10). All these elements were present in varying degrees in Darul Islam. Many local villagers perceived DI/TII members as having supernatural powers and S.M. Kartusuwiryo himself gained great prestige through his reputation for personal piety. Most members of DI/TII carried *jimat* (amulets) for protection⁴⁴.

This characteristic of the political culture was turned against DI/TII by its own actions in plundering the population during the phase of Total Guerrilla War, however. The greed and violence of DI/TII raiding parties undermined confidence in the movement's piety, as did Kartusuwiryo's personal wealth, which was highlighted in Republican propaganda. Ricklefs concludes that:

Darul Islam government was based upon Islamic law and administered by *kyais*. Much of its local support came, however, from devotion to the charismatic Kartusuwiryo...As the years passed, Darul Islam became progressively more difficult to distinguish from simple banditry, extortion and terrorism on a grand scale (Ricklefs 1993, 227-28).

TNI propaganda attempted to discredit the insurgents' piety, emphasise the Islamic orthodoxy of the troops conducting COIN and build a close relationship with local people. TNI developed rules of conduct that are remarkably similar to those adopted by the British in Malaya during the same period:

1. Never offend local people.
2. Every statement must be proven by actions.
3. Be 'clean' and responsible towards Allah.
4. Our enemies are the DI/TII, not the local people.
5. We must be patient and kind towards the local people (Disjarah TNI-AD 1985, 131)⁴⁵

These rules of conduct allowed TNI to seize the 'moral high ground' in regard to local traditional beliefs and authority patterns and thus to undermine DI/TII influence.

⁴⁴ This tendency is not, of course, unique to DI/TII. Members of the Timorese Clandestine Front carried a red and black amulet, similar to a Catholic scapular, confirming their membership of the front and in memory of the victims of the Santa Cruz massacre. These amulets (known as *ilas* or *kakaluk* in Timor) were treated with religious respect (Fieldnote T47/AF/1).

⁴⁵ These rules are also remarkably similar to Mao Tse-tung's 'Eight Points of Attention'. See Mao (1964,343).

In summary, traditional authority structures, religious ideology and aspects of parochial political culture played an important role in the DI/TII insurgency. The side best able to take over the functional role of the traditional village elite and to exploit the characteristics of political and ideological culture, tended to have the initiative. In the early stages, this was undoubtedly the insurgent movement, but by 1961, TNI began to dominate and was ultimately successful.

Perceptions of DI/TII

Perception of DI/TII varied, but some general trends were identifiable. Civilian informants in Jakarta and Bandung tended to believe that the DI/TII movement was still very much alive (in 1996) in an ideological, if not a military sense. These respondents also believed there was widespread support for an Islamic state among the rural population of West Java (Fieldnotes J1/W/1, J6/Y/1, J7/T/1). Although at the time there was little evidence for such claims, subsequent events during the fall of the New Order regime in 1998 indicated that Islam was still a powerful motivating factor for Sundanese groups. In 1999 and 2000 Islamic 'militia' groups (*laskar jihad*) arose in West Java and conducted military training south-east of Jakarta, then travelled to Maluku and engaged in violence against Christians. This spontaneously formed movement, sometimes calling itself *Hisbullah*, consciously harked back to the earlier *lasykar* and *Hizbullah* of the occupation period and to the *strijdtorganisatie* of the War of Independence, both contributing groups to DI/TII. During the author's 1996 fieldwork, however, respondents in Garut and the surrounding areas were more evenly split on the issue of current support for an Islamic state. All military informants stated that DI/TII was completely extinct, whereas several civilian informants felt that there was still an ideological attachment to DI/TII among the local people. These informants were adamant that there was no practical desire for such a state. However, it must be remembered that in the ideological climate of 1996 the open expression of such sentiments was particularly risky.⁴⁶

Certain respondents in Garut perceived that DI/TII had originally been soundly based and that its ideals had not been essentially in conflict with those of the Republic. These informants were strongly Islamic and believed that DI/TII had been a 'good' organisation during the War of Independence, but had then been penetrated by PKI elements and perverted into an instrument of anti-Islamic and anti-Republican terror. Thus, it had to be defeated and purged of PKI elements, but the remaining ex-guerrillas were not bad or dangerous. Rather, they were to be pitied as they had been deceived by the common Communist enemy (Fieldnotes J15/ET/1, J16/IT/1, J17/N/1).

This view is entirely absent from official documentary records or from contemporary writings. It would also seem illogical given the well-documented clashes between PKI and DI/TII and between Sundanese Islamic peasants and

⁴⁶ Sources for this information were numerous and included J9/F/2, J11/Suk/1, J15/ET/1, J17/N/1, J19/SD/1, J23/A/1, J27/KK/1, J28/AM/1, J30/DS/1, J37/E/2, J39/Ny/1 and J41/Ru/1.

PKI land reform cadres in the 1960s (Crouch, 1978). This view may have developed among Islamic villagers loyal to the government, to reduce the ideological stress generated by a clash between traditional elite loyalties and religious obligation. Of course, these respondents may simply have been unacknowledged supporters of DI/TII and hence seeking to justify it. Alternatively, this version of events may have been deliberately fostered by the central government. This would have encouraged the swift and complete re-integration of ex-DI/TII members into local society, whilst blaming their excesses on the left-wing scapegoat of the PKI⁴⁷. Indeed, Sloan remarks of the suppression of the PKI that

throughout Java, the reaffirmation of traditional values took place with the call for Islamic solidarity against the real or imaginary threat of the Communist Party. The village *ulama* (scholar) used the anti-Communist drive as a means of reasserting the vitality of traditionally held beliefs in the face of the forces of modernization that were penetrating the countryside (1971, 71).

A perception common to respondents in Bandung and the Garut valley was that PKI were far more savage in their attacks on local villagers than were DI/TII. This is not the case: casualty figures for the DI/TII insurgency are much higher than those of the PKI's Land Reform campaign in West Java in 1963-4. In addition, contemporary documentation highlights the savagery of DI/TII terror during the period of 'Total Guerrilla War' in 1959-62 (Disjarahdam VI/Siliwangi, 1979; Disjarah TNI-AD, 1985). There was no comparable PKI terror in West Java; indeed, the only comparable bloodletting in this region occurred as part of the *anti*-PKI campaign of 1965-66. Nonetheless, many respondents considered DI/TII misguided religious fanatics, whereas PKI were monstrous terrorists who got what they deserved (for example, Fieldnote J24/Suk/3). Again, this perception may have developed spontaneously as an antidote to ideological anxiety about DI/TII, or it may have been deliberately generated by the government. In any case, there is a striking difference between public perception of ex-PKI members compared with ex-DI/TII members. DI/TII are more or less fully re-integrated into society. By contrast, in 1996 – 30 years after PKI's suppression – those Garut villagers with even the slightest PKI connections were still held under virtual house arrest in several 'secret' villages in the valley (Fieldnotes J15/ET/1, J20/Suk/2).

Control of the Local Population by the Military

There is clear evidence from the fieldwork that TNI control over the local population increased significantly during the course of the insurgency and remained after it was over.

⁴⁷ There is insufficient evidence from the present fieldwork to support this contention. Nonetheless, a similar approach was used by the government in the anti-Chinese riots in Bandung in 1966 and 1973, both of which – according to Emmerson (1976, 226) – were racially motivated but blamed on the PKI. The PRD incident of 27 July 1996 also resulted in similar efforts.

In the first phase of the insurgency, none of the three competing forces controlled the population. KNIL/KL forces were based in cities and towns, but were unable to control rural areas effectively. Large 'pockets' controlled by DI/TII existed in rural areas, especially in the mountains around Garut and Malangbong, while other forces including TNI also controlled some areas. KNIL/KL even had difficulty controlling major urban centres: one of the key DI/TII planning meetings of this period took place in the Preanger Hotel in the centre of Bandung, the provincial capital (Disjarah TNI-AD 1985, 80). TNI was not the only, or even the principal force opposing the KNIL/KL in the province. For example:

By the end of November 1948 the TNI had reached a strength of 6,000 in occupied West Java. In addition, an independent Islamic Army of some 12,000 men and a number of semi-autonomous combat groups [principally leftist or student organisations] totalling around 9,000 men were operating in the area (Groen 1986, 82).

After the second Dutch Police Action in December 1948, TNI re-infiltrated West Java to conduct guerrilla warfare against the Dutch. They were generally unable to wrest control of the countryside from DI/TII. After the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the Republic of Indonesia, TNI inherited all former Dutch military camps, equipment and positions. Thus, TNI inherited control over the towns and lowland areas, while DI/TII retained control of isolated regions and the highlands. As a result, in the second phase of the insurgency, TNI controlled most of the urban population and major town centres, whereas DI/TII exercised effective control, through its shadow government, over the rural population.

During the third phase, TNI began to gain control over the rural population. TNI strategy was to clear rebel sanctuary areas from west to east, thus cutting DI/TII off from sources of Islamic support in Sumatra and pushing them into a blocking force on the inter-provincial boundary to the east. Terrain played a major part in these operations. Because the terrain of West Java consists of a series of isolated jungle-covered hill complexes surrounded by a sea of cleared, cultivated lowlands, it became possible for TNI to encircle each insurgent sanctuary area in turn.

TNI developed a new set of COIN tactics in late 1958.⁴⁸ These tactics were developed by a committee of experienced staff officers and commanders from the Siliwangi Division, based in Bandung. For most of the 1950s and 1960s, this Division was the elite strike force of TNI. It was one of the most professional and regular formations at a time when other divisions were characterised by a disdain for central authority coupled with a high degree of loyalty to local commanders. Siliwangi was not radically different in this regard, however its internal cohesion was greater so that provided the commander was loyal to

⁴⁸ The following section, unless otherwise acknowledged, is taken from TNI official histories, in particular Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD (1985) *Penumpasan Pemberontakan DI/TII S.M. Kartusuwiryo di Jawa Barat*, Jakarta, Puspenad – author's translation throughout.

Jakarta the loyalty of his troops could be taken more or less for granted. However, as has been seen, Siliwangi officers themselves were not averse to independent action when it suited them – the formation of RPKAD being an example. The Siliwangi plan, known as *Rencana Pokok* (Outline Plan) 2.1, developed a *pokok pelaksanaan pemulihan keamanan* (loosely, pacification strategy) known as P4K. This was based on the notion of ‘defeating the enemy’s ability to manoeuvre, until the enemy is restricted into certain discrete areas, which can then be cleared area by area’ (Disjarah TNI-AD 1985, 129 – AT).

P4K divided West Java into areas of operations (*daerah operasi*, DO), categorised as type A (normalised security situation), B (TNI dominated, but guerrilla action ongoing) and C (fully dominated by DI/TII). Most major towns in West Java were ‘A’ areas, most rural lowland districts were ‘B’ areas. By contrast, at the outset of the strategy in 1959 virtually every forested hill-mass in the province was a ‘C’ area, or guerrilla base. The areas between ‘C’ areas were declared destruction zones (*daerah perhancuran*), loosely equating to the free-fire zones later employed in Timor and elsewhere. In these areas all movement was assumed to be enemy, infrastructure was destroyed, villages fortified or evacuated and surveillance and cordon activities established. The aim was to defeat DI/TII manoeuvre by restricting their ability to move from one ‘C’ area to another. Simultaneously, by denying the guerrillas the ability to communicate (by courier) with either the local people or the other base areas, TNI attacked the guerrillas’ popular support and C² systems.

Operations began in Banten district, which was cleared of guerrillas after six months – a stunning success given the preceding decade of failure in the counter-insurgency. The operation then moved on to Bogor, then to the high country north of Bandung. A two-battalion sweep using 328 and 330 Battalions of the Siliwangi Division (later elite KOSTRAD battalions) then pushed TII forces eastward into the Pengalengan, G. Malabar and G. Rakutak area to the immediate west of the Garut basin. Major fighting occurred with the increasingly desperate insurgents as their base areas were constricted and their supplies cut. The most intense of these was the contact and pursuit of a major TII force under Kartusuwiryo’s principal lieutenant Toha Mahfud by 328 Battalion. DI/TII strongholds were attacked in turn, with strong emphasis on winning over the local people, raising local militia to defend villages and using the population as sources of information about the guerrillas. An intensive propaganda and public information campaign was directed specifically at the traditional elites of undecided or parochial villages. Regular consultation occurred between local military leaders and the traditional elite, particularly religious leaders.

By March 1962, DI/TII had been restricted to its original base area in the hills surrounding the Garut basin. TNI was now poised to complete the pacification of the province. The intent was to complete this by December 1962, through two major operations, ‘Brata Yudha’ and ‘Pamungkas’. By this time there were only four remaining DI/TII base areas, at Galunggung, Guntur/Bukit Guru, Rengas/Maroco and Cimareme – the principal hills of the case study area. For

'Brata Yudha', the military district commands of Central Java and East Java formed a coordinated force under operational control of Siliwangi Division, forming a blocking force on the inter-provincial border. This was an unprecedented degree of cohesion and cooperation within TNI and was occasioned at least partially by tighter central political control under the Guided Democracy system. Moreover, the spectacular collapse of the insurgency following the adoption of the P4K strategy had given an enormous boost to TNI morale and cohesion.

The final collapse of DI/TII came sooner than expected. 328 Battalion had been directed into the last remaining 'C' area to find rebel routes and tracks. On 4 April 1962, they located tracks near G. Agung. A four-man patrol from A Coy 328 Battalion contacted 60 guerrillas returning from a raid, pursued them and eventually located two major guerrilla camps. These were encircled by B and D companies, then attacked by A Coy. The insurgents fled into ambushes laid by the encircling troops, suffering several casualties. This operation, in effect, represented a large-scale example of the 'camp attack' tactic used by British forces in Malaya, although it was clearly independently developed. By keeping pressure on the area, using *pagar betis* (to be discussed below) the guerrillas were isolated in the one remaining area of jungle available to them. Without supply or support, the insurgency began to collapse and several important DI/TII leaders surrendered.


C Company of 328 Battalion had been tasked to pursue and locate S.M. Kartusuwiryo, who was known to be hiding somewhere in the encircled area. On 4 June 1962, 2 Platoon under Lieutenant Suhanda, following local information tracked the guerrillas to Kartusuwiryo's hiding place, attacked the camp and captured him alive. In interview, Suhanda was very reticent to discuss details of the capture with the author (Fieldnote J126/P/25) but it is clear that Kartusuwiryo was not mistreated, although he was very ill at the time of his capture. He was taken to Bandung where he signed a letter to all DI/TII ordering their surrender. He was eventually tried by a national court and executed, but this took several months and in the interim he was well-treated. Following Kartusuwiryo's capture the insurgency collapsed very rapidly, all organised resistance ceasing within a few months. The TNI official history ascribes this to the traditional hierarchical element within DI/TII and the cult of invincibility which had surrounded Kartusuwiryo: '...the insurgency was not completely based on ideology. Rather, it was partially based on elements of personal charisma, so that after the key leaders surrendered, their troops followed their example quickly and easily' (Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD 1985, 145 – AT).

As can be seen, the P4K strategy sought to isolate each successive guerrilla stronghold by surrounding it from the lowland areas. TNI thus overcame the problems of terrain and manpower by mobilising the population of several low-lying villages, then encircling a rebel-held hill feature using the civilians as a cordon, supported by troops. This tactic negated the DI/TII's terrain advantage, while giving TNI political control over the local population. The originality of

this notion is not immediately apparent, but it represents a unique TNI contribution to COIN tactics, as will be shown.

The cordon method is illustrated at Figure 3.2. TNI section posts were positioned approximately 1-200m apart, depending on terrain. Between them, a single line of civilians camped in static positions in the jungle or on the jungle edge, stiffened by police, civil defence, or members of the Village Security Organisation (*Organisasi Keamanan Desa*, OKD). Each family or local area was responsible to maintain a certain number of people in the cordon. Villagers serving in the cordon would carry food sufficient for 3-5 days, after which they would be relieved and return home. After a period of isolation designed to starve the insurgents, a TNI strike force would then enter the sanctuary area and destroy the insurgent group or force it onto the cordon where it could be destroyed in the open. This tactic, known as *pagar betis*⁴⁹, was developed specifically as part of the P4K strategy and in response to the problems posed by the geography of West Java (Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD, 1985).

Figure 3.2
Pagar Betis Cordon and Search Technique



⁴⁹ Literally 'fence of calves' (*betis* means the calf or lower part of the leg). More usually, particularly in its East Timorese variation, it has been translated as 'fence of legs'.

A variation noted by Jackson was to march the civilian cordon slowly up the mountain, forcing DI/TII to fire on the civilians. After drawing fire, TNI reserves would attack through the cordon (Jackson 1980, 18). This was ruthlessly effective: the DI had to choose between remaining static and being captured, or firing on their own people. Even if they succeeded in breaking out of the cordon, they would have been forced to attack local civilians and thus to erode their own popular support base. DI/TII guerrillas spoke with Jackson of the effectiveness of *pagar betis* in demoralising DI/TII insurgents, who often knew civilians in the cordon (1980, 18). This was confirmed by the author's fieldwork, in interviews with former guerrillas who considered this tactic a main factor in TNI success (Fieldnote J25/M/1).

From the TNI point of view, the strengths of the technique are clear. First, by using civilian personnel for cordon and garrison tasks, TNI freed its troops from static security locations and allowed the creation of mobile strike forces that could operate in the rebel sanctuary areas without being tied to fixed positions. This also allowed it to sidestep the problems of numerical strength which have led military analysts to posit a ratio of 10:1 in favour of the government for a successful COIN campaign (O'Neill 1990, 70). Second, the system gave the military a high degree of control over local people and village leaders:

'Yes, the local people really were volunteers, because you could not do a thing like *pagar betis* with unwilling people – they would just let the insurgents [*lit.* GPK] through [the cordon]. People's main reason for volunteering was hatred of the rebels, caused by the continual disruption and pillaging of villages. Volunteers would be gathered from nearby villages but also from faraway locations such as Garut itself and formed into a cordon around the rebel area. The spacing between men would be about 5m, with every 100m or so a section of troops. In the lines themselves, would be a mixture of OKD, police, TNI and local civilians'. (Fieldnote J13/An/1).

Whether or not they joined the cordon willingly, once in position the civilians were effectively hostages; they relied on military transport to return to their villages and they could only return once other villagers had relieved them. The relationship between TNI and local leaders was cemented by regular 'consultation' meetings, which in fact allowed TNI local commanders to pressure civilian leaders into more extensive cooperation (Disjarah TNI-AD 1985, 135). Thus, the military was able to control large numbers of people, improve its freedom of manoeuvre and strike into the insurgents' base areas, without deploying prohibitively large numbers of troops. Nonetheless the logistic support for such a large group of people in the cordon was difficult. The following description of a *pagar betis* operation was given to the author by a TNI Captain of the territorial staff at Garut:

...The main problem was that of supply. The whole idea of *pagar betis* was to cut off rebel lines of communications and supply lines to the lowlands and thereby weaken them so that a strike force could go in, or else so that they would surrender. The problem was that people in the lines would get hungry and their alertness would drop. Nowadays [1996], in East Timor, they use the technique of supply drops by parachute, but at that time they had no external support. In fact, the operation at Mt

Haruman [in which my parents took part] was unsuccessful, mainly due to the supply problem. They could not send in a supply force on foot because of the terrain and distances involved and they did not have [the] resources for any other supply methods (Fieldnote J/13/An/1).

Third, the system allowed pacified lowland areas to be expanded until they linked up, as rebel sanctuaries were constricted. The civilian population was thus removed from DI/TII influence and placed under the influence of the National Government. Almost immediately an area was 'normalised' (i.e. pacified), a massive development program would begin, in which the government would seek to show the local people that prosperity and stability were on the side of the Republic. The figures in Table 3.3 are representative of the fast pace of development in newly secure areas.

These figures were compiled by the author from development statistics in the archives of the Siliwangi Division. In themselves, the totals have little significance, but they do indicate the importance TNI placed on material development and bringing measurable lifestyle improvements to the local people. This, it was felt, would reinforce the impression that their decision to support the government had been wise. An essential aspect of this development program was involvement by the local population in military-sponsored economic enterprises. For example, the Siliwangi Division established the Siliwangi Institute (*Yayasan Siliwangi*) in 1963. This consisted of eleven enterprises including printing, transport, animal husbandry, a tobacco plantation, tea plantations, a bakery and ice factory, hotels, banks and a newspaper (Disjarahdam VI/Siliwangi 1979, 354). Thus, TNI gained economic leverage over the people, gave them an interest in opposing the insurgency and reduced the economic and political underdevelopment that had contributed to DI/TII's initial popularity.

Table 3.3
Military-assisted Development Statistics for West Java
September 1962 to June 1963

<u>Buildings Repaired/Constructed</u>	<u>Stock/ Crops Distributed</u>	<u>Agricultural Infrastructure Assistance</u>	<u>Transport and Industrial Infrastructure</u>
Houses 24 545 Mosques 31 310 Schools 372 Markets 32 Village halls 103 Religious Affairs Office 1 Polyclinics 2 Washing areas 11 Racecourses 10 Village Council offices 2 Guardhouse 1 Teachers House 1 Factory 1	Sheep/cattle 1924 Chickens 655 Fish 39 108 Coffee trees 39 500 Tea bushes 24 000 Padi 4550 kg Potatoes 2500 kg Beans 2000 kg Peanuts 17 000 kg Corn 175 000 ears Uncooked rice 430 378 kg	Fishponds 80 Sawah/ladang 12,575 ha Grazing farms 2 Levee bank 152 km Bags of cement 15700 Nails 53 480 kg	Dams 269 Bridges 353 Road 917 km Water pipe 720 km Trees 108226

Sources: Disjarahdam VI/Siliwangi 1979, 353 and unpublished development reports in the archives of the Musium Mandala Wangsit Siliwangi.

Development was patchy, but this was due to inefficiencies in organisation and distribution, rather than an attempt to punish ex-DI villages. Official Indonesian sources state that once a village had demonstrated loyalty to the Republic, it received development assistance regardless of previous loyalties. However, this contention is somewhat undermined by the example of Cibugel, which was a small and poor highland village before the insurgency. As has been seen, despite numerous severe attacks by DI/TII it remained loyal to the Republic. After the conflict Cibugel was rewarded with enormous development assistance to the extent that it is now one of the largest and most prosperous villages in its area (Fieldnote J22/Sak/1). Despite this, during Jackson and Pinardi's research the area of the case study was still significantly underdeveloped by comparison to other parts of Java and poverty was commonplace (Jackson 1980, 54). From this, it can be deduced that the development program associated with the end of the insurgency was commenced no earlier than 1963 and possibly as late as 1969 and that it particularly favoured villages with a creditable 'war record', but in a somewhat haphazard fashion influenced strongly by the personal preferences of local commanders, particularly Babinsa.

By the end of the campaign every village in the area had a NCO Village Manager (*Bintara Pembina Desa*, Babinsa) responsible for co-ordination with the village chief (*lurah*) on all matters relating to development and security. Many respondents saw the Babinsa as the *de facto* leader of the village. Babinsas themselves tended to perceive their role as that of guidance and mobilisation of the local population. Some believed that they were inheritors of a Dutch system established in the 19th century⁵⁰ (Fieldnotes J13/An/1, J14/San/1, J19/SD/1, J21/SS/1, J37/E/2). On the other hand, civilian respondents viewed the *babinsa* and *lurah* as essentially co-equal, while the *babinsa* tended to exercise more effective day-to-day control over the villagers.

At the higher level, each district within the civil administrative system was paralleled by a military headquarters responsible for the same area. This ensured TNI had full control over all population centres. It was a valid COIN technique similar to the War Executive Committee system established by General Templer during the Malayan Emergency (FARELF 1952, 60). This high degree of control, coupled with the introduction of Martial Law in 1959 and the establishment of the system of Guided Democracy, led Morris Janowitz in 1964 to assess Indonesia as military-controlled, immediately after the end of the insurgency:

When the military expands its political activity and becomes a political bloc, the civilian leadership remains in power only because of the military's passive assent or active assistance. The extent of political competition decreases; and it is appropriate to

⁵⁰ This is partially correct; as will be demonstrated, the Dutch police brigade system had some similarities to the current village system. The most important influence, however, was the Japanese local security system of the occupation period (see above page 32). This did not effectively spread to DI/TII areas until after the end of the insurgency.

describe such a pattern as a civil-military coalition, because of the crucial role of the armed forces. Here the military serves as an active political bloc in its support of civilian parties and other bureaucratic power groups. The civilian group is in power because of the assistance of the military. Indonesia provides an example of such political intervention (Janowitz, 1964, 7).

As has been shown, TNI's initially negligible control over the local population improved through each phase of the insurgency. TNI then cemented this control during an extremely rapid burst of development in the province after the campaign and has maintained control to the present day.

A significant illustration of the persistence of military-dominated authority relationships in West Java is given by Nugroho Notosusanto:

...our commander and superiors had contacts with the more important people in the village, the *lurah* and his 'cabinet', the *ulama*, [and] the village elders. Most of these 'higher' contacts have been maintained up to the present time [1980] either through correspondence, deputations from the village to the city, or conversely *ajangsana* [reunion visits]. ...I have witnessed several times at the home or office of the late *Seskoed* [Army Staff College] commandant General Suwanto. He used to have visitors from his former *daerah gerilya* (guerrilla locality) in Priangan Timur [the Garut region]. They would put grievances against the local authorities or asked [sic] for a new road or a bridge or a new school building, or a mosque, much as an American citizen would do to his congressman or an Australian citizen to his MP. And Suwanto would do his best to bring the grievances as well as the proposal to the proper channels to be processed further, because the deputation would come again to ask for the results. It was amusing to hear these people calling him *Pak Mayor* [i.e. Major] after he had already become a Major General (Notosusanto 1980, 124-5).

Despite Notosusanto's comparison of this authority relationship to representative government in western democracies, there are clear differences. For one thing, these villagers already had an MP to go to – their local member of the Provincial Parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*, DPRD). Instead, they chose to seek representation through their former military commander. Suwanto had established an informal power structure based on a close, enduring relationship with members of the village traditional political and religious elite, which superseded the formal legislative power structure. In Jackson's terms, Suwanto had established a patron-client relationship with the village leaders. This gave him control over the village leaders, while placing upon him obligations of loyalty and assistance that cut across legislative hierarchies or political institutions. By the establishment of this patron-client relationship, Suwanto had become the *de facto* representative of the village to the Provincial Government and the village had become his constituency. Notosusanto's findings also confirm the enduring nature of the relationships studied by Jackson. While Jackson provides historical evidence for the persistence of patron-client relationships, his research is synchronous and hence represents a snapshot of political organisation in West Java in the mid-1960s.

Notosusanto's observations confirm empirically the conclusions drawn by Jackson's study and are in turn supported by the author's 1996 fieldwork⁵¹.

Autonomy of Local Commanders

The increasing success of TNI during the 1950s paralleled the decreasing autonomy of local commanders *vis-a-vis* the central military leadership. Initially, each local military commander had acted on his own as he saw fit:

In practice, as Dutch observations showed, circumstances forced the TNI commanders of units of 10-200 men to be allowed great freedom in carrying out general directives as they thought best. According to the same observations, the semi-autonomous/regional combat groups in West Java may well have recognised the authority of the republican leaders in name, but refused to be incorporated into, or even at times to work together with TNI guerrilla units. The autonomous Islamic guerrilla groups in West Java [including but not restricted to DI/TII] operated completely independently of the Republic (Groen 1986, 83).

Professor Groen confirms that Dutch forces suffered the same decentralised C² structure while fighting DI/TII and TNI in West Java during the first phase of the insurgency. She considers that Dutch divisional and brigade commanders found it increasingly difficult to control their subordinates. Battalion and company commanders increasingly took action on their own initiative without direction from higher headquarters. By the end of the campaign, KL local commanders were effectively out of the control of the senior leadership (Groen, interview NL1/PG/1).

In the case of TNI the central military leadership in Yogyakarta and later Jakarta, had nominal authority over local military leaders but exercised little operational control. Early operations against DI/TII were mounted by local commanders on their own initiative, without central co-ordination; they often drove the insurgents from one area into another without reducing their overall effectiveness. As Jackson found, 'repeatedly, the public was assured that the Darul Islam had been eliminated from an area, only to find, after the successful TNI sweep, that the guerrillas had returned to their mountain bivouacs to begin raiding again' (1980, 18).

As discussed on page 13 above, O'Neill (1990) identifies typical authority structures within guerrilla movements as hierarchical, pyramidal, or segmentary. He assumes that the insurgents will face a technologically superior government with full control over the state administrative apparatus. As we have seen, at least initially this did not apply to DI/TII. The DI administrative

⁵¹ During the author's 1996 fieldwork, visits to the Garut District Military Command (*Komando Distrik Militer*, KODIM) were essential to organise interview clearance. Part of the work of the KODIM staff, at that time, was preparation for the May 1997 elections. KODIM headquarters had compiled detailed timetables for electoral information campaigns, polling, scrutineering and administration of electoral rolls. They were also concerned with the security of ballot boxes and polling points. These tasks, while more familiar to Western readers as the role of a civilian Electoral Commission, illustrate the high degree of control by TNI over the political activity of the local population (Fieldnote J12/Tj/1).

apparatus was, if anything, more effective and more legitimate in the eyes of the local population than that of the Republic. Because TNI was still evolving from a guerrilla force into a regular army, it was in transition to the formal hierarchical power structure that characterises most regular armies. Indeed Nasution, writing in 1953, laments at length the effects of 'guerrilla-mania' – a lack of discipline or centralised planning and unwillingness by local commanders to accept central directives (Nasution, 1953).

Rather, TNI for much of the insurgency exhibited an informal, pyramidal power structure. Factionalism between ex-PETA and ex-KNIL officers in the army high command led to a series of power struggles and the establishment of multiple centres of loyalty and authority within TNI. Regional commanders did not necessarily acknowledge the authority of TNI headquarters and indeed in 1958-59 many provincial military commanders were in open revolt against Jakarta, in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion (Crouch, 1978; Stevenson 1964, 115).

Nasution's success in suppressing PRRI/Permesta gave him the necessary prestige to unite the armed forces. Indeed, the revolt itself brought down the system of Parliamentary Democracy, to be replaced by martial law and Guided Democracy. In this system greater political unity and stability at the central level allowed TNI to plan and execute an overall strategy to combat the insurgency. Thus by 1961-62 the political structure of TNI was formalised and near-hierarchical, although it still had pyramidal or even segmentary characteristics, especially in the relatively high autonomy of provincial commanders and their remaining influence in the informal power structure.

Conversely, DI/TII started the insurgency as a hierarchical structure, with strict lines of theocratic, political and military authority from Kartusuwiryo as Imam, through a political and military committee system to the lowest level. By 1960, TNI's success in isolating guerrilla sanctuaries through *pagar betis* forced Kartusuwiryo to abdicate central control, declare 'Total Guerrilla War' and leave individual commanders in the now-isolated base areas to carry on independently. The 'parallel hierarchy' of guerrilla government thus broke down, DI/TII lost control of the population and was forced to operate from sanctuary areas and prey on its natural supporters, the highland villagers. This further eroded support for the movement and allowed TNI to extend its control over the population. By the end of the insurgency, DI/TII consisted of roving bands of guerrillas operating independently in isolated areas of mountainous jungle, without a coherent command structure. The power structure, rather than merely segmentary, had become entirely dysfunctional.

Another relevant aspect of power structure is administrative boundaries. Indonesian administrative maps show that inter-district military and political boundaries tend to follow the summit ridges of major hill features (see for example C.V. Pradika, *Jawa Barat* 1: 500 000). This system, inherited from the NEI, was well suited to peacetime administration since the bulk of the population lived in valleys, whereas mountain areas were sparsely populated. This created problems during the insurgency, however, because of the initially

low level of political integration in the province. As has been seen, a segmentary power structure existed, in which local military commanders conducted their own independent military operations according to local or personal priorities. DI/TII, on the other hand, based its administrative organisation on topographical features so that its boundaries coincided with areas of mountainous jungle. This allowed the insurgents to operate from mountain bases straddling several government administrative regions, while the national government was unable to mount an effective response. This would have required a level of co-operation between local officials that the central leadership initially lacked the authority to enforce (see Disjarah TNI-AD 1985, 126ff; and Puspen AD 1959, 6).

The transition to Guided Democracy in 1957-59 and the increasing integration of military and civilian bureaucracy, led to a much more effective response to the insurgency. Military regions corresponding to topographical and political reality were created and a combined civil and military strategy was developed (Disjarah TNI-AD 1985, 137).

Thus, fieldwork results indicate that the cohesion and organisational power structure within each of the rival military forces altered over the course of the insurgency. While TNI developed from informal segmentary/pyramidal structures toward a formal hierarchy, DI/TII declined from a cohesive formal hierarchical structure to a segmentary and ultimately dysfunctional one. Further, administrative and military boundaries were rationalised by TNI as its power structures developed; this allowed more effective central direction.

Geographical Factors

Effects of Topography on the Insurgency

As explained in the geographical overview (see Appendix 3 page 195), West Java consists of a broad northern coastal plain and a mountain spine running east to west across the southern half of the island. Within the mountainous area, however, individual hill features tend to run roughly north to south (See Map 2, reproduced at the end of this dissertation). As a result, movement within the mountains is considerably easier from north to south than from east to west. These terrain characteristics dictated TNI's COIN strategy. As has been seen, this consisted of isolating and searching each successive hill complex, commencing from the West in Banten and driving the insurgents into increasingly isolated and constricted hill complexes to the East of the province. As noted, a blocking force on the inter-provincial boundary prevented rebel movement into Central Java (see Sjarifuddin 1962, 198 and Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD 1985, 130-33). This strategy meant that the most strongly rebel-held areas, in the hills around Garut, were pacified last. Much of the destruction in these districts was caused by the increasingly desperate insurgents as their sanctuary areas were threatened after the start of the TNI sweep from West to East (Fieldnote J22/Sak/1). Had the topography of the province been different, TNI most probably would have attacked the insurgent centre of gravity from the

outset and thus these areas would have been dealt with first. They might not have suffered as much destruction.

On a similar note, as one travels eastward the hill complexes of the Priangan Highlands become larger, increasingly discrete and isolated from each other and higher in altitude. This meant that forces in the eastern mountains were more easily cut off from each other and from lowland sources of supply. This terrain characteristic contributed to TNI's success in suppressing the insurgency and meant that insurgent areas became increasingly cut off from each other, thus reducing the overall political and military coherence of the insurgent movement as noted above (page 71).

As described (page 196), the lowland areas of the province form an extensive plain of *sawah*, traversed by road and rail links, dotted with many small villages and a few large towns. The basins on which Garut and Tasikmalaya are located form lobes from this main cultivated area. Axis to these lobes is through a restricted corridor between Limbangan and Malangbong. The Garut and Tasikmalaya areas were self-sufficient in rice (Robequain 1958, 438 *et. seq.*), but their isolation made them vulnerable to attack from the surrounding hills. Former guerrillas, whom the author interviewed, indicated that the insurgents maintained base camps on the summits of the mountains and moved down during the day to the foothills. Once night fell they would attack nearby villages, then withdraw to the foothills before dawn. When daylight was sufficient to move in the jungle, the now heavily laden raiding parties would return to the base camp (Fieldnote J26/M/2). Particularly important base locations were the G. Guntur feature, G. Galunggung and G. Telagabodas. In particular, G. Telagabodas was a key area: it was centrally located within easy striking distance of the Tasikmalaya valley to the east, the Garut valley to the west and the Limbangan-Malangbong choke point to the north. Further, during the Second World War the Japanese had constructed a network of caves and tunnels on the mountain. These were useful as storage and living accommodation for the insurgents (Fieldnotes J14/San/1, J15/ET/1, J16/IT/1, J23/A/1).

This terrain-driven pattern of activity allowed the insurgents to build strength in isolated areas, prey on remote settlements and villages and avoid TNI strength which, like that of the Dutch before it, was urban-based. On the other hand, because each of the forested hill complexes is surrounded by cleared and heavily populated areas of *sawah*, they were vulnerable in turn to encirclement and isolation from the lowlands.

The *pagar betis* tactic, already described and depicted in detail above (see page 65), made sound use of these geographical characteristics (Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD 1983, 126ff). In later conflicts, TNI used *pagar betis* with minor variations in Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, East Timor and Irian Jaya (now West Papua). In particular, as will be shown below (see page 101) the tactic was critical in TNI's success over Fretilin in the Mount Matebean campaign of the mid-1980s. The concept has thus been very influential and a generation of Indonesian military

commanders has applied *pagar betis* to problems of internal security. In areas where the terrain has resembled that of West Java, the technique has been relatively successful, as in the suppression of the Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force (*Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Serawak*, PGRS) in Kalimantan (Disjarah Dam VI/Slw 1979, 66-69). In other locations, such as East Timor and Irian Jaya, it has been markedly less successful (Fieldnotes J13/An/1, J11/Suk/1).

Thus, both the insurgents and TNI adopted methods and patterns of operation that derived directly from local topography. These operating patterns have continued to influence Indonesian military thinking. Indeed, Indonesian military planners – like the French and Americans in Vietnam – have fallen into the trap of attempting to apply a successful tactic from one theatre of war to another with radically different topography and demography. The French and Americans attempted unsuccessfully to apply European methods to South-East Asia; Indonesian planners have attempted – equally unsuccessfully – to apply a paradigm developed for West Java to the underpopulated, undeveloped and continuously vegetated South West Pacific areas of East Timor and Irian Jaya.

Human Geography

As Jackson showed, the isolated villages of West Java in the 1950s were illiterate, xenophobic communities whose awareness of the outside world was mediated through traditional authority relationships dominated by the Islamic elite. This political and demographic climate left an ignorant populace open to manipulation by the more politically sophisticated village elite and traditional landowners. The Dutch local educational system was inadequate, (see KNAG 1938, Map 19b) and this had forced local communities to rely on Islamic village schools (*pesantren*), dominated by village religious teachers (*kyai*). Jackson (1980) estimates that several hundred thousand *pemuda* were students at *pesantren* or influenced by *pesantren*-based authority relationships within the Garut region at the start of the insurgency; this provided a ready supply of manpower for the insurgency. Both the literature and the author's 1996 fieldwork results indicate a generalised perception of DI/TII as mostly very young men, dominated by a few older leaders (Fieldnote J16/IT/1, Pinardi 1964, 202). 'Because of their firm hold on large segments of the rural population, many *pesantren* became institutionalised devices for religious leaders to ingrain a hostile and aggressive attitude towards both the foreigners and the *prijaji* (the aristocratic bureaucracy of colonial Java)' (Kartodirdjo 1973, 11).

The DI/TII insurgency led, as noted (see page 57), to infighting within the religious elite and had a profoundly disturbing effect on traditional social authority patterns in the rural areas. This hastened the opening up of these districts to national, regional and international influences. In turn, this diluted the xenophobic Islamism prevalent before the rebellion and it was replaced by a more modernist Islam in parts of the region. In addition, population movement generated by the insurgency (including refugees and migrants) reduced the social isolation of the rural areas.

Therefore, in a more general sense the pre-insurgency isolation of West Javanese villages was eroded by the campaign. This occurred through contact with the outside world, population movement, deliberate government propaganda and improved transport infrastructure in the aftermath of the insurgency. This lessened the political, cultural and religious isolationism of the local population and led to greater integration with the rest of Indonesia.

Infrastructure Factors

Another influence of the insurgency was its effect on the road and rail networks of the province. Dutch maps and aerial photographs of the 1930s and 1940s, as well as Indonesian maps of the early 1960s, show that the transport network lacked lateral routes over the mountain areas around Garut. This meant that the bottleneck around Limbangan and Malangbong, already mentioned (page 73), also dominated transport infrastructure nodes connecting the southern settlements to the rest of Java. Attacks on this area were carried out by DI/TII with great intensity throughout the insurgency. This resulted in areas such as Cikajang, Cisurupan and the southern coastal settlements being cut off from the provincial capital and the principal rail routes to Central and East Java.

This had two major effects. First, the rail line through the valley was closed and only reopened after the insurgency (see Sjarifuddin 1962, 16), forcing greater reliance on road transport which led to more rapid road construction in the 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, lateral routes were developed very quickly, so that all-weather roads across the major hill complexes were in place by 1969, when imagery for the 1:500 000 air chart was compiled (see TPC M-10C Edition 1, 1970, 1:500 000, for example grid square ZH1516). This led to deforestation in the major hill complexes, encouraged tourism and provided a stimulus for settlement of previously underpopulated areas.

In terms of human geography, as already noted, the insurgency led to urbanisation, which exacerbated urban poverty. It also disrupted economic production and social organisation, which as Jackson (1980) showed, had already suffered enormously during the Japanese occupation. Communications between local areas were disrupted, transport costs rose and hence commercial traffic declined. This impeded the development of an integrated commercial economy in West Java and meant that subsistence agriculture remained the dominant economic activity of the province into the 1980s. As the security situation improved, social and economic development improved also: 'As security was achieved in West Java commercial road traffic was able to be restored. When traffic, agriculture and infrastructure development could be carried out effectively, production levels were restored. In addition, the area was able to attract foreign tourist interest, which had previously been disrupted because of the security situation' (Disjarah AD 1985, 149 – AT).

In summary, the research appears to show that factors of physical and human geography significantly influenced the nature and progress of the insurgency and were deeply affected in turn by the insurgency and its suppression.

Summary of Fieldwork Results

In summary, fieldwork results during the 1996 case study showed that:

- traditional authority patterns exercised a key influence on the progress of the insurgency;
- TNI took advantage of the disruption of this authority system to gain control over the bulk of the provincial population;
- aspects of political culture favoured the DI/TII in the initial phases of the insurgency, but ultimately allowed TNI to discredit the insurgents in the eyes of the local people;
- perceptions of DI/TII varied among respondents according to whether they were urban or rural dwellers and whether they were military or civilian;
- in 1996 most local people still perceived DI/TII as relatively innocuous compared to PKI, despite physical evidence to the contrary;
- TNI had virtually no control over the local population at the start of the insurgency but developed a suite of extremely effective control measures by the end of the campaign, such that TNI leaders were still exercising *de facto* representative authority over the region as late as 1980 and administrative authority at all levels as late as 1996;
- autonomy of local TNI commanders was greatest during the guerrilla war against the Dutch, but progressively declined during the conduct of COIN operations, while TNI adopted a more hierarchical power structure;
- autonomy of DI/TII commanders was low at the start of the campaign, but became progressively higher, as the power structure became pyramidal, then segmentary, then dysfunctional.

Conclusions

Having examined the case of West Java, it is appropriate to identify the tentative conclusions that may be drawn from the fieldwork.

In the West Java case, the proposition that the command and control (C²) structures inherent in guerrilla warfare tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders appears to be valid. The Republican government's control over regional TNI commanders was weakest at the end of the War of Independence, when it had been conducting guerrilla warfare using a decentralised and diffuse C² structure. Further, TNI commanders had assumed *de facto* legislative authority over their areas, removing civilian leaders from central government control. Conversely, Darul Islam's control over its military forces was greatest at the start of the insurgency

and declined significantly as the guerrilla campaign progressed. Its shadow government became increasingly regionalised, pyramidal and eventually dysfunctional.

A possible objection would be that DI/TII's control became weaker because it was being defeated and losing territory, not because of any inherent characteristic of guerrilla C² systems. If this was so, however, why do TNI's (successful) and DI/TII's (unsuccessful) campaigns against the Dutch and the Republic respectively exhibit the same general tendency to diffusion of power? To answer this objection fully, it will be necessary to complete the second case study but, in the interim, one can say that there appears to be a correlation between guerrilla operations and diffusion of political power.

The second proposition of the initial thesis was that the conduct of COIN or Internal Security Operations tends to increase the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local political leaders and at the expense of central leaders, whether political or military. In the West Java case, it is clear that control of the local population by TNI increased during the insurgency in a general sense. TNI had negligible control over either the urban or rural population of West Java before about 1950. From 1950 until 1959, TNI controlled urban areas and towns, as well as rural areas contiguous to major cities. However, it did not exercise effective control over the rural population. By 1959 the technique of *pagar betis*, the negative effects of indiscriminate DI/TII terror and increasing integration within and between the military and civilian bureaucracies led to more effective control. By the end of the campaign, TNI control was firm and effective and has remained so ever since.

This control was exercised by local military commanders at the Kodim, Koramil and village (i.e. Babinsa) level. However, the author's 1996 fieldwork results highlighted local variations in terms of the relationship between *lurah* and *babinsa*. Whether the two tend to work co-operatively, or whether one or the other dominates the village population, seems to be as much a matter of personalities and local conditions as a general aspect of civil-military relations. This point is further discussed in the next case study.

Further, the second part of the proposition (i.e. that local military leaders develop greater control than central leaders, whether civilian or military) is not supported by the present fieldwork results. If local military leaders are part of a central hierarchical authority system, military commanders at the provincial or central level are able to exert authority or coercion over them and hence exert indirect control that is just as strong as the direct control exercised by local leaders. Conversely, if the military organisational structure is pyramidal or segmentary, local leaders *may* exercise greater control than their more remote military superiors. In either case, local military leaders appear to develop considerably greater day-to-day control over local populations than do central political leaders.

Based on this, Thesis 2 can be modified as follows: 'The conduct of COIN or Internal Security Operations tends to increase the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, COIN operations will also tend to increase control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders.'

The third proposition – that if both types of operations occur simultaneously, then there will be a diffusion of power from the centre to the regions and from civilian to military leaders – has limited application to this case study, in that of the 14 years of DI/TII insurgency, the Republic conducted simultaneous guerrilla operations and COIN operations in West Java for only two years in 1948-49. During this period, there was indeed a diffusion of power from the centre to the regions. The Republican government in Yogyakarta was unable to exercise effective day-to-day control over its forces in West Java, let alone the territory of the province or the provincial population as a whole. Further, by the end of the guerrilla period of the War of Independence, the civilian leaders had been captured by the Dutch and exercised no authority over any civilian or military elements in West Java. This authority was exercised by TNI under General Sudirman in general and under Nasution in particular in West Java.

Thus, superficially, the West Java case appears to bear out the proposition. In fact, there are two important objections. First, the capture of the civilian leaders by the Dutch removed them from the power structure of the republic about half-way through the guerrilla period and the trends in political authority were thus disrupted: it is impossible to say what power relationship would have developed had the cabinet not been captured. Second, although power may have been lost by the civilian leaders, it did not necessarily flow to the military leadership. As has been seen, TNI was neither the only, nor indeed the strongest anti-Dutch force in the province at this time. It did not control the population effectively and held no towns or population centres of any size. The guerrilla 'pockets' which gave the Dutch such trouble in West Java were principally DI/TII areas (Groen, 1986; Fieldnote NL1/PG/1). Consequently, it is appropriate to leave Thesis 3 unaltered at this stage and to analyse it more closely in the next case study.

In conclusion, this case study has examined the conduct of guerrilla operations in West Java since 1945, allowing an understanding of the interrelationship between political development within the Indonesian armed forces and civilian government and the military operations in the province. The initial thesis, which was based on theoretical considerations and analysis of the literature on guerrilla operations, has now been refined to reflect more accurately the West Java fieldwork data. It is clear from these data that the peculiar geographical, cultural and historical context of the insurgency exercised significant influence over the processes identified in the theses. Consequently, the next step is to examine East Timor, the other major insurgency in Indonesia since 1945; this is the task of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

IN EAST TIMOR

Mercenary captains are either excellent men of arms or not: if they are, you cannot trust them because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their patron, or by oppressing others contrary to your intention; but if the captain is not virtuous, he ruins you in the ordinary way.

Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, XII: 3

INTRODUCTION

This, the second case study, builds on the tentative conclusions for West Java and analyses the processes of power diffusion under the stress of guerrilla operations in East Timor between 1974 and 1999. The case study is based on fieldwork conducted in East Timor in 1999-2000, which is discussed in detail in the preface (see page ix).

Aim

The aim of the case study was to evaluate the thesis by comparing historically-generated fieldwork data from West Java to contemporaneous observation of a developing regional insurgency campaign. In this sense, the fieldwork relating to events after August 1999 in East Timor is essential as validation for the conclusions drawn from West Java. These conclusions having been developed prior to the outbreak of militia violence, were able to be 'field tested' in a real-time guerrilla operation, providing an invaluable validity tool for the thesis. Thus this case study is presented in two main sections: a section of historical fieldwork similar to that for West Java and providing a baseline for the identification of influential local variables and a section of real-time participant observation in the developing guerrilla campaign.

Before examining the fieldwork dataset in detail, it is necessary to establish the geographical, cultural and historical framework for the research and to review the existing research on the East Timor insurgency.

Historical Overview

East Timor was colonised by the Portuguese in the early 16th century, perhaps as early as 1512. Because the events in East Timor from 1975 until the present can be seen as a process of interrupted decolonisation, it is important to understand the historical and colonial background of the island⁵².

⁵² The physical and human geography of the case study area are also described in detail in Appendix 3 (see page 201), including the anthropological characteristics of the population and cultural factors affecting the insurgency. To maintain the flow of the argument this geographical data is not discussed here. However, it was an essential part of the case study and is critical to a correct understanding of the fieldwork results. It is referred to as necessary in the

Portuguese Administration Before the Second World War

James Dunn (1996) emphasises the fact that Portuguese colonialism in East Timor was based on indirect rule right up until 1974⁵³. This form of colonialism – control of the indigenous population through their own traditional elites and local leaders, who themselves are given a stake in colonial rule through ties of privilege and relative autonomy – was quite common until the 1950s. Examples of it can be found in Malaya, Sarawak, Brunei, the Native States of British India and in the Indonesian experience under the VOC and, indeed, the Dutch Crown until about 1871. However, the degree of autonomy given to local leaders and traditional elites was exceptionally high in Portuguese Timor.

These local leaders mainly consisted of *liurai*, or kings of small independent states (*rai*) within the island of Timor. Their authority was hereditary and based on the prominence of their family or clan (*ahi matan*) within the ethno-linguistic grouping of a particular local area. These ethnic groups functioned as independent mini-states, known as *suco* (cf. Indo-Malay *suku*, tribe) and were normally based on a number of villages. Each village or area of settlement (known in Portuguese as *povoações*) was dominated by a particular clan group, with the overall *suco* being ruled in a monarchic fashion by the *liurai*. Taylor (1991) posits the original existence of a single overall kingdom at Wehale, with three principal *liurai* located at South Belu, Sonbai and Suai and subordinate *liurai* linked to this overall system by tribute and exchange. From ethnographic data gathered by Middlekoop (1952) he argues that 'these kingdoms were neither unified nor centrifugal in any sense that would be familiar to European contact. They combined loosely-knit localised territorial groups in a general hierarchy of clans, each related through exchange' (Taylor 1991, 2). Taylor is thus describing a pyramidal political model, although the reality of *liurai* behaviour – particularly after European contact and the decline of higher traditional kingdoms – tends to support a segmentary model. In any case, both Dunn and Taylor agree that the principal loci of political influence throughout the colonial period were the *liurai*.

Liurai tended to be despotic or consultative depending on their own personality and the political culture of their *suco*, but in general, they were subject to very little interference from the Portuguese. Early in the 18th century there were 46 petty kingdoms in East Timor, most of whose elites and *liurai* had been

body of the case study, but should be read in detail in conjunction with the remainder of the analysis.

⁵³ James Dunn's *Timor: A People Betrayed* (1983, revised 1996) is the most comprehensive assessment of the conflict and is therefore worth considering in detail. Dunn's account is based on his experience as a diplomat in East Timor in the 1960s and on his involvement in the decolonisation process in 1974-75. Since then, he has been a noted activist in support of Fretilin and his account reflects this background. It is more scholarly than some other accounts of the period but, because of the emotive, polemic language often used, must be seen as a contribution to the East Timor debate – a contentious issue in Australian politics – rather than as an analytical study. However, Dunn makes a number of observations of relevance to the present analysis.

converted to Catholicism. The Portuguese governors, originally based in Oecussi and then in Dili, controlled the province through a series of alliances and relationships with *liurai* and native elites, who themselves administered the people in a manner unchanged since pre-colonial times. Taylor points out that, since European colonialism was based on the exaction of tribute and the exchange of goods (in trade), Portuguese penetration into Timorese society was minimal:

The entry of a European economic system operating through the medium of exchange thus resulted in the strengthening of the dominant values of a society itself based on the notion of exchange in the cultural, social, political and economic spheres. Consequently, although the Timorese economy was increasingly diverted to external needs and *although control of its political system shifted to an external grouping, the concrete effects of these changes were limited...* This conclusion is of fundamental importance in understanding contemporary Timorese society, since it indicates how its *indigenous social, economic and cultural systems were able to reproduce themselves intact, despite being subject to foreign control...* the history of this period is thus marked by the *success of Timorese communities in restricting [colonial] influence to the political sphere of princely kinship alliances* (Taylor 1991, 9 – emphasis added).

For much of the colonial period, the inland mountainous regions of Timor were in a state of semi-permanent warfare between *liurai* and *suco* and later in a series of rebellions against Portuguese attempts to exert tighter control. Until well into the 20th century the Portuguese were militarily weak and the warlike Timorese were employed as local levies, fighting for their *liurai* on behalf of the governor to suppress other tribes. An attempt by the Portuguese to tighten their direct administrative and military control of the colony caused a series of revolts by local kingdoms, most notably that of Maubara in 1893. This led the new Governor, Celestinho da Silva, to attempt the full pacification of Portuguese Timor. Da Silva's army comprised only 28 European troops and more than 112,000 Timorese levies (Dunn 1996, 17) – a quantitative indication of the degree of 'proxy rule' still being employed at the turn of the century. Over almost twenty years to 1912, da Silva succeeded in pacifying the colony, fighting against local traditional leaders and in the process establishing a military administration based on 11 military districts and 48 posts (*posto*). Each *posto* was dominated by a fort and a military garrison (still usually Timorese not Portuguese) that ensured the security of its region. This reduced the hitherto almost unchecked powers of the *liurai*, but still left the colony under regionalised control. Moreover, the Portuguese tended to reward loyal *liurai* with Portuguese military ranks, often as high as Colonel or Brigadier. This practice started as early as 1701 and was used to cement alliances with the *liurai* (Dunn 1996, 15). However, it meant that Portuguese military control, like all other forms of Portuguese control over the colony, was exercised indirectly through local elites. In economic, political and cultural terms the Portuguese colonial administration still functioned through indigenous elites, with the bulk of the population retaining their traditional hierarchical loyalty to local leaders, who were themselves only loosely and ritually subordinated to a notional central kingly authority. The local people thus interacted with the Portuguese

district officers (*chefes de suco* or *chefes de posto*) only very rarely and regarded them as administrative figures at one remove from indigenous society itself.

In the 1920s and 1930s Timor slipped back into the earlier, indirect form of rule with the *liurai* again assuming *de facto* administrative power in their own regions. This was caused partly by the continuing decline in Portugal's economic and political status as a European power and also from the late 1920s by a change of regime. The fascist Dr Antonio Salazar, who held power in Portugal from the late 1920s, focussed on the problems of Portugal itself and its richer and closer African colonies of Angola, Guiné and Mozambique⁵⁴. Timor was a low priority of effort for Portugal (Dunn 1996, 18). Economic development of the colony was also extremely poor:

On the eve of the outbreak of World War I, Portuguese Timor was undoubtedly the most economically backward colony in Southeast Asia, its living conditions often a subject of derision to the few who ventured to it.... In the thirty years of peace before Japan entered World War II the Portuguese returned to the earlier languid and apathetic form of administration. There was, as one observer put it, 'little administration and less development'.... On the eve of World War II the capital, Dili, had no electricity and no town water supply; there were no paved roads, no telephone services (other than to the houses and offices of senior officials) and not even a wharf for cargo handling (Dunn 1996, 16-18).

Callinan (1953) provides a more detailed picture of village life on the eve of the Japanese invasion. According to his observations, Portuguese roads were generally untrafficable except on the coast, while thousands of tiny inland villages were joined by a network of foot and horse trails. Smaller hamlets tended to cluster around larger villages, which in turn clustered around the Portuguese *postos* – Ermera, Balibo and Atabae are examples within the 1999 case study area. Habitation varied locally but, apart from government buildings, was entirely traditional and used local vegetation and stone as building materials. Villages were normally stockaded for protection, while the commercial economy comprised only government coconut, kapok and coffee plantations. Villages tended to be clustered in fertile and relatively well-watered inland valleys rather than on the arid coastal strip. Agriculture was based on individually owned gardens, *ladang* rice and maize cultivation. Portuguese administration was evident only in the construction of the *postos* themselves, the conscription of indigenous labour for 30 days *corvée* per year on government tasks and the occasional presence of a Portuguese or *mestiço* administrator on a Timor pony moving between villages.⁵⁵ Retail commerce,

⁵⁴ Ironically, writers such as Taudevin (1999), Dunn (1996) and Taylor (1992), who spend considerable effort in criticising Portugal's tendency to 'forget' or place a low priority on Timor at this time, tend themselves to overlook the fact that Portugal had several other colonies beside Angola and Mozambique, although these were undoubtedly its most populous and economically important. Portuguese 'overseas provinces' at this time included Angola, the Antilles, Goa, Guinea-Bissau, Macau, Mozambique and Timor. Goa was forcibly annexed by India in 1962, the African colonies gained their independence over the 1960s by guerrilla wars of independence and Macau was handed over to China in 1999.

⁵⁵ Callinan's personal observation of forced labour in 1942 contradicts Taylor (1991) who asserts that such *corvée* was a postwar reconstruction measure only.

such as it was, was dominated by the Chinese and indigenous economic activity was based on the trading of staple agricultural commodities between regions and the conduct of weekly markets at *posto* towns (Callinan 1953, 32-37).

In summary, then, the Portuguese occupation did little to disturb the pre-colonial balance of power at the village and local level. An urbanised Portuguese administrative and political superstructure sat above and only indirectly connected with, a regionalised traditional hierarchy dominated by a somewhat Westernised indigenous elite, who themselves exercised administrative power through traditional hierarchical relationships. The penetration of the Catholic church and the cash economy were both felt most at the elite level, while the bulk of the population continued within an undeveloped material culture and a largely animist belief system. Timorese indigenous political culture was notionally pyramidal, with the *liurai* representing centres of roughly equivalent political power and often working against each other. At times – for example during the rebellions up to 1912 – and often in day-to-day practice, the political culture was segmentary. Partly for this reason and partly because of almost complete isolation from the outside world, there was negligible anti-colonial or nationalist sentiment among the Timorese at this time, or indeed at any time up until 1974.⁵⁶

Interhierarchical Roles

The Manchester school of anthropology, based principally on Gluckman's ethnographic fieldwork on de-tribalisation in Central Africa in the 1930s and 1940s, has developed a useful explanatory framework for the interactions of such indigenous leaders. This ethnological concept – the *intercalary* or *interhierarchical* role – is a particularly valuable analytical tool for the behaviour of Timorese indigenous elites. In this concept, during a process of de-tribalisation or de-colonisation the holders of political power within the traditional hierarchy also function as officials within the colonial administration and as key actors in the economy and are consequently nodes of articulation or interaction between the various hierarchies (see Gluckman 1968; Werbner, 1984). Applying this notion to Timor, it can be seen that the concentration of local executive power in the indigenous elite had much the same interhierarchical function. Thus, a *liurai* acted as head of his *ahi matan* and leader of his *suco* within the indigenous socio-political hierarchy, exercising political power within the constraints of a series of patron-client relationships similar to those identified by Jackson in West Java (see page 52). The same individual, however, often ruled his district in conjunction with the *chefe de suco* as an official of the Portuguese administration, subject to differing and often conflicting political constraints from those of the indigenous hierarchy. Again,

⁵⁶ As both Dunn and Taylor point out, the fact that Portugal was itself a fascist country at this time limited the influence of liberal political thought in the metropole upon colonial thought. This is in marked contrast to the experiences of both the Netherlands East Indies and Indochina, each of which received substantial impetus to its nationalist movement from interaction between metropolitan intellectual elites and colonial students attending university in the home countries. The presence of exiles (*deportados*) from Portugal and of left-wing conscript members of the armed forces, counteracted this tendency to some degree.

the military rank given to many *liurai* involved them in the mixed Portuguese-indigenous military administration of the territory and subjected them to further political constraints. Similarly, the indigenous elite influenced both the subsistence and indigenous trading economy and had ties through Chinese, Arab or Portuguese patron-client relationships to the Portuguese-dominated industrial economy and to Chinese-controlled commerce. Thus, one individual performed several roles within varied and sometimes conflicting hierarchies. This constituted a functional check on the behaviour of the elites, as their various obligations and ambitions tended to counterbalance each other. At the same time, a politically astute individual could call on political resources from one hierarchy to maintain or improve his position in another, thus maintaining the elites in power. For example, a *liurai* threatened by a rival within the *suco* could use his colonial administrative power or military influence to defeat his rival. Similarly, a *liurai* or village chief faced with an unpopular administrative or military policy could oppose it by applying his influence in the traditional hierarchy to local officials or military commanders⁵⁷. This notion of *interhierarchical* roles will be referred to later in fieldwork analysis, as it represents a conceptual key to elite behaviours in the face of insurgency.

The Japanese Occupation

The Japanese invasion of Timor in February 1942 was, in part, provoked by the pre-emptive occupation of the island by Dutch and Australian troops in late 1941. In Portuguese Timor these troops consisted of 260 KNIL and 155 troops from the 2/2 Independent Company (Wray 1987, 25; Wigmore 1957, 469).⁵⁸

The Dutch and Australian forces holding Koepang in Dutch Timor and Dili in Portuguese Timor were quickly defeated by the Japanese 228th Regiment (of the 16th Army – see page 32) and driven inland. The Dutch quickly surrendered but the Australians commenced guerrilla warfare against the Japanese⁵⁹. The

⁵⁷ The parallel between this concept and that of the *wantok* system in Papuan Melanesian society, or the *bapak* relationships already analysed in the case of West Java, is quite apparent. An even closer parallel can be found with the system of kings and paramount chiefs under German administration in Bougainville, where such intercalary roles performed an important latent social function in checking the independence of local rulers. The author is indebted to James Tanis of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army for this insight (Tanis, *pers. comm.*, October 1998).

⁵⁸ Dunn argues that the commitment of these troops to Portuguese Timor cynically involved the indigenous population in an avoidable military calamity – Portugal was neutral and could perhaps have avoided anything other than a token Japanese occupation of Timor, while the troops sent to the colony were manifestly (in hindsight of course) inadequate to hold it against the invasion their presence was likely to provoke (Dunn 1996, 19). The moral and political issues surrounding the Australian guerrilla operations in Timor from February 1942 until January 1943, are not germane to this analysis. However, the nature and the effects of the guerrilla operations themselves are significant.

⁵⁹ Australian authors (Wray, for example) occasionally write with barely-concealed contempt for the contrast between Dutch willingness to surrender and supposed Australian 'dogged gallantry'. It is well to remember, however, that the Dutch were fighting in the last remaining corner of a defeated colony belonging to a defeated metropolitan power, while the Australians were fighting on an outpost of an independent nation expecting imminent invasion. The Dutch commanders' ultimate chance of victory was slim indeed, while their continued resistance exposed their troops to the danger of an apparently pointless death which it seemed could be

description 'guerrilla operations' often applied to this campaign does not match the definition adopted in this dissertation – 'military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces' (see page 12). In this case the operation was conducted by regular, predominantly Australian forces and was therefore more in the nature of the Chindit long-range penetration operations in Burma than a guerrilla operation *per se*. Indeed, even the use of armed local hill tribes as partisans in support of the penetration group, as occurred in Burma, did not take place in Timor⁶⁰. Timorese involvement in the campaign was limited to the provision of carriers, scouts, guides and labour assistance to the Australian forces, by local auxiliaries known as *criados*. The extent of this assistance should not be underestimated and indeed, it was essential to the survival of the Australian force. However, the notion – sometimes advanced – of a military partnership between the Australians and the Timorese does not stand up to examination.⁶¹

Catholic missions initially played a major part in the maintenance of order in the interior (Wigmore 1957, 492-3). The intensity of guerrilla operations forced the Japanese to deploy more than 20 000 troops to Timor to control the island. *Heiho* and, towards the end of the war, PETA troops and other auxiliaries were deployed on the island to support the Japanese occupation, although Dunn (1996, 20) asserts that these levies were not of East Timorese origin. The levies were employed to form what Dunn calls a 'black column' to support sweeps by regular Japanese forces across the island. This in fact equates to the '*barisan hitam*' employed by the Japanese in Sumatra and elsewhere (see page 37).

Importantly, although the Japanese Army troops on the island originated from 16th Army, they had come directly from the capture of Hong Kong in December 1941 and Ambon in January/February 1942 and therefore had not formed part of the 16th Army's conquest of Java under General Imamura. Subsequently they remained under operational control of the Imperial Navy throughout the occupation. Consequently, Imamura's policies for military government – the encouragement of mass youth organisations, training of military levies and the development of nationalistic and political consciousness in the population (as discussed on page 36 above) – were not applied in Timor. In any case, the political development of the indigenous population, as has been shown, had probably not yet reached the level where this would have been a workable approach. The employment of Javanese *heiho*, *Tokubetsu Keibotai* or *romusha* in Timor (as was acknowledged by 16th Army to have occurred) is unlikely to have spread any degree of political awareness to the population as such auxiliaries were employed to suppress and control the Timorese rather than to work alongside them (See HQ 16th Army, 1945b).

averted by surrender – after all, as discussed above (page 31) native ex-KNIL were treated very leniently by the Japanese. Anyone who has not personally been in such a situation – whether as an analyst or as a professional soldier – should perhaps be wary of criticism.

⁶⁰ For a discussion of irregular partisan operations in support of British operations in Burma see Masters (1961), O'Brien (1987), Allen (1985) and Slim (1972).

⁶¹ See particularly Wray (1987) and Dunn (1996) for examples of this viewpoint, which is not shared by contemporary eyewitness accounts such as Callinan (1953) or Wigmore (1957).

Instead, both the Japanese and the Australians worked through the indigenous traditional hierarchy. The Japanese employed *liurai* and village headmen to provide food and labour, while the Australians also worked through the *liurai* and church leaders to secure indigenous assistance. This meant that numerous *liurai* and village headmen were forced into intercalary roles – theoretically still part of a non-functioning colonial administration and yet responsible on the one hand to maintain order and support the Japanese administration and on the other to assist the Australians. However, Dunn argues that neither the Portuguese nor the indigenous elites ever accepted Japanese occupation:

Mounting enemy pressure, plus the increasing use of the infamous so-called 'Black Column' native force, which was initially brought in from the Dutch side of the island, caused the Australians to be evacuated in January 1943. The Japanese then conducted punitive expeditions, sometimes using Black Column troops, at great cost in lives to the Timorese. Many Portuguese and Timorese fought on against the Japanese long after the Australians had departed, but the risk of savage reprisals was a deterrent to most of the population. In areas where the Australians had been active, villages were razed to the ground and whole families wiped out, particularly on the south coast between Uato Udo and Uato Lari, the atrocities being committed by both Japanese and Black Column troops. While a few of the *liurais* sided with the enemy or were neutral the vast majority of the population remained bitterly hostile to the invaders until the very end. In one celebrated example, Dom Aleixo, the *liurai* of Same and many of his followers went to their deaths rather than surrender to the Japanese. In spite of relentless persecution, the chiefs [sic] of Maliana, Maubara, Atsabe, Marobo and Bobonaro never really submitted to the invaders (Dunn 1996, 20).

Despite Dunn's contention, it is apparent that opposition to the Japanese – like submission to the Portuguese – was largely a matter of concern for the colonial and indigenous elites and for the Portuguese and *mestiços* themselves. For instance the people of Same, in the example given above, followed the traditional hierarchy and their own *liurai* rather than a general political consensus against the Japanese – less than thirty years before, the same group of people from the Same area had fought the Portuguese under their *liurai* and suffered almost 16000 casualties⁶² (Dunn 1996, 17). It is highly unlikely that in the period between Dom Boaventura's revolt of 1912 and their opposition to the Japanese in 1942 the people of Same had been won over at the grass roots level to support the colonial *status quo*. After all, as we have seen (page 82 above), almost nothing had been done by the Portuguese to improve the lot of the ordinary people in that period. Instead, just as they had followed the lead of their traditional hierarchy in 1912, they did so again in 1942. Indeed, to use Almond and Verba's terminology, the Portuguese displayed a *participant* political culture, while the *mestiço* and indigenous elites displayed a mainly *subject* political culture with the exception of upper aristocracy and *liurai* who showed – through the exploitation of intercalary roles – the ability to maintain themselves in power through a combination of open submission to and covert

⁶² Taylor accounts for only 7 000 Timorese casualties (1991, 11) but his figures are generally less reliable than Dunn's and in this case are based on a report from a Melbourne newspaper, whereas Dunn (1996, 17) is working from Portuguese and Timorese accounts.

opposition against, the Japanese. By contrast, the vast majority of people at the village level maintained a *parochial* political culture, conditioned by patron-client relationships and the influence of the traditional hierarchy.⁶³

Administratively, the Portuguese colonial system initially continued to function. However, intimidation and killings by the Japanese and auxiliaries and the increasingly pro-Allied attitudes of many Portuguese, led the Japanese to marginalise the colonial administration – although without replacing it with any alternative system as they did in Java.⁶⁴ Japanese political policy was to exploit inter-*suco* and inter-regional hostility, reopen divisions left by earlier revolts and exploit traditional rivalries between *liurai*. By January 1944, the Portuguese administration controlled only Liquiça, the hospital at Lahane and the Governor's residence. Many local administrators had fled to Liquiça and the telephone system – which had previously linked the central colonial administration to the districts – was taken over by the Japanese. Thus, the situation on the Japanese capitulation was one of almost total anarchy, starvation and devastation. The political system had reverted to its pre-colonial state, the economy had retreated to subsistence levels, while more than 40 000 Timorese had died (Dunn 1996, 21-22).

The Post-War Portuguese Administration

Although there was no attempt at nationalist overthrow of the returning Portuguese, post-war reconstruction was extremely dilatory and slow and focussed on the re-establishment of the *status quo ante bellum* rather than on progressive development. This was partly due to the poverty of metropolitan Portugal and partly because as a Fascist-oriented neutral power Portugal was excluded from Marshall Plan aid. Conversely, the US threat of cessation of aid which was applied to the Dutch to force them to relinquish Indonesia was never applicable to the Portuguese and the colony continued in much the same fashion as before the war. Labour for reconstruction was conscripted using the existing *corvée* system and the population was again controlled through the *liurai* and *chefes de suco*.⁶⁵ The Portuguese district officers – *chefes de posto* – continued to operate in the manner of patrol officers in Australian New Guinea, touring their districts and dealing with the people indirectly through local indigenous leaders. Very little progress was made on reconstruction until the late 1950s, however significant development occurred in schooling, transport infrastructure and public administration, with Timorese civil servants and

⁶³ See Chapter 3 (page 29 *et seq.*) for a detailed discussion of these concepts.

⁶⁴ Portugal at this time was under the Fascist-oriented regime of Dr Salazar. Nazi Germany spent much of the war attempting to win over the Salazar government because of the strategic importance of Portuguese possessions in the Atlantic and because of Portugal's location at the head of the English channel. Consequently, the Germans exercised considerable pressure on the Japanese to moderate their activities in technically neutral Timor. Thus, unlike the remainder of the Indonesian archipelago where the Japanese frankly supplanted the colonial governments and established their own administration, in Timor they were obliged to leave *de jure* control in the hands of the Portuguese. See Gunn (1988) for a detailed discussion of these issues.

⁶⁵ This system was abandoned in the African colonies as early as 1961 under the stress of insurgency, but in the absence of such a threat in Timor the Portuguese appear to have seen no reason to abolish it (Chamberlain 1985, 71).

NCOs entering the colonial public service and army (Dunn 1996, 25). Thus, the existing indigenous political elite began to be threatened by the emergence of a new, educated middle class in the 1950s and 1960s. It would be an exaggeration to say that political consciousness had developed within the population as a whole, but a small intelligentsia began to develop, often with close links to traditional indigenous elites or to the Portuguese colonial administration and often also influenced by the thinking of dissident *deportados* from metropolitan Portugal. A further political influence began to be felt in the 1960s as Timorese members of the colonial armed forces served in the insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique and were exposed to more radical political thought⁶⁶.

At the village level, the same 'administration by proxy' continued after the war, with the significant difference that the indigenous elites used as intermediaries by the Portuguese now included indigenous officials, teachers, a small number of church leaders and military NCOs, as well as the more traditional – and still powerful – *liurai*. Commerce continued to be dominated by the Chinese, while large-scale industrial enterprises (principally coffee and copra) continued to be controlled by the Portuguese in tandem with the traditional elite.

The military forces of Portuguese Timor developed considerably during this period, following the reorganisation of the Portuguese military into a single entity: before 1950 the colonies had possessed their own Army under the Minister for Colonies, completely separate from the regular military establishment under the War Ministry (Cann 1997, 61). Because of their enormous subsequent influence on the guerrilla operations in the province, these forces are worth considering in detail. The military forces were organised into first line (*primaira linha*) or regular troops, popularly known as Tropaz (from the Portuguese *tropas*, troops) and second line (*segunda linha*) troops, raised locally and commanded by the local Portuguese administrator. While Tropaz was a professional, long-service force, second-line troops were conscripts and served two years followed by a period of war-service obligation. In addition, local volunteers (*voluntario*) served in a civil defence role. Tropaz consisted of six rifle companies, two composite infantry/artillery companies, two horsed cavalry squadrons, four support companies, a military police detachment and a military training centre. Tropaz forces within the case study area in early 1975 included Light Infantry Company No. 12 (*Companhia dos Caçadores 12*) at Ermera and Cavalry Squadron No. 5 (*Esquadrão de Cavalaria 5*) at Atabae (Subroto 1998, 279). Tropaz forces numbered 5,000, with an additional 2,000 *segunda linha* troops available. These troops were well equipped with modern weapons, included a number of personnel with combat experience in Mozambique and Angola and were well trained and aggressive. In particular, the cavalry squadrons despite their slightly archaic title, formed extremely

⁶⁶ As will be seen, this was significant because the threat from a rising, progressive intelligentsia and middle class threatened the position of the traditional elites. This gave them a common cause with Indonesia in preventing the emergence of an independent socialist East Timor, which would probably have been dominated by these newer political forces to the exclusion of the older elites.

mobile and hard-hitting forces and were later to inflict severe setbacks on TNI. These cavalry squadrons were in effect mounted infantry, fighting dismounted with heavy equipment including heavy mortars and machine guns that they were able to deploy rapidly through difficult terrain on horseback⁶⁷. Their tactical mobility was vastly superior to that of the road-bound TNI in 1975-76 (Subroto 1998, 280 *et seq.*). Hendro Subroto's assessment of their combat effectiveness was as follows:

Tropaz had a high capability for individual manoeuvre. Their use of ground, both for fire positions and for cover and concealment, was good. Their ability to construct individual defensive positions was good and their employment of crew-served weapons such as mortars was also very good. Their shooting was also accurate.... [However] in the attack or ambush at section level, Tropaz had only a fair degree of proficiency – they could not be described as good. Because the highest [indigenous] rank within Tropaz was only that of NCO, they did not demonstrate any outstanding ability above platoon level. Perhaps an ex-Tropaz NCO platoon commander could lead a [Fretilin] combat team at company level, but an [ex-]NCO could not command a battalion. Consequently, each of the eleven Tropaz companies in East Timor only operated independently in an uncoordinated manner – these companies were never organised into a battalion (Subroto 1998, 281 – AT).

Dunn's assessment of Timorese military strength varies somewhat from that of Subroto – he calculates that in 1974 there were almost 3000 Timorese in Tropaz, with about 7000 available second line troops.⁶⁸ The territory was divided into several military regions, of which the most important was the border region, headquartered at Bobonaro. Dunn also emphasises that the conscripted Portuguese junior officers posted to Timor were often of left-wing political views and opposed to the Salazarist regime and argues that these officers 'had a considerable impact on the better-educated of the Timorese soldiers, whose political interests thus were shaped not by events in Asia but by opposition currents emanating from metropolitan Portugal' (Dunn 1996, 39). While senior officers tended to be loyal to the regime, junior officers influenced educated

⁶⁷ It is fashionable among some military analysts to undervalue the importance of horsed cavalry in modern war. While the massed cavalry charge is undoubtedly a suicidal anachronism on today's high-intensity battlefield, cavalry have shown great utility in low-level conflict, guerrilla operations and partisan warfare since 1941. Grey's Scouts in the guerrilla war in Rhodesia proved highly effective, as did German, Yugoslav and Soviet cavalry in the Second World War and Serbian cavalry in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s. Alan Clark has the following passage which might equally well describe the Tropaz cavalry:

The [Soviet] cavalry, far from being an anachronism, was of immense value. Recruited from Cossacks and Kalmyks – peoples who spent their lives in the saddle – it had an extraordinary mobility. Its men were trained to fight as infantry, but would use the horses to cover huge distances over bad ground and to tow their light artillery and mortar limbers. They were adept at the art of concealment and dispersion. "A Soviet cavalry division", Manstein grumbled, "can move, in its entirety, a hundred kilometres in a night – and that at a tangent to the axis of communication." They were invaluable under conditions of fluid fighting....(Clark 1996, 41).

⁶⁸ Both were present at the time of the invasion and it is difficult to reconcile the variation in figures. Subroto's account seems more reliable for two reasons: first, he had access to BAKIN and TNI intelligence which Dunn lacked; and secondly, Dunn seems to be including all Tropaz as part of Fretilin's forces, whereas there is eyewitness testimony to the contrary from Tropaz members based at Maliana and Bobonaro – see for example 'Alexandrino' in Turner (1992, 85 *et seq.*).

Timorese with more radical views. Dunn argues that this explains why the majority of Tropaz regulars, *segunda linha* troops, educated Timorese and some Portuguese regular army officers supported Fretilin rather than UDT.

Portuguese military doctrine and organisation is noteworthy because it influenced both sides in the civil war and the later conduct of operations by Fretilin. Francisco Xavier Lopes da Cruz of UDT and Nicolau Lobato of Fretilin, among many others, had served as officers of the Portuguese Army on counter-insurgency operations in Africa. Portugal had fought a series of protracted COIN campaigns in its African colonies between 1961 and 1974. Portuguese COIN doctrine was based primarily on British doctrine, refined by experimentation and adaptation during the wars in Africa. In addition, the French doctrine of *Guerre Révolutionnaire* – in particular the tactics of *quadrillage* and *reserve générale* – was influential⁶⁹. Portuguese practice emphasised the employment of small, lightly equipped, mobile units of light infantry and their support by heavily-armed mobile horsed cavalry forces. Military and civilian administrative organisations paralleled each other, with primacy (following the French practice) usually given to the military and decisions taken at the local and regional levels rather than by a centralised authority (Cann 1997, 39-55).

The Portuguese also demonstrated unusual tactical flexibility and willingness to learn from their opponents. This particularly influenced the organisation of light infantry units, which became based upon the *bi-grupo* system employed by the FARP, the armed forces of the PAIGC, opposing the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau. This was similar to the British 'multiple' as employed in Northern Ireland and consisted of between 20 and 25 men in mutually supporting small patrols. The FARP also included snipers, a heavy weapons element and a political commissar in the *bi-grupo* ("two-section") organisation, which was adopted from 1968 by the Portuguese forces in Guinea-Bissau, under General Spínola – later Portuguese President in 1974/75 (Cann 1997, 76-77). Thus the Portuguese system, which influenced both UDT and Fretilin, can be summarised as a *quadrillage* deployment implemented through parallel military and civilian hierarchies, with large numbers of small patrols being used to dominate and pacify an area, supported by mobile strike forces at local level.

⁶⁹ *Quadrillage* and *Réserve Générale* are the two principal components of rural COIN tactics as developed by the French in Indochina and Algeria. The *quadrillage* is a framework of fortified posts used as patrol bases and observation posts to dominate the countryside. From these posts, numerous small patrols radiate outward to dominate, initially, the immediate surrounds of the base. As security in this area improves the patrols' radius of action increases gradually, until all the ground and population between each patrol base and the next are dominated by the security forces. This method of gradually increasing the radius of action, in the manner of a spreading stain or drop of oil, is known as *tache d'huile* (oilspot) and was originated by General Lyautey in Morocco in the late 19th century, then refined in Indochina under General de Lattre de Tassigny and later in Algeria. The *Réserve Générale* equates to the quick reaction force in British/Australian doctrine and is essentially a mobile strike force operating from a larger firm base, which responds to crises or difficulties experienced within the *quadrillage*. The strategic basis of these tactics is essentially defensive. Offensive operations against the insurgents are undertaken by other forces. For a detailed discussion of these tactics see Paret (1964), Fall (1994), de Chazet (1947) and Trinquier (1964).

Dunn gives an overview of Portuguese colonial administration in its most developed form. He is corroborated by Hoadley (1975, 11-13) working from documentary records at the same period. As can be seen, despite the influx of educated Timorese into administrative posts and the creation of a more elaborate system of local administration, the basic features of indirect rule and the concentration of interhierarchical political power in the hands of the traditional elite still remained:

The province was divided into thirteen administrative divisions, called *concelhos*...headed by the *administrador do concelho*, whose local powers and discretion were in practice very extensive, the incumbent being in a position to dominate the political, social and economic life of his district. Apart from his administrative duties, he exercised the powers of magistrate, chief of police, commander of second-line [*segunda linha*] troops, coordinator of economic activity and development plans and so on. He also usually acted as mayor of the town in which his office and residence...was located. The *administrador do concelho* was usually Portuguese although, of course, not necessarily white – there were one or two Goans and some *mestiços*. These senior officials tended to be authoritarian, politically conservative and uncompromising pillars of the old regime...The *concelho* was divided into between four and six *postos* or subdistricts, each administered by an *administrador do posto*. By 1974 there were some 58 *postos* and the staffing pattern had changed somewhat, with 60 per cent of these posts being manned by Timorese...These officials were among the Timorese to become politically active when, in April 1974, the new regime permitted the formation of political associations. Unlike their Portuguese masters, the young Timorese post administrators as a rule harboured little enthusiasm for the system of indirect rule, which gave the *liurais* considerable discretionary powers and influence.... and they sometimes combined with the *chefes de suco* to resist the oppressive demands of the *liurai* (Dunn 1996, 37).

Decolonisation

Based on this, it is unsurprising that the Portuguese and not the Timorese were the driving force behind decolonisation. In April 1974, a military coup overthrew the Salazarist government of Marcelo Caetano. The new Armed Forces Movement (*Movimento Forças Armadas*, MFA) regime announced its intention of granting independence to all Portuguese colonies as soon as practicable. This led to an immediate upsurge in political activity within Timor and the formation of indigenous political parties. The leaderships of these parties were generally similar, coming from the intelligentsia or Portuguese administration, while no party initially had significant grass-roots support at village level. The parties are summarised at Table 4.2.

Table 4.2
Timorese Political Parties 1974-75

Variable	UDT	Fretilin	Apodeti	Kota	Trabalhista
Name	<i>União Democrática Timorense</i>	<i>Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente</i>	<i>Associação Popular Democrática Timorense</i>	<i>Klibur Oan Timor Aswain</i>	<i>Partido Trabalhista</i>
Date Formed	11 May 1974	20 May 1974	27 May 1974	June 1974	c. June 1974
Political Orientation	Conservative, seeking	Social-Democratic,	Conservative, traditionalist,	Conservative, seeking	Social-Democratic, urban labour union

	independent Timor within Portuguese Union.	Marxist rhetoric, seeking independent socialist Timor.	seeking integration into Indonesia.	establishment of Timorese federalist monarchy.	orientation.
Members	100 000	80 000+	2-3000*	2-300	Less than 200
Key Leaders	Mario Carrascalao, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, Domingos de Oliveira, Cesar da Costa Mousinho	Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Nicolau Lobato, Aleixo Corte Real, Rui Fernandes, Jose Ramos Horta	Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, Jose Osorio Soares, Hermenegildo Martins, Guilherme Gonçalves	Jose Martins, Tomas Dias Ximenes	A. Abrao
Leadership Composition	Senior administrators, customs and forestry officials, wealthy population including <i>mestiços</i> .	Public servants, administrators, customs and ex-military, intellectual and liberal elites including <i>mestiços</i> .	Traditional hierarchy, conservative <i>liurai</i> .	Traditional elites, conservative <i>liurai</i> , traditional establishment (<i>topasses</i>)	Urban intellectualised working class.
Degree of village-level support	Very limited initially, later significant. Major loss of support after start of civil war August 1975.	Limited initially, overtaking all other parties by Jul/Aug 1975, in part provoking civil war.	Limited, except in Atsabe	Non-existent except in Ermera, where Jose Martins was <i>liurai</i> 's son.	Extremely limited to non-existent. Localised support in Dili and Ossu only. Most members from one family in Dili.
Links to Outside Organisations	Initially nil, Lopes da Cruz influenced by Indonesians, others requested Indonesian assistance during civil war.	Indonesians assert links to Cuba, Communist China and North Vietnam. Some ideological links to Frelimo (Mozambique)	Alleged links to BAKIN and other Indonesian agencies. Links through <i>liurai</i> of Atsabe to Indonesian interests.	Links through <i>liurais</i> of Belu region (W Timor) to BAKIN and other Indonesian agencies.	Became linked with the other non-Fretilin parties under UDT leadership and Indonesian influence in Aug/Sep 1975.
Geographical Loci of Influence	Dili, Baucau, Los Palos, then Liquiça, withdrawing to Batugade during civil war.	Initially urban-based, then spreading to villages throughout Timor.	Atsabe, some other mountain areas. Maliana and Balibo pro-Indonesian sentiment.	Ermera, and other areas dominated by sympathetic <i>liurai</i> in Western regions.	Principally Dili, with support among urban intellectuals and proletariat only.

* Originally ASDT (*Associação Social-Democrática Timorense*, Timorese Social-Democratic Association, renamed 12 Sep 74). † Including personal following of Guilherme Gonçalves, *liurai* of Atsabe.

Sources: Dunn (1996), Taylor (1992), Subroto (1998), Roff (1992), Hoadley (1975), Freney (1975, 1979).

This table over-simplifies a very complex situation that even contemporary researchers found difficult to understand⁷⁰. However, it is clear that each party, with the possible exception of Trabalhista, was formed from the elite strata of Timorese society. For instance, UDT functioned as the party of the conservative elite. It sought to uphold the interests of the current ruling class within Portuguese Timor, including conservative educated officials, former members of the Fascist political party *Accaõ Nacional* and business interests. Fretilin was a party of the radicalised elite: its central committee were socially and culturally very similar in origin to the leaders of UDT and was similarly removed from the local people, but exhibited a left-wing political orientation based on European social democracy rather than indigenous nationalism. Fretilin tended to recruit its members from 'low status civil servants, teachers, students and

⁷⁰ This section, which presents the author's own analysis, is based on data from Hoadley (1975), Freney (1975, 1979), Taylor (1991) and Dunn (1996). Despite its Marxist polemic, the author is indebted to Denis Freney's *Timor: Freedom Caught Between the Powers* (1975, 20) for the insight into Fretilin's elite origins.

recent migrants from the hills to the towns...' (Hoadley 1975, 4). Fretilin quickly penetrated the village strata of politics through aggressive propaganda, land reform agitation and 'popular re-education' by volunteers (mainly students) and this quickly-developed mass base may obscure the elite roots of the party. In June 1975, for example, Fretilin formed Revolutionary Brigades and moved out of the towns and into the villages to commence an intensive campaign of 'socialist development', including forming a village militia (Magalhães 1992). This may appear a popularist approach, but in fact it had considerable similarity to the South American Marxist principle of 'rural focoism', in that the revolutionary element consisted almost entirely of students and members of the radicalised elite⁷¹. Thus while Fretilin clearly was very different from UDT, its differences were in political orientation, Marxist organisation, rhetoric and socialist agitation/propaganda tactics rather than in socio-cultural origins.

Of the minor parties, Apodeti represented the interests of both the traditional hierarchy and sections of the radicalised elite. As has been described, in the late 1950s and 1960s Portuguese colonial administration had become more inclusive of non-elite groups within Timorese society. Increasing education, the rise of an urban middle class and increased administrative and economic participation by ordinary people threatened the previously influential position of landholders, *topasses* and the *liurai*. These groups therefore had a common interest with Indonesia in preventing the rise of an independent, socialist East Timor. Apodeti was thus dominated by several influential *liurai*, of whom the most important was Guilherme Gonçalves, *liurai* of Atsabe. His ties with Indonesia and his military support to the Indonesian invasion, were based on his authority as a traditional leader and the threat Fretilin posed to that authority. Indeed, Gonçalves' behaviour represents an extreme example of the use of intercalary roles to maintain elites in power. Through his clan and ethnic connections with the Belunese of West Timor, Gonçalves developed close relations with BAKIN and TNI and his support for them during the invasion assured his position after 1975 – he was later the Governor of East Timor.

Other elements within Apodeti, however, were motivated by economic rationalism, pan-Indonesian attitudes and opposition to Chinese influence in the economy. These elements advanced a radical critique of both colonialism and independence and sought integration with Indonesia as the key to economic modernisation and political development. Certain expatriate former PRRI leaders had been involved in a revolt against Portuguese administration at Viqueque in 1959 and some observers have consequently written off Apodeti as a movement of no indigenous significance (Freney 1975, 1979), an Indonesian puppet (Dunn 1996, Taylor 1991) or a purely conservative grouping (Hoadley 1975). This may apply to the conservative element within Apodeti, but there were also progressive tendencies in its platform, which may explain its

⁷¹ This now largely-discredited approach to insurgency, as advanced by Carlos Marighela in the context of rural Marxism in Latin America, was at the height of its popularity in the mid-1970s and clearly influenced Fretilin. The concept was further developed by Régis Debray and popularised by Ernesto 'Che' Guevara's campaign in Bolivia. For a detailed discussion of the concept, see Staff College Camberley (1991) and Guevara (1961).

relatively high degree of support in some border regions – and the post-invasion *rapprochement* of its more progressive leaders with Fretilin/CNRT.

Of the other minor parties, Kota represented the traditional establishment of the *liurai* and *topasses* and, lacking the radical progressive element of Apodeti, its influence was limited to elite groupings and their personal followings. Its influence at village level was therefore based on patron-client relationships within the traditional village polity and while intense in some areas was of narrow geographical distribution. About Trabalhista very little is known. It was a small party of the urban working class, founded in Ossu and with very limited support in the villages. Fretilin apologists (particularly Freney, 1979) seem determined to write it off: this may represent the traditional Marxist distaste for parliamentary socialism. At the same time, it was significant enough to be included by the Indonesians in the Balibo Declaration of September 1975 and there is insufficient unbiased evidence completely to discount its influence.

The period of decolonisation was markedly affected by events in metropolitan Portugal. Throughout 1974 and 1975 Portugal was highly unstable, with left-wing and centrist elements within MFA and the army vying for control. A sudden shift to the left occurred in September 1974; simultaneously ASDT renamed itself Fretilin and adopted openly Marxist-revolutionary rhetoric. By August 1975 the situation had become critical and a near-civil war erupted in Portugal in early September, with attempted coup and counter-coup eventually resulting in a more stable parliamentary government in 1976. Moreover, during this period Portugal was engaged in negotiations for the independence of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Angola and Lisbon's attention was firmly engaged by the difficulties of withdrawal from its African empire. The Portuguese armed forces were fully stretched in Angola and in consolidating control over the metropole and Timor was a low priority. Accordingly, early in the decolonisation process the Portuguese government stated that it would be willing, under certain conditions, to accede to the integration of Portuguese Timor into Indonesia. Indeed, of all parties the Portuguese government was the first to suggest such an option (Dunn 1996, 73 *et seq.*). As decolonisation continued, the Portuguese initially favoured UDT as a potential successor, then turned to Fretilin as it began to demonstrate the greater degree of popular support. This was particularly demonstrated by Fretilin's victory in the *concelho* elections in Lautem district in August 1975 (Magalhães 1992). Finally, on the outbreak of the civil war, the Portuguese administration abrogated its responsibility for the colony and withdrew to the island of Atauro, from where it remained passively inactive as Fretilin ousted UDT, only to be itself displaced by Indonesia.

Timor had been of little importance to Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s. Both Sukarno and, initially, Suharto had other priorities and the New Order had hardly completed its consolidation (following the 1974 Malari incident) when the issue of Portuguese Timor arose. Sue Rabbitt Roff (1992) quotes *Sinar Harapan* to show that Indonesian leaders had made occasional mention of the possibility of integration in the past. However, it is clear that this was not

considered at any official level until mid-1974⁷². The Indonesian motivation to integrate Timor appears to have been primarily geopolitical. The threat of an independent, Marxist Timor was perceived as extremely serious in Jakarta. Since 1986 it has become fashionable to play down the Marxism of Fretilin. Fretilin itself has been largely responsible for this reinvention of its position and other Fretilin supporters such as Dunn (1995, 1996) and Taylor (1991) have argued that any left-wing element in Fretilin was largely a matter of rhetoric and fashionable youth radicalism. This, unfortunately, does not stand up to close scrutiny. As Freney (1975, 1979) makes clear, Fretilin's social programs and political agenda were of a revolutionary socialist nature and eyewitness accounts indicate that its policies in the 'liberated areas' after the Indonesian invasion were also of a revolutionary character (Fieldnote T81/G/1). Hoadley (1975, 8) found no evidence of direct Chinese or Vietnamese Communist Party involvement in Fretilin and this is reasonably certain despite strident Indonesian claims to the contrary. But Hoadley acknowledges the revolutionary socialist aspects of the party, as well as its links to Frelimo, PAIGC and MPLA in Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Angola. Fretilin's organisational structure, mass tactics, emphasis on rural focoism, agitation-propaganda techniques and military doctrine were Marxist and revolutionary in substance as well as form. Indonesia, having just emerged from the extremely violent upheaval associated with the suppression of the PKI, thought it had reason to fear the emergence of a regional 'Cuba', which might destabilise Eastern Indonesia, act as a rallying point for remnants of the PKI and provide bases for Soviet or Chinese expansionism. This may seem unrealistic now, but these months coincided with the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia, the sharp reduction of western influence in the Pacific and the destabilisation of Laos leading eventually to Communist rule on 2 December 1975. The post-Vietnam 'domino theory' appeared likely to be realised. It may be that Indonesia was wrong about Fretilin and that an independent, revolutionary socialist Timor would not have threatened it. The issue has been so muddled by later polemic that it is difficult now, 25 years later, to determine objectively each actor's perceptions at the

⁷² Roff's work is essentially a summary of Indonesian newspaper coverage of the Timor issue in 1974-75, based almost wholly on *Sinar Harapan*. It should be regarded as a source document rather than a basis for analysis and its utility is qualified by Roff's limited knowledge of Timorese politics and geography and by numerous questionable translations from the Indonesian. As one of several examples, Roff translates the Indonesian 'kapal Bea dan Cukai menuju ke Maubara' ('a Customs and Excise vessel headed toward Maubara') in *Sinar Harapan* of 16 September 75, as 'two Indonesian ships, the Bea and Cukai etc....' (Roff 1992, 49).

time. But it is naïve to argue, as some researchers have done⁷³, that Indonesia's concerns were not genuinely held, or that they were a smokescreen for expansionism. The whole spirit and tendency of the New Order regime runs counter to such an argument and in the absence of more accurate information we must conclude that Indonesia genuinely believed (rightly or wrongly) that a Fretilin-led independent East Timor would be a significant threat to its security. It is, in the author's view, no accident that September 1974 – the period of a sudden left-wing shift in metropolitan Portuguese politics and the reinvention of ASDT as the radical revolutionary socialist Fretilin – coincided with the initiation of Indonesian moves to neutralise this perceived threat.

Indonesian Subversion and Invasion

The Indonesian invasion of Portuguese Timor can be divided, in retrospect, into four phases. In the first phase, from September 1974 until July 1975, BAKIN (under the direction of Ali Murtopo, but probably without the direct knowledge of President Suharto and almost certainly without the knowledge of Adam Malik, the foreign minister) conducted a subversion campaign using radio propaganda from Kupang and Atambua, clandestine⁷⁴ support for Apodeti, intelligence cultivation of sympathetic and influential Timorese and an international media campaign portraying Fretilin as Communist. The intent was to destabilise Timor, win over anti-Fretilin political groups and encourage the ascendancy of elements favourable to integration with Indonesia. An early success was the defection of approximately 300 members of Guilherme Gonçalves' clan group from Atsabe to West Timor, where they received military training under BAKIN sponsorship (Subroto 1998, 277). Magalhães (1992) and Taylor (1991) both characterise this as a forced movement under duress or as a 'kidnapping', but Subroto (who was present) describes it as a mass exodus, under the leadership of Tomas Gonçalves, son of the *liurai*. This group received military training at Nenuk near Atambua. It may be that some of the group went unwillingly and it was certainly motivated by traditional patron-client relationships rather than political support for Indonesia.

⁷³ For example Taylor (1992), Turner (1992), Sword and Walsh (1991) and most particularly Winters (1996). It is indisputable that Indonesian actions since the invasion have been of a profoundly unpleasant character. However, lack of factual objectivity can only undermine researchers' credibility. This problem has afflicted much of the work of East Timor support groups in Western countries. Winters is a case in point – she and a colleague, unable to speak either Indonesian or any local language and with no knowledge of indigenous informal political structures, published (on the basis of a few weeks' visit and a number of casual interviews) an 'exposé' of Indonesian brutality and 'genocide'. They further adopted pseudonyms for the publication and had their faces blacked out in photographs 'because we might want to go back there', while publishing their Timorese informants' names and photographs for the perusal of the Indonesian authorities. The Indonesians may possibly have engaged in genocide in East Timor; they may well have been brutal. But emotive description of this nature does not of itself demonstrate the truth of such a contention.

⁷⁴ Throughout, the term 'clandestine' refers to an operation the existence of which is intended to remain unknown by the target or victim. This is distinguished from the term 'covert', which denotes an operation the existence of which is known, but of which the sponsor's identity remains unknown. The only exception to this is in the phrase 'Clandestine Front' which is used by CNRT to denote the urban *intifada* of the 1990s.

Nevertheless, the group's later actions (particularly in the capture of Batugade and Balibo) do not indicate unwillingness (see below page 98 and footnote).

The BAKIN subversion campaign was designated *Operasi Komodo* and operated through customs vessels, the commercial 'front' PT Arjuna (an import-export firm based in Kupang), Indonesian Aero Club civilian light aircraft for insertion and extraction of agents, and print and radio propaganda from Kupang and Atambua (Subroto 1998, 271 *et seq.*). Dunn (1996, 99-107) considers that the operation was initially designed to win over the population of the border areas and to destabilise East Timor by accentuating differences between the parties, emphasising the development of international support for and acquiescence in, Indonesian intervention in Timor. Subroto's impression from the ground in West Timor was that the operation was offensive from the outset and developed gradually through disinformation and destabilisation to incursion and provocation. This process culminated in the UDT *coup d'état* of 11 August 75, encouraged and sponsored (indeed at least partially provoked) by Murtopo.

The UDT attentat led to the withdrawal of the Portuguese authorities and, on 19 August, to a counter-coup by Fretilin supported by left-wing elements of Tropaz (by far the majority). This provoked a civil war, between Fretilin on one side and UDT, KOTA, Trabalhista and Apodeti on the other. In this second phase, from August to early October 1975, BAKIN and TNI provided clandestine and later covert support to UDT and the other anti-Fretilin parties. On 19 September, these parties formed, under Indonesian leadership, the Anti-Communist Movement (*Movimento Anti-Communista*, MAC). MAC held Liquiça and Maubara, before being pushed back by Falintil to the *posto* fort at Batugade. This was captured by Falintil on 26 September, driving MAC across the border into Indonesian Timor and under the control of TNI/BAKIN. As early as 20 September, however, Fretilin claimed to have clashed with Indonesian Special Forces at Bobonaro, claiming one TNI killed and two captured. On 22 September *Sinar Harapan* reported an Apodeti counterattack, with clashes in Atsabe, Ermera, Bobonaro, Balibo and Maliana – virtually the entire extent of the 1999 case study area. On 23 September Fretilin claimed to have captured numerous TNI, probably from the same fighting (Roff 1992, 49-51). From this it would appear that Indonesian intervention in the civil war, although officially restricted to the provision of naval shipping to evacuate refugees, also involved clandestine and covert military support to the MAC. Dunn (1996) believes that Indonesia, having provoked the civil war with the intention of destroying Fretilin's influence and choosing a moment when Portugal was distracted by internal unrest and a constitutional crisis, originally intended to use MAC as a proxy and avoid overt involvement by TNI. The rapid defeat and ejection of MAC by Falintil rendered this plan unworkable. Both Dunn and Taylor (1991) argue that Indonesian strategy now changed to one of direct invasion, but that until this could be prepared it was essential to keep MAC 'in the game' by supporting it covertly and maintaining the public perception that it was capable of counterattacking. This argument is broadly supported by the available facts, but the chronology of TNI intervention as shown by Roff – beginning as early as 20 September, i.e. a week before MAC's

stronghold at Batugade was captured – indicates that the reality was somewhat less controlled. Similarly, Subroto (1998, 285-6) points out that the initial attack by TNI on Fretilin at Batugade was made on the authority of the local TNI commander and probably without authorisation from Jakarta. As noted above (page 96) the border subversion campaign may have been unknown to Adam Malik, the Foreign Minister and possibly to Suharto also (Dunn 1996, 97-98). Thus, it is perhaps more accurate to argue that local commanders in West Timor were increasingly drawn into the cross-border fighting as MAC's defeat became obvious. This was probably in accordance with a general strategy as outlined by Taylor and Dunn, but in practice local commanders on the ground often initiated incursions and attacks.

In the third phase, Indonesian special forces (then RPKAD/Kopassandha, now KOPASSUS) infiltrated and destabilised the border regions, then invaded East Timor. This was portrayed as a MAC counterattack and all TNI personnel used *noms de guerre* and wore civilian clothing. RPKAD and BAKIN controlled the activity, according to Subroto (who was present) and Rajawali and Susi Team⁷⁵ personnel operated as irregular cadres, raising partisan forces from local indigenous people who were then led by TNI. 'Major Andreas' (Captain, later General Yunus Yosfiah) commanded the assault on Balibo on 16 October 1975, which followed the recapture of Batugade a week previously⁷⁶. Tomas Gonçalves, who commanded the Timorese partisans in the assault, estimates

⁷⁵ Groups specialising in the raising, training and leading of indigenous guerrilla forces. Most armies maintain this capability, often (as in Indonesia) as part of their Special Forces.

⁷⁶ The so-called Balibo Incident has received significant publicity as a result of the killing of two news teams, a three-man team from Australia's Seven National News and a two-man British team working for the Australian Nine Network. The most reliable and balanced of many accounts of the incident is Dunn (1995). Testimony by the partisan leader of the attack, Tomas Gonçalves, in April 2000 tended to exonerate him from responsibility for the news crews' deaths. This is convenient as, at the time of his interview by SBS television he was involved in a process of reconciliation with Fretilin/CNRT and was thus anxious to revise and minimise his part in the invasion and subsequent occupation. If Gonçalves is to be believed, Captain Yunus was personally responsible for opening fire on the journalists as they attempted to surrender following the capture of Balibo. The 60-man Falintil garrison had withdrawn and no major fighting occurred on that day. The Indonesian explanation of 'cross-fire' would thus seem to be unsupportable. Despite James Dunn's excellent investigation of the incident (Dunn, 1995) and three official investigations by the Australian Government, in the hardly surprising absence of comment from General Yunus the full details of the incident are still not clear. Subroto, who was present, describes the incident in completely different terms (1998, 290 *et seq.*). What is clear, however, is the motivation for the journalists' deaths – they would have exposed the baseless Indonesian claim that the attack was part of a MAC counter-offensive, when plainly it was nothing of the kind. The *post mortem* attempt to portray the journalists as armed Fretilin fighters was cruder and is less well-documented, but appears to have been quickly abandoned. By contrast, testimony by John Calardho in April 2000 indicates that Roger East, the journalist killed in the overt invasion on 7 December, was heavily armed and wearing Fretilin uniform when he left his accommodation on the evening of 6 December, after the Indonesian preliminary bombardment had already begun. While there is evidence that he was summarily executed after capture, if this testimony is accurate East's death was of a different nature from that of the Balibo journalists, as he would appear to have relinquished his non-combatant status before the invasion. For a detailed discussion of these issues see Dunn (1995, 1996), Taylor (1991) and SBS (2000).

that 400 TNI personnel took part supported by 1-200 partisans acting as porters and guides (SBS, 2000). This contradicts Subroto's assertion that TNI acted as guerrilla cadres. In fact TNI seems to have dominated the incursion: the fact that TNI employed the Atsabe partisans (who had been under its control and training since November 1974 and were its most loyal and best-trained indigenous troops) rather than the recently-defeated MAC forces, emphasises this tight TNI control.

While operations in Balibo, Atsabe and Batugade were successful, the proxy invasion encountered serious opposition north of Maliana, near Bobonaro and especially at Fatularan near Atabae. At Fatularan a Tropaz cavalry squadron (*Esquadrão de Cavalaria 6*) severely defeated an armoured column of the TNI 5th Marine Battalion, causing it to withdraw after a large scale ambush (supported by horse-deployed heavy machine guns and mortars) and inflicting numerous casualties (Subroto 1998, 300 *et seq.*) The Indonesian-sponsored forces continued to progress slowly toward Dili in the months ahead, while Fretilin continued propaganda and revolutionary development activity in the villages and attempted to cement its control over Portuguese Timor. Opposition within the population was negligible. Meanwhile the Portuguese colonial administration remained on Atauro Island and although negotiations occurred between the Portuguese and Indonesian governments in Rome in early November, these did not halt the Indonesian intervention. Portugal during this period was on the brink of civil war and distracted by its own internal concerns, which were finally resolved in favour of parliamentary democracy on 25 November. On 28 November, Fretilin unilaterally declared its independence from Portugal and formed the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

The fourth phase, commencing on 7 December 1975, was a conventional, overt invasion. Dunn (1996), Magalhães (1992) and Freney (1979) argue that this was a response to the failure of the proxy invasion of September/October to reach the capital. This may have been so, but it is also possible that the proxy invasion was only ever intended to gain time for the buildup of TNI forces necessary to invade Timor – after all, the proxy invasion occurred only eight weeks after the outbreak of the civil war and the overt invasion some six weeks later. For a major conventional invasion this is a very limited preparation time and the uneven performance of TNI in the assault may be partially attributable to this factor.

The principal Indonesian eyewitness account of the invasion is Hendro Subroto's *Saksi Mata Perjuangan Integrasi Timor Timur* (1996), later amplified in *Perjalanan Seorang Wartawan Perang* (1998).⁷⁷ Subroto discusses in detail the

⁷⁷ Subroto was an ex-RPKAD soldier and landed as a TV journalist with the Indonesian Marines at Batugade during the proxy invasion. He was also involved in the capture of Balibo and was wounded in the ambush at Fatularan. Subroto's work has been criticised by other Indonesian journalists and by foreign analysts for its reportedly biased and pro-Indonesian nature. This criticism has some merit; however, Subroto is particularly candid about the insurgency methods adopted by the so-called 'militia' – the insurgent partisans raised and trained by TNI – before and during the invasion. His level of access, given his RPKAD connections, appears to have

contribution of TNI Special Forces – drawn at that time from both KOSTRAD and RPKAD personnel. As has been explained, these forces operated covertly, raising and training East Timorese ‘militia’ or ‘volunteer’ units, who were trained in West Timor and led by TNI cadres in partisan operations against the flanks and rear of Timorese forces opposing the invasion. For example, Yunus Yosfiah was later responsible for raising, training and equipping the first indigenous East Timorese infantry battalion, specifically trained and tasked with COIN and pursuit operations against Fretilin. Yosfiah, like many other officers of his generation, retained a close and personal commitment to the future of Indonesian control – and TNI influence – in East Timor.⁷⁸

In addition, Subroto describes the capture of Balibo in 1975 by an amphibious landing and deception on the coast near Batugade and an inland outflanking manoeuvre on foot. In an interview with the author in November 1999 in Balibo, he amplified this description to include details of deception measures employed and routes used. These matched the principal infiltration routes used by militia in 1999: the route along the escarpment via Railuli and Bauwai from the Southwest of Balibo and the route from the Southeast via Haekesak in the Sakafini salient and Leohitu district (Fieldnote T54/HS/1). Despite infrastructure development elsewhere in East Timor, the terrain constraints upon insurgency and infiltration therefore appear to have remained relatively constant between 1975 and 1999.

The Indonesian Occupation 1974-1999

Magalhães (1992) identifies six phases of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor until 1992. These are summarised at Table 4.3.

Table 4.3
Phases of Resistance (Magalhães)

Phase	Date From/To	Remarks
1	Dec 75 – Aug 77	Conventional large-scale ops; population in mountains; large-scale TNI combat ops.
2	Aug 77 – 1981	TNI search/destroy ops eliminate most Falintil and many civilians. Resistance weakened.
3	1981 – 23 Mar 83	Resistance resurgence under Xanana Gusmao; <i>pagar betis</i> and large-scale sweeps in interior.
4	Mar – Aug 83	Cease fire; peace talks between Xanana and TNI commanders. Broken by TNI on orders of General Moerdani.
5	Aug 83 – Sep 89	Major multi-brigade sweeps and extensive resettlement, air ops, <i>pagar betis</i> (‘fence of legs’), resistance activity widespread but small-scale and infrequent. Clandestine movement develops in urban areas and student groups, including Indonesia outside Timor.
6	Oct 89 – Nov 92	Increasing clandestine political activity and civil disobedience, student front activism,

been particularly high and he was present in Timor for much of the period of *Operasi Komodo* and the civil war.

⁷⁸ Yunus, interview (1994). Yunus candidly acknowledged his personal commitment to Indonesian control over East Timor – his wife is East Timorese and he retained a close *bapak* relationship of patronage and commitment to his former East Timorese subordinates and colleagues from the 1970s and 1980s. General Yosfiah was typical of his generation of TNI officers in this regard, but was distinguished by his unusually close involvement in both insurgency and COIN operations in the province.

		TNI responds with covert urban Counter-terrorist groups, terror, riot control measures.
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Source: Magalhães (1992)

Magalhães' first three phases can be subsumed into one phase of 'conventional operations', Phase 4 and Phase 5 into a 'guerrilla operations' phase and Phase 6 onward into an 'urban insurgency' phase. These will be examined in turn.

Conventional Operations. Commencing with a naval bombardment on 6 December 1975, in the early hours of 7 December a combined TNI parachute and amphibious assault captured Dili. This was followed on 10 December by the capture of Baucau. Despite a UN resolution on 12 December calling for Indonesian withdrawal, TNI quickly gained control of all major coastal towns, the border region and the Maliana plain. By 18 December the Indonesians were confident enough to bring the MAC leaders to Dili from Atambua and proclaim the Provisional Government of East Timor (*Governo Provisório Timor Loro Sae*). The following day, the Oecussi-Ambeno enclave was occupied and on Christmas Day 1975 10,000-15,000 troops landed at Dili, Liquiça and Maubara, completing Indonesian control over the north coast. Fretilin initially controlled the remainder of the territory and some 80% of the population. Between January 1976 and late 1981 TNI combat operations gradually reduced the area under Falintil control, capturing successive highland towns until Fretilin's control was restricted to the areas around Viqueque and Mount Matebean in the central mountain range. Fretilin President Xavier do Amaral surrendered in 1977, provoking severe criticism from left-wing supporters outside Timor (see, for example, Freney 1979), while Nicolau Lobato – who had succeeded him as president – was killed by a TNI patrol under the command of Lieutenant (later Major General) Prabowo on 31 December 1978. During most of this period Fretilin maintained radio contact with the outside world and the situation in Fretilin-controlled areas initially remained as it had been before the Indonesian invasion. However as these areas were constricted, pressure on Falintil and the local population intensified.

Guerrilla Operations. Jose Alexandro 'Xanana' Gusmao became President of Fretilin in 1981, during a period of intense Fretilin self-examination. Despite its success in delaying the Indonesian conventional drive into the interior, it was clear that time was running out for Falintil. Accordingly, the Fretilin-controlled population was urged to move out of the mountains and into the Indonesian-controlled zone and Falintil began to conduct guerrilla operations from much smaller base areas. By abandoning fixed positions and reorganising into smaller independent guerrilla groups, Falintil moved to a pyramidal C² structure and adopted tactics that, in the long run, considerably enhanced its survivability.

TNI, for its part, began to apply *pagar betis* and search and destroy techniques much more effectively. TNI blockaded the Fretilin base areas around Mount Matebean, resettled the population into larger villages closer to main roads and the coast and created large depopulated 'free fire zones'. By 23 March 1983, TNI and Fretilin had commenced negotiations following a ceasefire. The negotiations were initiated by Colonel Purwanto, KODIM commander in East

Timor and conducted at Larigutu. The Indonesian intent seems to have been to negotiate a Fretilin surrender and amnesty, along the lines of the DI/TII amnesty negotiated in 1962 after the capture of Kartusuwiryo and the constriction of Darul Islam base areas. Conversely, Fretilin's intent seems to have been a negotiated settlement based on (at least partial) Indonesian withdrawal and possibly partition. Inevitably, by August the talks had become deadlocked and on 17 August 1983 General Moerdani ordered the resumption of large-scale pacification operations against Fretilin. These were supported by US-supplied COIN aircraft and involved significant troop reinforcements and a major multi-brigade sweep operation against Mount Matebean. Fretilin activities dropped in intensity and frequency and TNI expected a quick victory, but instead a stalemate developed. TNI was unable to eliminate the guerrillas, while Fretilin was unable to prevent TNI from pacifying the lowlands, resettling the population and commencing an intensive program of development and civic action designed to win over the Timorese.

Urban Insurgency. Throughout the 1980s TNI's hold over the territory, infrastructure and population centres of East Timor improved, while Fretilin succeeded in maintaining its forces in the field and conducting occasional raiding, sabotage and ambush activity. During this period three major developments occurred. First, the Timorese political parties outside Timor – including UDT, Apodeti and Fretilin representatives – overcame their differences and formed the Timorese National Convergence, a united political front, in Portugal on 18 March 1986. This was followed by a gradual change in the nature of the guerrilla forces in East Timor, with Falintil becoming, in late 1987, the Timorese armed forces of national liberation rather than simply the armed wing of Fretilin. Similarly, on 31 December 1988 Xanana Gusmao resigned from membership of Fretilin to emphasise Falintil's impartiality. This unification of the previously fragmented Timorese political parties encouraged the second major development, that of a broadly-based international support movement for East Timor. This took the form of lobbying, activism, support from human rights groups, financial and media support and was most influential in Europe (particularly Portugal, France and the UK) and Australia⁷⁹. Further, UN-sponsored talks between Indonesia and Portugal commenced in New York, indicating a higher level of interest and discussion in the UN and leading to increasing pressure on Indonesia by aid donor nations linking human rights with aid and economic development. Third and most importantly, an urban-based resistance movement known as the Clandestine Front, led by students and supported by all strata of the urban population including numerous small children, began to develop. This had existed initially as a support movement for Fretilin (in a similar vein to the Malayan *Min Yuen* –

⁷⁹ Importantly, this development represented a move away from Fretilin's traditional support base among left-wing and Marxist organisations. This was partly due to the united front approach adopted from 1986, but also to the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. This reduced the degree of threat perception of Fretilin as a left-wing grouping, particularly in the United States and opened the way to increased international support. It remained an open question throughout the 1990s as to whether this change of political orientation was genuine, or simply represented the classic Marxist 'United Front' strategy.

see below page 176) but with the effective decapitation of the guerrilla movement in the 1980s it developed an independent character, focussing on agitation, propaganda, subversion and civil disobedience⁸⁰. The importance of the Clandestine Front was emphasised when Xanana Gusmao acknowledged in September 1990 that Falintil had been 'exterminated' but that its struggle had maintained the continuity of resistance which had now been taken up by the Clandestine Front. It is tempting to over-emphasise the parallels between the Clandestine Front and the Palestinian *intifada* of the same period: obvious similarities are the involvement of students and young children, the combination of sophisticated subversive propaganda with mass demonstrations and low-intensity attacks on security forces and the goading of security forces into a disproportionate response then exploited by the international media. However there were significant differences, particularly in that the level of actual violence against security forces was much lower in Timor than in Palestine. Key activities included the publication of an underground newspaper, petitions to church leaders and the UN Secretary General and demonstrations during visits by international figures such as the Pope (1989) the US Ambassador (1990) and a team of academics from UGM (1990). By the early 1990s the movement had links to several radical Indonesian student groups and was active in university cities including Yogyakarta and Bandung.⁸¹

Insurgency in the 1990s

In retrospect, the last decade of the 20th century ended both the New Order regime and the Indonesian occupation of Timor. It is difficult now to recall the high level of Indonesian confidence and control at the start of the decade, but this was such that in 1989 TNI declared the insurgency officially ended and the Indonesian government opened the province to the outside world for the first time since 1975. This exposed East Timor to the influence of external variables based on systemic, regional and nation-state factors within greater Indonesia and the principal events of the 1990s emphasise the interaction of these variables.

At the sub-nation-state level of analysis⁸², the first key event was the Santa Cruz Massacre of 12 November 1991. As mentioned, one of the targets of the Clandestine Front was a delegation of academics from UGM, who visited from January to April 1990 to research the progress of development and political integration in the province. Its report was severely critical of TNI brutality and pacification methods and was pessimistic as to the eventual success of integration. The Indonesian government rejected the report's conclusions and suppressed its publication, but then responded with a major troop reinforcement and large-scale sweep operations aimed at the capture of Xanana. Civilians were killed by TNI at Bobonaro and Ainaro and a curfew imposed on all urban areas. In response Falintil conducted a number of ambushes and

⁸⁰ These terms are used in their technical sense with no implicit pejorative connotation.

⁸¹ For example, in 1990 the trial of Ammarsjah, a dissident student activist at ITB in Bandung, showed a high degree of solidarity between the student movement in greater Indonesia and the Timorese Clandestine Front.

⁸² For a detailed description of the levels of political analysis see the footnote to page 24.

attacks against TNI and there was an upsurge in student activism, demonstrations and political subversion by the Clandestine Front.

The TNI response was to 'urbanise' the counter-insurgency campaign, much as the Clandestine Front had urbanised the insurgency. Its focus now turned to intensive counterintelligence and counter-subversive activity, infiltration of student groups, the use of provocation and propaganda and a more sophisticated approach to COIN. House searches, curfews and roadblocks were used to control and intimidate the civilian population, while covert counter-terror groups conducted kidnappings, extra-judicial killings and intensive human intelligence activities. Psychological operations also improved in sophistication at this time, for example the ostentatious digging of mass graves as a deterrent prior to planned demonstrations (Magalhães 1992).

The talks between Portugal and Indonesia had now (in late 1991) reached the point where Portugal wished to send a parliamentary fact-finding delegation to Timor. Awareness of this proposed visit led to a sharp increase in Clandestine Front activity and propaganda in the urban areas, which had now become the decisive terrain for both sides. On 10 August 1991, the Portuguese journalist Mario Robalo met secretly with Xanana and published an interview which convinced TNI that it would be impossible effectively to restrict contact between the Clandestine Front and the parliamentary delegation. Indonesia therefore began to pressure Portugal to cancel the visit and until 26 October 1991 (when the visit was finally cancelled) unrest, agitation and propaganda intensified in the towns, while TNI counter-terror also intensified. The cancellation of the visit led to major unrest including a number of demonstrations and on 27 October, for the first time during the occupation, TNI killed a civilian inside a church – Sebastião Gomes Rangel, an 18 year-old student, was killed inside the church of St Antonio at Motael in western Dili. Other churches in Timor were attacked on the same day and house searches occurred at Lospalos, Viqueque, Fatumaca and Manatuto, involving many beatings and arrests.

This escalation culminated on 12 November 1991 at Santa Cruz cemetery, where a large-scale demonstration had developed around Rangel's burial. A cortège of students moved across Dili into the cemetery, where it was encircled from the surrounding streets by Brimob, elements of KOSTRAD Battalion 303 and Territorial Battalion 700. The demonstration was aggressive and vocal, but not violent until a police agent in the crowd was identified and stabbed. The security forces then opened fire and killed at least 100 demonstrators in the initial firing and the subsequent clearance of the cemetery, conducted as a company group sweep. Numerous arrests were made and most of the wounded were taken to the Dili hospital where it is alleged that some were later poisoned. Many other prisoners were also killed after the incident: Magalhães quotes eyewitnesses to the killing of 68 prisoners from Santa Cruz at Be Musi

on 15 November 1991 and the subsequent killing of 17 witnesses to the Be Musi shootings.⁸³

Importantly, the massacre was filmed by the British freelance journalist Max Stahl and soon televised internationally. The global reaction was correspondingly severe, as was the reaction within Indonesia: Timorese students demonstrated in Jakarta and Bandung, supported by sympathetic Islamic students. Aid from most donor countries was cut and Indonesia was severely criticised by the US, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and the UN. Under international pressure, an Indonesian inquiry was appointed. It initially reported only 19 killed in the incident, later revised (again under international pressure) to 50 killed and 90 missing. As a result of its findings, the KODAM IX and KODIM 164 commanders (Sintong Panjaitan and Rudolf Warouw) were transferred and Battalion 303 (from central Java) and 700 (from Sulawesi) were deployed out of East Timor.

A similar influence by the regional political system upon events at the local level was seen in the capture and trial of Xanana Gusmao in 1992 and 1993. Throughout his trial scrutiny by international human rights agencies and regional governments – including Australia – combined to pressure the Indonesian government toward leniency (see *The Australian* Jan-Jun 1993). Xanana although imprisoned in Jakarta continued to play an important symbolic role for insurgents on the ground in East Timor and provided a focal point for activists in other regional countries.

At the systemic level, the Gulf War of 1991 indicated the willingness of the international community to assist a small independent nation and prevent its annexation. This was, of course, influenced by the strategic position of Kuwait and its oil resources, but it provided the East Timorese support movement with considerable leverage. By likening East Timor to Kuwait, Fretilin lobbyists and propagandists were able to pressure military aid donors to Indonesia (such as the United States, Australia and the UK) to reduce their aid – arguing that it was immoral for them to support Indonesia when they had opposed Iraq. Jose Ramos Horta was particularly effective in this regard (see BBC, 1996).

Similarly, at the systemic level the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1992/93 significantly reduced the motivation for Western support to Indonesia: its position as a bulwark against Asian Communism, which had militated against effective Western intervention in 1974-75, was no longer applicable. This gave greater freedom to Indonesia's critics in Western countries and led to suspensions of aid and arms sales by the US in 1993 and 1994. (By contrast, Australia alone of western nations strengthened its military ties with Indonesia in this period, while British military aid remained steady).

⁸³ The same information and additional claims of torture were given to the author by members of the student organisation (Fieldnote T47/AF/1) and during a visit to the site on 7 January 2000 (Fieldnote T108/Z/1).

From the Indonesian point of view, the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1992-95 strengthened ABRI's claim to be the guarantor of stability and democracy.⁸⁴ Central authoritarianism, it was argued, would be better in the long run than separatism and its attendant anarchy and violence. In the light of subsequent events, there was clearly some merit in this argument, but these international events strengthened the arguments in favour both of the central government and of the Timorese insurgents during this period. This led to acrimonious political debate, brought to a head over the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Archbishop Belo and Jose Ramos Horta in 1996. While antagonising ABRI and leading to significant unrest in East Timor (see Taudevin 1999, 85-86, 133) this award showed the extent to which CNRT was winning the propaganda war by the mid-1990s.

The Fall of the New Order Government

At the regional and nation-state levels, the most significant event of the 1990s was the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Beginning in Thailand and Malaysia, the crisis soon affected Indonesia and led to rapid economic depression, currency devaluation and the annihilation of many middle-income earners' savings. The banking and financial crises were followed by racial and religious unrest, as the dominant cleavages in Indonesian society – religion, ethnicity and the rural/urban divide – became aligned with each other. Thus poor Muslim Javanese struck at richer Chinese groups across both rural and urban areas in April-May 1998. This led to intense repression by ABRI and by militia groups, notably the National Discipline Movement, (*Gerakan Disiplin Nasional*, GDN) which provoked the first major rioting in West Java in early 1998. In response to this repression the Clandestine Front and student bodies throughout Indonesia assumed leadership of the mass urban poor and large-scale demonstrations resulted which combined skilful use of propaganda by the students with the anger and mass tactics of the mob. By mid-May 1998 this coalition had succeeded in provoking and exploiting a disproportionate response by the security forces, to bring down the Suharto government.

The most significant effect of this for the East Timorese resistance movement was the formation, on 27 April 1998, of CNRT, the Timorese National Resistance Council, combining all five major Timorese parties under a single political united front as a government-in-opposition. Neither the East Timor Socialist Association (the ideological successor of Fretilin) nor the Reconciliation Group for East Timorese Development joined CNRT, but in other respects it was capable of functioning as an effective 'united front' coalition.

On the ground in East Timor the fall of the Suharto government had little immediate effect: TNI increased the number of military posts around Dili and a

⁸⁴The Yugoslavian example was quoted to the author in 1993 (Fieldnote A1/U/1), 1994 (Fieldnotes J941/YY/1, J942/YS/1) and 1995 (Fieldnote A3/BS/1) by TNI officers as justifying the strength and coercive power of a military-dominated central government which could prevent the breakup of Indonesia.

buildup of paramilitary militias commenced. Taudevin reports hundreds of applicants joining the militia in Dili at this time, but claims that over 70% were from West Timor. According to Taudevin:

They were trained at ABRI [sic] bases such as the 744 [Territorial] Battalion in Becora. Newly armed and empowered, the gangs roamed the city of Dili attacking houses of pro-independence leaders, including Manuel Carrascalão, the student office, the pro-independence contras office and the CNRT office. The people of Dili defended themselves. Supporters with machetes and spears guarded the CNRT office. The paramilitary had rifles, including automatic weapons, though most were armed with knives and homemade rifles (Taudevin 1999, 144).

Alongside this buildup (and perhaps a significant cause of it) freedom of political expression gradually increased in East Timor, with calls for autonomy and independence becoming common. The East Timor Students' Solidarity Council was formed on 8 June 1998, an overt student movement which for the first time complemented the activities of the Clandestine Front. On 9 June 1998 a mass meeting in Dili indicated the strength of pro-independence feeling in Timor. This was met with unaccustomed restraint by the security forces.

Development of Militia Groups

As has been shown (see page 101 above) TNI large-scale COIN operations were successful in defeating Fretilin as a conventional force in the early 1980s and by 1989 Falintil had been marginalised and fought to a stalemate. The Timorese resistance movement responded to this 'decapitation' by transforming its supporting infrastructure into a sophisticated urban subversive movement (the Clandestine Front) during the 1990s. This, in turn, led to enhanced international support and increased effectiveness in the movement itself. By the late 1990s Falintil still survived in its mountain base areas and occasionally attacked TNI, but the scale and intensity of the fighting was not comparable to that of the early 1980s. Instead, Falintil had been marginalised and fulfilled the symbolic functions of armed resistance and administration-in-waiting. The main effort for both TNI and the resistance was the propaganda war and the urban subversive *intifada*, which had become the decisive point for the campaign.

TNI's response to this urbanisation of the campaign was to operate through covert and clandestine paramilitary and intelligence groups. On the intelligence front significant recruitment of agents and informants occurred and the interception of mail, email, telephone and mobile phone communications was routine (Taudevin 1999, 78). The use of overt police and military COIN techniques became a form of control over the population at large rather than a means of combatting the insurgency and within this overt framework a covert campaign of counter-terror and counter-subversion was carried out⁸⁵.

⁸⁵ This represents, in fact, an urbanised form of *quadrillage* in which overt checkpoints, bases and patrols form a framework for covert mobile 'strike' forces. The French themselves adopted a similar method in the urban fighting in the Algiers *casbah* (see Horne, 1977) but there is no evidence of French influence over Indonesian tactics.

The tactic of 'Petrus' (*penembakan misterius*, 'mysterious' shootings) first used in Java in the 1980s against political and criminal opponents of the New Order regime was applied (often by the same individuals) in Timor in the 1990s.⁸⁶ These killings occurred in Central and West Java and some parts of Sumatra, commencing around 1986 and continuing at varying degrees of intensity into the early 1990s.⁸⁷ *Petrus* was based on the recruitment of petty criminals or underprivileged individuals by intelligence officers from the local territorial structure, who maintained patron-client relationships with them, based on financial and other assistance⁸⁸. These personnel were then employed (with TNI cadre staff) for extra-judicial killing and intimidation of subversive or undesirable elements. The main features of this technique were, first, that it was controlled through TNI-AD intelligence officers and KOPASSUS cadres at the KODIM level rather than by POLRI or counter-intelligence officials. Second, it employed semi-criminal and underprivileged elements on the basis of personal and financial allegiance. Finally, its intent was the covert assassination of *local* elements deemed subversive by *local* commanders rather than a coordinated national effort – central government and military leaders officially deplored the actions but there is some evidence that they were centrally instigated or encouraged.

The paramilitary groups in East Timor originated from the MAC partisans and other anti-Fretilin groups of the 1970s, but were of little relevance during the early phases of conventional operations. By the late 1980s however, they became the principal TNI tool for urban and rural COIN. There was a qualitative difference between the partisans of the 1970s – who were employed in the field alongside Indonesian regular troops on COIN operations and acted from broad political and clan allegiance – and the groups of the 1990s who were recruited and employed on the *Petrus* model, with some local variations. This is evidenced by the distaste felt by many former partisans of the 1970s for the 1990s militia groups – the refusal of Tomas Gonçalves to accept the leadership of the militia movement in 1998 is a case in point (SBS, 2000). Militia groups were formed in 11 out of the 13 districts of East Timor, under the leadership of local prominent personalities who had benefited from the Indonesian occupation – a further instance of colonial proxy control through local elites. Schuster (1999) summarises the principal militia groups in early 1999 as follows:

⁸⁶ The author is indebted for this insight to (then) Major David Rawson, ADF School of Languages (*pers. comm.* 1993)

⁸⁷ The most intense *Petrus* actions occurred in Yogyakarta in 1986-87, but occasional action of this type still took place when the author was a language student in Yogya and Bandung in 1993 and 1994.

⁸⁸ The concept of 'welfare', familiar in most intelligence agencies, forms the basis for the relationship between the intelligence officer and his agents. Indonesian intelligence officers are particularly outstanding in this area and the patron-client relationships generated are correspondingly robust and long-lived.

Table 4.4
Principal Militia Groupings (Early 1999)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Membership</u>	<u>Number armed with modern weapons</u>	<u>Year Formed</u>
Halilintar	800	400	1977, revived 1995
Saka Loromonu	970	250	1983, revived 1998
Besi Mera Putih	2890	Unknown	Late 1998
Mahidi	2000	500	Late 1998
Aitarak	1000	100+	29 January 99
Laksaur	500	100	Unknown
Tim Alfa	300	300	Late 1990s
Makikit	200	100	Unknown
ABLA	100	70	Late 1980s
Naga Merah	Unknown	Unknown	1990s

Source: Schuster (1999)⁸⁹

Situation on the Eve of Intervention

By 1999, therefore, the urbanised insurgency and COIN response had become well-developed. TNI had a dual command structure in the province, with (on the one hand) combat operations handled by KOSTRAD and KOPASSUS under orders from their respective headquarters in Java but often poorly coordinated with each other and (on the other hand) a territorial structure under a regional commander. The urbanisation of the campaign had shifted the TNI command structure away from the large-scale conventional operations which had characterised the early part of the war. The emphasis on *Petrus*, intelligence and small-group COIN had given KOPASSUS a high degree of influence in the province, with KOPASSUS officers usually heading both the combat and territorial commands and filling key positions in the territorial structure (Tapol 1999a, 3). KOPASSUS under Major General Prabowo had increased its numbers to almost 7000 by 1998 and this expansion included the formation of KOPASSUS Groups 4 and 5. These supplemented the original structure of Groups 1 and 2 (Operations) and Group 3 (Training). By 1998 Group 3 provided many territorial commanders in Timor, while Group 4 and 5 were employed on clandestine and *Petrus* tasks – Group 4 acting as political counter-subversives and agents provocateurs and Group 5 carrying out extra-judicial killings.

With the fall of the Suharto regime the position of KOPASSUS became less secure. Prabowo's *Tim Mawar* ('Rose Team') admitted in 1998 to assassination

⁸⁹ Shuster's report, prepared for the US National Security Adviser from a variety of sources, is the most comprehensive Open Source assessment of the Timorese militia. Nevertheless it contains numerous factual and linguistic inaccuracies. The table shown above has been amended to reflect the true nomenclature of militia groups, but overall Shuster's excellent work highlights the complexity of the 1999 situation and the paucity of (then) available information about the militia groups.

and kidnapping and was disbanded; Prabowo himself was dismissed as KOPASSUS commander and eleven others were jailed. This paralleled an increasing loss of centralised control over KOPASSUS field commanders:

After Prabowo's dismissal, several Group 4 and 5 platoons were reported as having 'defected'. Since then, there has been talk of 'Phantom' troops operating in Aceh and Maluku, which suggests that the 'disappeared' KOPASSUS platoons may still be operating although no one knows who is in command (Tapol 1999a, 3).

Although Tapol's examples are external to East Timor, as just pointed out KOPASSUS was highly influential in East Timor and effectively controlled the TNI response in the province. The breakdown in centralised control of KOPASSUS – both by ABRI/TNI headquarters itself and by KOPASSUS HQ over its field elements – led to loss of control by both Jakarta (ABRI Headquarters and the civilian central government) and by KOPASSUS headquarters at Batujajar.⁹⁰

Tapol's analysis of internal ABRI/TNI C² in 1998-99 is significant in this regard. The Tapol organisation's on-line journal (Nov 99a) argues that two key factors are at play. The first is the effect of close interlinkages between TNI units and businesses:

Until the early eighties the several military components, the territorial commands, KOSTRAD and KOPASSUS had their own string of private companies to raise money. But globalisation brought many of these companies to their knees...Many generals became increasingly reliant on one or more companies or conglomerates. Top generals became the errand boys of big business...in the nineties, most of the super-rich were Suharto cronies, while military business ventures were in decline. TNI had to supplement their earnings from schemes mentioned above as well as getting involved in organised crime. Illegal gambling dens, prostitution, drugs, protection-rackets in shopping malls became money-spinners for TNI. Many TNI members earn more from their 'casual' jobs than from being soldiers. Against the background of such widespread breakdown of discipline, it has become increasingly difficult for HQ to assert its authority (Tapol Online Bulletin 154/5 November 1999).

The second factor, according to Tapol, was a clash between the reform-minded generals loyal to General Wiranto at TNI HQ at Cilangkap and the Prabowo faction within KOPASSUS. Tapol argues that because of the personal rivalry and clash of interests between Wiranto and Prabowo, KOPASSUS and the rest of TNI were openly working against each other during the unrest in Jakarta in May 1998. This conflict continued throughout 1998-9, with internecine struggles at the central leadership level of TNI. Because KOPASSUS was so influential in

⁹⁰ This loss of control may also be an example of patron-client relationships at the elite level. Prabowo's commitment to East Timor was a personal one – his capture and killing of Nicolau Lobatu in 1978 had made his reputation and ensured a close and beneficial relationship with the Suharto family, including marriage to Suharto's daughter. His prominence in seeking an autonomy solution in 1994-95 was almost certainly personally motivated and his commitment to East Timor was similar to, if more intense than, that of many other senior TNI officers with patron-client connections in the province. The author is indebted to Major General (then Colonel) A J Molan for this insight.

East Timor and controlled the militia, Wiranto at Cilangkap was unable to exercise any effective control over events at the local level. This continued, according to Tapol, from 1998 until immediately before the INTERFET intervention in September 1999 (Tapol Nov 99a, Nov 99b).

Summary of Historical Factors

From the foregoing analysis, a number of historical factors and trends are apparent. These can be summarised as follows:

- *Decrease in Government Through Local Elites.* The Portuguese colonial administration functioned through local elites and was based on principles of exchange, maintenance of traditional informal power structures at the village level and a high degree of autonomy for local leaders who themselves exercised very tight control over their areas. The Indonesian occupation initially used indigenous political parties and military forces as front organisations and subsequently local leaders became figureheads for the administration of the province. Indonesian practice therefore initially mirrored (in form if not entirely in substance) that of the Portuguese. However, as the campaign continued, control by local military leaders over the civilian population at all levels increased dramatically, through the application of the RT/RW system, use of informants and parallel government and military territorial structures. By the late 1980s, open opposition to the Indonesian government was only possible in the Falintil base areas, which were small, underpopulated and isolated from direct contact with the population through resettlement and rural depopulation.
- *Patron-client Motivations for Conflict.* The principal motivations for conflict at the local level in Timor have always been patron-client loyalties at *ahi matan* or village level. *Liurai* or other traditional leaders have given their loyalty to influential individuals in order to maintain their own power and benefit their clan, village or regional grouping. In turn local people have supported their traditional leaders with military force: the case of Same has been quoted (see page 86) to show how a change in direction by traditional leaders brought violent resistance to the Portuguese in 1912 and equally violent action *on their behalf* against the Japanese in 1942. Similarly, the MAC partisans represented traditional patron-client loyalties: directly in the case of Tomas Gonçalves and the Atsabe group and indirectly in the case of KOTA and the conservative elements of Apodeti and UDT. Fretilin exhibits somewhat different characteristics and will be discussed in detail as part of Fieldwork (see page 139 below).
- *Application of West Javanese COIN Paradigms.* TNI's approach to COIN in Timor has been extremely heavily influenced by its only previous experience of large-scale protracted insurgency, in West Java. This influence will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5, but at this point it is sufficient to note the influence of the following West Javanese paradigms over TNI practice in Timor:

- *Decapitation of the Insurgent Movement.* Initial TNI efforts attempted to kill or capture key Fretilin leaders. When such leaders were eliminated, Fretilin replaced them relatively quickly with equally effective leaders and this disconcerted and confused TNI's COIN planners. The attempt to eliminate such leaders may be traced to the startlingly rapid collapse of DI/TII following the capture of S.M. Kartusuwiryo in 1962 (see page 71). This success led to a similar (and equally successful) attempt by TNI to round up the PKI leaders in the aftermath of the Gestapu coup in 1965 and later to similar attempts against Xavier Amaral, Nicolau Lobato and Xanana Gusmao.
- *Counter-Force Approach.* TNI's methods as developed in West Java focussed on defeating insurgent forces in the field rather than winning over the population. The same approach in East Timor led to massive civilian suffering and loss of life, without significant concomitant progress in pacification. This may be traced to the effectiveness of the approach in West Java, where the insurgents had voluntarily separated themselves from the population and acted as an ultra-traditionalist hierarchical group. Thus by eliminating the insurgents TNI ended the insurgency. To borrow terminology from nuclear strategy, this is a counter-force approach while the alternative approach is that of counter-value. British COIN tactics are the classic example of a successful counter-value approach. This approach conceptualises an insurgency as a competition for government and for the hearts and minds of the population and seeks to remove genuine grounds for grievance, win over the people and isolate them from insurgent influence. While counter-force approaches have been more common, they have often been less successful (the French and later the US in Vietnam are prominent examples). The success of the counter-force method in West Java, however, may have led TNI to adopt it uncritically in Timor.
- *Pagar Betis.* The tactic of *pagar betis* ('fence of legs') developed in West Java was re-applied in East Timor and proved spectacularly successful in eliminating Fretilin base areas. It had significant limitations in the East Timorese context (see page 66 above), but its application brought victory over Falintil field forces and forced the urbanisation and sophistication of the insurgency as noted above.
- *Civil Affairs Program.* A similar civil affairs program to that applied in West Java (see page 67 above) was used in East Timor, with a focus on Army-owned enterprises, basic infrastructure development, health and sanitation improvements and enhancement of local government control over the population. This led to considerable infrastructure development in the province, but did not translate (as it had done in West Java) into increased support for the government. The reasons for this will be examined in detail later.

- *Petrus*. The *Petrus* model (as this dissertation has termed it) denotes the employment of covert assassination, counter-subversive propaganda, infiltration of dissident groups by *agents provocateurs* and informers within a framework of conventional COIN operations by regular troops. This model was developed in West and Central Java in the 1980s (while the East Timor campaign was still being fought along conventional rural COIN lines) and then applied with increasing sophistication in East Timor. Although not a result of previous experience against Darul Islam, it again emphasised TNI's tendency to apply tactics developed for Java to the outer islands.⁹¹
- *Urbanisation And Increasing Sophistication Of The Conflict*. As has been seen, by the late 1980s TNI COIN strategy had negated Falintil as a military threat. The supporting organisation gradually transformed itself in the late 1980s and early 1990s into an urban subversive movement of great sophistication. It demonstrated the ability to manipulate media coverage, conduct national and international propaganda, provoke a disproportionate response from TNI and then exploit that response for its own aims. Most importantly, this movement developed spontaneously from the younger urban generation rather than from the rural insurgents, although it maintained a close linkage with the armed resistance. Nevertheless, by the early 1990s it was clear that the decisive point for both the insurgent movement and the Indonesian security response was the urban *intifada* rather than the rural campaign. Falintil was an essential part of the resistance in that its existence and survival in the field constituted a constant challenge to Indonesian authority, but not in the sense that it contributed directly at the tactical level. Similarly, the overseas political leadership (fronted by Jose Ramos Horta) skilfully manipulated the activities of the Clandestine Front for propaganda purposes. However, there is little evidence of direction from the overall leadership (political or military) over day-to-day tactical-level activities by the Clandestine Front. This issue will be examined in detail below. For the present, it is sufficient to note that by the early 1990s the main effort and decisive terrain for both the resistance and the security forces had become (and remained) the urban clandestine movement rather than the rural armed guerrilla force.
- *Increasing Influence Of Systemic And Regional Political Systems*. In the early phases of the conflict, systemic and regional influences were of negligible significance. For example, the UN resolutions and condemnation by the international community had no bearing on Indonesian activities in the

⁹¹ It should also be noted that techniques developed in Timor in the early 1990s were also applied in Java itself later in the 1990s, against the urban subversive movement and clandestine student organisations. There was therefore a degree of cross-pollination: tactics originally developed in Java were applied in Timor, refined and sophisticated, then re-applied in Java with enhanced effect. The author is indebted for this insight to Major General A J Molan, who served as Military and later Defence Attache in Jakarta in 1994-96 and 1998-99 and observed this process at first hand (Molan, *pers. comm.* 2000).

province in 1975-83, because it was almost entirely isolated from the outside world and such activities were unknown. Moreover, while ever Fretilin remained an avowedly Marxist organisation and its supporters overseas remained primarily left-wing, the Cold War polarisation in the region gave Indonesia leverage to reduce criticism and maintain international support. Throughout the 1980s this situation persisted, although increasing pressure began to be exerted as Fretilin and Falintil divested themselves of obvious Marxism and adopted the United Front strategy. By 1989 the Indonesians were confident enough to open the province to the outside world. This coincidentally marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War and an era of multipolar systemic politics and globalisation commenced, which led to much greater systemic and regional influence on the conflict. In the first place, as the province was opened much more became known about the situation. Secondly, as the conflict was urbanised its Timorese protagonists became increasingly articulate, politically aware and able to access international media. Thirdly, the Kuwait situation of 1991 and the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc removed the principal basis for support by the West of the Suharto regime, namely the fear of Communism. Finally, increasing globalisation of the economy led to the demise of major TNI-owned businesses, leading to an alliance between middle-ranking officers (particularly of KOPASSUS) and private business interests and undermining central control within TNI. Globalisation also contributed to the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, one of the major factors that contributed to the fall of the New Order government and the events of 1999.

- *Increasing Control Over The Population By The Military.* As has been seen, initially the military controlled very little of the population (only 20% according to Fretilin). By 1999 its control had extended to almost the entire population; indeed the only elements formally outside TNI control by 1999 were the few hundred Falintil in the mountains, less than 0.01% of the population. While precise figures are impossible to verify, it is clear that over the course of the insurgency local military commanders gained steadily in their influence and control over the population. Political control – as indicated by the 30 August referendum result – was still lacking in 1999, but security control over the province was better by 1999 than ever before and it was only TNI's internal problems and the TNI-sponsored unrest that finally jeopardised this control.
- *Decreasing Control Over The Local Military By Central Authorities.* As has been shown, over time the influence of KOPASSUS within East Timor became predominant in the TNI COIN structure and approach. KOPASSUS itself had also developed a high degree of independence from ABRI headquarters at Cilangkap. Moreover, KOPASSUS' responsibility for the original acquisition of East Timor, its carriage of the main burden in the urbanised insurgency of the 1990s and its close business ties with the province, had given local KOPASSUS and intelligence officers a sense of 'ownership' that counteracted central government control. While Prabowo commanded KOPASSUS this situation was workable, as the two command structures

were united through loyalty to President Suharto (head of the formal command structure and, in terms of informal power structures, Prabowo's *bapak* and father-in-law). However, with the fall of Suharto and the intense competition for power between General Wiranto and KOPASSUS, TNI lost control over its forces in East Timor. Prabowo's dismissal had decapitated KOPASSUS and hence removed ABRI Headquarters' medium of control over the KOPASSUS-dominated structure of East Timor. This loss of control can be seen extremely clearly in the events of 1999, to be discussed in the next section. It is one of the strongest pieces of historical evidence identifying the mechanisms by which the process of political power-diffusion in guerrilla operations may operate in a given circumstance.

Conclusion

These historical data show that East Timor, despite its enormous environmental and situational differences from West Java, exhibits some of the same characteristics identified in the first case study. These have been summarised above. In order fully to understand their significance, however, it is necessary to examine the fieldwork results from 1999.

FIELDWORK RESULTS

Campaign Summary⁹²

Having examined the historical basis for guerrilla operations in East Timor, it is now appropriate to discuss the real-time fieldwork data generated by direct observation in 1999-2000. The 1999 campaign within the area of the case study can be conceptualised in four phases: the militia campaign, the intervention phase, the mobile operations phase and finally the static security operations phase. An understanding of the developing militia insurgency campaign in East Timor is an essential prerequisite to understanding the fieldwork results and is therefore presented in detail.

The Militia Campaign

Concurrent with President Habibie's announcement in January 1999 of the East Timor independence referendum, KOPASSUS and KOSTRAD units began to augment the existing armed militia groups within the case study area⁹³. These groups comprised some pre-existing armed paramilitary⁹⁴ personnel as cadre

⁹² This section does not purport to be an overall history of the campaign, but rather a survey of key events as they occurred within the case study area. Events external to the area are referred to for context only.

⁹³ The source for this account, unless otherwise acknowledged, is the author's own daily record of events, in the form of the Op Warden Diary (OWD) from 20 September 99 to 12 January 00, which was updated each day and included personal participant observation as well as the principal military events of the campaign. Terrain studies, interview notes and political/cultural analyses were also recorded in fieldwork journals using the same format, sequence and referencing system as for previous case studies.

⁹⁴ The term 'paramilitary' is used to distinguish groups such as Halilintar, in which every member was issued with a military-style weapon and received training in guerrilla warfare and fieldcraft, from militia groups such as *Firmi*, *Besi Merah Putih* and *Dadurus*, in which only key

staff and core elements and were sponsored by KOPASSUS SGI personnel. The initial round of violence occurred in March/April 1999, under operation *Sapu Jagad I*, intended to discourage the independence vote by targeting influential pro-Independence figures. The most publicised incident of this phase was the killing, at Liquiça, of 23 civilians in a Catholic church. This was carried out by paramilitary groups under TNI supervision and overall the operation forced a number of influential independence leaders to flee either to Dili, or to the hills. TNI also conducted reprisal killings within the area of the case study and forced concentrated the population of outlying villages into regional centres where they could be more easily controlled (Fieldnote T79/O/1). There was then something of a lull until the lead-up to the referendum of 30 August 1999, however militia groups continued to build in numbers and activity under the leadership of KOSTRAD, SGI, Kodim intelligence staffs and paramilitary cadres. Around Independence Day (17 August) further violence occurred, with militia in Railuli, Balibo and Maliana targeting members of the population considered likely to vote for independence. Again, this violence was sponsored by SGI and territorial troops and led by armed paramilitary elements. A small number of high-profile pro-independence figures were killed or forced to flee, while others were intimidated.

When it became known, in early September, that the referendum result favoured independence, operation *Sapu Jagad II* was launched. This was a widespread campaign of arson and looting, commencing with pro-independence premises and the killing of pro-independence members of the population. This rapidly grew out of the control of military leaders and led to the destruction of most buildings in the case study area and the dispersion or forced relocation of 90% of the population. In Balibo, 80% of buildings were burnt and the entire male population was gathered in the centre of town, where between nine and 13 young people were killed with machetes by members of the Firmi militia, supervised by Halilintar paramilitaries and TNI. The remainder of the male population was then coerced into joining Firmi under threat of similar treatment, except for some who fled to the hills within the Aidabaleten hinterland and towards Ermera and Maliana, to known Falintil areas, returning in mid-October 1999 to make contact with INTERFET forces. The women and children, together with the men who had joined Firmi, were forced to move to IDP camps in Atambua, using their own transport or in trucks provided by Halilintar and being first given time to empty and dismantle their houses. The town was then systematically destroyed, with only three buildings in the entire town retaining their roof and walls.

Batugade, Aidabaleten and Maliana experienced a similar pattern of intimidation and salutary killing followed by forced relocation to West Timor. By contrast, in Ermera the vast majority of the population fled to the nearby Falintil base area and returned in a relatively short time frame to a partially destroyed town. The IDPs, on arrival in West Timor, came under the close

leaders were issued with military weapons and the rank-and-file carried homemade weapons (*senjata rakitan*) only. See the detailed discussion of Military Actors below (page 129).

control of militia, again supervised by paramilitaries and TNI. Approximately 150 people from Balibo were killed on arrival, ostensibly for not possessing an Identity Card (*Kartu Tanda Pengenal*, KTP) which was taken as evidence of membership of Falintil⁹⁵. In practice this killing served to cow the population and emphasise militia control over them.

Falintil throughout the militia campaign did not directly confront the militia, but maintained its base areas in mountainous and forested regions. The most important Falintil cantonment in the case study area was at Sinvema, in the hills approximately three kilometres southwest of Ermera. Falintil in this area provided a haven for local people fleeing from militia violence in the population centres and in particular protected those who had fled from militia searches after the initial stage of arson and destruction had passed. The local priest from Ermera, a person of great traditional and cultural influence although (unlike some other clergy) not directly involved in the political process, fled to a coffee plantation near the Falintil base area and survived as a result of Falintil protection and humanitarian assistance, along with several thousand other IDPs from Ermera (Fieldnote T58/SA/1).

Intervention Phase

By mid-September the killing and destruction had reached crisis proportions, prompting the declaration of martial law and the replacement of KOPASSUS forces with KOSTRAD elements loyal to the armed forces command at Cilangkap rather than to KOPASSUS headquarters at Batujajar. Despite this, the wave of killing and arson continued to grow, forcing President Habibie to accede to international pressure for the deployment of Australian-led combat forces to restore security. These forces arrived on 20 September 1999 and immediately secured Dili airport, port and key infrastructure, followed by the town and airfield of Baucau, 170 kilometres further East. INTERFET forces initially focussed on securing Dili, the hills immediately south of the town and Baucau, with a significant action being fought against militia elements in Los Palos, at the eastern tip of East Timor. In addition, there were a number of clashes and incidents in Dili with both militia and TNI. The militia in these areas fought when cornered, but generally sought protection from TNI. This was an effective tactic because they were generally indistinguishable from TNI territorial troops and INTERFET rules of engagement prevented TNI being engaged even when they were clearly harbouring or escorting militia.

Meanwhile, in the area of the case study the militia and paramilitaries continued with more killing, arson and forced relocations. In addition, militia groups and the captive or semi-captive population moved through the case study area from regions further east and made their way into West Timor. A

⁹⁵ In fact this accusation was incorrect: on arrival in Balibo, Australian forces found numerous KTPs left abandoned within the town. These were collected and collated by the author and proved to have been – in the main – those of people later killed in Atambua. The reason for abandonment of these identity documents by the population is unclear, but similar discarded KTP were found during the initial seizure of Dili airport on 20 September 99.

large amount of sea movement of IDPs and militia occurred at this stage. Again, numerous civilians were killed to ensure compliance.⁹⁶

Mobile Security Operations Phase

In late September INTERFET conducted a company group airmobile landing at Liquiça, supported by an armoured ground advance. This caused a further withdrawal of militia to West Timor and the return of scattered population from the hills to Liquiça. This was followed on 1 October 1999 by a battalion airmobile landing at Balibo and Batugade, supported by an armoured advance along the littoral strip and later amphibious landings at Batugade. Militia had constructed a number of road blocks and ambush sites, but generally abandoned these with little or no resistance and fled into West Timor⁹⁷. Some militia and population groups were cut off in East Timor by the seizure of the border crossings in this area; this forced some elements to bypass INTERFET forces through un-secured portions of the border. Others – notably the Halilintar paramilitary group that controlled Aidabasalala – decided to remain in place and attempt to hold out. There were numerous clashes and incidents between militia and INTERFET forces across the area of the case study at this time. This culminated in the major contact between 2 RAR and militia supported by TNI at Motaain on 10 October and the pursuit at Nunura Bridge (again by 2 RAR) during the period 11-14 October of twelve armed militia attempting to exfiltrate from the case study area. Both these incidents were sufficiently important from a political and insurgency standpoint to be worthy of detailed discussion.

Motaain

The Motaain contact demonstrated the close cooperation that still existed between TNI, armed paramilitary groups and militia at this time. On the morning of 10 October 1999 a number of militia (later detained and interviewed) were present at Motaain, in the process of conducting training under the supervision of a TNI master sergeant, from a territorial battalion. The commander and intelligence officer from Atambua KODIM were responsible for the overall conduct and resourcing of training, which was led by armed paramilitaries and incorporated fieldcraft and weapon training. Militia involved in the training originated from the area of the case study and had been collected in early October from IDP camps in Atambua, some being forced to join the Armui group, while others participated willingly. The intent of this training was partially to prepare for an eventual return to East Timor in a guerrilla role and partially to maintain morale among militia elements in the West Timor border region. Joao Tavares and Euricco Guterres, leaders of the

⁹⁶ The usual method was for the victims' hands and feet to be cut off with machetes to prevent them from being able to swim, after which they were thrown overboard to drown. Numerous bodies of these victims continued to wash up along beaches throughout the littoral strip of the case study area, until late November.

⁹⁷ Seven roadblocks were identified by reconnaissance along the road from Batugade to Balibo. These were all abandoned rapidly on the arrival of INTERFET forces and the only incidence of opposition was token gunfire and a rapid withdrawal at Batugade. Also, several reconnaissance parties of militia maintained observation over INTERFET movements (OWD, 1 October 99).

Halilintar paramilitary and Aitarak militia groups respectively, had been sighted on several occasions over the preceding few days, in Atambua, Motaain and other border population centres, attempting to build support for a campaign of infiltration and subversion targeted on Balibo.⁹⁸

The contact between INTERFET and militia at Motaain was initiated by personnel dressed as militia but armed with TNI weapons. As the contact progressed, 20 – 30 militia who were in the village at the start of the contact mounted into trucks and withdrew toward Atambua. Other militia withdrew along the road on foot. TNI territorial troops from 743 Battalion covered the disengagement of the militia elements in the village and then ceased firing and began negotiations with the INTERFET patrol. Simultaneously five militia armed with *senjata rakitan* engaged the rear elements of the INTERFET patrol and immediately withdrew East along the coastal strip. INTERFET returned fire and followed up the withdrawing militia, before being forced to abandon the pursuit in view of the greater threat from TNI to the front of the patrol. Meanwhile the KODIM commander, moving to Motaain to conduct negotiations, met withdrawing militia on the Atambua road. According to these militia (later detained and interviewed) he told them that training was no longer to occur in the immediate vicinity of the border and that they were to move to Atambua where they would be given further direction.

From 10 October 1999 onward, militia training was concentrated in two principal areas opposite the case study area. Halilintar paramilitary groups trained under their own leaders in Atapupu and Silawan districts, behind but close to the border area. Other militia groups trained with TNI assistance in the areas of Nenuk and Lidak, south of Atambua and well away from the border.

Another important result of the Motaain contact was the recognition by both TNI and INTERFET of the requirement for tighter control and closer coordination of the border area. This led to the establishment of permanent border crossing points along the entire East/West Timor border. Those in the case study area were Junction Point Alpha (Motaain), Junction Point Bravo (Belu) and Junction Point Charlie (Memo). These junction points were in place and operating as controlled IDP movement nodes by mid-November, manned by 432 Airborne Infantry Battalion of KOSTRAD (as distinct from Territorial troops). INTERFET troops controlled access to the East Timor side of the border with UNTAET military observers in place. Other unofficial crossing points were opposite the village of Railuli and at the Nunura River Bridge. Detailed overlays were produced depicting the numerous discrepancies between Indonesian and INTERFET mapping of the border, which had been noted after the Motaain contact. Indonesian representatives at the contact suggested to the author that TNI and INTERFET should set up joint control posts manned by both forces at key crossing points on the border. The same suggestion was repeated by Indonesian representatives to the Joint UN investigation into the incident and at later meetings with INTERFET representatives.

⁹⁸ OWD, 5-10 October 1999.

Overall, therefore, the Motaain contact imposed limitations on the freedom of action of both militia and their TNI sponsors in the immediate border region. It forced militia training away from the border, undermined cooperation and confidence between militia and TNI, led to tighter control of border crossing points and thus limited militia ability to infiltrate into the area of the case study. In addition, it embarrassed TNI and it is noteworthy that KODIM and territorial staff were marginalised by KOSTRAD personnel immediately after the contact and that key personnel including the KODIM commander were later replaced.

Nunura

The day after the Motaain contact, an Australian platoon was in overwatch of a known militia courier route between the Halilintar enclave at Aidabasalala and West Timor. This route followed the dry riverbed of the Nunura River and entered West Timor at the head of the Sakafini salient. This was an area occupied by militia and TNI as an observation post and reception area for militia exfiltrating from the area of the case study. At mid-afternoon the platoon sighted between 12 and 20 militia moving along the riverbed towards the border. The group was led by two motorcycles, moving well ahead of the group and carrying armed personnel who later were found to include Paulo Gonçalves, head of the Halilintar paramilitary group⁹⁹. Behind the motorcycles were two individuals in full TNI uniform, armed and patrolling with a high degree of skill. These were assessed to be cadre staff, possibly KOPASSUS troops due to the high skill level observed. Behind this group were twelve personnel wearing civilian clothes but armed with TNI rifles and carrying TNI field equipment. The INTERFET platoon closed with the militia, who scattered and fled, dropping their equipment but retaining weapons. The motorcyclists succeeded in reaching the West Timorese border a few hundred metres away, but the dismounted militia were scattered into jungle terrain North-West of the incident site. These militia made their way via a lateral route across the northern edge of the Balibo plateau, across to the coast road where over several days they were sighted and pursued before contact was lost on 14 Oct ¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁹ The use of motorcycles or other vehicles (or occasionally dogs or cattle) to move ahead of a patrol was a common militia tactic and one shared with insurgent forces in both East Timor and Irian Jaya (now West Papua) (UK1/RA/1). The concept was to send an obvious decoy element several hundred metres ahead of the main body of the patrol, to detect and spring any ambush or overwatch group. This tactic could be countered by remaining concealed, allowing the initial scout group to pass and then dealing with the main body. This was the method by which a TNI infiltrator was captured on 23 December 99 by a reconnaissance patrol of the author's company in the Salore Pocket area. (OWD, 23 December 99)

¹⁰⁰ The militia element, moving extremely lightly equipped, was able to stay out of reach of INTERFET forces who were moving in unfamiliar terrain and unaware of the lateral route until this incident. Conversely, having lost their field equipment in the initial contact they were forced to survive by raiding local villages along their route for food and water, thus leading to a trail of sightings which allowed INTERFET to track their progress toward the border. At this stage of the campaign, INTERFET patrols were still wearing ballistic armour and carrying a full load of heavy weapons and ammunition more suited to the high-intensity phase of the operation in Dili. Accordingly they were consistently outmanoeuvred and outrun by militia in the

The Nunura incident showed that TNI were still supporting and leading militia elements in the case study area at this time. In addition to the KOPASSUS cadre staff, an older NCO (possibly a Babinsa) accompanied the militia group. Of more importance were the documents recovered from the abandoned militia packs, which showed that the militia group were members of Halilintar, had been formally trained by TNI as part of Hansip and Wanra groups (to be discussed below), originated from Aidabasalala and other towns within the Aidabaleten hinterland and included several Indonesian public servants of East Timorese birth¹⁰¹. These individuals were public school teachers and their papers included posting orders transferring them to schools in the Haekesak and Atambua regions. This indicated that Indonesian government employees were being transferred from East to West Timor in a formal administrative sense and that therefore the 'asset stripping' of physical infrastructure carried out by the militia was also applied by the Indonesian public service and TNI to Indonesian-trained public servants and thus to the 'intellectual infrastructure' of the new independent state. This aspect of the campaign is to be discussed in detail below.

Later Operations in the Mobile Phase

Following these incidents, TNI support to the militia diminished dramatically and the militia were forced to find other routes into West Timor. At the same time, other INTERFET units began to arrive in the border area to support 2 RAR, which until that time had operated alone. This led to more effective sealing of the border and consequently trapped a number of militia inside the area of the case study.

On 18 October 2 RAR launched a large-scale clearance operation of the Aidabaleten hinterland. This operation was compromised 24 hours before its start time, by a contact between SASR troops and militia at Aidabasalala. This township was a militia stronghold, dominated by the Halilintar leader Paulo Gonçalves. Halilintar and the Aidabasalala group are to be discussed in detail below. The clearance operation comprised an airmobile assault into blocking positions on the hinterland, supported by an armoured sweep from two directions attempting to cut off militia in the area. The operation was successful only in the sense that it was completed without major deviation from the initial plan: in tactical terms it was a failure as no militia were encountered and no major areas of population were identified – the compromise and contact of the SASR patrol on the preceding day had warned the militia. Following the sweep,

extremely rough terrain of the case study area. Only later, following the results of several similar incidents, was approval gained to reduce the load carried to a tactically realistic level.

¹⁰¹ These documents included official transfer orders for individuals employed by the Indonesian government to report to West Timor, as well as educational records and letters of militia and paramilitary members. They were translated by the author and returned to Dili for examination.

troops were immediately diverted to Aidabasalala but failed to prevent the escape of Gonçalves and his key leadership group to West Timor, where they established a base area in Atambua.

Other mobile operations in this phase of the campaign secured Maliana and Bobonaro before the arrival of other INTERFET units into the border area, but again SASR patrols were compromised immediately before these operations and no militia were caught. By late November the operation had settled into static patrolling.

Static Security Operations Phase

From late November, the campaign settled into a phase of static security operations by INTERFET, aimed at dominating areas of friendly population, defeating infiltration by militia, controlling the return of IDPs and protecting INTERFET base areas. This phase coincided with the establishment of the UN transitional authority in East Timor following ratification by the MPR of the 30 August referendum vote.

The return of IDPs from West Timor was a major feature of this phase, in increasing numbers as the border area became more secure and border crossing points were formalised with UNHCR and UNTAET presence. At the same time NGO aid agencies began to penetrate the area of the case study and provide humanitarian assistance to the population. The figures for return of the population by 26 Nov indicate that, while the case study area was significantly depopulated by comparison to its pre-war status, there were still considerable numbers of returnees present. This is shown in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5
Percentage Return of Population by 26 Nov 99

Town	Population 30 Aug 99	Population 26 Nov 99	Percentage of Return
Balibo	17400	2690	15.5%
Atabai	10600	2650	25.0%
Maliana	24000	13360	55.6%
Bobonaro	26300	19000	72.2%
Marko	8234	7204	87.5%
Lolotoe*	7384	6789	91.9%

Source: Pre-referendum figures based on UNHCR/UNAMET pre-referendum census. Returnee figures based on NGO/CNRT agreed totals for district (rather than town/village) populations as at 26 Nov 99. *Lolotoe is located outside the case study area in the southern portion of the border region and is included for comparison.

As can be seen from the figures, the further West or the closer to the border within the area of the case study, the less the proportion of IDPs who had returned from West Timor by this time. This was partly an indication of

proximity to the main IDP centre in West Timor at Atambua, but also an indication of the severity of initial depopulation due to militia activity.

The static security phase saw the return of 100,000 IDPs to West Timor, by a combination of road, sea and air. Limited militia infiltration into East Timor commenced in this phase, often motivated by the need or desire to acquire goods, cattle or assets from East Timor border areas and penetrating to shallow depths of a few thousand metres at most, in areas not obviously secured by INTERFET troops. TNI positions were established along the border, using KOSTRAD troops from 432 Bn and often including militia in the same locations. By 7 December 1999, the UN reported that 171,000 IDPs remained in West Timor, of whom 110,000 wished to return while the remaining 61,000 comprised employees of the Indonesian government (Fieldnote T144/P/7). Permanent border crossing points were now established at Motaain, Nunura Bridge, Belu and Memo within the case study area. These points were manned by TNI border posts on the West Timor Side, mirrored by INTERFET posts at Batugade, Nunura Bridge, Junction Point Bravo (opposite Belu) and Memo. UN Military Observers (UNMOs) from the newly-established UNTAET also began to deploy into the area of the case study at this time, working from a base in Maliana and, amongst other duties, being responsible for liaison between TNI and INTERFET at permanent crossing points.

Militia activity in this phase can be seen as consolidation. Partially this resulted from disorganisation engendered by the militia's rapid withdrawal from East Timor in the face of INTERFET. In addition, political will and guidance within the militia suffered during this period due to a change of government in Indonesia (the election of the new President Abdurrachman Wahid), the ratification of East Timor's separation from Indonesia and the withdrawal of direct support from TNI. Further, the wet season began to impact seriously on both sides' operations by mid-November. The overall militia strategy was to maintain morale by repeated statements of intent to attack INTERFET forces, propaganda and raiding activities, meanwhile training a core element of militia for future insurgent activities. IDP return to East Timor was initially hindered and discouraged by both TNI and militia (OWD Oct/Nov 99). Later, under pressure from the UN and INTERFET, TNI troops began protecting returning IDP convoys from militia intimidation. The militia intent was to hold back large numbers of IDPs, to be released later once militia elements were trained and ready to accompany them back into East Timor, using the IDPs as cover for their infiltration. Militia groups would then separate themselves from the IDPs, move into the hills and commence guerrilla operations. A variation on this intent was to await the completion of the INTERFET mission and the handover to UN peacekeeping forces, who would have a more restrictive mandate and rules of engagement, before commencing insurgency operations.¹⁰²

¹⁰² This strategy appears to have borne some fruit, with the infiltration of a 60-man militia incursion group in several small parties astride the Nunura River crossing point in February 2000. Although the incursion was scattered and defeated without significant damage to security, most militia survived and withdrew to West Timor. This demonstrated clearly what

Militia activities opposite the area of the case study focussed on training, conducted at Nenuk near Atambua and at locations (including Atapupu and Silawan) closer to the border, propaganda and raiding/robbery activities. Training at Nenuk was conducted with TNI assistance and included fieldcraft, weapon training and physical training. Training at Atapupu was carried out under the direction of militia leaders, but with assistance from current and past members of TNI and was more basic, focussing on individual military skills and often using wooden weapons for drill purposes.

Propaganda comprised written publications, forged documents purporting to originate from East Timor and deliberate spreading of rumours among IDPs and the civilian population. Propaganda themes were that INTERFET and Falintil were not cooperating and were fighting each other, that families were being separated with young men taken away, women used as prostitutes and children taken from families and that INTERFET was unable to protect the civilian population. This propaganda was countered by allowing IDP representatives to visit INTERFET base locations and talk with local people and returned IDPs. Further, as more and more people returned this type of propaganda became increasingly difficult to sustain. Later in this phase as militia leaders became increasingly desperate to maintain propaganda themes, rumours spread that Russia intended to bomb INTERFET with jet aircraft, while Libya would provide sponsorship of the militia and would bomb Australia. Such propaganda was more difficult to counter, but because of the number of safe returnees in East Timor by this time it was inherently less effective¹⁰³.

Robbery of returning IDPs at border crossing points was systematic and thorough and was carried out both by militia and TNI, sometimes working together, as at the border post at Salore. The militia aim was to collect valuables and resources to finance future activities, while TNI conducted such robbery on an individual basis. There is no evidence that specific guidance was given to TNI troops to conduct robberies, rather these were an individual initiative by troops on the ground, incidental to the search for contraband or weapons among the IDPs. By contrast, militia robbery of IDPs occurred whenever they were encountered and represented a significant form of intimidation.

Cross-border raiding was aimed at unsettling returned IDPs, targeting INTERFET movements and gaining additional plunder for economic purposes. Raiding groups were small, sometimes armed (normally with *senjata rakitan*) but more often unarmed¹⁰⁴. Abandoned villages were targeted for stripping of

was already self-evident to any trained soldier on the ground, namely that the border remained permeable to infiltration along almost its entire length.

¹⁰³ These rumours are discussed in detail in authors' fieldnotes and OWD. In addition, an example of written propaganda is at Appendix 4.

¹⁰⁴ The tendency of local people to identify all negative activity – whether politically, economically or criminally-motivated – as 'militia activity' was noted early in the case study and had to be carefully guarded against. However the carriage of *senjata rakitan* was a key indicator of militia (rather than ordinary criminal) activity, as militia groups were the only elements

assets and stealing of crops and livestock. Road blocks and non-explosive booby traps were also constructed in border areas, while raiding for crops and forest products was widespread along the border.

A policy change became apparent in early December – core militia groups were retained and training continued in the areas of Nenuk and Atambua, controlled by TNI. However Tier 3 and some Tier 2 militia groups were disowned by the militia leadership and officially disbanded. On the one hand, this represented a desire by TNI and the political leadership in West Timor for greater control over militia in the border area. On the other, it reflected a desire to improve the quality of militia personnel for possible future operations (Fieldnote T144/P/7). At the same time, improvements in border security on the West Timor side began to be apparent. The KOSTRAD 432 Battalion, which had deployed to the area and established border posts in early November but had done little to prevent infiltration, now began to take a more active role in border security.

On 9 December 1999 the Governor of East Nusa Tenggara (*Nusa Tenggara Timur*, NTT) Province announced a ban on the sale of nine staple products to East Timor, including basic foodstuffs and household supplies (*Pos Kupang*, 12 December 99). This directive reflected the growing problem of cross-border trade. The economic imperative for local people on both sides of the border was very clear: East Timor was still suffering a severe shortage of food and basic supplies including building materials, while the cash economy was beginning to develop with the influx of foreign aid workers and military personnel. Similarly, the highland districts around Ermera had large crops of coffee without a buyer that needed to be sold to buy food – as this area had been based on cash crops there was insufficient subsistence farming in the area to support the population, particularly after the destruction of the principal highlands rice-growing area at Gleno (Fieldnotes T65/EB/3, T60/AR/1, T64/AR/2). Further, many individuals who had stripped roofing material, consumer goods and other loot from East Timor in September now brought these items back to the border to sell them back at a profit. The principal area for this trading was the Sakafini Salient, in particular the crossing points at Nunura Bridge, Belui and Memo.

On some mornings up to 2000 people from as far afield as Dili and Ermera would gather at these crossing points to meet traders from West Timor. Militia, FSP, CNRT and Falintil Clandestine Front members almost certainly made use of this activity as cover for cross-border movement and intelligence collection activities. This was shown by the grenade incident of 20 December at Junction Point Bravo, in which an altercation between West Timorese traders and East Timorese buyers was broken up by TNI. An individual (of unknown political orientation) used the cover of the altercation to throw a grenade into the crowd, critically injuring seven people. Simultaneously, INTERFET patrols began to intercept numerous attempts at smuggling and currency transfer across the

armed with these weapons: traditional border crossers and bandits were armed with spears, bows and arrows and machetes/parangs only.

border. Both TNI and INTERFET had an interest in reducing trading activity because of the inherent security risk involved. On the INTERFET side additional control measures were instituted by mid-December 1999. Falintil were also becoming concerned about the trade, principally because of the risk of violence and loss of control by CNRT over the population as it moved about in search of trade goods. In addition, Falintil at this time wished to establish its credibility in the eyes of the local people and hence Falintil posts were established in Batugade, Nunura Bridge and Maliana on 12 December. These measures, in addition to the prohibition of movement by empty trucks into the border area thus preventing large-scale commercial activity, were effective in reducing cross-border trade. TNI local commanders, however, were taking a cut from the trading profits in their areas and continually ignored higher direction to stamp out the trade. These directions were given to local commanders as early as 7 December, but no significant action was taken to implement them until the aftermath of the grenade incident of 20 December.¹⁰⁵

In addition to the problem of civilian cross-border movement, a number of TNI cross-border incursions also occurred during this period. For example, an armed stand-off occurred between TNI and INTERFET at Belui on 10 December 1999 and there were numerous incidents of infiltration by armed TNI into the Salore Pocket. Unlike earlier incursions, such as the 10 November entry into East Timor by a lost TNI patrol at Memo, these were hunting parties and patrols originated by local commanders for security or to supplement rations. This culminated on 23 December with the capture of an armed TNI infiltrator in the Salore Pocket by 2 RAR, which led to significant embarrassment on the TNI side and brought a temporary halt to such infiltration.

Meanwhile the militia in West Timor had been officially disbanded by Joaõ Tavares on 14 December, but militia units sponsored by TNI continued to train at Nenuk and Atapupu. The police station at Belu on the Eastern side of the Sakafini Salient became a major base area for East Timorese members of People's Security (*Keamanan Rakyat*, Kamra) the auxiliary police force, who established a camp there with more than 1000 occupants by early November 1999. These personnel had been evacuated from East Timor ahead of INTERFET's arrival and in some cases exfiltrated across the border after INTERFET forces had arrived. They now came under the control of the NTT Police Regional commander and were supervised on a daily basis by the Belui police section. These personnel were something of an embarrassment to TNI and although (like other Indonesian Government employees of East Timorese origin) they were not offered the option of returning to East Timor, their absorption into TNI/POLRI was problematic and the existence of such a large concentration of trained paramilitary personnel so close to the border had a destabilising effect (*Pos Kupang* 13/12/99, 6).

¹⁰⁵ OWD 7-20 Dec 99

State of the Case Study Area on 1 January 2000

2 RAR began handing over to 5/7 RAR, another Australian battalion, in late December 1999 and departed the case study area on 2 January 2000. The state of the area at this time can be summarised as follows:

- *Littoral Strip.* Population had begun to return to the littoral strip from early November and major towns along the coast were now approximately 40% repopulated. Most occupied houses were roofed with tarpaulins and the population remained dependent on aid from NGOs, now numerous in the area and operating under the umbrella of UNHCR. Coastal infiltration by small boat remained reasonably frequent but no significant militia threat to the population existed. Batugade remained depopulated and largely destroyed, but was a major staging area for IDP returnees, crossing the border in orderly convoys under NGO supervision but still subject to robbery and intimidation on the West Timor side of the border and dependent on aid from NGOs on the Eastern side.
- *Balibo Plateau.* The Balibo plateau remained the least re-populated area of the case study area, with several suburbs within Balibo (the area north of the church, for example) still abandoned and the population of those areas remaining as refugees in Atambua. This can be explained by the pro-Indonesian orientation of Balibo before the crisis and by continuing strong control by militia groups over the Balibo IDPs. The security situation in the town itself was generally excellent, however the population remained reluctant to return to the fields and outlying villages, particularly towards the border, for fear of militia raiding activity. In late December it was apparent that a change in INTERFET methods was required. Until this time security operations had been low-profile or covert, following a COIN paradigm. It became clear that this was not providing the population with confidence as they were unaware of the presence of hidden patrols and security positions. Consequently a more overt approach was adopted, using a Peace Operations paradigm. Balibo remained relatively neglected by NGOs due to its comparatively small population and despite a well-organised CNRT/FSP system there were still food, water and medicine shortages.
- *Aidabaleten Hinterland.* The Aidabaleten hinterland remained quite depopulated, although returnees were starting to make their way back to remote villages by late November. There was no significant militia activity in this area and no NGO activity at all, as the area was poorly served by roads and NGOs/Humanitarian agencies tended to be largely road-bound.
- *Maliana Plain.* The Maliana plain was the most re-populated zone within the area of the case study and most houses were re-roofed with tarpaulins by the end of the year. However, several housing estates in Maliana remained unoccupied in December, their population remaining in West Timor. Problems occurred continually with groups of youths exacting revenge on returning IDPs from West Timor, for supposed or genuine militia orientation. In addition, cross-border shooting occurred between INTERFET

and TNI on several occasions in December. Rumours of a major militia attack over the Christmas-New Year period caused a degree of agitation amongst the population, (see Document 9, Appendix 4) but came to nothing.¹⁰⁶ In several of the outlying villages there was a very low degree of popular support for Falintil. This was due to a perception that they had remained idle during the massacres of September; Falintil were consequently working very hard to restore their credibility in that area at this time (Fieldnote T82/A/1).

- *Central Highlands.* The central highlands remained secure, but rumours continually circulated among the population about small militia groups living in coffee plantations. A program of methodically clearing and securing these plantations was initiated in late November, but this was not continued in December. The region, being equidistant from the principal INTERFET base areas, received less security attention than its economic importance warranted. The principal humanitarian concerns in the highlands remained lack of transport due to fuel and tyre shortages, lack of electrical power and lack of a buyer for the coffee crop, which had been harvested immediately before the crisis. As most land had been given over to coffee and other cash crops a food shortage began to be felt in November which was likely to worsen into the New Year.

This, then, completes a survey of the progress of the campaign in the area of the case study until 1 January 2000. The following sections will draw on the fieldwork data to analyse the factors at work in the campaign described. The first and most important factor to be examined is the influence of military actors.

Military Actors

The political culture, C² structure and organisational hierarchy of the military actors in the campaign varied widely. This section discusses each of the non-INTERFET actors in turn and demonstrates how the conduct of operations affected their structure and activity.

TNI

During the 1999 East Timor crisis, a TNI organisation structured and intended for COIN performed extremely effectively as an instrument of public repression and population control. Later, however, it performed indifferently as an instrument of insurgency against INTERFET forces. Analysis of both TNI's successes and failures is of value in understanding the interdependence of political culture, traditional authority, the nature of military operations and the C² systems employed.


Figure 4.1 depicts the TNI structure within the area of the case study before the arrival of INTERFET Forces in September 1999. The structure outlined in detail relates to KODIM 1636 (Maliana) which covered the entire case study area with

¹⁰⁶ This may have been a precursor to the major infiltration which in fact occurred in February 2000 in that area.

the exception of the Ermera District, which fell under the control of KODIM 1637. A parallel structure existed within KODIM 1637 to that outlined in the table above, but is omitted for clarity.

The normal TNI territorial structure existed within East Timor, with additional special-to-theatre organisations and units. East Timor fell within KODAM IX/Udayana, headquartered in Bali, with the province comprising KOREM 164 and divided into 13 KODIM, each of which was commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel (Dandim) with intelligence, operations and territorial staffs. The area of the case study (except the central highlands) formed part of Kodim 1636 headquartered in Maliana, while the central highlands area comprised Kodim 1637 headquartered in Ermera. In addition, each town or village was controlled by a Koramil under the command of a Captain or Lieutenant (Danramil). At village level, each Desa within the case study area had its Babinsa. Commanded directly by KOREM 164 were two territorial infantry battalions, Batalyon 744 (Dili) and 745 (Los Palos), totalling 5000 troops between them and deployed as permanent resident battalions in the province. In addition, another five infantry battalions each with engineer support were deployed within the province on a *roulement* basis (Fieldnote T146/I/7). Although never formally acknowledged, a troop of KOPASSUS special forces was deployed within the area of the case study (Fieldnote T79/O/1). This group tended to operate in pairs, as cadre staff for militia groups and for high-priority intelligence and strike tasks and covert reprisals. The KOPASSUS SGI element, although not working formally as part of the KODIM, maintained liaison with KODIM staff (Tapol 1999a, 2; Fieldnote T79/O/1).

Figure 4.1
TNI Order of Battle – KODIM 1636



Source: Fieldnotes T146/I/7, T79/01, T142/P/6, ADF(1999), OWD.

In addition to the normal territorial structure outlined above, a battalion of territorial infantry (BTT 143) was deployed within KODIM 1636. BTT battalions, as distinct from the resident battalions most of whose personnel were East Timorese by birth, were raised in one part of Indonesia for territorial/internal security duties in another part of the country. BTT 143 originated from Sumatra and a company group of 180 troops from this battalion was deployed within the area of the case study during 1999. This company group maintained a quick reaction force in Maliana and deployed section posts within the case study area as well as guard groups to control the IDPs who had already been rounded up into centralised camps by March/April 1999 to facilitate control over the population during the Independence referendum (Fieldnote T79/O/1).

UN sources indicate that the KODIM staff exercised extremely close and effective control over the population of the case study area (Fieldnotes T79/O/1, T75/D/1). In particular, the intelligence staff at KODIM HQ were widely travelled and were closely involved in the raising, training and

employment of militia forces. For example, the KODIM intelligence officer was present at every major killing incident by militia/TNI during the campaign and was also present at every major militia attack on towns and villages in the area of the case study (Fieldnote T83/O/2). Through liaison visits, permanently emplaced liaison officers with militia groups and handheld VHF CB (Amateur Radio Association, *Organisasi Radio Amatir Republik Indonesia*, Orari) radios, this control extended from KODIM HQ at Maliana throughout the case study area. At no time during the campaign did militia in the case study area appear to be out of the control of KODIM staff. For example, the carriage and use of firearms were always very strictly controlled and militia groups were always accompanied by escorting BTT or KODIM personnel on any major activity. In addition, on at least one occasion (the attack on Maliana of 2 September 1999) the only personnel armed with firearms among the large militia group that carried out the attack were recognised by UN observers as Babinsas in plain clothes (Fieldnote T79/O/1).

From these observations, it can be concluded that the driving force behind militia actions throughout 1999 in the case study area was TNI, in particular the territorial intelligence apparatus at Kodim level. Thus the TNI COIN function – originally directed against Falintil – proved itself highly effective in exercising political control over the civilian population of the case study area. As UN information shows, by contrast to the rest of East Timor 80% of the civilian population in the area of the case study voted for autonomy within Indonesia at the 30 August referendum – a result that exactly achieved the political and military aims of the local TNI commanders¹⁰⁷. Indeed, the Maliana Kodim commander was chosen as 'Kodim commander of the year' by the Korem commander in September 1999. Population movement, voting behaviour and militia activity remained under strict control of the Kodim commander throughout the crisis (Fieldnotes T79/O/1, T83/O/2).

By contrast to its effectiveness as a COIN tool, TNI's territorial structure proved quite inadequate to conduct insurgency against INTERFET during the 1999 campaign. In particular, the militia groups operating within East Timor were responsive to their own local indigenous leaders rather than to TNI direction – the decision by Halilintar to remain in Aidabasalala after the arrival of INTERFET is a case in point. Similarly, militia continued to raid into East Timor from West Timor despite strong discouragement and security measures designed to disarm them in November 1999. After late October, in fact, no meaningful militia activity of any kind was initiated by militia or TNI groups

¹⁰⁷ As at December 1999, UNAMET/UNTAET were unwilling to release any documentary evidence relating to voting patterns and local electoral results for the 30 August 99 referendum. This information is based on eyewitness accounts by UNAMET staff (military and civilian) who were present during the referendum. It should be noted that numerous West Timorese locals were transported by TNI and FPKD/BRTT into East Timor on polling day. UN staff estimate (T79/O/1, Righetti 1999, T/R/1) that even without this attempt to influence the vote, the result in the Balibo/Batugade/Maliana area would still have been in the order of 70% in favour of integration.

based *within* the area of the case study, although groups based outside it continued to raid into the area.

The principal reason for this was the depopulation of the border districts. If one accepts Mao's analogy of the guerrilla as a fish swimming in a sea of people, then the depopulation of the case study area dried up that sea completely. INTERFET operations in the early stages of the campaign were made easier by the fact that virtually all movement within 5000 metres of the border was militia – all the remaining population had fled. In addition, when population began to return to these areas, it consisted of pro-independence individuals who had been brave enough to run the militia gauntlet in returning to East Timor and consequently represented a population deeply hostile to the militia and easily able to identify them. This undermined the traditional TNI approach to insurgency and made their cooperation with the militia largely irrelevant. The exception to this rule was TNI control over *Kamra* and *Wanra*, examined in detail below (see page 135). At this stage it is sufficient to note that in October 1999 TNI supervised a difficult and almost wholly successful operation to exfiltrate *Wanra* and *Kamra* members across the border into West Timor. This operation was commanded and controlled by TNI cadre staff and was very well-conducted.

Some examples of the generally poor performance of TNI C² are as follows:

- A lack of coordination was evident in the initial intervention phase in Dili. Some TNI units co-operated with INTERFET, while others engaged in armed standoffs and intimidation of local people. There was no apparent pattern to the action of TNI units, except that all seemed to act on the initiative of the local commander rather than on central direction. For example, General Syanakhri as overall TNI commander in East Timor laid down very strict guidelines for TNI dress and equipment in late September, with the intention of preventing TNI troops being mis-identified by INTERFET as militia. These rules were almost wholly ignored throughout the campaign. Similarly, TNI troops moving through Dili en route to West Timor in this phase acted in a very confrontational manner toward INTERFET, while other troops in the same area were suggesting joint patrols and coordinated handover-takeover activities.
- Only token resistance was offered by the militia and TNI when INTERFET arrived in Batugade and Balibo. Indeed, the approach seemed to be overt withdrawal while maintaining covert observation and surveillance. No coordination was apparent between the activities of stay-behind groups.
- The Motaain contact has already been discussed in detail. It is clear, however, that the TNI at Motaain did not effectively control the militia, who acted on their own initiative to engage INTERFET without TNI knowledge or approval, thus starting a contact and costing TNI several casualties while they took up the contact and covered the militia withdrawal.

- Infiltration into the Salore Pocket also showed poor control by TNI regional commanders over their subordinates. Despite repeated assurances that they would prevent infiltration and repeated direction by regional commanders to that effect, local commanders continued to allow hunting parties, foraging parties and other armed TNI groups – often in civilian clothes – into the Salore Pocket.
- Support to Militia was, on the whole, effective in Dili where it consisted in the main of escorting and protecting the militia as they moved around the city in the early stages of the operation and escorting them as they fled to West Timor in late September. In the case study area, however, it was ineffective as has been shown.


The people of the case study area showed, in general, a lack of popular commitment to integration once TNI were no longer present, despite their voting behaviour in the referendum where more than 80% voted in favour of autonomy and against independence. UN observers indicated that some of these results were skewed by the bringing in of people from West Timor for the vote; however, the same observers estimated that even without such assistance the vote would still have been in favour of autonomy by approximately 70%. Therefore it is clear that the TNI structure was extremely effective at controlling the population while ever TNI remained in the province, but that once they left it was ineffective in maintaining an effective insurgency. It is not necessarily the case, however, that the local people were merely subject to repression rather than having a genuine ideological commitment to Indonesia. As has been seen, this area was the key region of recruitment and support for militia within East Timor, not only in 1999 but also in 1975/76 and there was undoubtedly a high degree of support for Indonesia among the elite groups within the population, including both participants and subjects within the political culture (Fieldnotes T75/D/1, T79/O/1, T83/O/2, T81/G/1, Subroto, 1998, 277ff). However, this support did not extend to the mass of the population once the traditional elite leadership had been removed following the mass flight to Indonesia in September.

Militia

Militia within the area of the case study existed in a number of segmentary groups, operating within a pyramidal C² structure and controlled loosely by various TNI and intelligence agencies and indigenous special interest groups. The structure of the militia can, however, be conceived in the form of three tiers. The top tier consisted of groups that were armed, trained and provided with cadre staff by TNI. The second tier consisted of groups that armed themselves or received only limited TNI arms and were provided with training and cadre staff by Tier 1 Groups, rather than directly by TNI. The third tier consisted of localised auxiliary groups, operating on an entirely part-time basis and providing labour, guard duties and recruits for the higher organisations. This description implies a degree of structural organisation which was lacking, however and in practice the various groups and tiers overlapped considerably and were driven very much by local conditions and personalities. This structure

is also an analytical framework imposed from without rather than a construct to which militia groups subscribed themselves¹⁰⁸. Bearing in mind these limitations, the structure (complex and ill-defined as it was) can be represented indicatively as follows:

Figure 4.2
Indicative Militia Groupings – Balibo/Ermera Case Study Area



Source: Fieldnotes T71/RC/1, T79/O/1, T45/CB/1, T55/M/2, T12/FG/3, ADF(1999), OWD.

The first tier, also referred to as paramilitaries, was raised and trained directly by TNI. The most notable paramilitary group within the case study area was known as Halilintar and was led by Joao Tavares. Based on the Atabae district (the Aidabaleten hinterland and Aidabasalala), Halilintar originated in 1977 and had been used throughout the COIN campaign to support TNI action. It was regarded as the most reliable of all militia groups in East Timor and had often worked closely with TNI under KOPASSUS cadre staff, but had been disbanded in the late 1980s following TNI's perceived victory in the guerrilla phase of the insurgency. As the Clandestine Front grew and TNI turned in the mid-1990s to the use of counter-terror, Halilintar was reformed in 1996 under the direction of KOPASSUS SGI personnel. Schuster (1999) estimates its

¹⁰⁸ This structure may appear to match the orthodox guerrilla groupings already discussed, namely main force, regional force and local force guerrillas, however in practice there were significant differences and hence the use of this terminology has been avoided.

strength at 800, of whom 400 were armed with modern firearms – the highest proportion of any militia group in the province. The re-forming of Halilintar was an initiative of Major General Prabowo, then commander of KOPASSUS, utilising Joao Tavares's loyalty to the regime as a former member of ABRI, as well as his prestige as a wealthy and influential man in Atabae district and a member of the traditional elite. Halilintar members undertook military training as part of the lowest tier of TNI territorial forces, the people's security (*Keamanan Rakyat*, Kamra) and people's resistance (*Perlawanan Rakyat*, Wanra) forces. Kamra acted as auxiliary police, while Wanra undertook paramilitary tasks. Training took the form of several courses covering basic military training, police work, patrolling and basic agriculture and civic skills. In addition considerable training effort was spent on indoctrination of the basic political ideology of Pancasila and UUD45, with a strong emphasis on the unity and indivisibility of the unitary state of Indonesia. Training lasted for two months, after which members were formally inducted as part of the territorial forces. However, they continued to owe personal loyalty and allegiance to the Tavares family, as shown by the fact that their pay, weapons, vehicles and uniforms were provided by the personal wealth of the Tavares family (Fieldnotes T109/AP/4, T110/AP/6). During the militia activity preceding INTERFET intervention, for example, Halilintar members moved around the case study area in vehicles belonging to Tavares. Further, in the static security phase the training camps supervised by Halilintar were controlled by Rufen Tavares, Joao Tavares's son (Fieldnote T24/CA/1). Thus despite the reliance of Halilintar on TNI training and support and the formal induction of its members into TNI, the motivating factor of the group remained personal patron-client loyalty to their *bapak*, Joao Tavares.

An important sub-group of Halilintar existed within the Aidabasalala-Coilaco area. Although initially a centre for the Guntur militia, Aidabasalala was dominated by the personality of Paulo Gonçalves, the local Halilintar commander. With his deputy Amerigo, Gonçalves had sufficient influence to prevent his group and the local people of Aidabasalala from fleeing to West Timor in the general exodus of mid-September. His reasons for remaining are still unclear, but local sources indicated that he intended to stay and make an accommodation with incoming INTERFET forces if possible. Gonçalves' situation indicates the pyramidal nature of power within the militia group: although the militia exerted extremely tight control over the local people through salutary killings and intimidation¹⁰⁹, the higher militia leadership was not able to effectively control local leaders such as Gonçalves, who could defy the general directive to withdraw to West Timor and still remain in control of his village, militia group and local population. It is also possible that he was taken by surprise by the INTERFET seizure of the border area on 1 October,

¹⁰⁹ The ringleader in such killings was normally Amerigo rather than Gonçalves himself. Killings were often carried out by family members of the victim acting at gunpoint, or by Tier 3 militia 'thugs' whose loyalty was suspect and who needed to be bound more closely to the group by shared guilt. Between 12 and 25 persons were killed, often by beating or machete blows, in the ten days before INTERFET intervention. After the seizure and clearance of Aidabasalala on 18 October 99, 2 RAR investigated the killings and identified 12 bodies of local people.

which cut his withdrawal route to West Timor and that he made a virtue of necessity by attempting to stay and hold out in Aidabasalala rather than attempt an opposed withdrawal.

The destruction of this militia group is also instructive. By 8 October 1999 2 RAR was receiving numerous reports of militia activity within the Atabae/Aidabasalala area. This was linked to a series of sightings and pursuits of militia couriers along the Nunura river, a major movement route for militia into and out of the area of the case study opposite the militia-held Sakafini salient. Information identified up to 40 Halilintar, well-armed and operating in Aidabasalala under the control of Gonçalves. The Nunura Bridge pursuit incident of 11 October almost certainly interdicted the movement of members of Gonçalves' group, under his personal leadership. Gonçalves himself succeeded in reaching West Timor, but returned several days later to Aidabasalala. His reasons for returning are unclear: as INTERFET had not yet made a move against his base he may have considered the area safe; alternatively he may have been returning to confirm arrangements for the remainder of his militia group to escape to West Timor. INTERFET then planned a clearance operation, with 2 RAR clearing the Aidabaleten hinterland by a three-axis armoured/airmobile advance, driving militia toward a blocking position in the Aidabasalala area. An SASR patrol was inserted to provide overwatch but was compromised 24 hours before the planned operation, in a hide location in a creekline west of the village by a patrol led by Amerigo. The SASR patrol reacted aggressively, killing Amerigo in the initial burst of fire and wounding one other. The militia fled to Aidabasalala, informing Gonçalves (incorrectly) that they had clashed with a Falintil group in the jungle. Gonçalves rounded up all available militia and set off with 20-30 followers, up the creekline. Arriving at the hide about 20 minutes after the initial contact, the militia found the SASR still in the same location. Again the SASR reacted very aggressively, firing numerous 40mm grenades and causing the militia to withdraw in confusion, having realised they had made contact with a superior force (Fieldnote T77/G/1)¹¹⁰. An armoured company group was reacted to the village, but was unable to apprehend the militia who had immediately fled into West Timor. The village was secured, a number of caches and hide locations were found and military equipment was captured, but the militia themselves escaped. Although two Armui members returned the following night to speak with their wives, the remaining militia all fled to West Timor. As at December 1999, Gonçalves and the Aidabasalala Halilintar remained in West Timor, while their families remained in Aidabasalala. Some Armui had returned, unarmed, and reintegrated into the community, while other Armui remained in the Sakafini salient area, fearful of CNRT reprisals if they returned (Fieldnote T77/G/1).

This account indicates, first, that while the militia in this area were able to exercise effective control over the local population, they were not themselves

¹¹⁰ In addition to the interview quoted, this account is based on studies by 2 RAR of the contact site and statements made under questioning by Armui and ex-Halilintar members who were present.

subject to tight control from higher militia commanders. The local commander was able to go his own way without being forced to conform to higher directives. At the same time, TNI maintained close relationships with the militia in this area up to ten days after the arrival of INTERFET in the district, but immediately after the Motaain contact these TNI personnel – along with Indonesian government employees – were withdrawn to West Timor. The militia leadership in this area was based on the personal prestige and authority of its commander and quickly collapsed once that leader was removed. Further, control within the militia was effective amongst the core, disciplined group of Halilintar, but ineffective among the larger Armui group. The attitude of the local population is also illuminating and is discussed in the next section.

Halilintar controlled the Northwest portion of the case study area while Dadurus Merah Putih controlled the Southeast part. Dadurus like Halilintar was a Tier 1 paramilitary group, but was composed of serving or ex-TNI personnel, public servants, businessmen and local elites. It was armed in a similar manner to Halilintar, but control was exercised more directly by the KODIM HQ, located in Maliana next to Dadurus headquarters. 200-300 Dadurus members were active in the Maliana/Bobonaro area, but when calculating militia/TNI strengths in the case study area it must be taken into account that many of these personnel were also serving TNI members (Fieldnote T/79/O/1). Finally, Guntur – based on Marko/Cailaco – controlled the central part of the area of the case study with approximately 200 members. Guntur acted under close supervision of KODIM staff and appears to have been less well armed and trained than the other Tier 1 militia groups, of whom Halilintar was the undoubted elite.

Hansip personnel, the lowest tier of TNI total people's defence (*Sistem Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta*, Sishankamrata) structure, did not necessarily join Tier 1 militia groupings despite having received equivalent training to Kamra or Wanra personnel. On occasions (as in the case of Miguel, a key leader of Firmi in the Leohitu/Kowa district) they joined lower tier militia groups as leaders. On other occasions they were not directly involved in militia groups. In addition, the RT/RW 'neighbourhood watch' structure (which has been analysed above, see page 32) was not an effective part of the militia/TNI security structure and its leaders tended to be drawn from traditional elites within *kampong* and village areas and largely stood aside from either pro-independence or pro-autonomy groups in these areas.

Halilintar, Guntur and Dadurus were cadres for Tier 2 militia groups within the area of the case study. Tier 2 groups were numerous and normally organised along regional lines as listed in Table 4.5. Only the leaders within these groups carried military weapons, while the remainder carried *senjata rakitan* or traditional weapons. In addition, training of these groups was often carried out using wooden weapons as TNI did not trust the loyalty of Tier 2 militia sufficiently to guarantee that they would not flee or switch sides in a crisis. Tier 2 groups normally received two or three representatives from Tier 1 militia, who supervised their training and encouraged or urged them on during acts of

violence. For example, the Firmi in Balibo normally received two to three members of Halilintar as supervisors, who would in turn be checked and supported by visits from KOPASSUS SGI personnel or KODIM intelligence staffs.

This complex but pyramidal power structure began to break down once the intervention phase commenced. In Dili, militia found that their only means of survival in the face of armed INTERFET troops was to move with TNI and under their protection. TNI were well aware of INTERFET rules of engagement, which prevented either militia or TNI being engaged provided they did not act aggressively toward INTERFET or the local population. TNI on numerous occasions took militia under their protection to prevent INTERFET detaining or engaging them. During the last weeks of September a mass exodus of TNI and militia occurred from East to West, with militia exiting East Timor in small *ad hoc* disorganised groups under the protection and control of any TNI unit that would protect them. This broke down the regionally-based TNI/militia relationship and meant that once militia arrived in West Timor their organisational hierarchy had to be re-created.

In addition to the breakdown of regional relationships, the control of central militia leaders over regional leaders became increasingly tenuous, until by mid-October central leaders exercised little or no effective control over Tier 1 or Tier 2 leaders. For example, Paulo Gonçalves was able to maintain his own guerrilla *kantong* in Aidabasalala despite the adoption of a *hijrah* strategy by the overall Halilintar leadership¹¹¹. Similarly, Mahidi militia in Suai, Dadurus Merah Putih militia in Bobonaro and Halilintar in Aidabasalala all adopted different tactics and approaches to INTERFET forces and differing degrees of cooperation with TNI. Thus any common program of action broke down rapidly in the face of INTERFET deployment.

Tier 3 militia groups were raised by Tier 1 or 2 groups as auxiliary forces. For example, the most numerous and widespread Tier 3 group within the case study area was Armui, raised initially by Halilintar in the Aidabaleten hinterland area, then augmented by forced recruiting in IDP camps in West Timor during the mobile operations phase. Some elements of Firmi and BMP recruited later in the campaign, as well as the Railekis group in Kowa district, also fall into this category. Tier 3 militia were never extensively armed – only their leaders had *senjata rakitan*, while the remainder had traditional weapons only. Armui were employed as labour, porters, guards, scouts and guides for Tier 1 and Tier 2 militia and were used as expendable decoys when necessary (Fieldnote T79/O/1). Unsurprisingly, Tier 3 militia often ran away when confronted by superior forces and switched sides to support INTERFET forces with alacrity as soon as the opportunity presented itself. In addition, following the vote of 30 August 1999 many Tier 3 militia fled to the hills, being aware of

¹¹¹ See the West Java case study for detailed discussion of these competing strategies, each of which was developed in the War of Independence and subsequently applied during the *Perang Segi Tiga* phase of the Darul Islam insurgency.

what was coming and unwilling to participate in the wholesale slaughter and destruction of their own people and villages (Fieldnote T79/O/1).

Those Tier 3 militia who did take part in killings were often noticed to be under the influence of drugs and alcohol. The urban element of Tier 3 militia were often unemployed, socially underprivileged and members of the criminal or extremely poor elements of village society. They were recruited by higher-tier militia groups or directly by SGI or KODIM intelligence staffs, whose hold over them rested on the ready provision of narcotics and alcohol, but more importantly over the provision of money and the chance to plunder¹¹². TNI thus exploited resentment against the more prosperous elements of East Timorese society, but ironically the Tier 3 militia were almost invariably controlled and directed by members of traditional, military or political elites within village and town areas. Despite this, TNI realised that such control was far more tenuous than genuine ideological commitment, such as only Tier 1 militia genuinely possessed within the case study area. Tier 2 and 3 members were therefore exploited for killings and vandalism and for other forms of 'dirty work', but were not trusted with modern weapons or with politically or militarily important tasks. In the face of INTERFET combat troops they were unceremoniously abandoned to their fate and once international pressure forced Jakarta to distance itself from militia in early December 1999, the Tier 3 militia in camps in West Timor were dispersed and disbanded without support or assistance from their erstwhile leaders. Many returned to East Timor, where they generally re-integrated into society with minor difficulty, despite attacks on them by some members of the population.¹¹³ By contrast members of Tier 1 and 2 militia groups were specifically forbidden to return to East Timor and were kept in training and under arms in the West Timor border area.


Falintil

Militarily, Falintil (East Timorese Liberation Armed Forces, *Forças Armadas do Libertação de Timor Leste*) was a spent force by 1999. The area of the case study belonged to Falintil Region IV, encompassing the central highlands and western border area. In turn, it formed part of the zone of responsibility of Region IV's North Company commanded by Commandant Rocke, while South Company (commanded by the influential Commandant Dekka) controlled the area of Suai south of the case study area, but also exercised some influence in the extreme South-East of the case study area around Bobonaro. The boundary between North and South companies rested on the high range of hills Southeast of Maliana, forming the Southeastern boundary of the case study area. Figure 4.3 shows the Falintil structure for the case study area.

¹¹² This represents an identical use of 'welfare' to create patron-client relationships, as seen in West Java.

¹¹³ This was the result of a deliberate CNRT policy of reconciliation, aimed at demonstrating to IDPs in West Timor that it was safe to return. CNRT leaders where possible prevented reprisals against returning ex-members of Tier 3 militia and where they were known to have committed murder or other serious crimes they were normally handed over to INTERFET or the UN for detention/investigation.

Figure 4.3
Falintil Order of Battle – Balibo/Ermera Area



Source: Fieldnotes T96/F/1, T83/O/2, T79/O/1, ADF (1999), OWD.

As described above (page 102) Falintil was largely restricted to its base areas by 1999. The principal bases in the area of the case study were at Rairobo and Sinvema near Ermera. The Sinvema base was occupied until 17 November 1999 when all Falintil were relocated to the main base area at Aileu. It included a parade ground, accommodation, a generator, wooden weapons for military training, an education centre, a basic hospital and school facility and a headquarters which published a variety of circulars and newsletters designed to control outlying elements and influence local people (Fieldnote T107/L/1, see also sketch map at Fieldnote T132/T/6). As has been discussed in the historical section, Falintil's very existence formed a challenge to TNI authority and it maintained close relationships with the urban *intifada*. It also conducted reasonably frequent, but low-level ambushing and attacks on isolated TNI patrols and outposts throughout the late 1990s, particularly in the Viqueque area (see Taudevin 1999). However, in the area of the case study Falintil was of negligible influence and proved unable to protect the population against either militia or TNI violence. This led to loss of respect for Falintil, which the author observed particularly in the Saburai area Southeast of Maliana, where resentment for Falintil's lack of action during the militia campaign often resulted in abuse and occasionally in stoning of Falintil patrols by villagers (Fieldnote T82/A/1). In fact, the lead in protecting villagers from militia was initially taken by members of the Clandestine Front and the student union (in the pre-election period) who later suffered for this activity. This emphasises the fact that leadership within the resistance had, by 1999, passed to the urban subversive movement and no longer resided with Falintil.

An UN eyewitness (Fieldnotes T79/O/1, T83/O/2) estimated that Falintil in the case study area numbered approximately 120 fighters of whom only about 50% were armed. These fighters were exhausted and usually remained in their

base areas, while for its part TNI did not go into the base areas – as has been noted, its operational focus was on the urban areas by this time. Only two known Falintil offensive activities occurred in the area of the case study throughout 1999. The first was the killing of a government tax collector at Marko in early April 1999, which appears to have been motivated by personal animosity rather than politics. In reprisal all public servants (*Korps Pegawai Negeri Republik Indonesia*, KORPRI) in Maliana were rounded up by the KODIM intelligence staff on 12 April 1999, taken to Marko and forced to watch as the KODIM intelligence officer selected eight local men at random and BTT troops summarily executed them (Fieldnote T79/O/1). This event is instructive: it shows TNI placing its main effort on control of the urban civil population in the Maliana Plain (through reprisals and terror) while Falintil appears to have had no clear targeting strategy at this time.

The second and last Falintil offensive action was an ambush, in early May, at Lolotoe. This again appears to have been motivated by personal animosity – perhaps generated by the TNI/militia sweeps and killings which had been occurring on average every two weeks since the April killings. Falintil was clearly, throughout 1999, unable to oppose the militia or TNI in any meaningful fashion. Although Falintil was better armed than the militia, the militia were far more numerous and much better organised and TNI effectively denied the guerrillas access to the population in the case study area.

During August and September, Falintil remained in its base areas and played no part in protecting the population. This was a sensible strategy from the point of view of long-term survival, but politically risky as it led to a loss of popular support. During the INTERFET intervention phase Falintil waited several days while INTERFET stabilised the situation, then began to emerge from its base areas and make contact with the international force. The same pattern was followed in the area of the case study – Falintil representatives first began to approach the force in Balibo around 4 Oct, after the initial securing of objectives and the withdrawal of TNI and militia. Falintil representatives at this time emerged to claim leadership over the remaining population, but this leadership (as will be seen) was sometimes disputed by FSP or CNRT.

Falintil by late October 1999 had been recognised as the armed forces of the independent state of East Timor and made efforts to recover the credibility it had lost. This was done by establishing Falintil posts at Batugade, Maliana and Nunura Bridge to control the border markets and prevent smuggling or militia infiltration. Falintil exercised no practical influence on either of these issues, but its presence did result in increased prestige and credibility for the force. This was enhanced by extremely tight central coordination over Falintil by the Dili leadership, by means of hand-held radio communications and frequent visits by Taur Matan Ruak and Riak Leman. Falintil also sought to control FSP and this was achieved in Batugade and Balibo although the Maliana FSP exhibited a high degree of independence throughout the case study period.

In summary, Falintil displayed a high degree of internal cohesion and discipline, but was of negligible military influence in the case study area. It maintained a symbolic opposition to TNI and Indonesian government and acted in this sense as a cementing factor for the urban Clandestine Front. It also maintained liaison with CNRT and with the students' organisations. However the initiative in the case study area was clearly held by the militia: Falintil offered no direct opposition to the integrationist movement and its supporting apparatus of intimidation. After waiting out the intervention phase, Falintil representatives emerged from its base areas and attempted to assume leadership, but they faced a credibility problem. Their principal competitor for credibility was FSP.


FSP

The People's Security Force (*Força Sigueranza Popular*, FSP) was the unarmed police and security force of CNRT and was (and is) quite distinct from Falintil. Indeed, as described above (see page 140), in some areas such as Saburai there was a degree of antagonism between the two groups, as Falintil were seen as having failed to protect the people against militia violence, emerging later to gain the benefit of INTERFET intervention, whereas FSP were seen to have protected and supported the local people (Fieldnote T82/A/1).

As has been seen, the urbanisation of the conflict in the 1990s followed from the effective destruction of Falintil as a military force. It then remained a figurehead organisation but the real burden of the insurgency was carried by the Clandestine Front. This was accompanied by the *rapprochement* of Timorese political leaders of the various parties in the Timorese diaspora, particularly in Portugal, leading to the united front strategy and the formation of CNRM. When CNRT was formed within East Timor in June 1998, it required a security element because of militia and TNI intimidation and the prevalence of informers and agents provocateurs. This was the origin of FSP, which despite a generally good working relationship with Falintil owed its primary allegiance to CNRT and hence to the urban subversive movement.

Figure 4.4 illustrates the organisation of FSP for Balibo Zone on 15 November 1999, which was typical of the static-phase organisation of FSP following the return of IDPs to East Timor (Fieldnote T53/AC/6). As can be seen, it was organised along CNRT political lines, following the Celcom and Nurep system originated by Fretilin but now applied by CNRT. FSP members were young, radical, often violent in their approach to suspected militia or integration supporters and in some areas were intent on revenge for the August/September killings. FSP tended to be led by teachers, youth leaders of the Catholic church, or former student leaders and its rank and file were principally from the urban or village youth.

Figure 4.4
FSP Organisation – Balibo Zone, November 1999



Source: Fieldnotes T53/AC/6, T45/CB/1, T31/AM/2, T32/AP/3, T110/AP/5, ADF(1999), OWD.

FSP began to organise very quickly after the end of the intervention phase and by early October FSP and CNRT organisers from Dili were touring the area of the case study to inspect progress and enforce policies. As IDPs returned from West Timor FSP grew in numbers and organisation and by mid-November it was fully formed as shown in Figure 4. In the Ermera district, FSP established a training school for 'People's Security Companies' at Gleno, with more than 200 youths in training at any given time. Similar training occurred at Maliana and Marko, but Gleno was the largest of these training camps (Fieldnote T64/AR/2). By mid-November, these FSP trainees had begun to adopt a vigilante role toward returned IDPs who were suspected of being ex-militia or having militia sympathies. This went counter to CNRT's policy of reconciliation which was designed to encourage repatriation and rebuilding and hinged on IDPs in West Timor feeling safe from intimidation if they returned to East Timor. This led to some clashes between CNRT and FSP, for example at Ermera on 17/18 November 1999, when the CNRT leader from Ermera was forced to drive to Gleno in the middle of the night to intercede for the release of militia

suspects who were being beaten by FSP and then hand them over to UNTAET (OWD 18 November 1999).

Similar intimidation by FSP began to be of concern in the Maliana area in December 1999. Returned IDPs were regularly beaten or intimidated by FSP from the Oeleu FSP camp East of Maliana (OWD 13-17 December 1999); this undermined assurances given to INTERFET by both CNRT and Falintil (newly established in their post at Maliana). Falintil as a consequence undertook tours of the border area to bring FSP under control and ensure their compliance with the reconciliation policy (Fieldnotes T92/SF/1, T96/F/1, OWD 21 December 1999). This activity was only marginally successful and by the end of the case study period, FSP was still largely independent of Falintil control.

Political Actors

As this dissertation has shown thus far, political actors in guerrilla operations are at least as important as military actors. Indeed, the influence of political groupings over the conditions and processes of political power-diffusion is arguably more important than that of armed forces in the field. While it was impossible to study the political makeup of population groups at first hand over the period of the insurgency and the militia campaign, fieldwork conducted immediately afterward during the INTERFET intervention provides insight into the enduring characteristics of these political actors and is hence essential to an understanding of the case study. The key political actors included the political parties and interest groups as well as Indonesian government agencies and representatives. The local people themselves were also important political actors in this instance. This section examines the fieldwork results in relation to these political actors.

Local Population

The population of the case study area before the crisis was approximately 147 000, as has been seen. The anthropological characteristics of the population are discussed in Appendix 3 (see page 207); in political terms this translated into a village political culture emphasising traditional authority structures. However, the author's fieldwork results showed clear cleavages between the older, more traditional leaders within the population and the younger elements and strong influences from the Catholic Church and the independence movement.

Older leaders, who had either been educated under the Portuguese colonial system, or had remained uneducated through long periods in the jungle, tended to look to a traditional Portuguese orientation for the future of East Timor. These leaders (like most Timorese in the pre-invasion period) saw the issues in terms of an interrupted process of decolonisation from Portugal. They considered that now the Indonesians had been evicted the process should recommence, again under the tutelage of Portugal. This was reflected in a desire to adopt the Escudo as the unit of currency, Portuguese as the national language and to court Portuguese investment and economic sponsorship (T65/EB/3, T67/AP/4). By contrast, younger interviewees tended to take for

granted a continuing economic relationship with Indonesia and the adoption of either Indonesian or English (but not Portuguese) as the future national language (Fieldnotes T84/JS/1, T90/BB/1, T63/D/1, T60/AR/1, T47/AF/1, T106/Z/1). The clash between attitudes of younger and older leaders was most clearly observable in the incident (already quoted) where the CNRT *Secretário da Zona* at Ermera (EB, a man of about 60) was forced to intervene to protect suspected militia from FSP youth elements at Gleno. A similar incident occurred at Ermera on 22 November, when local clashes occurred between CNRT youth and returnees and were only halted by the intervention of the CNRT leadership (OWD 22 November 1999). The same difference of opinion was evident during the security conferences at Balibo in December 1999 (Fieldnotes T92/SF/1, T102/H/1, T101/AP/8, T100/A/3).

Formal and Informal Power Structures in Balibo

The influence of traditional hierarchies on the political conduct of the population was apparent, but other tendencies were also perceptible throughout the case study period. The case of A, the Balibo *Secretário da Zona*, was significant in this regard. Like most CNRT zone secretaries in the area of the case study he was in the 40-60 age bracket, Portuguese speaking and educated under the Portuguese system. He was also astute, well educated and spoke Indonesian fluently but with a Portuguese accent. A had been active in both Fretilin and CNRT before the outbreak of militia violence in September 1999. He was then sheltered by Falintil for several weeks during the intervention phase of INTERFET deployment (Fieldnote T9/JM/1). A arrived in Balibo on 9 October 1999 as part of the first group of fifteen IDPs to return to the area and quickly gained control over all aspects of local people's administration and government in the Balibo *Zona* (OWD 9 October 1999). His authority was based in part upon his age and known prestige within the independence movement, in part upon his personal qualities, which were highly impressive and in part upon a clear CNRT mandate as zone secretary. Although there were at least three other individuals who arrived at the same time and had similar backgrounds and qualities, there was never any apparent power struggle between these older leaders; this was probably due to the fact that CNRT had appointed A as zone secretary before the militia violence and this appointment secured his position in the hierarchy. The position was reinforced, within three weeks of his arrival, by a visit from CNRT/FSP leadership from Dili which confirmed him in office (Fieldnote T18/RL/1, OWD 30 Oct 99).

A was neither a member of the traditional aristocracy (which in this region was largely pro-Indonesian) nor was he a revolutionary or military cadre in the strict sense of the term. Rather, he was an official of a pre-existing parallel hierarchy whose claim to govern in Balibo was based on a mandate from CNRT and on his personal qualities. Once in office, however, he exercised power in the manner of a traditional leader: he met frequently with a council of representatives from CNRT, FSP and the women's organisation (OMT), but these meetings were consultative and advisory rather than having any executive or legislative authority. This practice mirrored the Portuguese system

in which the *administrador do posto* sought advice from a local council without being bound by that advice. Similarly, A adopted a hierarchical approach to dealings with INTERFET.

By contrast, F was the first CNRT member to establish contact with INTERFET (Fieldnote T113/FG/1). He was in the 20-40 age group and had been active in the student movement and Clandestine Front before the militia violence. He arrived in Balibo very early in October. F was very active in the first few weeks, until the CNRT hierarchy was re-established in Balibo and through his close relationship with INTERFET and his ability to speak English achieved a high degree of informal influence. For instance, he met with INTERFET almost daily throughout October, to discuss the militia and IDP situation and pass information on the situation in the cross-border area (Fieldnotes T11/FG/1, T12/FG/2, T13/FG/3, T14/FG/4, T16/FG/5). Similarly, on 21 October he was influential in organising the escape of 260 IDPs from camps in the Haekesak area of West Timor, their crossing of the border despite militia intimidation and their establishment at Balibo where they formed the first major return of population into the town (OWD 20-21 Oct 99). He was also a very important source of information on militia activity and locations in the area. Both of these aspects show that he was well-informed and influential: it was no easy task to persuade several hundred terrified IDPs to cross the border under militia threat into the arms of an unknown occupying force. However, he organised this over several days and was a key actor in the recovery of another 700 IDPs over several weeks. The basis of his influence with the IDPs appears to have been ties of clan and village loyalty – he originated from Leohitu and almost all the returnees of this period were from that district or personally known to him. However, within a month of the arrival of A and the establishment of the *Concelho da Zona*, F was marginalised. The reason for this remained slightly unclear: it appears to have been based primarily on his youth and lack of prestige with the older generation of CNRT. It was expressed, however, in terms of suspicion as to his allegiances. F was allocated a position in the education section of CNRT, which relegated him to lesser status and employed his language skills in education rather than in the more influential role of interpreter.

Despite his personal influence in rescuing the bulk of the (then) population from West Timor, F was quickly marginalised by older leaders whose record in the current crisis had been arguably less creditable. These older leaders based their political legitimacy on a mandate from the CNRT central leadership. Education, courage and initiative, while they gave F a high degree of informal influence and prestige, did not win him a place on the *concelho*.

AC, the Balibo FSP leader, was a teacher by background and had a high degree of prestige and influence among the local youth. He arrived around the same time as A although in a separate group and like A had been pre-appointed by CNRT and sheltered by Falintil. Like A, his authority derived principally from his membership in the CNRT hierarchy, which was confirmed by a visit from FSP leaders, but was also solidly based on personal qualities of leadership and

intelligence. Although younger and better educated than A, AC never gave any indication of disagreement with his policies. His influence as an FSP organiser and head of the indigenous security apparatus in the Balibo area was very significant. However, (unlike the situation in Ermera/Gleno) this did not translate into differences of approach between FSP and CNRT. There was, however, some clear tension between AC and the Falintil leaders who began to arrive in late December 1999 as part of their effort to regain credibility in the border region (see page 140). While he never openly disagreed with Falintil or opposed their policies, there was an obvious antipathy between AC and P, the local Falintil commander.

The process of return of IDPs from West Timor in early November 1999 was also illuminating in terms of local hierarchy. Most IDPs were terrorised by militia in the camps in West Timor and were subject to constant propaganda that depicted INTERFET as raping and killing returnees, separating families and imprisoning IDPs. These propaganda themes remained relatively constant throughout the case study period (Fieldnotes T17/FG/7, T29/FG/8) and were very effective in preventing the return of IDPs who were often divided among themselves as to the wisdom of returning. The procedure often adopted was for a representative to approach INTERFET initially and, after a period of confidence building, to return and give an evaluation of the situation to the waiting IDPs. This occurred on a daily basis in Dili in the early stages of INTERFET intervention (Fieldnote T5/OM/1). The case of F can be interpreted in this way and an even more striking example occurred near Salore in early November. During a patrol near Salore, local guides advised the author that IDP leaders from a camp at Silawan (near Motaain) wished to set up a clandestine meeting to discuss the return of their group (OWD 3 November 1999). This meeting occurred just after dawn on 4 November, at the destroyed village of Maneha in an area of thick jungle close to the border. Eleven individuals had made the border crossing between TNI posts overnight and wished to confirm the situation in East Timor before bringing their people across (OWD 4 Nov 99, Fieldnotes T36/MR/1, T37/MR/2). During the course of the meeting the two key leaders – both clan elders, one of whom was a teacher – were persuaded to return with the author to Balibo and see conditions for themselves. They were initially very frightened and reluctant to do so and this perception was highlighted by two incidents with militia *en route* (OWD 4 Nov 99). However on returning to Balibo, they met with A, AC and the remainder of the CNRT *concelho* and were quickly convinced that the propaganda was false and that conditions were better in Balibo than in the camps. They were then returned to Maneha from where they re-crossed the border alone to speak with their people, while INTERFET established reception points in East Timor. Within five days several hundred additional IDPs from their group were recovered from the border area and this marked the beginning of the period of mass IDP flow across the land border back into East Timor (OWD 5 – 30 November 1999).

These examples show the influence of traditional hierarchical structures, modified by the CNRT and FSP organisation, upon the actions of the local

people. In particular the traditional hierarchy exhibited immense influence upon the critical choice of political allegiance – whether to remain in West Timor under the militia or return to the CNRT. Only about 70% of IDPs in the camps decided to return, showing the high degree of control of the militia over the IDPs.¹¹⁴ The villagers' choice was almost always determined by their traditional leaders – in the examples given, the author's having won over F and the Silawan IDP leaders, their influence ensured that the majority of their village and clan groups returned. Significantly, F's involvement in the return of the Leohitu IDPs did not translate into political influence due to his lack of CNRT endorsement.¹¹⁵ In other words, creditable behaviour in the current crisis was sufficient to bring informal influence and prestige, but not to gain political authority. Authority of this kind was still based on traditional hierarchical roles and a proven 'track record' of support for the independence movement.

The Role of the Catholic Church

The influence of the Catholic Church varied throughout the case study area. Very few of the smaller villages had chapels, although there was often a prayer house. Larger villages often had churches, normally untouched by the militia, who were themselves usually Catholics. For example, all the militia detainees whom the author interviewed were Catholic (Fieldnotes T44/PM/1, T72/D/1, T73/M/1, T43/PB/1, T42/FG/1, T8/SC/2, T47/AF/1, T49/F/1) and militia documents found early in the deployment included Catholic prayers and religious letters (OWD 2 Oct 99). Nonetheless, there is evidence – including the massacres at Suai and Liquiça, both outside the area of the case study – that the militia (when directly supervised by TNI) specifically targeted Catholic clergy during the violence, probably because of their influence over the population and in the independence movement. The two towns in the case study area whose priests returned in October were Balibo and Ermera.

In Balibo the priest, M, originated from Flores and had served as parish priest in Balibo for two years, before being forced to flee from Balibo in September 1999. Being non-Timorese, he had not developed particularly close relationships with CNRT, but supported the independence movement informally. During the forced evacuation in mid-September he, along with several other priests, had taken refuge in a convent at Nenuk, near Atambua, while his assistant was murdered along with several other lay people by militia at Maubara (Fieldnotes T55/M/2, T57/L/1). As described (see page 96), Nenuk became a key militia base area and the clergy were subject to increasing intimidation. The charitable organisation SVD, which had initially visited the camps to help the IDPs, were intimidated to the point that by mid-November they were too frightened to enter the camps. Similarly, on 4 November 1999 the Nenuk convent was raided and fired on by militia and vehicles were stolen for use in infiltration. TNI and POLRI intervened and returned most of the vehicles, but this incident along

¹¹⁴ On 7 December 99 the UN stated that 171,000 IDPs remained in West Timor, of whom 110,000 wished to return to East Timor but were too frightened to do so (Fieldnote T144/P/7).

¹¹⁵ The author's own role in the return of the IDPs likewise gave the author a degree of prestige and informal influence with much of the population, particularly the Silawan leaders and their group of several hundred IDPs. Again, however, this did not translate into formal authority.

with the successful return of the Leohitu and Silawan refugees, convinced M to return to Balibo. This occurred on 16 November 1999 and was the subject of enormous rejoicing among the local people.

M exercised informal authority rather than political power, but his prestige was enormous and allowed him to question the actions of both CNRT and INTERFET. He tended to stand deliberately outside the formal power structure, using this position of freedom from formal allegiance to question any action that appeared to harm the people. The CNRT/FSP leadership were at great pains to maintain a close relationship with him and his influence was significant in supporting their political legitimacy. His manner of arrival in Balibo also highlights the relationships involved. He waited in the jungle away from the town, just on dusk and first approached AC who was a personal friend and whose position as head of FSP allowed him to guarantee M's security. AC then fetched the author (without informing any other FSP or CNRT member) and the author, also secretly, met with M and gave him assurances of security within the town. Only after both these informal meetings did M actually enter Balibo and were CNRT and INTERFET officially informed of his arrival (OWD 16 Nov 99). This indicates M's concerns for his safety, but also the tendency (both of M and AC and common with many other leaders) to work through trusted informal contacts initially and only then through the formal hierarchy.

In Ermera, the situation was somewhat different. There was a large church and convent in the town and S, the priest, was a person of insignificant political influence. S, who was 50 years old, originated from Suai but had studied at a seminary in Flores in 1975-78 over the period of the initial Indonesian invasion. He then worked in Dili and Ermera, where he was senior priest (of several) at the time of the 30 August referendum. At this time the population of Ermera secretly supported Falintil with food, information and money. He attempted to flee to Dili on 2 September, but was stopped by militia and returned to Ermera under militia guard and kept under house arrest until 7 September. On that day his classmate, the priest in Suai, was murdered in the cathedral with several others and the militia told S that he would be next. That night he escaped and fled to the hills near the Falintil base area about 5 kilometres from Ermera, where much of the town's former population were bivouacked among the coffee plantations. Falintil were unable to provide any humanitarian aid to the population but did provide security. In early October S returned to Ermera to find the town extensively damaged, although the church and convent were intact (Fieldnote T58/SA/1).

Alessandro Righetti (1999b, 6) assessed the political influence of the church – whether formal or informal – as minimal in the Ermera area and the author's observations tended to confirm this. S was a person of great prestige and his ecclesiastic role was considered important, but he was not consulted on any humanitarian or political questions by CNRT. Overall, Righetti's assessment of formal and informal power structures in Ermera in October 1999 was that

With the absence of any other authority in the region, CNRT have momentarily filled the vacuum and taken on a de facto political and administrative leadership role. In most municipalities, the old Kepala Desa was already a CNRT member and only nominally loyal to the Indonesian government and almost 80% of cases it is now the same person who presently covers the role of Nurep secretary. The role of traditional leaders is relevant, but is also exercised in close partnership with CNRT. The church is politically active only in Letefoho sub-district, where the Catholic priest is an important CNRT leader (Righetti 1999b, 5)¹¹⁶

Voting Behaviour

As has been shown (see page 131), the case study area was traditionally one of the most pro-integrationist areas in East Timor. This pro-Indonesian orientation of the traditional leadership continued into 1999 and was reflected in the voting pattern within this area – 80% in favour of integration with Indonesia, as against 78.5% in favour of Independence in the province as a whole. Thus the voting pattern was the opposite of the overall poll result. The UN officer responsible for supervising the elections believed that this pattern reflected a genuinely high degree of popular support for the militia and for integration. He estimated that about only about 10% of pro-integration votes were attributable to West Timorese voters trucked in from Atambua by TNI specifically for the poll and that the level of militia intimidation in polling booths was relatively low. Thus at least 70% of the local population favoured integration. However the same UN source argued that, whereas most of the area of the case study was genuinely pro-Indonesian, the Rairobo and Aidabasalala areas actually favoured independence but were subjected to severe intimidation and coercion by Halilintar and Guntur militias (Fieldnote T79/O/1).

Part of the voting trend may also be attributable to the extremely efficient TNI and militia control of the population in this area, as already discussed. The only significant pocket of pro-independence opinion before the poll was at Memo, Southeast of Maliana and this area was subject to one of the most severe attacks on the last day of campaigning before the poll. Two people were killed and 24 houses burnt in this attack, which was led by TNI territorial personnel in plain clothes and conducted by up to 2500 pro-integration supporters from Maliana (Fieldnote T79/O/1).

The most significant influence upon voting behaviour appears to have been the attitude of traditional leaders in the Balibo/Maliana area and the coastal strip. The key militia leaders originated within this area – Joao Tavares, leader of Halilintar originated from Bobonaro while the BRTT leader Francisco Soares came from Megir in the Aidabaleten hinterland (Fieldnote T79/O/1, Schuster 1999). Moreover, the *bupati* of Liquiça and Maubara (Leoneto Martins and Jose Afat) were enthusiastic supporters of the BMP and Halilintar militias. These individuals, through ties of clan and district loyalty no less than through their control of the local militia, were able to influence the majority of the population

¹¹⁶ Letefoho is located outside the case study area and is in a mountainous region close to two major Falintil base areas; this may explain the greater political role of the church in that location. In both Ermera and Balibo, however, the church played an important pastoral role and was endowed with prestige and informal influence but with little or no formal political power.

to vote for integration. Conversely, once these individuals were eliminated after the arrival of INTERFET, the population adeptly discarded its former allegiances and became, overnight, almost unanimously pro-Independence. This was not particularly noticeable in Balibo, which remained largely underpopulated and where the returnees were principally pro-independence and had suffered under the militia. However, in Maliana which retained 60% of its pre-referendum population and which had been a major centre for pro-integrationist activism, the population by late October 1999 claimed to be 100% pro-independence.

A similar pattern is evident in the campaign of the principal pro-integrationist political parties in April-September. The key group was the Forum for Unity, Democracy and Justice (*Forum Persatuan Demokrasi dan Keadilan*, FPDK) the umbrella organisation for all political and paramilitary elements of the integrationist movement. FPDK exploited the personal ties of its leaders to the administrative establishment, organising 'socialisation meetings' throughout the case study area from late June until early August, urging the local population not to register for the referendum. During the campaign period, FPDK and its paramilitary wing PPI became increasingly strident and violent and this culminated in the post-referendum violence already discussed (Fieldnote T79/O/1, ADF June 1999, ADF Sep 99).

The key players in the integrationist movement were thus FPDK and PPI, whereas Golkar played little independent role except in Dili. Moreover, the RT/RW system, which had been used to such good effect in controlling the population in Java (see above page 32) and which, as noted, had been set up in East Timor during the 1980s to fulfil the same purpose, played no significant similar role in 1999. Formal Indonesian government administrative structures thus played little important role in the integrationist campaign, although individual local officials were very active through FPDK, PPI and the other local militias and through individual *bapak* relationships and links to TNI/POLRI. As has already been mentioned, following the loss of the province the Indonesian government forcibly evacuated all its employees to West Timor – a total of approximately 60,000 personnel including teachers, public servants, medical staff, auxiliary police and military, civil defence personnel and indigenous members of TNI. However this 'stripping' of the province after INTERFET intervention reflects the perceived value of these trained personnel in administering an independent nation and hence the perceived need to deny them to CNRT, rather than a measure of their value in the integrationist campaign.

ANALYSIS OF FIELDWORK RESULTS

From the fieldwork results discussed above, a number of common threads emerge:

- *Interaction of External Variables.* As noted above (page 113), throughout the 1990s events at the sub-nation-state level in East Timor were increasingly

affected by events in Indonesia as a whole, in the region and at the systemic level. This trend continued during the case study period and events in East Timor themselves also influenced events within national and regional systems. For example, the fall of the New Order government and the established linkage between agitation in Java and the Timorese Clandestine Front was influential in provoking increased militia activity. Following President Habibie's referendum announcement this violence increased to the point at which it provoked international intervention, the fall of Habibie's government, the loss of East Timor and the destruction of the militia movement in the province. Thus external variables at all levels of analysis interlocked and played an interactive part in the events of 1999, to an extent not previously seen anywhere in Indonesia.

- *Political Culture.* The Timorese political culture which emerges from the fieldwork data is heavily influenced by traditional spatial and familial patterns of authority, including clan, village and district loyalties. Traditional elites showed an ability to manipulate their personal followings and translate their informal influence into political power, in the breakdown of formal power structures that occurred over 1999. The pattern of patron-client *bapak* relationships was of critical importance in this regard. Most leaders, regardless of political orientation, exhibited some form of interhierarchical role and the ability to manipulate rival hierarchies for purposes of political influence and survival. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the majority of the population in the case study area exhibited a profoundly parochial political culture. On the integrationist side, activist political and military groupings showed generally subject cultures, mediated through segmentary or pyramidal organisations dominated by leaders who generally had the support of the traditional elite and exhibited a participant political culture. On the independence side, this pattern was significantly influenced by CNRT and Falintil organisational structures, which were much more tightly controlled and hierarchical. They owed less to traditional elite allegiances and more to education, personal qualities, revolutionary 'track records' and the possession of a mandate from the central CNRT leadership. On this side of the conflict personal character and connections were sufficient to gain informal influence and prestige but not formal power.
- *Effects on the Insurgents.* The Falintil/Independence Movement nexus broke down somewhat over the course of the militia violence and subsequent INTERFET intervention. However, the C² structures of CNRT and FSP were still strong in October/November. They were reinforced by visits of inspection and encouragement from the central leadership; this was the principal means of control by the central administration over the local leaders. Although there is a clear parallel with Portuguese colonial practice – the touring district officer maintaining control over local administrators – Falintil/CNRT were clearly the most modern of the factions in Timor. This can be seen in their ability to operate effectively outside the traditional elite authority structure, their skilful management of relationships with the UN,

INTERFET and aid agencies, the interaction between urban student groups and rural villagers and the survival of their government-in-opposition despite the attempted militia decapitation of August/September. This command structure formed a viable parallel hierarchy which was able quickly to assume control in the power vacuum of October 1999. As time went on, tension developed between the older and more conservative elements who looked to Portugal and the younger, more radical elements who were more Indonesian in their outlook and had more fellow-feeling with activist elements in the rest of the archipelago.

- *Effects on the Counterinsurgents.* The TNI, POLRI and Indonesian government agencies in East Timor were increasingly uncontrolled in 1999. As has been seen, this resulted from a power struggle between KOPASSUS and TNI headquarters in Java, as well as from a loss of cohesion throughout the TNI chain of command itself. Local commanders at all levels took measures into their own hands: the militia violence, while guided by general policy given by the KODAM and KODIM commanders, went much further than senior leaders wished and was certainly directly contrary to the intent of TNI headquarters by early September, when General Wiranto personally visited Dili in an attempt to stop it. Ultimately this loss of control was the factor which provoked international intervention and lost Indonesia the province. A similar loss of control was evident in the political sphere, where FPKD, PPI and the militia movement became the main effort for the integration movement, rather than the Indonesian government structures so carefully established for precisely this purpose in the 1980s. Just as TNI proved ineffective in dominating the province and so recruited militias which it then failed to control, so the Indonesian government failed to secure the allegiance of the people and so reverted to the traditional practice of government through local elites, which it was likewise unable to control. The 1999 campaign thus shows a move from centralised to localised leaders, from formal to informal power structures and an overall loss of coordination and control from the centre to the periphery of the counterinsurgent organisation.
- *Geographical Factors.* As in previous case studies, geographical factors – both physical and human – played a critical role in the progress of events in East Timor. The difficulty of road and telephone communication between urban and rural centres, particularly after the destruction of the power supply, meant that the only organisations able to function were those which could effectively move about and coordinate their subordinates by personal interaction or courier messages. This was initially true of the militia and TNI, but after INTERFET intervention it was true only of CNRT – even Falintil leaders were unable to move about unless unarmed. Similarly, the steepness of the terrain in the Ermera and Aidabaleten areas meant that local leaders were less subject to outside control. In the case of Ermera, this meant much greater freedom for pro-independence groups, in Aidabaleten it allowed the survival of a major militia group in INTERFET's rear for several weeks, immune to either TNI control or INTERFET pressure.

Because both TNI and the militia relied on vehicles for mobility and were generally road-bound, political differences began to be apparent between mountain and plains areas – the plains were generally much more pro-integrationist than the mountains, where security force control was less. Once INTERFET arrived, this situation changed only slightly – INTERFET's ability to move across country using helicopters and armoured vehicles and its willingness to conduct foot patrols, were counteracted by the limited force-to-space ratio which INTERFET was capable of generating. Finally, patterns of depopulation and repopulation show that the areas most accessible to TNI and militia – the coast and the plains and those areas contiguous to the West Timor border – were the soonest and most completely depopulated and the slowest to regain their populations. This relates partly to the ability of integrationist forces to reach and coerce these populations, but also to their accessibility to government benefits, propaganda and development and hence to a greater degree of genuine support for integration in these areas.

CONCLUSIONS

In considering the East Timor fieldwork, both in historical its historical aspect and in the direct participant observation of guerrilla warfare in 1999-2000, it is clear that the COIN techniques employed by the Indonesians owed an enormous amount to the techniques earlier developed in West Java. This earlier experience provided TNI and the Indonesian government with a blue-print for success which was applied with great effectiveness throughout the 1980s.

By 1990, however, the effects of modernisation and globalisation and developments at the systemic level, had changed the objective conditions of the insurgency to the point where the West Javanese paradigm was no longer applicable. Although TNI succeeded in defeating Falintil and decapitating its leadership, the support organisation instead of withering on the vine – as the DI had done – transformed itself into a highly effective urban subversive movement. In combatting this *intifada*, TNI modernised and urbanised its methods again by using a West Javanese paradigm – the *Petrus* model. This, however, allowed KOPASSUS to dominate all military and counter-subversive activity in the province and proved a fatal flaw.

The influence of globalisation – defined in this case as the increasing influence of global and regional external variables upon local events – is most clearly shown in the fall of the Suharto regime, which was initiated by the Asian financial crisis, hastened by the student activist movement and ultimately triggered by the ineffectiveness of TNI's approach to subversion when subject to international media scrutiny. Thus systemic developments hastened the fall of the national government, whose fall in turn decapitated KOPASSUS and led to a breakdown in the command relationship between it and TNI. This breakdown led to a loss of control over security forces in Timor precisely at the time when the militia movement and the FPDK were becoming powerful forces in their own right. Attempts by local elites – both indigenous and TNI – to

manipulate and control these elements failed and provoked the international intervention. This in turn led to the loss of the province after 24 years, countless expenditure and 50,000 TNI casualties and hence represents the final defeat of Indonesia's COIN strategy.

REVISED THESIS

How, then, does this case study affect the thesis on which this dissertation is predicated?

It will be remembered that the original thesis was modified slightly after examining the case of West Java, leaving three propositions, as follows:

Thesis 1. The command and control (C²) structures inherent in guerrilla warfare tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders.

Thesis 2a. The conduct of COIN or Internal Security Operations tends to increase the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, COIN operations will also tend to increase control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders.

Thesis 3. If both types of operations occur simultaneously, then there will be a diffusion of power from the centre to the regions and from civilian to military leaders.

Having examined the results of the fieldwork, we can now apply it to the initial thesis. It is appropriate to look at each proposition in turn.

Thesis 1. The command and control (C²) structures inherent in guerrilla warfare tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders.

In the East Timor case, this proposition appears on the surface to be valid, but in fact needs modification. While Falintil and Fretilin conducted guerrilla operations throughout East Timor, their control was gradually eroded to the point that the organisation as a whole lacked leadership and coordination. The civilian leaders of the movement were all either in exile or captured and all the original central military leadership was eliminated by 1981. This loss of control was explicitly acknowledged after the large-scale *pagar betis* operations of the mid-1980s, when Fretilin leaders formally advised the population that the organisation was unable to protect or support them any longer and it was reduced to scattered groups of fighters aiming only at survival in their mountain bases.

The resurgence of the Clandestine Front in the 1990s, while showing a great deal of cohesion, sophistication and control, essentially represents a separate political subversive movement from that of Fretilin. Its leadership maintained close contact with overseas CNRT leaders and with subversive groups throughout Indonesia and supporters throughout the world. Its successes were achieved through skilful use of the mass media and manipulation of a

disproportionate TNI response. But it was not the same organisation as Fretilin and its outlook and objectives were different.

Thus this theoretical proposition appears to be valid primarily in terms of a rural insurgency which lacks access to global and regional media and communications. While Fretilin persisted in this structure, it disintegrated; once the clandestine movement had developed its urban modernised structure, it flourished. As even rural insurgencies now have access to media and modern communications – the Abu Sayyaf kidnappings in the Philippines in May 2000 are a case in point – there is therefore a historical dimension to this proposition. It was clearly valid in relation to Darul Islam and to other insurgent movements of the 1960s and 1970s. It also has elements of validity in relation to traditionalist, un-modernised insurgencies in severely underdeveloped areas such as Irian Jaya (now West Papua) and Bougainville. But where an insurgent force has access to globalised media and electronic communications, it seems invalid. This factor of globalisation appears to be the major differentiating variable between the experiences of West Javanese insurgents in the 1950s and East Timorese insurgents in the 1990s.

This point is reinforced when we consider the effects on the insurgent elements of the loss of this sophisticated media and communications ability in September 1999: for a period, the more traditionalist forces of the militia and FPDK gained the upper hand and the independence movement suffered a severe disruption and loss of cohesion. It was saved partly by its external elements – the lobby groups and supporting elements outside the province – and partly by the fact that its cell structure allowed independent elements to continue functioning until control was regained.

Conversely, the militia forces represented local partisans raised by the central and regional military leaders to carry out insurgency against the independence movement and later against INTERFET and the newly-independent state of East Timor. As the insurgency progressed, control was progressively lost to the point where it disintegrated entirely in late September 1999 and was never effectively regained. The militia represented a traditional guerrilla structure, as fieldwork results have shown. Their means of communication were vulnerable to interdiction and, once communication was lost, control over the dispersed and disparate militia groups broke down. As the original source of cohesion had been personal patron-client relationships, these tended to determine the groupings and their behaviour after this disintegration. Moreover, the process of disintegration within the central military leadership after the fall of Suharto and its cascading effects down to the local level, reinforce this view.

Thus Thesis 1 can be modified as follows: Thesis 1a. The command and control (C²) structures inherent in *traditional, dispersed rural guerrilla movements that lack access to mass media or electronic communications* tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders.

Thesis 2a. The conduct of COIN or Internal Security Operations tends to increase the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, COIN operations will also tend to increase control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders.

In the case of East Timor, the fieldwork clearly demonstrates that control over the local population by local military leaders increased dramatically over the period of the occupation, from virtually nil in the first three years of the campaign, to the situation in 1999 where TNI territorial and special force commanders at the local level exercised unchallenged control over the movement, activities and voting behaviour of the general populace.

The fieldwork also showed, however, that this situation was not typical of the experience within the rest of East Timor – elsewhere the population voted against TNI's wishes and after peaking in 1989 the local military commanders' influence gradually diminished again as the clandestine movement gained in strength. Further, it is not clear that the increase in control by local military commanders was at the expense of central or regional political leaders. Initially there were no such civilian leaders and the gain in TNI control represented a zero-sum diminution in Falintil control rather than a loss of control by central or regional Indonesian leaders. Later, the local civilian leadership though allied closely with local commanders was comprised largely of traditional elites and was dominated by the military.

The second part of the proposition is validated by the fieldwork in terms of events since 1998: the pursuit of the *Petrus* model of COIN and the raising of militia forces paralleled an accelerating loss of control by Jakarta over the KODAM and KODIM commanders and by those commanders over local militia groups. The C² structures were initially pyramidal in this phase – KOPASSUS HQ at Batujajar acted as a separate and roughly equal source of power to TNI HQ at Cilangkap – and then became segmentary as KOPASSUS and its regional commanders moved beyond effective control of the central TNI leadership.

Similarly, looking at the province and the campaign since 1975 as a whole, the influence of local commanders has grown steadily. In the 1975-78 period, operations were large in scale and closely controlled. As the period of large-scale operations ended, control was relaxed and local commanders conducted their own operations throughout the late 1980s. Despite the negative consequences of overreaction by uncontrolled local commanders – seen most clearly in the Santa Cruz incident – this process continued in the 1990s. The adoption of the *Petrus* model of urban counter-insurgency to deal with the clandestine *intifada* meant that the principal burden of the campaign was carried by small, covert or clandestine groups, often led by KOPASSUS. These groups were not only outside the direct chain of command of TNI HQ (because they were controlled by KOPASSUS) but were also difficult to control because of their method of operating.

It appears, therefore, that whereas (as already seen in the West Java case) in the Old Order period the first part of the proposition was the dominant factor, during the New Order period the second part was the dominating factor. Once the New Order government fell, the Habibie regime was subject to a similar diffusion of power as was experienced during the Old Order.

The common factor between Sukarno and Habibie, of course, is that their regimes while dependent on the military were headed by civilians and had interests which differed in key respects from those of the Army. In Sukarno's case, his socialism and *rapprochement* with the PKI were a clear issue of divergence between his interests and those of TNI; his policies of 'Crushing' Malaysia during the Confrontation period and support for Communist China were other factors separating the interests of his regime from the TNI. In Habibie's case, his previous disagreements with ABRI (for example, over the purchase of East German warships in 1993 which he forced upon a reluctant TNI-AL in his role as Science and Technology Minister) provided a history of divergent opinion. His appointment to the presidency set him up in opposition to the Army's preferred candidate and most crucially his decision to offer a referendum to the East Timorese struck at the heart of TNI's ideological and politico-economic interests.

Thus while civilian presidents whose interests differed significantly from TNI's were in power, the dominant factor in COIN was the diffusion of power from civilian, central leaderships to local military leaders. While a president was in power whose interests coincided with TNI's, the dominant factor was the diffusion of power from military to regional commanders. In other words, during these periods there was a change in TNI's internal politics rather than in the overall political complexion of the country. This is the more understandable in that while ever Suharto was president, there were virtually no civilian politicians in executive power in the regions. The vast majority of Provincial governors, for example, were military men who ruled with little interference from their provincial legislatures.

Based on this, Thesis 2 can again be further refined, as follows:

Thesis 2b. If COIN or Internal Security Operations are conducted, two factors will operate. First, there will be an increase in the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Second, where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, there will be an increase in control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders. Where the central government is civilian or has interests divergent from the military's, the first of these factors will dominate. Where the government is military or has largely identical interests to those of the military, the second factor will be dominant.

The third proposition was this:

Thesis 3. If both types of operations occur simultaneously, then there will be a diffusion of power from the centre to the regions and from civilian to military leaders.

The fieldwork, again in this case study, is not directly applicable to this proposition. There was never a time in East Timor when the Indonesians were conducting simultaneous insurgency and COIN operations at the national level. It could perhaps be argued that in 1999 both COIN (in terms of framework operations and control of the elections) and insurgency (in the form of militia operations) were being conducted. But in any case the two operations were not conducted simultaneously – the one occurred primarily before 30 August and the other afterward. Moreover, Indonesia's domestic and international circumstances in 1999 were sufficiently abnormal that it would be difficult to sustain any valid generalisation from them.

Based on this, the same argument is now clearly applicable to the West Java case: having examined East Timor and West Java – the two principal instances of protracted intense guerrilla warfare in Indonesia since 1945 – in significant detail, it is apparent that the circumstances during the guerrilla phase of the War of Independence were unique in Indonesian history. The fieldwork and historical data gathered in this study clearly demonstrate that this proposition is a true statement in relation to the peculiar circumstances of 1948-49. However, because of their very precision these results say nothing about the proposition's general validity, for want of another instance with which to compare it. Thus the proposition should read: 'In the guerrilla phase of the War of Independence, when both COIN and insurgency occurred simultaneously, there was a drain of power from the centre to the regions and from civilian to military leaders'. This statement, although true, is of historical rather than political or military importance and hence will not be developed further in this study.

CONCLUSION

Having re-examined the thesis in the light of East Timor, it is clear that it requires modification and that the operation of general principles, while broadly supported by the evidence, is subject in practice to a number of very important contextual variables. In the case of East Timor as in West Java these variables were traditional authority, geographical factors, political culture and the interaction of external variables.

This dissertation has now examined two instances of COIN in Indonesia in great detail; indeed, the two most important COIN campaigns in the history of Indonesia and the two most influential in political terms, have been subjected to a detailed fieldwork appraisal on the basis of rigorous theoretical propositions.

It is now appropriate to draw together all these elements of analysis into a comprehensive consideration of the political consequences of military operations in Indonesia since 1945: this is the task of the next, final chapter of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 5

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

As a nation, we believed that history repeats itself. What happened in the 19th Century to the invading British would also be the fate of the Soviet invaders. Philosophically, the Soviets believed that history is unidirectional, progressive and does not repeat itself. History did repeat itself and we did prevail.

Abdul Rahim Wardak, in Ali Ahmad Jalali (1995)

Introduction

So far this dissertation has examined the operation of general principles and the influence of contextual variables in the two foremost examples of guerrilla operations in Indonesia since 1945. In both West Java and East Timor the author's fieldwork indicated that while general principles of power diffusion did operate, they were subject in practice to numerous contextual variables, producing results which while broadly compatible with identified general principles were different in detailed circumstance. It is now necessary to analyse the conclusions of the two case studies in a comparative manner, to answer the question posed at the start of the dissertation:

To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect?

Aim and Scope

The aim of this chapter is to develop comprehensive conclusions from the fieldwork data for West Java and East Timor. It will discuss, in turn, a summary of fieldwork results, a comparison of Indonesian insurgencies, a refined thesis, comparison with a non-Indonesian example and overall conclusions.

Summary of Fieldwork

The fieldwork data from the two primary case studies can be summarised as follows.

West Java

The 1996 fieldwork results showed that informal, traditional authority patterns were important in the progress of the DI/TII insurgency and that TNI took advantage of the disruption of this authority system to gain control over the provincial population. The xenophobic, isolationist and traditionalist political culture of West Java initially favoured DI/TII, but ultimately allowed TNI to discredit the insurgents. Perceptions of DI/TII varied according to whether respondents were urban or rural dwellers and whether they were military or

civilian. In particular rural people were favourably disposed towards DI/TII and considered it to have been less dangerous than PKI (despite having opposed it at the time and despite physical evidence to the contrary) and had developed various rationalisations to explain the violence of the insurgents. They still perceived Islamic militancy as a political force, whereas TNI and government officials considered it a dead issue¹¹⁷.

The West Java fieldwork showed that TNI had virtually no control over the local population at the start of the insurgency but developed extremely effective control measures by the end, such that TNI leaders were still exercising *de facto* representative authority over the region as late as 1980 and administrative authority at all levels as late as 1996. Local TNI commanders had most autonomy during the guerrilla war against the Dutch, but during COIN operations against DI/TII they adopted a more hierarchical power structure. The Republican government's control over regional TNI commanders was weakest at the end of the War of Independence, when it had been conducting guerrilla warfare using a decentralised and diffuse C² structure. TNI commanders had assumed *de facto* legislative authority over their areas, removing civilian leaders from central government control. However, government control over TNI grew rapidly once martial law was declared and the Guided Democracy system initiated.

Darul Islam's control over TII was greatest at the start of the insurgency and declined significantly as the guerrilla campaign progressed. Its shadow government became increasingly regionalised, pyramidal and eventually dysfunctional. Based on both TNI and DI/TII experience, there thus appears to be a broad correlation between guerrilla operations and the diffusion of political power.

In terms of general principle, then, the fieldwork data indicated that there is a correlation between the conduct of COIN or Internal Security Operations and an increase in control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, COIN operations will also tend to increase control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders.

However the data also indicated a high level of influence by geographical context, cultural characteristics of the population (particularly aspects of political culture and traditional authority patterns) and historical context at the sub-nation state level of analysis. By contrast systemic and regional factors had little influence on the conduct of the insurgents or the security forces in the West Java case.

¹¹⁷ It should be remembered that this study was conducted in 1996 – if the same research had been conducted in 2000 after the rise of *laskar jihad* and the other militant West Javanese Islamic militias, these perceptions might have been very different.

East Timor

From the author's Timorese fieldwork data it was clear that throughout the 1990s events in East Timor were increasingly affected by events in Indonesia as a whole, in the region and at the systemic level. This trend continued during the case study period in 1999-2000 and events in East Timor themselves also influenced events at higher levels of analysis. Thus all levels of analysis interacted in the events of 1999, to an extent not previously seen anywhere in Indonesia.

Fieldwork data showed that Timorese political culture is heavily influenced by traditional spatial and familial patterns of authority. Traditional elites were able to manipulate personal followings and translate informal influence into political power, in the breakdown of formal power structures that occurred between 1974 and 1999. Patron-client *bapak* relationships were of critical importance. Most successful leaders exhibited some form of interhierarchical role and the ability to manipulate rival hierarchies for purposes of political influence and survival.

The broader population showed a profoundly parochial political culture. On the integrationist side, political and military groups showed generally subject cultures and segmentary or pyramidal organisations whose leaders were sponsored or supported by traditional elites and who themselves exhibited a participant political culture. On the independence side CNRT and Falintil organisational structures were more controlled and hierarchical. They owed less to traditional elite allegiances and more to education, personal qualities, revolutionary 'track records' and the mandate of the CNRT central leadership. On this side of the conflict personal character and connections were sufficient to gain informal influence and prestige but not formal power.

The fieldwork showed that the Falintil/independence movement nexus was somewhat disrupted by the militia violence and subsequent INTERFET intervention. However, the C² structures of CNRT and FSP were still strong in October/November 1999. Falintil/CNRT were the most modern of the factions in Timor, shown by their ability to operate effectively outside traditional authority structures, their skilful management of relationships with outside agencies, the cooperation between urban and rural groups and the survival of the parallel hierarchy of their government-in-opposition despite the attempted militia decapitation of August/September. However, as time went on, tension developed between older, more conservative elements who looked to Portugal and younger, radical elements who were more Indonesian in their outlook.

Security forces and Indonesian government agencies in East Timor were increasingly uncontrolled over the course of the insurgency. This resulted in numerous instances of ill-discipline and atrocities which, because of increasing international scrutiny and the end of the Cold War, had a seriously damaging effect on Indonesia's interests. After the fall of the Suharto government in 1998 this lack of control was exacerbated by a power struggle between KOPASSUS

and TNI headquarters in Java and a loss of cohesion throughout the TNI chain of command itself. The militia violence, while guided by general policy from the KODAM and KODIM commanders, went much further than senior leaders wished and was directly contrary to the intent of TNI headquarters by early September. Ultimately this loss of control provoked international intervention and lost Indonesia the province. A similar loss of political control was evident, where FPKD, PPI and the militia movement became the main effort for the integration movement, rather than the Indonesian government structures established for precisely this purpose in the 1980s. Just as TNI proved ineffective in dominating the province using ground troops and so recruited militias which it then failed to control, likewise the Indonesian government failed to secure the allegiance of the people and so reverted to the traditional practice of government through local elites, which it was similarly unable to control. The Timor campaign thus shows a move from centralised to localised leaders, from formal to informal power structures and a cascading loss of coordination and control from the centre to the periphery of the counterinsurgent organisation.

As in West Java, geographical factors heavily influenced events in East Timor. The difficulty of communication between urban and rural centres meant that the only organisations able to function were those that could move and coordinate their subordinates by personal interaction or courier messages. This was initially true of the militia and TNI, but after INTERFET intervention it was true only of CNRT – even Falintil leaders were unable to move about unless unarmed. Because both TNI and the militia relied on vehicles for mobility and were therefore generally road-bound, political differences were apparent between mountain and plains areas – the plains were generally much more pro-integrationist than the mountains, where security force control was looser. Once INTERFET arrived, this situation changed only slightly. Finally, the areas most accessible to TNI and militia – the coast and the plains and those areas contiguous to the West Timor border – were the soonest and most completely depopulated and the slowest to regain their populations. This relates partly to the ability of integrationist forces to reach and coerce these populations, but also to their accessibility to government benefits, propaganda and development and hence to a greater degree of genuine support for integration in these areas.

COIN techniques employed by TNI in Timor owed an enormous amount to the techniques developed earlier in West Java. This earlier experience provided TNI and the Indonesian government with a blue-print for success which was applied with great effectiveness throughout the 1980s. By 1990, however, modernisation, globalisation and developments at the systemic level rendered the West Javanese paradigm obsolete. Although TNI succeeded in defeating Falintil and decapitating its leadership, the support organisation instead of withering on the vine – as the DI had done – transformed itself into a highly effective urban subversive movement. In combatting this *intifada*, TNI modernised and urbanised its methods again by using the West Javanese *Petrus* paradigm. This, however, allowed KOPASSUS to dominate all military and

counter-subversive activity in the province, split the TNI command and control chain and ultimately proved a fatal flaw.

The fall of Suharto although arising from internal Indonesian factors, was clearly exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis, hastened by the student activist movement and was triggered by TNI counter-subversive measures that were unacceptable to international media scrutiny. Suharto's fall in turn decapitated KOPASSUS and dislocated the command relationship between it and TNI. This provoked a loss of central control over security forces in Timor precisely at the time when the militia movement and the FPKD (both of which were initiated during the closing years of the New Order regime) were becoming powerful local forces in their own right. Attempts by local leaders to control these elements were ultimately contrary to the wishes of central leaders (both political and military) and provoked INTERFET intervention. This in turn led to the loss of the province.

Comparison of West Java and East Timor

There were a number of areas of similarity in principle between the two case studies and some equally significant differences of specific detail.

Development of COIN Doctrine

The P4K strategy developed by Siliwangi Division to combat DI/TII was extremely influential from its conception in 1959 through to 1999. It revolutionised the TNI approach to the West Java insurgents and brought victory within two years after twelve years of stalemate and failure. It also represented an original contribution by Indonesian thinkers to the theory and practice of counter-insurgency. As has been shown (see above page 65) it represented a spectacularly successful solution to the problem of controlling the populace and simultaneously solved the classic problem of COIN – how to free sufficient numbers of troops from static security tasks in order to mount offensive operations against the insurgents. It is clear, however, that it involved a high degree of callousness and brutality toward the local population. This included forced participation in the cordon, the use of cordon participants as *de facto* hostages to guarantee the loyalty of their home villages, the use of villagers as human shields during contacts with the insurgents and a range of highly effective but repressive measures inherited from the Japanese. In the then-prevailing environment of minimal international scrutiny, this level of brutality was no disadvantage to the effectiveness of the tactic.

The P4K strategy and the tactic of *pagar betis*, became highly influential in the other major protracted COIN campaign in Indonesian history, in East Timor. The middle period of the insurgency, from 1981 to 1989, was also highly successful in using P4K methods to destroy Falintil as a military threat, constrict its base areas and deny it access to the population. The campaign against Mount Matebean, as has been described (see page 101 above) was essentially a P4K-style clearance and sweep operation, albeit on a slightly smaller scale than in West Java. It culminated in a series of cordon and search operations identical in

concept and only slightly different in execution from the *pagar betis* operations in West Java.

Despite the overwhelming importance of the West Javanese experience in the conduct of TNI operations in East Timor, the application of P4K and *pagar betis* was not without problems. These stemmed from three principal causes: geographical factors, political culture and the nature of the insurgents.

Geographical Factors

The terrain in East Timor did not allow the encirclement of discrete guerrilla bases. As has been described (see pages 65 and 195) the geomorphology and vegetation of West Java – islands of mountainous jungle in a sea of rice fields – were an essential prerequisite for *pagar betis*, as they allowed effective encirclement of the guerrillas and protection of the lowland population from them. By contrast, East Timor is a series of broken ridgelines and dissected plateaux (see page 201) with no discrete jungle and cleared areas and thus little opportunity for such encirclement. Moreover the road and rail infrastructure of West Java allowed the movement of large numbers of troops and civilians and their resupply, something that was extremely difficult in East Timor (see the interview on page 66). Moreover, the demography of the two areas was very different. West Java comprised heavily populated, well-developed lowlands surrounding uninhabited jungle-covered hills. Its population density allowed very large numbers of civilians to be pressed into service without seriously disrupting the economy and harming or alienating the population. Moreover its fertility allowed large numbers of people to be employed on security tasks without risk of famine. By contrast, in East Timor the low population density made it impossible to generate as many people for the cordon operations and they suffered severely because of the difficulty in resupplying food and water. Meanwhile those remaining in the villages starved through lack of a labour force to cultivate crops in the infertile and arid soil. The hardship endured by the civilian population during the ‘fence of legs’ (i.e. *pagar betis*) operations in East Timor in the mid 1980s was thus extreme. The population, scattered in small highland villages rather than clustered in lowland areas (as in West Java), was also frequently caught in crossfire between the guerrillas and the security forces, or affected by the anti-Fretilin blockade of the highlands. This higher level of hardship for the civil population may explain why *pagar betis*, although militarily successful, did not translate into political support as it had done in West Java, where the negative impact of the tactic had been much less severe for most of the population.

Political Culture

West Javanese political culture as described above (see page 58) was heavily influenced by hierarchical relationships between the traditional elite and lower social strata in the villages. In this sense it was similar to East Timorese culture which was also extremely heavily influenced by patterns of traditional authority, exchange-based interaction and clan/village loyalty (see page 111). However, in West Java the political culture was more hierarchical than East Timorese society, which tended to be more segmentary. In West Java leaders of

villages and interest groups established patron-client relationships with leaders at the provincial and national level and brought their personal followings with them. In East Timor local leaders experienced a variety of conflicting demands from competing hierarchies and tended to balance the demands of this interhierarchical role to maintain themselves in power. Thus local elites were slower to form relationships at the provincial and national level and tended to act more independently than in West Java. Indeed, as shown (see page 152 above) it was CNRT/Falintil's ability to establish these national hierarchies and maintain them effectively which set it apart from more traditionalist groups and allowed it to achieve a dominant political position.

Nature of the Insurgents

The West Javanese insurgents were somewhat different from those in East Timor. The DI were initially very hierarchical but their allegiances were personal and religious – thus the decapitation of the DI leadership in June 1962 brought a rapid collapse (see page 57 above). Fretilin/Falintil was tightly disciplined and hierarchical, but its organisation was based on political ideology and a Marxist cell structure and was thus highly resilient to decapitation. As has been shown, TNI initially attempted to eliminate the Fretilin leadership and had succeeded by about 1981 (see page 101). However this did not bring about the expected collapse. TNI then turned to eliminating the guerrillas themselves and cutting them off from their support base – a counter-force strategy and in itself a form of decapitation on a larger scale (see also page 102). This also succeeded and ultimately resulted in the capture of Xanana Gusmao in 1992 and his trial in 1993. By the terms of the West Java paradigm this was a spectacularly successful outcome and could have been (and indeed, clearly was) expected to result in the collapse of the insurgency. In the event, however, it only reinforced the momentum of the Clandestine Front, whose urbanisation and globalisation of the campaign ultimately defeated the TNI who remained bound within their West Javanese paradigm (see page 111).

Another key difference was that DI were Islamic. This was critical, as most of the security forces opposing them were also Islamic and originated from an identical or very similar cultural and religious base. This allowed TNI to win over the local people, to understand and sympathise with their aspirations and to 'out-Muslim' the DI – an important element of the P4K strategy (see page 59). By contrast in Timor the security forces were of a different religious and cultural background and almost always originated from other parts of the archipelago. This allowed the Catholic church to become a focal point of opposition to the occupation – despite its lack of an active insurgent or subversive role (see page 148) – and denied TNI the ability to appeal to common cultural and religious values shared with the populace and the insurgents. It also may explain the Indonesian security forces' penchant for the use of local auxiliaries and militias, who shared the same cultural and religious

background as the insurgents and hence could have been expected to win them over more easily.¹¹⁸

The urbanisation and intensification of the insurgency in the 1990s indicated the failure of the P4K paradigm. To deal with the Clandestine Front the TNI began to apply a later and more sophisticated COIN paradigm, also from West Java, which has been termed the Petrus model (see page 108). This model used a framework of overt COIN measures to control the population and deny manoeuvre to the rural guerrillas. Within this framework subversion, provocation, covert terror, propaganda and assassination were employed to deal with the urban clandestine movement. This represented a version of *quadrillage* (see page 90) but owed nothing to the French model and almost everything to KOPASSUS experience against organised crime in urbanised areas of West Java. The Petrus model relied heavily on the intelligence and special forces apparatus and hence led to a degree of KOPASSUS dominance which was ultimately fatal to Indonesian interests in East Timor (see page 110).

Interaction of External Variables

The interaction of external variables was a critical area of difference between the two insurgencies studied.

The campaign in West Java was conducted with little international scrutiny and hence limited scope for influence by the systemic or regional polity, economy or media. DI/TII had no overt international support – at that time most Islamic nations were still colonies or absorbed in their own independence struggles (Egypt and Algeria are obvious examples) and there was no politically influential Islamic ‘fundamentalist’ movement. Indonesian sources argue that DI/TII was supported by covert advisors from Netherlands Intelligence, airdrops of medical supplies and smuggling of weapons through Dutch plantation owners (Disjarah TNI 1985, 83ff, see also transcripts of the Jungschlager trial as discussed in Palmier, 1962). However, there is no independent evidence for this contention and Netherlands academic sources – otherwise critical of Dutch policy at the time – have denied it (Fieldnotes NL1/PG/1, NL2/DS/1, NL3/DS/2). It may perhaps best be seen as part of the then-intense propaganda war between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West New Guinea.

Also at the systemic level, the Cold War led to support for Indonesia from both Eastern and Western blocs. The US saw Indonesia as a bastion against Communism in Asia and hence perceived its stability as vital. Conversely the Soviet Union and China saw Indonesia as the leading non-aligned nation and sought to draw it into the Communist sphere through political and military support. As DI/TII was the strongest threat to the Republic’s stability over this

¹¹⁸ The same pattern has been evident in Aceh, where KOPASSUS achieved a similar dominance to that shown in East Timor through the use of a Petrus model of covert operations using auxiliaries led by KOPASSUS cadres. A similar pattern was also starting to emerge in West Papua in May/June 2000 with the formation of the *Satgas Meraputih* and *Satgas Papua* militias.

period there was therefore no criticism or pressure upon Indonesia from either bloc. In the 1950s and 1960s, also, communications were less advanced and slower than in the 1990s, hence there was significantly less of a world media presence and media influence in general was less than it later became.

By contrast, the East Timor campaign was subject to increasing influence from events at the systemic level. The Fretilin united front strategy from 1986 led to the development of a vocal and broadly-based international support movement, which was able skilfully to exploit the developing international media and hence to influence public opinion in Western countries. In East Timor itself, the Clandestine Front emphasised civil disobedience, propaganda and the provocation of a disproportionate response from the security forces, which was then exploited through the international media to discredit and pressure Indonesia. The Gulf War of 1991 gave additional impetus to the propaganda campaign, as it provided a precedent for international intervention in a similar situation to that of East Timor. Moreover, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc by 1992 left the US as the sole remaining superpower and meant that Indonesia's role as a bulwark against Communism – which had guaranteed its support and muted any Western criticism – was no longer applicable. The breakup of Yugoslavia provided the TNI and the New Order government with a propaganda tool and, indeed, a genuine object lesson in the dangers of weakening central authority in an ethnically diverse society. Thus these global factors tended to polarise opinion in Indonesia. In this situation of increased international scrutiny, closer economic ties with Western nations and the loss of Cold War immunity from criticism, both TNI's COIN models – P4K and Petrus – became increasingly injurious to Indonesian political interests although they remained highly effective in practical military terms.

At the nation-state level of analysis, the principal difference between the campaigns in West Java and East Timor was ease of inter-provincial communications and interaction. In West Java, TNI had to contend solely with the population of isolated villages in the Priangan mountains. These had no communication with other Islamic insurgents – the Darul Islam movements in Aceh and South Sulawesi operated completely independently of Kartusuwiryo's group. Moreover, the low level of transport infrastructure, economic integration and the lack of radio and television prevented the insurgents from spreading a propaganda message outside West Java and prevented their communication with population groups in Central Java. TNI's inter-provincial blocking force during P4K was designed to prevent escape of the insurgents and effectively denied them influence except in very limited parts of Southwestern Central Java province.

By contrast, by the start of the campaign in East Timor there was already an effective national media, inter-island and inter-provincial communications were well established even in Eastern Indonesia and the progress of Transmigration and voluntary internal migration had led to a more mobile and less parochial society. Urbanisation and the rise of a relatively prosperous and educated middle class had also created an urban public opinion of considerable influence

and distinctly separate from provincial opinion. Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya were the most important examples of this tendency. As the insurgency progressed through the 1980s it became impossible to hide the lack of progress from the Indonesian people and this led to agitation in Jakarta and dissatisfaction within ABRI. The student population of the major Indonesian university cities – particularly Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta – was also targeted by the Clandestine Front and a pan-Indonesian student movement (albeit embryonic) began to develop. Thus events at the nation-state level became increasingly influential in East Timor and *vice versa*.

A key factor in these developments was the widespread accessibility of television, telephone communications, the internet and other technologically advanced forms of communication. This process of development in communications – including road and rail infrastructure, electronic communications and the media – contributed to the globalisation process in Indonesia. The government's ability to control the archipelago was increasingly outstripped by the ability of insurgent organisations to communicate, establish C² networks, develop intelligence and exploit the international media. This technological development is an essential contextual difference between the experience of insurgency in East Timor and the earlier experience in West Java, a difference that ultimately rendered earlier paradigms for COIN unworkable.

As has been shown (see page 154), the events of 1998-99 are also an excellent illustration of the increasing interaction of external variables caused by urbanisation and globalisation, in that systemic and regional events (the Asian financial crisis provoked by economic globalisation) led to dramatic changes at nation-state level (the fall of the government and subsequent vulnerability to international pressure over East Timor) which was paralleled by disintegration at the sub-nation state level (loss of control over KOPASSUS and hence TNI overall in East Timor, loss of central control over the militias, the rise of uncontrolled violence). The visibility of events at the local level, occasioned by globalised media, undermined the Indonesian government's position and ultimately led to INTERFET intervention and the loss of the province.

Political Power Diffusion

From all of this, one can conclude that there is indeed a tendency toward political power diffusion during the conduct of guerrilla operations. As deduced from the theoretical literature examined in Chapter 2 (see page 14) and as clearly demonstrated in the author's fieldwork, the nature of guerrilla war invokes the operation of a general principle of diffusion, which is however affected in practice by contextual variables. As discussed (see page 159) the most important of these are geographical factors, traditional authority patterns, political culture and the interaction of external variables. Having identified the tendency to political power diffusion, it is therefore appropriate to consider the mechanism by which it occurs and how it is affected by the contextual variables identified.

The key factor that emerges from the fieldwork is the destruction or weakness of formal power structures under guerrilla operations. As has been seen, during the War of Independence the removal of Japanese administrators from the governmental structure destroyed the formal power structure of the state. The capture of the civilian leadership by the Dutch dislocated the later formal power structures of the Republic. The Republic's formal structures were never acknowledged by Darul Islam, but while DI/TII's formal structure remained in place it was centralised and well controlled. Once these formal power structures were destroyed by P4K, political power diffusion occurred rapidly within the insurgent movement. In East Timor formal power structures had always been weak at the local level and the self-exile of the Portuguese at the start of the civil war destroyed the formal power structure of the colonial state. Despite the Indonesians' putting considerable effort into the creation of formal power structures in East Timor in the 1980s, these were dislocated in the late 1990s. TNI formal power structures were subverted by the power of KOPASSUS, which was in turn rendered ineffective by its decapitation in 1998. Civilian formal power structures were undermined by the creation of the integration movement and the alternative centres of political power such as FPKD and the militia.

When such formal power structures are undermined, formalised communication and authority within organisations – whether military, governmental or societal – breaks down and local leaders tend to fall back upon informal power structures. In this situation, the element with means of coercion – normally the military or the insurgents themselves – becomes politically dominant. Thus local military or guerrilla leaders are able to dominate all aspects of life in their own areas and are conversely subject to little or no control by central authority.

The precise nature of informal power structures in any organisation or society is, as we have seen, conditioned by geographical, cultural and local political factors, moderated by the nature and degree of influence of external variables. These are the key contextual variables that the fieldwork has identified.

In essence, then, the mechanism for political power diffusion identified in the Indonesian fieldwork is as follows:

- A crisis (revolution, military defeat etc) leads to the outbreak of violence, part of which may include guerrilla operations. The C² structures inherent in such operations give a high degree of autonomy and independence to local military leaders.
- The same (or a simultaneous) crisis produces a breakdown in formal power structures, causing organisations to fall back upon informal power structures.

- The nature of these informal power structures is determined by geography, political culture, patterns of traditional authority within the society and the degree of interaction of systemic/regional factors with local events.
- Thus the guerrilla operations and the concomitant breakdown in formal power structures form the *trigger* for political power diffusion. The precise nature and progress of this diffusion is then *determined* by contextual variables.

In terms of political culture, the breakdown of formal power structures removes the structural stability of the society and its elements become dominated by informal power structures. These informal power structures may be characterised as 'plastic', in the sense that they are more easily altered, more malleable under pressure and less set or stable than the formal power structures that preceded them. In such informal and plastic power structures, individuals tend to coalesce around strong local leaders whose authority derives from traditional, military or economic bases. This tendency is clearly evident from the fieldwork – in the formation of *strijdtorganisatie* around influential *pemuda* leaders, the formation of DI/TII around influential *kyai*, the formation of Timorese partisan groups around family members of influential *liurai* and the influence of Timorese and Sundanese village elites in determining their village's allegiance in the broader political/military conflict.

Those members of society exhibiting a participant political culture – often the same influential individuals – find their avenues to influence and participation blocked by the breakdown of formal structures. They thus tend to pursue their own political interests, taking their personal followers with them – the Aidabasalala Halilintar, the Atsabe partisans and the personal behaviour of Kartusuwiryo are examples from the fieldwork. Individuals exhibiting subject or parochial political culture will tend to support these leaders in proportion to their coercive power. Hence local elites who possess coercive means – primarily local military or guerrilla leaders – will become the nucleus for the local political systems that emerge from this loss of formal power structures.

Plasticisation of Power Structures


The term 'plastic' has been originated in this study to describe the process whereby social and political power structures become, for a time, more malleable and easy to change during crises and periods of upheaval. It is appropriate now to discuss both the theoretical basis for this phenomenon as well as its relevance to the case studies.

Jackson's research in West Java emphasised the difference in effect of vertical, as against horizontal, social integration. He pointed out that traditional societies tend to be vertically organised, whereas modern societies tend to be horizontally organised. In other words, in a highly traditional society the strongest bonds of social integration run from superiors to subordinates within a hierarchy, rather than between people of equal status in different hierarchies. This arrangement might loosely be called 'feudal' and indeed the close

relationship between a feudal master and serf (and the correspondingly slight relationship between a serf on one manor with serfs on another) are good examples of a 'vertically organised' traditional society. Another excellent example of a vertically organised society is a regular military unit, in which individuals (regardless of rank) may tend to have a higher degree of fellow-feeling with people of different rank in their own unit than with people of the same rank in another unit. Jackson argued that traditional authority patterns in West Javanese society were also 'vertically organised', with strong vertical relationships and weak horizontal relationships.

By contrast, in a modern urbanised society, the strongest relationships are horizontal – between people of similar socio-economic status – rather than vertical within hierarchies. This arrangement might be referred to as 'class-based', in that the degree of fellow-feeling between members of the same socio-economic class will tend to be considerably stronger than feelings that cross such class boundaries.

Figure 5.1
Vertical and Horizontal Social Organisation



These two contrasting stereotypes of social organisation can be represented graphically as shown in Figure 5.1. This shows how the same individuals can be differently organised – either into hierarchies or socio-economic classes (or any other class-based or hierarchical groupings). In a traditional society (as shown on the left of the figure) those individuals in the middle ranks of a hierarchy have close ties to those above and below them but little sense of commonality with individuals of similar rank in other hierarchies. In a modern society, these same individuals represent a middle class which has its own class interests and within which relationships between individuals in a class are stronger than relationships with individuals of different rank.

Either of these two forms of social organisation may be strong and stable. However, just as guerrilla operations have a 'plasticising' effect on formal power structures, so a process of modernisation or de-tribalisation tends to break down the traditional, vertical bonds within hierarchies while horizontal bonds have not yet arisen to take their place. Thus in a modernising (as Jackson and Samuel P. Huntington describe it), or a de-tribalising society (as Gluckman and Leach describe the same phenomenon) formal power structures are weakened. This allows individuals with informal influence – based on coercive power, religious authority, appeal to nationalist fervour etc – to gain political power.

This phenomenon can be clearly seen in both West Java and East Timor. As Jackson showed in *Urbanisation and the Rise of Patron-Client Relations*, the process of modernisation eroded traditional hierarchies in West Java, while the author's fieldwork showed that the crisis of the War of Independence and the outbreak of the DI/TII insurgency allowed military and religious leaders at the local level to gain extraordinary political and coercive power. In East Timor, the process of modernisation in the 1960s and 1970s – the rise of an urbanised educated middle class with interests different to those of the *liurai* – drove some elements of the traditional elite into alliance with Indonesia, led others to establish conservative alliances and others to seek radical alliances with intellectuals and the rural population. When the outbreak of guerrilla operations strikes a society in such a process of transformation – as it did in both West Java and East Timor – it appears to magnify the power-diffusion effect, as well as the influence of political, cultural and demographic factors upon the outcome.

Gluckman's work on de-tribalisation in Africa highlights the importance of interhierarchical roles, which this dissertation has also shown to be important in the Indonesian case. Gluckman showed that traditional elites, under the stress of modernisation/de-tribalisation, became subject to numerous conflicting demands – from their traditional hierarchy, from the colonial power, from the guerrilla movement if present, from the religious structure and from the emerging class-based system. As a coping mechanism, members of traditional elites who hold positions of authority in each of these structures tend to play off the demands of one hierarchy against another to maintain themselves in power. This, of course, is a further clear example of formal power structures becoming meaningless while informal political authority – based on personal prestige and membership of a traditional elite – comes to the fore.

In other words, the mechanism for political power diffusion identified above – a crisis leading to guerrilla operations forming the trigger for power diffusion which is itself mediated by contextual variables – may take place against a broader background of modernisation or de-tribalisation. This provides the motivation, indirect and proximate cause for the crisis which then triggers the power diffusion studied in this analysis.

Samuel P. Huntington's work on modernisation and its potential for the creation of conflict, follows a similar logic to that of Jackson and Gluckman, although Huntington examines modernisation at a significantly higher level of analysis than either of the others. The author's own fieldwork has focussed on a 'close reading' of the two insurgencies studied – to borrow the term from F. R. Leavis and its application to political anthropology from Claude Lévi-Strauss – and thus the present work is not directly comparable with Huntington's, although it can be compared with Jackson's and Gluckman's. As can be seen, the author's conclusions conform to theirs and are yet not contrary to Huntington's.

Comparison with a Non-Indonesian Example

This analysis, focusing on Indonesian examples, has shown that while the C² structures inherent in guerrilla operations do invoke a power-diffusion effect, the manner in which this effect operates in practice depends upon contextual variables. The question remains as to whether this phenomenon is peculiar to Indonesia, or whether it can be broadened to include non-Indonesian examples. Based on the results of the Indonesian studies, we should expect to see a similar broadly comparable diffusion of political power under guerrilla operations, but we should anticipate that contextual variables would cause this diffusion to operate differently in each case. Moreover, while the four contextual variables identified above proved most important in the Indonesian case, other contextual variables might be more significant in other examples, or the relative importance of each might vary.

The next section provides a brief overview of one other major protracted insurgency – the Malayan Emergency – to determine the broader applicability of the Indonesian results. It might be argued that the use of a historical example for comparison ignores the importance of globalisation as identified in the Timorese fieldwork. However, this example does equate fully to the fieldwork dataset for West Java and the historical portion of the East Timor fieldwork. Thus it is directly comparable to approximately 70% of the evidence used in this study. To compare a non-Indonesian example with the dataset relating to direct participant observation of guerrilla warfare, it will be necessary to find and observe an ongoing guerrilla conflict at first hand, something precluded (for the moment) by practical difficulties and the absence of a suitable conflict. However, as an interim solution the Malayan example is an excellent comparative tool to validate the general applicability of the thesis.

The Malayan Emergency 1948-60

Introduction

The Malayan Emergency of 1948-60 took place in an operating environment and timeframe almost identical to that of the DI/TII insurgency in Indonesia, but like Fretilin's later campaign it was inspired by Marxist ideology. There was certainly an ethnic distinction between the Malayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA) who were 90% ethnic Chinese and the broader population.

However, race and ethnicity were not the principal motivating factors in this insurgency (Asprey 1975, 860; HQ Malaya Command 1952, 8B). Thus, it provides a valuable comparative example to the Indonesian fieldwork since it occurred under similar general conditions but subject to different contextual variables.

The Insurgents

On the Communist side, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had been established under the guidance of the Chinese Communist party as early as 1927 or 1928, although it was not formally founded until 1933. By this time, it had come under Comintern influence and followed a policy line in accordance with that of the Third International (HQ Malaya Command 1952, 1B). The Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) had been formed during the Second World War and operated with British Liaison Officers from Force 136 during the Japanese occupation of Malaya (Chapman, 1950). At the end of the war, the bulk of the MPAJA was disbanded but a secret cadre retained its arms.

At the end of 1945 this clandestine organisation numbered some 4,000 guerrillas and included as many combat veterans as possible. Its core consisted of units of the MPAJA who had not come into contact with and were therefore unknown to the British liaison officers and most of the important MCP leaders who had remained *incognito* (HQ Malaya Command 1952, 5B).

The MCP had planned to assume control over the government of Malaya during the expected interregnum between the Japanese surrender and the arrival of British occupation forces. The size, strength and speed of arrival of the British re-occupation force quickly convinced the leadership that the MCP was not strong enough to attempt a takeover immediately. Thus a policy of apparent cooperation, combined with infiltration of crypto-communists into trade unions and other organisations, was adopted. During this period stocks of weapons and military equipment were maintained, however and political cadres were active amongst the ethnic Chinese population in the squatter settlements which existed on the fringe of the jungle (Clutterbuck 1977, 38).

The MCP was a joint civil-military organisation, headed by a mobile Central Executive Committee that met only occasionally, while a smaller group within it known as the Military High Command was responsible for detailed direction of the insurgency. North, Central and South Malaya were each headed by a Regional Bureau, responsible for passing on the decisions of the Central Executive Committee within its Region. Operational control within each state was in the hands of a State Committee, while larger states such as Pahang were divided into two or more regions headed by a Regional Committee. The States were further divided into districts, with a District Committee responsible to control local Branches and execute directions from the State/Regional Committee. The District level was the main functional level of the MCP and was responsible for controlling the *Min Yuen* or People's Movement (HQ Malaya Command 1952, 8B).

The *Min Yuen* was the MCP's parallel hierarchy, forming a guerrilla counter-government:

In each village, one or more Communist 'cells' performed a variety of essential tasks such as furnishing guerrillas with intelligence, recruits, food, medicine, clothing and money. Armed members of the *Min Yuen* – plantation workers by day, guerrillas by night – undertook propaganda, sabotage and terror missions. Administratively, the cells formed shadow governments, what the French in Indochina called "parallel hierarchies", at village, district and province [sic] levels. This machinery enabled the Central Committee of the MCP to control *Min Yuen* activities as well as provide an instant government for "liberated areas" (Asprey 1975, 861).

MCP districts within each state were controlled by the *Min Yuen* District Committee. This committee also had an armed group of approximately section strength (8-10 people) for military tasks, sabotage, armed propaganda and occasional cooperation with the guerrilla main force.

The main force guerrillas of the MPAJA (renamed the MRLA after the start of the armed insurgency in June 1948), were controlled at each level by a political officer of the MCP. The MRLA was in theory organised according to the orthodox 'triangular' structure of platoons, companies, battalions and regiments. Regimental HQ was merged with the State/Regional Committee, while platoons and companies were directed by a member of the District Committee. As noted above, the District Committee also controlled the activities of the *Min Yuen*, making the District level the core operational and governmental level within the MCP/MRLA parallel hierarchy. This fact was quickly recognised by the security forces, as is clear from direction given in the 1952 document quoted above:

The main difficulty which confronts the MCP at present is in recruiting intelligent and literate executives - able both to assimilate and also to pass on the Communist doctrines - to carry out their work and there have been many references in captured documents to this shortage of executives. This gives importance to the fact that the killing of terrorist leaders such as District and Branch committee members is of far greater value than the killing of the rank and file (HQ Malaya Command 1952, 10B).

In fact, once counter-insurgency measures began to take effect the MCP/MRLA hierarchy quickly began to disintegrate. In particular, the resettlement of the Chinese population within protected villages dramatically reduced both the influence of the MCP over the civil population and the ability of the central insurgent leadership to enforce its directives (Clutterbuck 1977, 39). By 1952, there was no standard organisation and conditions varied in each local area. Operations by the British Security Forces mainly targeted company and battalion levels of command within the MRLA, so that by 1952 "the effect of pressure and resettlement ha[d] been to force the MCP to reorganise their military forces. As a result all that ...remain[ed were] the Regiments and a large number of independent platoons" (HQ Malaya Command 1952, 8B).

As Asprey points out, the central leadership soon lost control of the organisation with political and military control devolving down to local level. Uncoordinated actions resulted:

...pressure on Communist communications and logistics slowly began to tell. As early as 1950, the guerrillas had abandoned 'regimental' operations...With central leadership giving way to state and district leadership, any semblance of a coordinated guerrilla campaign vanished. Despite 'formal' directives (often reaching jungle headquarters months late) local guerrilla leaders increasingly turned to terrorism to survive (Asprey 1975, 868).

Asprey's dates are slightly inaccurate. Company group operations, with MRLA groups of approximately 150 guerrillas under regimental direction, were mounted in late 1951 in North Johore. However, these were unsuccessful in part because the guerrillas lacked sufficient food supplies to remain concentrated for long periods (MQ Malaya Command 1952, 9B). Nonetheless, a general trend from 1950 to 1953 saw the size of guerrilla operations diminish from regiment to section level and the control of the central military and political leaders was gradually eroded over the same period. Local commanders became increasingly independent of central direction and operated principally on their own personal agendas. As Clutterbuck indicates,

By 1953, the Branch organisation, with its cadres in the villages, was suffering heavy casualties and the MCP had to milk the guerrilla regiments to provide men to keep it going. By the time Malaya became independent in 1957, only ten per cent of the guerrillas were left in the surviving platoons of the regiments; the remaining ninety per cent were concentrating desperately on keeping open the political and supply organisation across the jungle fringe – the parallel hierarchy. (1977, 41-2).

Thus, on the Communist side, the process of diffusion both of military and political power from central to local leaders can be clearly observed. The process of diffusion from civilian to military leaders is less clear, partly because throughout the insurgency there was little or no distinction between military and civilian leadership. Like the Chinese and Vietnamese communist insurgencies, the MCP military and civilian leaderships were indistinguishable – the army leadership *was* the party leadership and *vice versa*.

The MCP/MRLA initially displayed a high degree of centralisation and indeed exhibited the characteristics of a hierarchical guerrilla structure (O'Neill 1990, 61). As shown, the key level of the parallel hierarchy had always been the District Committee, both in political and military terms. Initially, the activities of District Committees had been controlled by guidelines and directives from the Central Executive Committee. However, as Security Force operations began to impact on the insurgents, this central direction disappeared and political power was increasingly localised and fragmented. To use O'Neill's terminology, the MCP evolved during the insurgency from a hierarchy strongly controlled by the Central Committee, through a pyramidal structure where District Committees were the key centres of power, to a fragmented structure in which political and military power was diffuse and localised.

The Counter-insurgency Forces

For their part, the British Forces were initially also highly centralised in their approach to the insurgency. Operations during the earliest phase of the insurgency in 1948-49 consisted of large-scale sweeps conducted by entire battalions and controlled directly by Brigade headquarters or higher. These operations were largely unsuccessful and coincided with the greatest period of Communist success during the entire Emergency. On the political side, a lack of unified control was initially apparent. COIN policy in each of the nine States of Malaya, the Straits Settlements and Singapore was initially controlled by the state premiers (*Mentri Besar*), while political control at national level was exercised by a civilian High Commissioner.

The initial lack of success of large-scale operations 'caused the military to decentralise control of operational units'... 'it would be almost a physical impossibility for a battalion commander to control every operation launched within his battalion area' (Asprey 1975, 865). This decentralisation took place within a so-called 'operational framework' which established close cooperation between military commanders, police and government officials at every level.

The Malayan Police, consisting of 25,000 regular police and 42,000 Special Constables, was divided into 10 Contingents, one for each State. Contingents were commanded by a Chief Police Officer and were further divided into Police Circles at district level and Police Districts at local village level. The principal role of the police was to control the population and ensure its security from the *Min Yuen* and MRLA. In addition, the Police Special Branch was the lead agency for intelligence collection and analysis, while regular and auxiliary police provided detailed information on the guerrilla organisation and identified key *Min Yuen* and MRLA cadres.

By the end of 1951, extremely close cooperation had been established between the police and the army. The army Brigade HQ formed part of the Chief Police Officer's headquarters at State level, while Battalion HQ was collocated with the headquarters of the Police Circle for that district. Each company commander within a battalion had his command post in the same building as the police officer commanding the local Police District.

In political terms, the counter-insurgency was directed at national level by a single supreme commander, the High Commissioner, who after 1951 was a military officer also holding the post of Director of Operations. Thus, both political and military control over the entire Federation of Malaya was vested in the hands of one military officer. A civilian Deputy High Commissioner controlled the Malayan Civil Service and the state and local governments on his behalf, while a Deputy Director of Operations exercised day-to-day control over the Security Forces. The High Commissioner during 1952 and 1953 was Sir Gerald Templer, a British Gurkha officer who exercised extremely effective centralised control over both the political and military apparatus. In Asprey's view, this system had 'virtually allowed Templer a dictatorial policy during the

next two vital years [1952 and 1953] during which the guerrillas suffered a military defeat' (Asprey 1975, 868). Indeed, the degree to which Templer felt himself to be free of interference from the London government is illustrated by his famous remark that it did not particularly matter what people in Britain thought about events in far-off colonies of which they knew little and cared even less (Carruthers 1995, 260). It is very difficult to imagine a Dutch, French or American commander making such an assertion during their respective COIN campaigns. However, Templer readily sought and accepted advice from his civilian advisers in Kuala Lumpur and repeatedly emphasised the primacy of the civilian government and police in dealing with the insurgency. His principal advisers were four Lieutenant Colonel-level staff officers, one each from the Army, Police, Air Force and Civil Service.

At State level, the same close political cooperation was evident, with the administration of each State being taken over by a State War Executive Committee, effectively a State war cabinet under the chairmanship of the Mentri Besar. It included the Mentri Besar himself, the British Adviser (a senior political officer of the Malayan Civil Service), the Chief Police Officer, the army Brigade commander and the Secretary for Chinese Affairs. At district level the District War Executive Committee was chaired by the local District Officer and included the senior police officer for the Police Circle and the army Battalion Commander (HQ Malaya Command 1952, 10B). Indeed, Milton Osborne has argued that 'the outstandingly successful aspect of the Malayan Emergency was the interlocking of military and administrative endeavour' (Osborne 1970, 140).

The overall COIN strategy envisaged in the Briggs Plan was strikingly similar to the P4K strategy adopted by TNI in dealing with the DI/TII. The plan was to clear the peninsula from South to North, pacifying each district in turn and only moving on to the next once pacification was complete. Again, similar to the P4K strategy in West Java, operations were based on localised, decentralised patrolling operations that concentrated on maintaining village security and control over the civilian population. This was the principal operational role of the Malayan Police, while the army concentrated on local patrolling to assist the police and mounted deep operations into the jungle.

Tactical methods were very different from those evident in West Java. Peninsular Malaya consisted in the 1950s of a central mountain range entirely covered in contiguous primary tropical forest. TNI encirclement tactics such as pagar betis would have been useless in this environment, particularly as Malaya was underpopulated by comparison to Indonesia, with a population in 1951 of only 6.3 million people (HQ Malaya Command 1952, 5A). MRLA tactics involved the use of bases well inside the deep jungle, from which raiding forces moved through the jungle fringe into populated areas to carry out attacks. The *Min Yuen* maintained an intelligence screen on the jungle fringe to warn the guerrilla main force of any impending security force operation. This was a key reason for the failure of early large-scale sweep operations, which alerted the enemy by means of the *Min Yuen* intelligence screen well before the sweep force was anywhere near its target.

The British response was to mount small-unit, long-term deep penetration operations in which troops lived in the jungle for weeks (and in some cases months) at a time. This allowed the patrols to operate from behind the *Min Yuen* intelligence screen rather than through it and hence denied the guerrillas early warning. Extensive use was also made of surrendered guerrilla leaders and of Police Jungle Companies, who operated on similar deep penetration operations, often with surrendered MCP or MRLA members as guides.

In military terms, the British approach to the campaign therefore saw political power pass from the hands of several civilian leaders within Malaya, to a single political-military supremo in the person of the High Commissioner/Director of Operations. In O'Neill's terms, it evolved from a pyramidal structure to a hierarchical one. At the same time, control over the local civilian population by the security forces intensified dramatically. Many Chinese squatter communities had never been under any form of government control whatsoever and the highland aborigines had experienced only limited contact with outsiders. By the end of the campaign, however, the civilian population was firmly controlled by local military and civilian leaders through the War Executive Committee system. Within the military itself, a centralised large-scale approach had given way to a decentralised C² system in which local commanders (often of non-commissioned rank) had an extremely high degree of tactical autonomy.

Summary

In both the MRLA and the British forces, then, a diffusion of power from the central military leadership to local commanders is evident. Whereas in the British case this was accompanied by a tendency to centralise an initially diffuse political power structure, in the Communist case both political and military power became increasingly diffused, localised and impervious to central direction. In the British case, power tended to flow from civilian to military leaders and from central leaders to local leaders. In the Communist case civilian and military leadership were indistinguishable, but there was a clear flow of power from central to local leadership.

Clearly, then, the assertion that guerrilla operations invoke a power-diffusion effect does have applicability to Malaya. However, as can be seen from the discussion of this example, the Emergency was effected by similar variables to those identified in Indonesia. These included geographical factors (squatter settlements, the jungle fringe, the land border with Thailand), political culture (both of the Malays and the Chinese), traditional authority structures (particularly among the Chinese population and reflected in the MCP's structure, but also among the British and reflected in their approach of minimum force and police primacy) and the interaction of levels of analysis (the Cold War, the Japanese invasion, the concurrent war in French Indochina/Vietnam and so on). Although not subject to the influences of globalisation as identified in the Timorese case, the Malayan example took place in an environment of physical and political infrastructure vastly more modern

than that of either West Java or East Timor and hence equates to a more modern stage of development than an equivalent historical time-period would indicate for Indonesia.

Thus, in this one example, the Indonesian model appears to have broader applicability. However it would be premature to draw such a conclusion without a similarly detailed analysis of a number of other non-Indonesian examples. This, therefore, represents an area requiring further analysis rather than an additional conclusion for the present study.

Refined Thesis

Based on all of the above, it is now possible to articulate concisely the answer to the problem examined in this dissertation.

The initial problem, it will be remembered, was this: *To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect?*

The fieldwork shows that low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 did indeed demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect. This effect was triggered by the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, which itself flowed from crises and 'plasticisation' of power structures, generated by processes of modernisation and change within Indonesian society from traditional hierarchies to modern forms of social organisation. These crises were also affected by events in the systemic and regional political systems – in the invasion of the NEI by Japan, the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis and so on. They resulted in a breakdown or weakening of formal power structures, allowing informal power structures to dominate. This in turn allowed local elites with economic, social or religious influence and with coercive power over the population, to develop political and military power at the local level while being subject to little control from higher levels. This represents, then, a process of power-diffusion from central and civilian leadership levels to local leaders with coercive means – most often military or insurgent leaders.

Having been triggered by guerrilla operations, however, the direction and process by which such power diffusion operated was heavily influenced by contextual variables, of which the most important were geographical factors, political culture, traditional authority structures and the interaction of external variables, of which the most important appears to be globalisation of media and communications. The contextual variables have been examined in detail above, but in summary topographical isolation, poor infrastructure, severe terrain, scattered population groupings and strong influence by traditional hierarchies tend to accelerate and exacerbate the loss of central control. Conversely good infrastructure, large population centres, good internal communications and a high degree of influence by nation-state and systemic levels of analysis – particularly through economic and governmental institutionalisation – tend to retard diffusion. Moreover, while power may be seen to diffuse at one level of

analysis (e.g. nation-state) it may be centralising at another (e.g. into the hands of military leaders at the local level).

In terms of the specific effects of military operations on the political process, the theses developed to answer the initial problem can be stated thus:

The command and control (C²) structures inherent in traditional, dispersed rural guerrilla movements that lack access to mass media or electronic communications tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders.

If COIN or Internal Security Operations are conducted, two factors will operate. First, there will be an increase in the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Second, where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, there will be an increase in control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders. Where the central government is civilian or has interests divergent from the military's, the first of these factors will dominate. Where the government is military or has largely identical interests to those of the military, the second factor will be dominant.

The process of power diffusion can be also be summarised as follows:

A crisis (revolution, military defeat) driven by processes of societal change or by external causes, leads to the outbreak of guerrilla operations. The C² structures inherent in such operations give a high degree of autonomy and independence to local military leaders.

The same (or a simultaneous) crisis produces a breakdown in formal power structures, causing organisations to fall back upon informal power structures.

The nature of these informal power structures is determined by geography, political culture, patterns of traditional authority within the society and the degree of interaction of systemic/regional factors with local events.

Thus the guerrilla operations and the concomitant breakdown in formal power structures form the *trigger* for political power diffusion. The precise nature and progress of this diffusion is then *determined* by contextual variables.

Conclusions

Summary of Results Obtained

In summary, this study has concluded that in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999, low-intensity conflict demonstrated a political power-diffusion effect. This effect was triggered by the command and control systems inherent in guerrilla operations, but was caused by crises generated by external global events and processes of modernisation within Indonesian society. These crises undermined formal power structures and caused a 'plasticising' of political and societal

organisation, which caused a reversion to informal power structures. These tended to favour local leaders with coercive means, usually military or insurgent leaders. Once the political power-diffusion effect began to operate, its effects were mediated by four principal contextual variables: geographical factors, political culture, traditional authority structures and the degree of interaction between systemic, regional, nation-state and sub-nation-state political systems. Analysis by insurgency theorists and historical data from the Malayan Emergency, suggest that these results may be applicable to non-Indonesian examples. In particular, there is strong evidence that the power-diffusion effect will occur in any guerrilla operation and there is weaker evidence that the same four contextual variables will also be influential, although their relative importance may vary. However, the applicability of the model outside of Indonesia requires considerable additional analysis before it can be determined.

Strengths and Limitations of the Research

The research conducted for this dissertation has the following strengths:

- It is based on detailed and intensive examination of specific examples of conflict in Indonesia, providing a level of factual detail and scholarship not present in previous analyses of these conflicts. It is also the first detailed scholarly study to emerge from fieldwork analysis of the East Timor situation.
- It uses contemporary Indonesian-language source documents extensively and makes use of a number of primary source documents not previously analysed.
- It includes a large number of interviews with key participants in historical events as well as with individuals from each level in the social structures analysed. These interviews, along with documentary sources, incorporate the views of both sides in each conflict and of neutral observers and foreign participants in the events.
- It incorporates a rigorous fieldwork methodology and detailed participant observation. Further, it draws on geographical, political and anthropological methods to balance and neutralise sources of bias in the data.

The research has the following limitations:

- There is a potential for some bias in certain interview results due to the author's gender, nationality and the fact that during fieldwork periods the author was a serving military officer. Despite extensive use of balancing material, some slight residual potential for bias remains.
- The East Timor fieldwork, although intensive, was conducted under conditions of active operational service and hence was subject to logistic and

time-and-space constraints not applicable to the West Timor study. In addition the degree of analytical detachment from the subject of research was maintained with greater difficulty at times.

- More detailed research into a current non-Indonesian example of ongoing guerrilla operations is necessary before a generalised theory of guerrilla power-diffusion, applicable to all conflicts, can be developed.
- The rapidly changing situation in Indonesia – particularly developments in Aceh, Maluku and West Papua – means that conclusions on the applicability of the present results to those potential conflicts would be problematic. Predictions of future developments in these areas are therefore difficult on the basis of the present results. However, depending on the progress of these flashpoints they may prove suitable for further fieldwork analysis.

Recommendations for Future Research

Based on the above, future research should focus on the applicability of these results to non-Indonesian examples occurring in modern conditions of globalisation. In addition, as future events unfold in Aceh, West Papua, Sulawesi, Maluku and the other current areas of conflict in Indonesia, these results are likely to be validated by further Indonesian examples. Moreover the ultimate progress of power-diffusion and national integration in Indonesia will be able to be examined in the light of these results. In addition, the situation in East Timor, as it develops, will provide an indication of the relative importance of traditional authority groups and globalised, ideology-based younger groups and serve to further illuminate the East Timor results. In West Java the development of the *laskar jihad* and other militant subversive Islamic groups will illuminate the West Java data in terms of the potential for resurgence of Islamic separatism in that province.

Concluding Remarks

The politico-military history of low-level conflict in Indonesia since 1945 shows that conflict exhibits certain general principles and yet is profoundly influenced by the context in which it takes place. To separate principle from context is a complex task and one that is fraught with theoretical difficulty. Nevertheless, in examining this question from the perspective of detailed fieldwork on the ground among local people, this dissertation has developed, validated and proven an explanatory model for several of the most important political and military processes of conflict.

APPENDIX 1

METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

Methodology

Research for this dissertation was conducted partly as documentary historical research, partly as geographical and historical fieldwork and partly by participant observation using anthropological fieldwork methods.

It is difficult to acquire data on the questions at issue in this dissertation in written form, as little previous research has been carried out on this precise question. Thus, while basic qualitative data can be obtained by researching primary and secondary written sources, the details must be based on interviews with participants in the key historical events and by participant observation and interview in the case of contemporary events. This research method has a number of methodological risks: in the first place, many of the participants in historical insurgencies are dead and those still alive are ageing – their memory may be hazy or distorted. In addition, some of the younger participants in insurgency are now, or have previously been, in positions of political or military power or social influence – their views may be coloured by later events and by the interpretations favoured by later regimes in Indonesia, or by their present interests.

To minimise these disadvantages, the policy followed was as follows:

- As many as possible written points of view were analysed, including documents, letters and studies from both sides in each conflict and from independent observers.
- Emphasis was given to contemporary accounts rather than later interpretations of events.
- Wherever possible, participants were selected for interview who retain a high degree of mental alertness, were in a position to record events at the time and do not currently hold high political office or have an obvious debt to a particular regime.
- Participant observation and analysis of currently occurring insurgencies was based on anthropological analysis methods, to provide a readily applicable research standard.

Fieldwork was essentially multi-disciplinary, combining elements of socio-political, anthropological, historical, geographical and military analysis. It was therefore critical to develop a sound and achievable methodology for the fieldwork aspects of the project. The methodology used was an adaptation of the research technique known as Participative Rural Appraisal (PRA).

PRA seeks to combine the perceptions of researchers with those of local people in a participative and inclusive manner. It was developed in response to certain earlier methods in which researchers constructed a detailed hypothesis, then used field research to test the hypothesis and finally returned to a laboratory or office to analyse the results. While these methods are effective for specific research problems, they are less appropriate to cross-cultural fieldwork in a rural area or combat zone. By approaching a local community with a pre-designed hypothesis and a set of propositions to test it, the researcher tends subconsciously to exclude data which are seen as irrelevant. Where a linguistic or cultural barrier exists, the finer nuances of local people's knowledge and perception may be lost. This notion was neatly summed up by Karl D. Jackson:

In the search for cross-culturally applicable propositions social scientists are sometimes wont to bring already completed conceptual frameworks to the foreign field setting. In cultures such as Indonesia's, where the existing store of systematic attitude research is small, this can result in the collection of data about concepts that are essentially irrelevant to the culture and its polity' (Jackson, 1971, 344).

It is clearly important to develop an outline hypothesis as a focus for preparatory research, before entering the field study environment. However, the purpose of the hypothesis is to guide or 'ground' the initial research, not to condition the researcher's perception of field observations in the case study area. Once in the field, the researcher approaches the problem with a self-consciously 'open' mind, ready to adjust the initial hypothesis to take into account local perceptions. To achieve this, PRA makes use of a suite of methodological tools, including:

- Cross-checking
- Learning from Experience
- Participation
- Flexibility and Adaptability
- Informal Interviewing
- Diagrams and Visualisation
- On-the-spot Analysis (Kapila & Lyon, 1994, 21).

The principal tools used in this study were cross-checking, informal interviewing, diagrams and visualisation and on-the-spot analysis.

- *Cross-Checking.* The researcher gathers information from multiple perspectives and sources, using a variety of methods. This counteracts bias which might be introduced by over-reliance on one particular respondent or research method. Cross-checking was achieved by comparison of local people's perceptions and responses with those of the central government, provincial government and military. In addition, men and women from a variety of backgrounds, age groups and social strata were interviewed and a variety of investigative methods was used.

- *Informal Interviewing.* The principal fieldwork tool was the 'semi-structured interview', where a set of interview topics was used to guide a free-flowing discussion. Where initial discussion revealed further areas for investigation, these were examined in an iterative manner.
- *Diagrams and Visualisation.* The use of visual aids, drawings and mental mapping helped those respondents with a poor formal educational or literacy level to express themselves. This helped counteract the tendency to elite bias in the results.
- *On-The-Spot Analysis.* Each day's research was analysed within 24 hrs of data collection. This analysis was then applied to future research and to previously collected data. Where new relationships or issues were identified, these were revisited in an iterative process.

Bias

In addition to the use of selected PRA-based research tools, it was important to identify and specify possible sources of bias in the research. The principal sources of bias were:

- *Elite Bias.* If research were based wholly on interaction with key respondents, there would be a bias in favour of more articulate and responsive individuals. These tend to be members of educational or social elites and thus the perceptions of these respondents are weighted more heavily than those of the poor or those lacking formal education.
- *Concreteness Bias.* There is a tendency to over-generalise from a limited number of concrete examples. Finer nuances may be overlooked in the process and results may ultimately lack validity.
- *Gender Bias.* As a male in a strongly Islamic community, the author was allowed only limited interaction with females among the local population. Thus, the perceptions and knowledge of male members of the community tended to be more influential than those of females and a special effort had to be made to encourage female participation, without offending local notions of propriety. Nevertheless, as tables 0.1 and 0.2 indicate (see Preface), only a relatively small proportion of respondents were female.
- *Identification Problems.* As a military officer in West Java, the author was initially strongly identified by local people with the Indonesian government and military. It was necessary to avoid too close an association with Indonesian officials, to reduce any bias based on a desire to be 'politically correct'. In East Timor, the author was identified as an INTERFET officer and as the individual responsible for guaranteeing the security of many returnees. This had its own problems of identification bias.

In summary, a modified form of PRA was the methodological basis for the project. The main research tools were cross-checking, informal interviewing, diagrams and visualisation and on-the-spot analysis. Sources of bias were identified before commencing research and steps were taken to avoid such bias where possible.

Sources

Sources used in the preparation of this dissertation were of two principal types: documentary sources and field sources. Documentary sources can be further subdivided into primary, secondary, archival and cartographic sources, while field sources can be subdivided into formal and semi-structured interviews, terrain studies and personal observation. Each will be discussed in turn.

Primary and Secondary Documentary Sources

Each source used is listed in the Bibliography. Where Internet sources were used the relevant URL has been included in the reference. Policies and methods of translation for sources in languages other than English are discussed in detail in the preface. Where a source proved obscure or difficult to acquire, it was included in full or (if length precluded full inclusion) in part in Appendix 4.

Archival Sources

Archival sources originated from the following institutions¹¹⁹:

- Archival Collection of the Gurkha Museum, Winchester (GMW)
- Archival Collection of the Musium Mandala Wangsit Siliwangi, Bandung (MWS)
- Archival Collection of the Pusat Sejarah ABRI, Jakarta (Pusjarah ABRI)
- Archives of the Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis, Koninklijke Landmachtstaf, Den Haag (SMG-KL)
- National Archives of Australia (NAA)
- Australian War Memorial, Canberra (AWM)
- Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Document Release Center (CIA-EDRC)
- Indies Collection of the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Amsterdam (IC-RVO)
- Public Records Office, London (PRO)

Again, where such archival sources are critical to the argument and difficult to acquire, they have been included in Appendix 4.

¹¹⁹ Abbreviations following each of the archival sources are used in the text as necessary, with a document number or cross-reference to Appendix 4 as appropriate.

Cartographic Sources

As has been seen, the interrelationship between infrastructure, communications and the diffusion of political power has been an essential factor in the development of the Indonesian political system. As a consequence, geographical analysis (and hence the use of cartographic sources) became an important element of this study. This allowed an understanding of the infrastructure, communications and level of development in each case study area over time and was essential in tracking the patterns of political and military influence. The principal cartographic sources used were maps and air photographs. A list of maps used is included in the bibliography. The Indonesian government considers maps, especially large-scale topographic maps, sensitive items from a security point of view. As a consequence, such maps are very difficult to obtain. To respect the host country's wishes in this regard, the author prepared basemaps using such maps which were available and then carried only readily commercially available maps (Tourist maps, ONC and TPC) in-country. Topographical maps of West Java are equally difficult to acquire. For example, the US Army AMS-FE 1:50 000 series is the best available, but is available outside the military in photocopied versions only. In addition, this map series is seriously out of date, being essentially a reprint of Japanese maps from 1943, which were in turn based on topographical surveys by the Netherlands East Indies Survey in the late 1930's and early 1940's. Even the ONC series Tactical Pilotage Charts, generally available in 1: 1000 000 scale, are current for the mid-to-late 1960's only. The Map Room of the Royal Geographical Society provided photocopied 1:50 000 scale topographic maps of the West Java case study area, however these were again seriously out of date. For example, Map GSGS Sheet 40/XL-C, *Garoet*, Edition AMS-1, 1:50 000, which covers the central part of the West Java case study area, was prepared in 1943 from Dutch maps of 1919. This is the most recent large-scale map of the area. Likewise, the ONC maps used in Timor were often incompletely surveyed or lacking in essential detail.

Similarly, in East Timor the Indonesian surveyed maps of 1992 were extremely inaccurate in regard to cultural features, while even major topographical features such as rivers and the positions of mountain summits were prone to be inaccurate by several hundred metres. This had significant practical effects on the conduct of the insurgency and COIN campaigns, as each side was operating on different topographical data – TNI on Dutch planimetric maps of mid-1930s survey datum, INTERFET and the UN on air photographs and reprinted Indonesian-surveyed maps of 1992 and the local people (both militia and CNRT/Falintil) on colonial-era Portuguese maps and place names. The practical results of such cartographic difficulties have been examined in the appropriate place in the argument, however it remains clear that maps of Indonesia represent statements of political and topographical wishful thinking rather than of physically reliable data. For research purposes, INTERFET maps were used, with comparison to Dutch and Portuguese maps as available. Basemaps were again constructed using base data from INTERFET mapping and air photographs.

The lack of up-to-date mapping was, in fact, a useful research tool, as the date of survey of each map series provided an indicator for changes to physical infrastructure during the period of interest. Navigation using these maps was more creative than scientific, however and local knowledge was essential. The most useful maps for general navigation (with the exception of INTERFET maps in East Timor) were the TPC series, used in conjunction with the *Periplus Editions* series of maps of western and eastern Indonesia. Even this map combination required considerable interpretation and updating during fieldwork.

Aerial photographs were a further essential source of topographical information and were principally obtained through the map room and library of the Royal Geographical Society, London. The principal source of airphotos for the West Java case study was the collection produced by H.M. De Vries (1929) using aerial photography by the Royal Netherlands Air Force, the *Koninklijk Luchtmaacht*. These air photos indicate in considerable detail the state of transport, commercial and communications infrastructure in Java immediately before the Great Depression, which effectively stalled development on Java until the start of the Second World War (Ricklefs, 1993, 186-7). Consequently, while the mapping of the area was and is incomplete, these photographs provide a detailed infrastructural 'start state' for analysis. Further information on Mapping and Cartographic issues is given in the geographical studies at Appendix 3.

Recording of Field Notes

Field notes were recorded according to recognised anthropological practice, using a standardised tabular format to assist analysis and retrieval. The application of an accession number to each field observation allowed cross-checking and iterative comparison. The standardised tabular format comprised the following:

- Accession Number (allocated to each field observation)
- Date of Record
- Relevant Case Study
- Country
- Location (normally a town name or UTM Grid Reference)
- Type of Fieldnote
- Interviewee (names of interviewees are privileged but available for checking where confidentiality can be ensured)
- Topical Keywords
- Cross-Referencing Information (allowing cross-checking with Field Journals or other documents)

Field Observations are discussed in the succeeding sections and consisted of:

- Formal and Semi-Structured Interviews
- Terrain Studies
- Participant Observation and
- Personal Fieldwork Journals

Formal and Semi-Structured Interviews

Both formal interviews (working to a detailed list of questions) and semi-structured interviews (working to a general agenda) were conducted, as were follow-up interviews for many respondents. Interviews were recorded on audio tape and/or written up into interview notes within 24 hrs of the interview and included in fieldwork journals. Appendix 2 summarises the fieldnotes and interviews conducted for the study.

Terrain Studies

As demonstrated in the case studies, terrain and physical geography exercised a major influence on the political processes at work in each of the situations analysed. As a consequence there was a requirement for detailed terrain and infrastructure analysis. This was conducted by means of a series of transects and compass traverses, both by vehicle and on foot. Standard planimetric and compass sketching methods were used and the results were recorded in fieldwork journals as appropriate. Further information on Terrain and Infrastructure Studies is given in Appendix 3.

Participant Observation

Certain elements of analysis, particularly those relating to current perception of historical events within the case study areas, were conducted by means of participant observation over periods of time spent working among local people in the field. Wherever possible such data was confirmed against formal interview results or contemporary primary source material and observations were also recorded in the narrative section of each fieldwork journal using the standardised fieldnotes format.

Personal Journals

Narratives were maintained for each period of fieldwork, recording detailed personal participant observations as well as contextual information for later checking. These narratives are superimposed with Accession Numbers for participant observations where appropriate.

References

Documentary and archival references follow the Harvard system as detailed in the style handbook for the Australasian Political Studies Association. References to interviews conducted outside case study areas include the interviewee's name. Where an interviewee within Indonesia requested privacy due to the potential sensitivity of remarks on a given subject, this was honoured – consequently interviews conducted within Indonesia are

referenced by code numbers rather than names. A summary of interview code references, dates and locations is at Appendix 2.

Research Materials Archive

Due to the considerable amount of fieldwork data involved in the preparation of the dissertation, a research materials archive was established to allow checking of conclusions from fieldwork or additional manipulation of data for later studies. This archive exists in the form of interview notes and copies of fieldwork journals, in addition to basemaps and transect notes as appropriate. Audio recordings of key interviews are also included. Reference to this archive is made throughout the text as appropriate. The research materials archive is to be deposited with the University College Library of the University of New South Wales (ADFA), Canberra.

Language

The author is a 1993 graduate of the ADF School of Languages Long Indonesian Course, holds an Advanced Diploma in Applied Linguistics (Indonesian) and maintains current qualifications as a Translator and Interpreter at the Higher level (requalifying most recently in August 2000). He has also published several articles (listed in the Bibliography) on Indonesian language and culture and the employment of interpreters and translators and is the author of *A Concise Indonesian Military Glossary* (Point Cook: ADF School of Languages, 1994). All interviews in Indonesia and Malaysia were conducted in Indonesian without the assistance of an interpreter, or in regional languages (principally Sundanese, Tetuñ and Javanese) with the assistance of locally-employed interpreters for interpretation into Indonesian. Where this occurred, interviews were tape-recorded to allow later independent checking of the interpreter's translation. Interviews in Europe and Australia were conducted in English. Written sources in Indonesian and French were translated into English by the author, while sources in Dutch were translated by the author with assistance from staff of the *Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdokumentatie*, Amsterdam. Sources in Japanese were translated by the staff of the ADF School of Languages, Point Cook. Originals of all documents translated by the author were retained for later independent checking, except where such documents were subject to restricted security classification.

APPENDIX 2

SUMMARY OF FIELD NOTES

This appendix summarises the field notes collected during periods of fieldwork in West Java and East Timor. It does not attempt to provide a full fieldwork dataset – this is available in the form of the Research Materials Archive (see above page 193).

Instead, this appendix provides tabulated summaries of the interview and participant observation fieldnotes and gives selected extracts from fieldwork journals in order to provide an overview of the level of fieldwork research conducted.

Enclosures:

1. Fieldnotes Summary (Interviews)
2. Fieldnotes Summary (Participant Observations)
3. Fieldnotes Extracts

APPENDIX 3

TERRAIN AND INFRASTRUCTURE STUDIES

This appendix presents two detailed studies of the physical and human geography of the case study areas. It is presented in this form in order not to disrupt the flow of argument in the main body of the thesis. Nonetheless it is an essential part of the analysis and should be read in conjunction with the relevant case studies.

West Java Geographical Overview

Physical Geography

Geomorphology. The landscape of West Java consists of a flat alluvial plain in the north of the province, rising to a main range running from east to west across the southern part of the island (see Map 1). The mountainous region is not a continuous range, but rather consists of isolated hill complexes surrounded by terraced wet rice (sawah) cultivation. These discrete hill-masses generally run south-north and hence movement in the mountains is much easier from north to south than from east to west, or *vice versa*. Moreover, as one moves from west to east the hill complexes within the mountainous area become larger, increasingly discrete and isolated from each other and higher in altitude. This means that population groups and military forces are more easily cut off from one another and from lowland sources of supply, in the east of the province than in the west. The Garut basin lies at an elevation of approximately 1220m above mean sea level (AMSL) and is surrounded by mountain ranges. To the East, a curving ridgeline runs from Mount (Gunung, G.) Sedakeling (1712m) to G. Galunggung (2241m), then to G. Keracak (1838m). This ridgeline extends Southwest to G. Cikuray and G. Mandalawangi (1813m). To the west a major ridgeline runs from G. Galancang (1667m) south-southwest across the major road and rail links to G. Guntur (2249m), west-southwest across a pass to G. Rakutak (1975m), then roughly south to G. Kendang (2608m), G. Puntang (2575m) and G. Papandayan (2675m). The floor of the valley runs north-south from Sukamerang (7°02'0"S, 107°58'45"E) to Bayongbong (7°15'45"S, 107°50'15"E). Overall, there are 'twenty-two 3,000 to 6,000 foot peaks' in the Garut district (Jackson 1980, 14). The town of Garut lies at an average altitude of 915m AMSL and a position of 7°13'0"S, 107°53'30"E. All of this means that the Garut area is an area of extremely steep mountainous terrain of approximately similar altitude to Mount Kosciuszko in Australia – this imposes its own difficulties on the researcher, but afforded both problems and opportunities to the insurgents of the 1950s. Pursuit was difficult in the mountains by day and virtually impossible by night. The hill slopes, being generally concave, allowed good observation of the valleys from the mountains. However, coupled with vegetation and weather conditions, they also allowed guerrillas in the hills to manoeuvre freely around the extremities of the basin and descend to attack at widely distant and unpredictable points.

Drainage. Garut lies on a former lakebed, now an upland alluvial basin, dissected by the river Cimanuk. This river rises on the slopes of G. Cikuray (2821m, 7°19'30"S, 107°51'15"E), part of the Papandayan volcanic group and flows north across the West Java plain to reach the Java Sea on the north coast at Indramayu. It is navigable by small vessels for most of its length and drainage density is high, with radial drainage patterns around volcanic peaks feeding into a dendritic stream system feeding the Cimanuk. Lake (*Situ*) Bagendit (7°09'30"S, 107°56'0"E) was a major water source during the 1950s and 1960s, but is now largely silted up, whereas a smaller lake at Leles remains. Watercourses on the upper slopes are steep, often intersected by rapids and waterfalls, but usually perennial. Their beds are narrow and rocky. They are not useful thoroughfares for human or animal movement because of this steepness: most animal and human tracks follow spurlines. The lower reaches of tributary streams often flow through deep cuttings to reach the principal rivers. In the Garut basin the Cimanuk is the main watercourse, while the principal tributaries are the Cibeureum, Cipanda, Cikamiri and Ciharus (flowing from the southwest) and the Cisangkan (from the Southeast). All of these tributaries exhibit the fluvial geomorphology described above. The Cimanuk itself is a single winding stream approximately 50m wide and 15m deep at Garut and increasingly sinuous, flowing between banks of 3 to 10 metres as it moves northward (Fieldnote J125/T/36)¹²⁰. Levee banks of Dutch origin limit its flooding but, throughout its length, the river supplies water for the irrigated *sawah* in the valley floor. Rates of erosion are high, reaching 0.4mm per year toward the mouth of the river at the time of the insurgency (Naval Intelligence Division 1944, 139).

Vegetation. The hill features in the area of the case study are generally covered by sub-montane forest, montane forest and small patches of moss forest on the upper slopes, which range in altitude from approximately 2000 to 2800m AMSL. The general vegetation pattern consists of cleared lowlands and anthropic forest derivatives surrounding discrete forested hill-masses. The lowland area comprises extensive fields of *sawah* rice forming a farmland mosaic, with small orchards, clumps of bamboo and scrub interspersed with open fields and cut by dykes, bunds and tree-lined roads. The foothills comprise *lalang* grasslands (*imperata cylindrica*) interspersed with patches of forest and plantation. The highland areas are heavily vegetated with tropical rainforest and form, on a macro scale, a broken high forest mosaic. Individually they consist of primary rainforest on the higher and southern slopes, with secondary forest and patches of plantation on the lower slopes. The G. Guntur-Rakutak feature (an active volcano) is covered with sub-montane forest and secondary growth, with some mossy montane forest to the south around the fumaroles at Kamojang (Fieldnote J96/T/26). The eastern ridgeline is covered primarily in semi-cultivated montane and sub-montane forest, in the form of a broken high forest mosaic. The Massenerhebung Effect – whereby vegetation on isolated features occurs at a lower altitude than on contiguous ranges – is widely noticeable in the

¹²⁰ See Appendix 2 for a summary of the fieldnotes dataset.

altitude banding of vegetation types within the isolated hill-masses. This is shown in the terrain schematic at Figure 2.

Climate and Weather. Using the Köppen classification, the Garut basin experiences a Tropical Rainy (A_r) climate, i.e. one with a constant monthly rainfall of more than 60 mm. Using the Schmidt-Ferguson classification for Java, this equates to a Type B climate in which every month is wet with slight seasonal variation. In fact, monthly rainfall exceeds 100 mm throughout the year, providing definitive conditions for the growth of tropical rainforest and moss forest on undisturbed high ground. The climate is dominated by the wetter West Monsoon (November to April), the drier East Monsoon (May to October) and the inter-monsoon periods (*musim pancaroba*) in late April and October. West monsoon monthly rainfall is 4-500 mm in the valley and >500 mm in the surrounding hills. East monsoon rainfall is 50-100 mm on both the valley floor and the surrounding hills (Fieldnote J124/T/35). The typical East monsoon weather pattern is early high cloud and scattered mist on the high ground, followed by a clear morning. During the afternoon, the cloud builds up, producing orographic rainfall over the peaks then spreading and coalescing into cumulonimbus with an afternoon storm on most days. The typical West monsoon pattern is early ground fog with cloud cover over all peaks above 1600m AMSL. By late morning, all peaks are clouded and showers and thunderstorms occur for the rest of the day, often with electrical storms over the high features throughout the night. This pattern of rainfall and cloud cover determines the hottest and coolest months, with an average 60% cloud cover throughout the year and the coolest months occurring during the West monsoon. The prevailing winds are westerly in January and south-easterly in July. The 25°C isotherm runs south of the plateau in July, while the 26°C isotherm traverses the valley south of Garut in January. The diurnal temperature range is 6-10°C, with a temperature range of 19-25°C during the West monsoon and 17-27°C during the East monsoon. Based on this climatic pattern, the insurgency followed a clear day/night pattern but there were no significant seasonal patterns. For example, guerrilla actions all tended to occur at night after a daylight approach march from hilltop bases, which was covered by weather conditions and the jungle. The attack itself was covered by darkness and followed by a withdrawal into the jungle by first light. Conversely, major TNI operations initially always tended to occur by day. Toward the end of the campaign new tactics allowed 24 hour dominance of the terrain, but not initially. By contrast to this diurnal pattern of activity, in the absence of a clear 'dry season' there was no major campaigning season or pattern of dry season offensives, such as characterised operations in East Timor.

Human Geography

Total Population. The total population of Java at the time of the insurgency was estimated as 55 million (Robequain 1956, 204) with West Java (excluding Jakarta) generally less densely populated than the remainder of the island. By comparison, in 1993 Java's population was 107.6 million (Grimes, 1996) while there were 27 million Sundanese speakers on the island, a proportion of 13.6%

of the total population of Java. Proportionally this would give a total Sundanese population of 13.8 million at the time of the insurgency, although accurate figures were not collected after 1930. Population density on the floor of the Garut basin and towards Tasikmalaya is >450 persons per km². To the South, in the main mountain spine of Java, population density is 200-500 persons per km². South of the main range on the narrow South coast littoral the area is less heavily populated at <200 persons per km². Most of the mountain features are uninhabited or visited rarely. Like the Javanese, the Sundanese cultural attitude to the forest is fear and distrust. Consequently, it is rare for traditional Sundanese villagers to work, live or travel in the jungle without dire necessity (Whitten et. al. 1996, 674). Moreover, the traditional worldview is that the town is a cleared, well-populated lowland area while the village is part of the wild surrounding highlands¹²¹. The principal population centres in the case study area are Garut, Leles, Tarogong, Cibatuan and Limbangan. Moreover, as will be shown the provincial capital at Bandung, only 31 km away by road, influenced events in the area.

Population Composition. The Sundanese are the second most numerous of the 17 ethnolinguistic groupings on the island of Java. They dominate the western 30% of Java, including the province of West Java (excluding Jakarta) and Southwestern Central Java. In West Java at the time of the insurgency the rural population was almost entirely Sundanese, while the urban population before the Second World War had included significant European and Chinese minorities. These had been decimated by the war – particularly the Chinese community – but were influential despite their numerical weakness. The population included some Javanese, but intermarriage between Sundanese and Javanese was relatively rare.

Anthropological Characteristics of the Population. The Sundanese language is more closely related to Minang and Sumatran Malay languages than to Javanese, however over time Javanising influence has led to a stratification of the language into *halus* and *kasar* forms as in Javanese. Nevertheless, the Sundanese place less emphasis on social hierarchy than do the Javanese, are generally considered to be more industrious and independent and quicker to anger. The Sundanese kinship system is bilateral, marriage is generally virilocal and land is owned individually by smallholders. This distinguishes the Sundanese from the Javanese, who traditionally own land in common but with semi-permanent leasehold for the family that works any particular plot. The Sundanese cosmology is generally Islamic, although the traditional form of West Javanese Islam is profoundly orthodox, following the Sunni tradition with significant *sufi* influence. A greater proportion of Sundanese are devout Sunni Muslims (albeit of orthodox rather than modernist 'fundamentalist' character), while further east there is greater influence from the relaxed and syncretic forms of Islamic belief common in central Java. Clifford Geertz'

¹²¹ For example, the West Javanese idiom for 'going to town' is *turun ke kota* ('descend into the city') while local respondents in the Garut valley consistently described the guerrillas in the hills as *orang liar* – 'wild men'.

categorisation of religious streams (*aliran*) in the population of Java is a widely recognised and therefore useful label for the general religious trends in Javanese society¹²². Using this categorisation, the Sundanese are predominantly modernist *santri*. Further east in Central Java there is greater *abangan* influence among Javanese, traditionally rivals for power with the Sundanese during the pre-colonial period (Sundhaussen n.d., 424-425).

Population Movement. The insurgency coincided with a period of significant population growth in Bandung, whose population of only 169,000 in 1945 (Robequain 1956, 211) had grown to almost one million by 1961 (Ricklefs 1992, 238). Conversely, the same period saw depopulation of the Garut basin and other areas affected by the insurgency. Smaller villages were destroyed or the population driven into larger villages and towns: this altered the traditional Sundanese preference for numerous smaller villages, towards fewer larger ones. Also, the population of many outlying settlements moved into Bandung each night during the insurgency, then returned home each morning. Many of the refugees displaced by the insurgency settled in Bandung after it was over, while many of the smaller hamlets were abandoned as their people remained in the larger villages clustered along main roads and lowland areas. Both of these events contributed significantly to urbanisation in West Java in the 1960s.

Infrastructure. The main transport link from Bandung (the provincial capital) to the town of Tasikmalaya runs along the northern extremity of the valley near the town of Baluburlimbangan, referred to in local usage as Limbangan (Fieldnote J80/T/18). Minor roads run along the valley floor, joining Sukamerang to Bayongbong via Garut. The major road link runs laterally, south from Nagreg (7°06'0" S, 107°54'0" E) to Garut, then south-Southeast to Tasikmalaya, hooking east at Neglasari (108°0'0" E, 7°21'50" E). Another major road, unmarked on many recent maps of the area, passes across the western ridgeline from Cijapati (North of Majalaya) to Kadungora, north of the town of Leles. The roads are generally very well engineered, despite major landslips in the high country during the wet season. Culverts, bridges and causeways of concrete and stone are common. This road system was, in the 1950s, complemented by a main rail line running east-west at the northern end of the valley and a branch line running south through the Garut basin and on to the south and west. Constant interdiction and ambushing destroyed the branch line during the 1950s and 1960s and it was closed south of Garut in the 1970s. The bridges and tunnels supporting this network still remain, as does most of the track itself, but in severe disrepair. All settlements in the case study area have reliable electric power on the West Java grid, based on the geothermal and hydroelectric power schemes nearby although not all houses in each village have access to electricity. Each major village and town has a telephone

¹²² It should be noted, however, that later researchers have questioned the validity of extending Geertz' conclusions for Central Java to other parts of the island. In particular, see Jackson (1980, 83) who argues that such categorisations while valid in the terms of Geertz' original research are not supported by sufficient empirical data for West Java. The use of the terms *santri* and *abangan* within this study does not imply the transposition of Geertz' conclusions to the wider environment of village West Java.

office; typically, few households have domestic telephones. Mobile telephone coverage extends to the lowland areas and is occasionally viable on open parts of the highlands, but uniformly unworkable in the rainforest or in areas of severe topography. Satellite television is common in major towns but virtually unknown in smaller villages.

Architecture and Habitation. Towns in the area of the case study have been well developed since the early 1930s. Dutch influence is evident in public buildings, schools and private dwellings in the towns. This is particularly noticeable in Garut, which was a Dutch hill resort used by officials from Bandung during the colonial period. Colonial houses are often of breezeblock, brick or stone construction and comprise a high-pitched tile or slate roof, 12' to 15' ceilings, tile floors and a veranda. Modern housing is often flat-roofed in the style of a Jakarta or Bandung town house, usually of concrete and tile construction with similar high ceilings and tiled floors. The major lowland villages follow the typical West and Central Javanese pattern, forming an island of settlement in the midst of a sea of irrigated *sawah* and linked by causeways and raised dirt tracks to the main roads. These villages are usually centred on a large banyan fig (*beringin*) tree, often of great age. Each village has a community health centre (*pusat kesehatan masyarakat*, *puskesmas*), military and police headquarters, family planning office and prayer room (*mushollah*) or mosque. Mosques in lowland areas often consist of the modernist chrome *kubah* with star and crescent; in highland areas, they are often of the traditionalist Javanese triple-roofed *merapi* design. Small shops, *warung* and mobile stalls are common. Each village has a guard post (*pos penjaga*) or neighbourhood security post (*pos keamanan lingkungan*, *Poskamling*) operated by local civil defence (*Pertahanan sipil*, *Hansip*) or RT personnel. Houses usually have tile roofs and wooden frames with timber or bamboo cladding, although occasionally corrugated iron roofs are seen. Poorer lowland villages tend to be surrounded by areas of *sawah* or other cultivation, but are often elongated following a watercourse or track. The major buildings in these villages may be wooden-framed with tile roofs, but most buildings comprise *palapa*, corrugated iron or *atap* roofs with woven bamboo or palm-frond walls on a wooden frame. Floors are generally of packed earth surrounded by a low retaining wall, although occasionally raised 'stilted' villages are seen. Prosperous highland villages tend to be of brick and concrete construction and develop along roads or tracks, with paved roads and narrow streets following ridgelines or areas of flat ground. Such villages tend to be perched above terraced *sawah* fields of great complexity and backed by the forest or by plantations. Poorer highland villages follow the same spatial arrangement but housing is often of bamboo and *atap* construction, frequently with houses raised on piles or stilts (the traditional Sundanese style). Many highland villages are severely isolated despite the quality of the road system, particularly during the wetter months. During the 1950s, this characteristic was even more marked, while the road system and housing construction were correspondingly underdeveloped. By night most villages were particularly isolated and movement at night was (and remains) difficult in the highland portions of the West Java case study area.

Agriculture and Economy. A cultivated area, principally terraced *sawah* rice, commercial plantations and root crops, covers the Garut basin floor and the foothills of the mountains. This area is approximately 28 km north to south and 12 km wide at its widest point, thus giving a total cultivated area (in 1996) of approximately 336 km². Unlike the area to the north and west of Bandung, which is dominated by large commercial tea plantations, there is little large-scale plantation agriculture in the case study area. Small experimental plantations of rubber-pine and timber crops including Kapok (*Ceiba*) and Teak (*Tectona grandis*) occur in the north, while to the west and south of the area of the case study cocoa, coffee and rubber are grown in larger plantations. During the colonial period, tea and cinchona plantations West of the case study area were commercially important. Rice is cultivated primarily on a commercial basis. Sufficient surplus is produced to make this area one of the principal rice suppliers for Bandung and Jakarta during periods of normality: during the insurgency this aspect of the cash economy deteriorated markedly. Fruit and vegetables are traded in local villages and major towns within the case study area, but are rarely sold further afield. There is a major geothermal electric project at Kamojang on the south-west side of the case study area, built in 1980. However, there is little interaction between the local population and the workforce, which is largely from Jakarta or Sumatra and has its own isolated on-site settlement.

Fauna and Livestock. The area of the case study lies within the range of the Javan Rhinoceros and Tiger, but such large mammals are now extremely rare. During the 1950s, tigers were occasionally encountered, while the rhinoceros population has been confined to the western extremity of Java for several decades. Deer, bats and rodents are common mammals, although monkeys (particularly the Javan Gibbon *Hylobates Moloch*) and leopards are now rare. The *banteng* (*Bos Javanicus*), a form of wild cattle, is still present in wild and domesticated form. Birds include raptors, kingfishers, sunbirds, peacocks, pigeons, red and green jungle fowl (*gallus spp*). Snakes, including the cobra and coral snake, are relatively common as are geckos, skinks and amphibians. Scorpions, centipedes and spiders are also common. Domesticated animals include chickens, goats, sheep, cattle, fish (penned and fished in *sawah* fields), caged birds and cats.

East Timor Geographical Overview

The East Timor case study area consists of the rural sub-districts (*kecamatan*) of Balibo and Ermera, the first representing the northernmost of the western border regencies and the second the central highlands area of East Timor.¹²³

¹²³ This section is based on terrain, vegetation and material culture studies conducted by the author in 1999 and detailed in Fieldnotes, in particular T124/C/1, T125/C/2, T153/T/7, T161/T/13 and panoramic sketches and maps at T137/C/6, T131/T/5 and T147/T/7. In addition, detailed analysis of the Ermera district was carried out by Alessandro Righetti and

These were chosen for the practical reason that they were the area where the author was deployed as a serving officer with the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) during September 1999, to January 2000. In addition, the two districts fortuitously represented a useful contrast in terrain, historical experience of conflict, political culture and economy, as has been shown in Chapter 4. The case study area was bounded by Motaain (124°57'00"E, 08°57'30"S, 0 m AMSL) in the Southwest, Aidabaleten (125°06'00"E, 08°47'00"S, 0 m AMSL) in the Northwest, Maliana (125°13'00"E, 08°59'15"S, 245m AMSL) in the Southeast and Ermera (125°23'50"E, 08°45'20"S, 1150m AMSL) in the Northeast. Both the physical and the human geography of the case study area can be broken into four distinct regions: the littoral strip, Balibo plateau, Aidabaleten hinterland, Maliana plain and central highlands.

Physical Geography

Geomorphology. The littoral strip runs from the small border fishing village of Motaain in the Southwest of the case study area, to Aidabaleten, a major town approximately 32 km north along the western coast of Timor. The strip varies in width between several hundred metres and five kilometres and consists of a flat sandy strip incorporating a sand dune succession in some areas. In other parts are mangrove and palm swamps of up to several hundred metres depth and numerous creeks, streams and inlets of varying sizes. Coral fragments and outcrops are common on the coastal strip and the author also observed them near the village of Bauwai, ten kilometres inland at 506m AMSL. The Balibo plateau sits at a mean altitude of 500m AMSL and dominates the Southwestern corner of the case study area. Numerous deep river valleys, the beds of which are generally level and clear of obstacles, dissect it although some mountain streams have extremely steep rocky beds. The centre of the plateau includes a number of limestone outcrops including several cave systems. The ridgelines within the area vary from knife-edged spurlines in the western escarpment overlooking the littoral, to broader spurlines and major ridges within the centre of the plateau and along the southern escarpment overlooking the Mota (River) Talau, which forms the frontier with Indonesian West Timor. The Aidabaleten hinterland lies northward from Balibo and is a similar area of plateau, but with broader valleys and less severe topography. The Maliana plain is a flat inland basin dominated by the major river systems of the Talau, Malibaca, Bulobo and Sasso rivers. It sits at a mean altitude of 200m AMSL, with occasional isolated hill-features, generally with forested slopes on the west.¹²⁴ By contrast, the central highlands sit at a mean altitude of 1450m AMSL and are an area of montane topography dominated by a series of extinct volcanoes. Seismic activity throughout the area of the case study is reasonably frequent, particularly in the central highland district. This rather dry

incorporated into Righetti (1999a and 1999b), unpublished typescripts in the author's possession and reproduced in full at Appendix 6.

¹²⁴ This is the plain referred to by Callinan (1953) and Wray (1987) as the 'Nunura Plain'. Although the Nunura River does form the Southwestern boundary of this plain and the small village of Nunura sits on its Western escarpment, the author has chosen to refer to it after the major population centre of Maliana, which also forms the district administrative centre, rather than to retain the older name. The nomenclature used also matches that of the local people.

description, based on the author's 1999 fieldnotes, can be supplemented by the considerably more picturesque account given by Bernard Callinan, who in 1942 fought the Japanese across the case study area:

It is difficult to give any accurate impression of the exceedingly mountainous nature of the country...Along the north coast in the region of Dili, there was only a narrow coastal plain with ridges rising steeply from it and, in some places, from the sea itself. Behind this façade the mountains rose tier upon tier to the central massifs of Ramelau and Cablac. The exceedingly tortuous windings of this mountain system and the rivers which cut it in all directions, were beyond description; razor-backed ridges twisted and turned in the craziest fashion.... Typical also were the rivers that intersected these mountains in all directions; their upper reaches so steep as to be almost like glaciers, they were in the dry season mere stony beds, but after heavy rains they became torrents...the bush, particularly in the gullies, was so dense as to forbid movement off the tracks, but nowhere, except perhaps in certain parts of the south coast, did we see anything approaching the dense jungle of New Guinea. We found that at least half of Portuguese Timor was open country, though nearly everywhere this was jumbled with bush country, as in a motley (Callinan 1953, 33-34)

Drainage. The Talau, Nunura and Malibaca rivers, forming the border with Indonesian West Timor, comprise the Southern boundary of the case study area, running generally East-West and draining into the Ombai Strait at Motaain. The area is further dissected by the major river system of the Bebai, Bulobo and Nunutura rivers, which run South-North through the centre of the area and drain into the sea near Aidabaleten. The major riverbeds are between 500 and 1000 metres wide in most parts, with hard gravel or sandy beds and usually of braided pattern with frequent changes of channel and course.¹²⁵ These rivers are major thoroughfares capable of carrying trucks, cars and armoured vehicles during the dry season. During the wet season, they become impassable to foot or vehicle movement, with frequent flash flooding and storm surge activity in the afternoons. The numerous minor rivers in the area fall into two categories. In the mountainous zone, they are steep, perennial streams with rocky beds dominated by boulders and fallen trees. In level areas, they are similar to the larger rivers, forming excellent thoroughfares during the dry season but becoming impassable in the wet. No rivers within the area of the case study are trafficable by sea-going vessels. However, the major rivers near Motaain and Aidabaleten are navigable by small canoes and boats for most of their tidal reaches, up to five kilometres inland.

Vegetation. The coastal strip is covered in palm swamp, dry *eucalyptus* scrub and mangrove swamp in some inlets and estuaries¹²⁶. Inland is an area of secondary growth and cultivation, rising on the foothills of the hinterland to become a

¹²⁵ For a detailed description of Timorese fluvial geomorphology see Meier Drees (1953) and Ormeling (1957). Callinan (1953) also notes the frequently changing courses of lowland rivers and this characteristic is clearly visible on aerial photographs from the 1940s.

¹²⁶ Botanical observations could not be confirmed in the field, due to lack of appropriate reference materials. However, detailed sketches and observations were made and compared with earlier botanical studies, principally Ormeling (1957) and Whitten (1996), but also Robequain (1958), to confirm field observations.

thicker scrub dominated by lantana undergrowth, *pandanus* and tree ferns, *eucalyptus platyphylla* (similar to ironbark) and casuarina. The principal palm species observed in 1975 by Subroto (1998) was *livingstonia rotundifolia*, which was still plentiful in 1999, as were *lontar* and *gebang* palms (*Borassus Flabelifer* and *Corypha spp.*). These performed an important function within indigenous material culture, particularly for housing and construction but also (in the case of *lontar*) for food. On the Balibo plateau, the hill features are generally wooded, with upper-montane forest and monsoon forest in isolated stands particularly in re-entrants and creeklines. Most of this area consists of anthropic forest derivatives in the form of farmland and broken secondary forest mosaics – this is the ‘motley’ referred to by Callinan. Elsewhere the vegetation consists of eucalyptus savannah referred to by the local Marae people as *ampupu*, which the author tentatively identified as *eucalyptus alba*, again with very thick lantana growth over much of the non-forested area. The Aidabaleten hinterland is similarly vegetated, while the Ermera district of the central highlands is dominated by coffee plantations interspersed with montane forest. The montane forest consists principally of *podocarpus* and other climax-forest vegetation, but with some eucalyptus and pine forest also and this area forms a broken high forest mosaic. During the dry season, the lantana and scrub areas appear particularly barren and open, but with the coming of the wet season a luxurious growth of grasses and scrub vegetation occurs, limiting visibility and movement. The hill-features on the western escarpment of the Balibo plateau and on some areas in the Maliana area, are open and barren with virtually no vegetation other than *lalang* grass (*imperata spp.*), whereas in most other areas they are forested.

Climate and Weather. The area of the case study experiences a seasonally arid monsoon climate (A_w , according to the Köppen classification). It shows strong influence by humid equatorial airmasses on the north and desert regions in northern Australia a few hundred kilometres to the south. The dry season from April to November coincides with the Southern Hemisphere low-sun period. It is characterised by extremely low rainfall and daylight temperatures in excess of 35°C in much of the central part of the case study area, with overnight temperatures of 20-25°C. The wet season from early December to late March coincides with the Southern summer, but is cooler with daylight temperatures of 28-32°C, night temperatures of approximately 18-20°C and extremely high relative humidity. The diurnal temperature range is approximately 10-15°C in both the wet and dry seasons. The length and timing of the wet season are highly variable and differ dramatically due to orographic and microclimatic factors, so that places only 15 km apart may experience dramatically different rainfall patterns. In the dry season, ground mist and high cloud appear on most mornings and a gradual build-up of orographic cloud on inland features develops by mid-afternoon on most days. By contrast, the entire area of the case study is subject to heavy rainfall every day during the wet season, normally with a few hours of sun in the morning. This is followed by a build-up of cumulonimbus clouds by 11 a.m. over the high features, heavy sustained rainfall and electrical storms throughout the afternoon and electrical storms over the high features throughout the night. This means that flying operations

over the high ground are almost impossible on any wet season afternoon or evening.

The physical features of the case study area are illustrated in the text of Chapter 4.

Human Geography

Total Population. Population figures for East Timor are difficult to determine with exactitude due to the underdevelopment of colonial Portuguese Timor and the constant state of insurgency in East Timor since 1975. Wray (1987, 2) estimates the population of Portuguese Timor in 1942 as approximately 505 000 of whom more than 500 000 were Timorese with the remainder Chinese, Portuguese and a few Africans and Goanese. By contrast Callinan (1953, 32) estimates it at 600 000, however this is more an indication of the imprecision of Portuguese proxy administration rather than of the true population. The population of East Timor before Indonesian intervention in 1975 has been estimated at between 650 000 and 680 000 of whom 97% were Timorese. Casualty estimates for the insurgency since 1975 vary widely, with some Indonesian authorities estimating as few as 15 000 deaths and some international human rights agencies estimating 130 000. James Dunn considers that the most authoritative figure for East Timor's population is that of Professor Mubyarto, who gave a figure of 657 411 in 1987, of whom 40 000 were born outside of East Timor (Dunn 1996, 285). The pre-referendum population of the case study area itself was estimated, in August 1999, as approximately 147 000 based on UN census figures and CNRT data (Fieldnotes T74/SC/2, T143/I/6). Righetti estimates the pre-referendum population of Ermera district at 90 000, however his figures include areas outside the present case study area (Righetti 1999a, 8; 1999b, 2)

Major Population Centres. Before 1975 80% of the people of East Timor lived in hundreds of isolated small villages within the interior, joined by a network of tracks and animal trails. Urban centres within East Timor were small by comparison – for example, the population of Dili in 1970 was only 28 000 (Dunn 1996, 3) whereas in 1999 it was 70 000 (Jones, 1999). The insurgency since 1975 saw a dramatic depopulation of the interior and movement of the population to larger villages and urban centres. This was paralleled by the abandonment and destruction of the majority of small villages and the relocation of the population to 'resettlement areas' corresponding to a version of the US-sponsored Strategic Hamlet program in Vietnam (Dunn 1996, 285). By 1999, the smaller villages in the interior had largely disappeared to be replaced by larger settlements along major road routes and tracks. The most obvious example of this in the area of the case study was that of Atabae (Atabai), a major town under Portuguese rule, originally located at approximately 125°09'E, 08°49'S. This was a major objective of invading Indonesian forces in 1975 and was difficult to subdue as its inland mountainous location made it difficult to approach. Following victory in the invasion, the Indonesians moved the entire town and its population to a new location on the newly built coastal road at approximately 125°06'E, 08°48'S. The smaller villages in the area were destroyed and their population moved to the

new town, which was renamed Aidabaleten¹²⁷. The principal population centres of the case study area in 1999 were Balibo, Batugade, Aidabaleten, Maliana and Ermera. The population of Balibo district on the author's arrival on 1 Oct 99 was one elderly woman. By 21 December it had grown to 3487 (Clingan 1999, 1) with approximately 1500 in the town of Balibo itself (pre-war population approximately 2500). Similarly, Aidabaleten was initially completely abandoned but by mid-December had reached 1500 persons. Aidabasalala and Maliana throughout the period of the case study maintained their pre-war population levels, at approximately 1500 and 4000 each. Ermera was initially depopulated due to the mass flight of its population to the nearby Falintil cantonment in early September 1999, but by mid-October had reached about 80% of its pre-war population of 2000.

Population Composition. The two principal ethnic groups on the Island of Timor are the Atoni and the Belunese. The Atoni are the aboriginal Timorese, show Melanesian ethnic and cultural characteristics and are currently the dominant population group in West Timor. The Belunese, originally from islands further to the West, are currently the dominant ethnic group in central and eastern Timor (Wray 1987, 2). The other major ethnic groups of significance to the case study are the Kemak (or Quémak), the Makassae and the Mambai, forming the dominant *suco* within the area of the case study. These peoples are Austronesian, sharing numerous ethnic and cultural characteristics with the rest of the Indonesian archipelago and some with the Melanesian peoples to the East, although the Atoni demonstrate more pronounced Papuan characteristics (Wray 1987, 2). Other important sub-groups in Timor at the time of the Indonesian invasion were the Portuguese colonial elite and the *deportados* (assimilated Portuguese dissidents exiled to Timor by the Salazar regime). In addition, the *mestiços* of mixed Portuguese/indigenous ethnicity often held great traditional political influence.¹²⁸ The overseas Chinese with links to Taiwan also tended to dominate the commercial sector in their traditional role as middlemen and money-lenders, while there were small urban Arab, Goanese

¹²⁷ This name is shared with an inland village at approximately 125°08'30"E, 8°52'10"S and the two should not be confused. This highlights the fact that Timorese place names often reflect political allegiance rather than geographical reality. The local people still call the new town Atabae and whereas the Indonesian government does not acknowledge the existence of such a town, Subroto (1998) also refers to the new town (officially Aidabaleten) as Atabai. Also, the use of the same name for widely distant villages is reasonably common and can be confusing. For example, in the author's patrol area of operations in 1999 there were two villages called Motaain, two called Aidabaleten, two called Turiskai and two called Fatuklaran. In addition, the local people had an entirely different set of names for many of the villages in Kowa and Leohitu districts from those shown on the maps. This practice bears some superficial similarity to the Melanesian practice of moving a village to a new location (but retaining the name) when the soil becomes infertile or the location unsuitable. However, in the Timorese case some villages have retained the same name after being relocated by the government for reasons of counter-insurgency. Conversely, others share the same name due to the practice of naming villages after common terms. (For instance, of the examples given above, Fatuklaran = fatuc larán [stony place] and so on.)

¹²⁸ In this study the term 'indigenous' is used to indicate people of Timorese ethnicity born in Timor, rather than in the special sense of 'unassimilated natives' implied by the Portuguese colonial term *indigenes* (See Taylor 1992, 13).

and African communities. In 1999, significant ethnic minorities of Javanese, non-Javanese Indonesians and transmigrants existed in some urban centres, notably Dili (where they formed a commercial and administrative elite) and Maliana (where there was a Balinese transmigrant settlement). These groups numbered between 40 000 and 50 000 and formed part of the exodus of non-Timorese civilians from the province in August 1999. Hence, by late September, the remaining population of the case study area was almost entirely Timorese. Other than ethnic grouping, the major cleavages within the population are based on religion and language. Dunn emphasises the importance of syncretism within the Timorese belief-system and the fact that animistic beliefs coexisted with Christianity in most of the population before 1975 (Dunn 1996, 4-5). In West Timor the majority of the population are Protestant, a result of strong Christianising influence from Dutch missionaries in the nineteenth century. By contrast, the Portuguese made little attempt to Christianise the East Timorese. As has been shown, Portuguese rule operated indirectly through indigenous elites and while the elite strata within East Timorese society were largely Catholicised by 1975, the majority of the population remained predominately animist in its beliefs. Again, Dunn estimates that less than 50% of the population of Portuguese Timor were Catholic in 1975. However, the social and political influence of the Catholic Church has increased markedly since that time to reach approximately 80% of the population in 1995 (Dunn 1996, 304). Abel Guterres, in a similar vein, estimates pre-invasion penetration of Catholicism at only 30% of the population (1994, 61). It should be noted that, the Portuguese having colonised Timor before the arrival of Islam in the archipelago, there is no indigenous Islamic population in East Timor. Arab and Goanese immigrants under Portuguese rule and Indonesian immigrants since 1975 created numerically small (but politically powerful) Muslim minorities, but these were largely centred in Javanese areas of Dili and had little influence on the population as a whole. In terms of language, a total of thirty-seven local languages are spoken on Timor, ten of which are of numerical significance, while Tetum (*Tetun*) (the principal Belunese dialect) serves as a *lingua franca*.

Anthropological Characteristics of the Indigenous Population. Abel Guterres (1994, 60) identifies 32 separate ethno-linguistic groupings within East Timor (compared to 37 on the island as a whole)¹²⁹. The Kemak, Makassae and Mambai were the principal ethnic groups observed in the area of the case study and all have members in both East and West Timor. Some follow principles of male ultimogeniture, as practised in West Timor among Atoni and Rotinese peoples (Fox, 1996) but this characteristic was not observed in the case study area in 1999. All groups exhibited matrilineal kinship systems based on uxori-local marriage and the primacy of exchange as a means of interaction between clans

¹²⁹ By contrast, Fire Mountain (1995-2000) identifies 26 linguistic groupings in East Timor and four in West Timor. Further, the Ethnologue identifies 30 groups in Timor as a whole, three of which are in West and the remainder in East Timor (Grimes, 1996). The difference in calculation appears to rest on definitions of language phyla as distinct from closely cognate regional dialects and ethnic groupings. However, for the present purpose, it is enough to note that there are a large number of ethno-linguistic groups on Timor and that there are about five times as many in East Timor as in West Timor, despite the small overall population.

and tribal groupings, but this did not appear to translate into matriarchal relations at the political level. Exchange among groups may take the form of goods, services or individuals (slaves or marriage partners), according to Taylor (1991,7-8). Under colonial conditions these groups did not have centralised villages, but lived in scattered hamlets based on cult groups (*lisa*) who shared a common cult house (*fad lisa*). These cult groups are organised in turn around a central 'house of origin' (*fada ni fun*) (Fox 1996, 134). As is immediately obvious, this system closely resembles both the Austronesian tradition of founder myths (cf. Ina Slamet-Velsink's study of the tradition of *pun rumah* among the Kayan of Borneo in Slamet-Velsink 1995, 102-103) and to the Melanesian tradition of *haus tambaran* which the author observed among the Kombio people of the Torricelli Ranges of PNG in March-April 1999. Like *haus tambaran* in the Torricellis, cult houses in the case study area tended to be grouped together on a hilltop at the centre of each village. Their architecture was of an older, more Melanesian style than that of local dwellings. The cosmology of the principal ethnic groups in the case study area exhibited similarities to those noted by Fox (1996, 142) for the Tetuñ. The earth is conceived as floating on a sea of milk, water or sperm (depending on local variations) and originating as a large banyan (*beringin*) tree. This tree is seen as the 'trunk' from which all people and locations in Timor are derived, with cult groups forming branches based on female descent. This cosmology and the attendant cult relationships – based on Austronesian progenitor myths and maintained by a complex system of marital exchange and kinship – have receded in political importance in the face of increasing Catholicisation of the people since 1975. However, such beliefs are still fundamental to loyalty and patron-client systems at village level. Taylor points out that the essentially exchange-based system of village relationships remained unchanged under Portuguese rule. As has been shown, the present fieldwork results indicate that it has altered significantly under the stress of occupation and war, but still retains considerable influence.

Population Movement. As in the previous 24 years of insurgency, mass population movement was a prominent characteristic of the 1999 militia campaign. Population movement began as early as March with the concentration of population into resettlement villages so that they could be more easily controlled during referendum polling. Then, in early to mid-September 1999, the militia and TNI forcibly relocated almost the entire population of the case study area to camps in West Timor, centred on the provincial centre of Atambua. Approximately 280,000 refugees (known as Internally Displaced Persons, IDPs) were in these camps at the time of INTERFET's arrival in early October 99. By early December approximately 100,000 of these people had returned, sponsored by UNHCR and NGO protection on the West Timor side of the border and by INTERFET protection on the East Timor side. In early December the UN reported that 171,000 registered IDPs remained on the West Timor side of the border, of whom 110,000 wanted to return, whereas the remaining 61,000 were employees of the Indonesian government and forbidden to return. The area of the case study remained consistently depopulated by comparison to its pre-war status throughout 1999 and early 2000.

Infrastructure. Electricity supply for the area of the case study originated from West Timor but was cut in early September 1999 and had not been restored by January 2000. Local villages were universally without power throughout this period, as were all towns within the case study area except for Maliana. Most towns and the Falintil cantonment area near Ermera, possessed their own diesel-powered town generator. However, because of the collapse of the East Timorese economy in early September 1999 all fuel supplies were suspended and these generators were generally not used. Maliana was the only major population centre within the area of the case study to have restored power by January 2000, while the remaining towns and villages relied on kerosene and palm oil for cooking and lighting. Water mains were likewise inoperable, with the exception of gravity-feed systems. This led to a severe shortage of water in towns in September/October towards the end of the dry season, except in the Ermera region where spring water was plentiful (Righetti 1999a, 8). However, by mid-December the wet monsoon had brought sufficient rain to redress this concern. Most small villages within the case study area, by contrast to the towns, had their own local permanent water sources from springs or seepage. Roads within the area of the case study were confined to all-weather two-lane routes along the littoral strip and between Batugade and Maliana in the south of the case study area. Another all-weather route ran through the central highlands area from Dili via Ermera toward Bauana, just Northwest of the confluence of the Bebai and Marobo rivers. These roads were well engineered, with numerous cuttings and good drainage. However, by late October 1999 they were suffering from degradation, landslips, washouts and the collapse of culverts through neglect and the onset of the wet season. There were also numerous unsurfaced roads in the area, used by local people for foot and vehicle movement. Throughout the area of the case study, numerous unmarked footpads and animal tracks exist, often covered over by lantana to form 'tunnels' in the undergrowth. These allowed rapid movement through the scrub, undetectable by air or ground observation, for those with good local knowledge. Bridges throughout the case study area consisted of Bailey-type steel bridging on metal and concrete/stone piers. The principal bridges of note were just north of Aidabaleten, at Batugade and East of Balibo at the crossing of the Nunura River. The Nunura River bridge, a five-section steel bridge 420 metres in length, is the longest bridge in Eastern Indonesia, while the bridge north of Aidabaleten (350 metres long) is the second longest (Subroto 1996, 8). Numerous smaller bridges were positioned at minor river crossings. Many of the major bridges in the area of the case study were constructed by Transfield Australia in the 1990s, as part of Australian aid (ODA) to the Indonesian government. Fords and cattle crossing points were also common, with many crossing points available in the dry season, but comparatively very few in the wet. The land-based telephone system, disconnected at the start of September 1999, was still not functioning by January 2000. However, major facilities such as exchanges and telephone lines remained intact. The microwave repeater station at Ermera remained intact, but was inoperable: the distant station in Dili had been destroyed in mid-September. The mobile telephone system within Dili was still working on the arrival of the Australian forces in late September and

remained operable throughout the period, however mobile phone networks in outlying areas were not viable. No significant ports existed within the case study area, although it was possible to land supplies by barge or landing craft near Batugade and small boats were able to use landing points all along the coast. The only airfield of any significance in the area of the case study was at Maliana. Civilian air and sea traffic was non-existent until early November, when a sea ferry route was opened between Atapupu (near Atambua) and Dili. Civilian air traffic did not resume within the case study area during the period of the case study.

Architecture and Habitation. Villages within the plateau and coastal regions consisted of agglomerations of habitation along major routes, usually foot or vehicle tracks. Astride the central road, usually sunken, a series of hedges and fences often consisting of fruit trees and bushes separates the houses from the road. Most houses in highland areas were constructed from walls of stripped coconut palm fronds or plaited bamboo, with thatched *atap*, grass or *palapa* roofs. In coastal areas, the same style of house existed, but often of sturdier construction indicating the greater prosperity of coastal fishing villages along the main coast road, as compared to highland villages. In addition, many coastal houses were constructed on a split-level packed earth platform 0.5 to 1m high, surrounded by a stone or brick retaining wall. In both coastal and inland areas, houses consisted of a single main building with one room divided into several smaller spaces by head-high partitions and a smaller storage hut to the rear. The rafter space of both buildings served as storage with all furniture including communal sleeping platforms constructed from bamboo and floors consisting of packed earth. Some more developed buildings – often, local government or religious infrastructure – consisted of concrete floors, wooden or breeze block walls and corrugated iron roofs. In most highland villages there were three to four buildings of this type, with most other houses of palm-and-thatch construction. Some were traditional '*rumah adat*' (large thatched beehive-style huts showing a strong Melanesian influence, although generally rectangular rather than circular in plan, as is the case in Melanesian highland dwellings). In coastal areas, these traditional houses were not often seen, whereas buildings of solid brick, stone or breezeblock construction were more common. Churches, often showing a marked Portuguese architectural influence, were normally the largest, most developed and least damaged structures in each village. Mosques were absent from all but major towns. Indeed, the only mosques of any size that the author saw during the case study were a destroyed structure close to the former Koramil HQ in Ermera and the mosque in the Dili suburb of Desa Alor. In the major towns, a number of Portuguese public buildings remained, in particular large 17th/18th century artillery forts (*postos*) in Balibo, Batugade, Maubara and Maliana and a large governmental centre in Ermera. In addition, Indonesian-style shops and markets, public buildings and private housing were present in all the major towns. Each town had its community health centre (*Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat*, Puskesmas), Military and Police headquarters (Koramil and Polres HQ), sub-district or village council (*Kecamatan* or *Kelurahan*) building, public meeting centre and family planning association (*Keluarga Berencana*, KB) buildings.

Many buildings in towns consisted of brick or timber construction, with corrugated iron or tiled roofing. In addition, a well-developed government housing estate at Maliana housed a number of transmigrants from Java, Bali and Sulawesi – the only significant evidence of the *transmigrasi* program within the area of the case study. This estate was evacuated in September 1999 during the flight of non-Timorese Indonesians and remained empty in January 2000.

Agriculture and Economy. Cultivation of *ladang* (dry-planted) rice and maize were the traditional agricultural methods within Portuguese Timor, using the slash-and-burn method of cultivation so common within highland South-East Asia and Melanesia. In addition, certain peoples – particularly the Mambai in the East and North of the case study area – engaged in irrigated rice cultivation using intricate and sophisticated *sawah* irrigation systems (Wray 1987, 3; Callinan 1953, xvii-xxix; Dunn 1996, 5). By 1999, the lowland regions of the case-study area were dominated by wet rice (*sawah*) cultivation. The principal *sawah* areas were Aumadok (near Batugade), Haekesak (in West Timor between Balibo and Maliana), Marko (in the centre of the Maliana Plain), around the confluence of the Bebai and Marobo rivers and inland from Aidabaleten. In higher-altitude regions, maize was the principal grain crop with local populations relying on imported rice in normal times and on rice supplied by UN agencies during the period of fieldwork. The cultivation of commercial crops, principally kapok (*Ceiba*) and coffee, was widespread in the mountainous regions, with coffee production dominating the agriculture of the central highlands. In addition, fruit trees such as papaya, banana, breadfruit, mango, coconut and citrus trees were common in all villages and population centres, while traditional tree crops such as *atap* palm and *bua* (*Areca spp.*, cf. Melanesian *buai*) were also common. In Ermera, the principal economic activity – to the exclusion of subsistence farming – was the cultivation of coffee in large co-operative plantations. Due to the timing of the militia campaign, the 1999 coffee crop was unable to be sold as no buyer was available and it was therefore stored in local dwellings and storehouses in the Ermera district (Righetti, 1999b, 3). Again, the timing of the militia activity coincided with the normal rice-planting season and prevented alternative crops being planted. This led to an unusually severe food crisis in Ermera in late October/early November 1999. Elsewhere, markets and local trading were the primary activities of the cash economy before the campaign, with markets being held on the West Timor side of the border at Sakafini and Haekesak. Once the campaign commenced, economic activity on the East Timor side ceased completely, while these markets continued to operate. There was a large amount of cross-border movement as a result, consisting of IDPs and people from East Timor crossing the border in both directions to visit the markets. Later in the campaign, black market activity became widespread at the UN-controlled border crossing points. Often this was driven by speculators who had deliberately stripped economic assets, supplies and trade goods from East Timor in the early period of the campaign. They then moved them to West Timor and sold them back to the East Timorese from border checkpoints. People from as far afield as Dili


travelled into the case study area to buy goods from these markets.¹³⁰ TNI and militia sponsorship of the black market in these locations also assisted in their longevity.

Fauna and Livestock. Livestock in the area of the case study include domesticated and wild pigs, buffalo, cattle, chickens, goats and horses. Bird life throughout the area of the case study is plentiful, as are snakes and several species of large lizards. Game within forested areas includes wild pigs, jungle fowl, deer, monkeys and jungle pigeons. Cockcroft (1969, 103) lists a larger variety of bird and animal life, but the author did not personally observe these during the study. Game is regularly hunted by local people using spears, bows and arrows and with the assistance of dogs, which are very numerous inhabitants of each village and *kampong*. Local hunting parties are normally accompanied by up to a dozen dogs. Some ethnic groups (notably Quémac) build hunting lodges as a base of operation for hunting parties. These move to the lodge for a period of several days to a week while hunting and then return to their home villages once sufficient game has been collected. These hunting lodges were common in areas of eucalyptus savannah and lantana scrub, particularly in the southern part of the Kowa and Leohitu districts and were normally constructed as elevated platforms with open sides and a grass or *atap* roof. During the period of militia infiltration in late 1999, they were occasionally used by both sides as overnight rest stops and by infiltrators as lying-up places before attempting to cross the border.

Destruction and Depopulation. The entire population of the case study area was displaced in early September 1999 and forcibly relocated to Atambua, exception for Maliana and Aidabasalala. These were both centres of militia activity and escaped much of the destruction that occurred elsewhere. All other major centres were severely damaged, with numerous houses – as many as 85% of all dwellings in some villages – being burnt down or systematically destroyed, shops completely gutted, public buildings looted and water sources filled in. Churches and, in some centres, TNI or Indonesian government buildings were the only structures to escape damage. Most villages in the Balibo plateau and coastal strip were burnt, while several villages in the southern escarpment and highlands areas were abandoned but remained largely undamaged. Bridges and roads were undamaged, probably due to the need for militia to make their escape across these structures when INTERFET troops arrived. Later in the campaign some groups of militia returned to East Timor and attempted to construct road blocks from felled trees across border tracks, but without causing any serious permanent destruction. The population began to return after about six weeks, in mid-October and gradually increased in number over time. Figure A3.1 summarises the return of population:

¹³⁰ It should be noted, however, that this pattern of cross-border economic activity is of long standing, as was noted by Callinan (1953) and more recently by Cockcroft (1969)

Figure A3.1
Return of Population to Balibo, 1 October – 2 December 1999



APPENDIX 4

SELECTED DOCUMENTS

This appendix presents documents discovered for the first time as part of the author's archival research, unpublished documents not generally available and documents that, although already known are difficult for readers to access.


The documents included in this appendix are as follows:

<u>Enclosure</u>	<u>Document Name</u>	<u>Provenance</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1.	Djawa Gunseikanbu, <i>Pemberitahoean Tentang Susunan Roekoen Tetangga</i>	IC-RVO, Amsterdam, 11.352.1 Pem	Japanese and Indonesian proclamation establishing RT system.
2.	TNI Map <i>Daerah Rajamandala dan Cililin</i> , 1: 25 000	Author's Collection	Issued to the author while commanding a training team with TNI, 1994. Example of the quality of TNI mapping available to units.
3.	NEFIS Situation Map, <i>Kaart Behorende bij Pol. Verslag, maand Januari 1949</i>	Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis, Koninklijk Landmachtstaf, The Hague	Kindly provided by Professor P. M. H. Groen. Original Top Secret classification now downgraded.
4.	Summary Report on Ermera District (Before the Popular Consultation) of 25 September 1999	Author's collection	Prepared by Alessandro Righetti, UNAMET Civil Affairs, Ermera
5.	Summary Report on Ermera District (After the Popular Consultation) of 4 November 1999	Author's collection	Prepared by Alessandro Righetti, UNTAET Civil Affairs, Ermera
6.	Unclassified Minute – CMO Report AO Redback of December 1999	Author's collection	Prepared by INTERFET Civil Affairs
7.	Militia Propaganda/Warning Letter of 2 December 1999	Author's collection	Handed by FSP representatives to the author.

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
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


SKETCH MAP 1: EAST TIMOR CASE STUDY AREA

SCALE 1: 250 000



FORM LINES 100m interval



David J. Kilgallen
Dec 1999

GLOSSARY

<u>Abbreviation</u>	<u>Full Name</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
ABRI	<i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i>	Indonesian Armed Forces
Aitarak		Thorn (East Timorese Militia)
Apodeti	<i>Asociação Popular Democrática Timorense</i>	Timorese Popular Democratic Association
APRA	<i>Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil</i>	Armed Forces of the Just King
Aza Jokai		Japanese-sponsored village council
Barisan Pelopor		Pioneer Column – War of Independence independent military group
BKR	<i>Badan Keamanan Rakyat</i>	People's Security Agency
BMP	<i>Besi Merah Putih</i>	Red and White Iron (East Timorese Militia)
Boei Giyugun		Volunteer Army
BRA	<i>Bougainville Revolutionary Army</i>	Bougainville independence insurgents
BRF	<i>Bougainville Resistance Faction</i>	Bougainville pro-PNG militia
BRIMOB	<i>Brigade Mobil</i>	(Police) Mobile Brigade
Celcom	<i>Celulle de Combatto Maubere</i>	Maubere Combat Cell (lowest CNRT organisation)
CGD	<i>Commissie van Goede Diensten</i>	UN Committee of Good Offices
CNRT	<i>Concelho Nacional de Resistanza Timorense</i>	Timorese National Resistance Council
CV	<i>Commanditaire Genootschap</i>	Limited Company
DI	<i>Darul Islam</i>	World of Islam = Islamic State
DI/TII	<i>Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia</i>	Islamic State/Indonesian Islamic Army
DMP	<i>Dadurus Merah Putih</i>	Red and White Whirlwind
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i>	People's Representative Council – National Level
DPRD	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i>	People's Representative Council – Provincial Level
DWIKORA	<i>Dwi Komando Rakyat</i>	Two Commands of the People (Confrontation)
Falintil	<i>Forças Armadas de Libertação de Timor Leste</i>	East Timorese Liberation Armed Forces
FARELF	<i>Far East Land Forces</i>	
FSDK	<i>Forum Persatuan Demokrasi dan Keadilan</i>	Forum for Unity, Democracy and Justice (East Timor pro-integration faction)
Frelimo	<i>Frente de Libertação Mozambique</i>	Mozambique Liberation Front
FRETILIN	<i>Frente Revolucionaria de Timor L'Este Independente</i>	Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor
FSP	<i>Força Sigueranza Popular</i>	People's Security Force
FULRO	<i>Front Unifié de Liberation des Races Opprimés</i>	United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races
G30S/PKI	<i>Gerakan 30 September / Partai Komunis Indonesia</i>	30 September 1965 PKI-sponsored coup attempt
GAM	<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i>	Free Aceh Movement
GCMA	<i>Groupement Commando Mixte Aeroporté</i>	Composite Airborne Commando Group
Golkar	<i>Golongan Karya</i>	Functional Groups – New Order ruling political party

GPK	<i>Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan</i>	Subversive / Terrorist group
Gunseikan		Japanese military governor
Halilintar	<i>Lightning</i>	Militia Group (East Timor)
Heiho		Individual auxiliary in Japanese armed forces
Hizbullah		Party of God – Islamic militia, War of Independence
IDP	<i>Internally Displaced Person</i>	UN/INTERFET terminology for refugees
INTERFET	<i>International Force East Timor</i>	
ITB	<i>Institut Teknologi Bandung</i>	Bandung Institute of Technology
Jawa Hokokai	<i>Java Service Association</i>	Japanese-sponsored political mass movement
KKO	<i>Korps Komando Operasi</i>	Indonesian Marine Corps
KL	<i>Koninklijke Leger / Koninklijke Landmacht</i>	Royal Netherlands Army
KM	<i>Koninklijke Marine</i>	Royal Netherlands Navy
KNIL	<i>Koninklijke Nederlandse Indisch Leger</i>	Royal Netherlands Indies Army
KODAM	<i>Komando Daerah Militer</i>	Military Region Command
KODIM	<i>Komando Distrik Militer</i>	Military District Command
KOPASSUS	<i>Komando Pasukan Khusus</i>	Special Forces Command
KORAMIL	<i>Komando Rayon Militer</i>	Military sub-district Command
KOREM	<i>Komando Resort Militer</i>	Military sub-sub-district Command
KOSTRAD	<i>Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat</i>	Army Strategic Reserve Command
Kota	<i>Klibur Oan Timor Aswain</i>	Sons of the Mountain Warriors (Timorese Political Party 1974-75)
Laskar Jihad		Islamic militia (West Java 1990s)
LLDB	<i>Luc Luong Dac Biet</i>	South Vietnamese Special Forces
MAC	<i>Movimento Anti-Communita</i>	Anti-Communist Movement (Timor)
Masjumi	<i>Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia</i>	All-Indonesia Islamic Council (political party)
MCP		Malayan Communist Party
Min Yuen		Masses Movement (MCP support organisation)
MPABA	<i>Malayan People's Anti-British Army</i>	MCP armed wing (1948-50)
MPAJA	<i>Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army</i>	MCP armed wing (1941-45)
MPR	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i>	People's Consultative Assembly
MPRS	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara</i>	Provisional People's Consultative Assembly
MRLA	<i>Malayan Races' Liberation Army</i>	MCP Armed Wing (from 1950)
NEFIS	<i>Netherlands Expeditionary Forces Intelligence Service</i>	Dutch Intelligence (War of Independence)
NEI		Netherlands East Indies
NICA	<i>Netherlands Indies Civil Administration</i>	
NIGO	<i>Nederlandsch Indisch Guerrilla Organisatie</i>	Netherlands Indies Guerrilla Organisation
NU	<i>Nahdatul Ulama</i>	Union of Muslim Scholars
Nurep	<i>Nucleo de Resistanza Popular</i>	Centre of People's Resistance (CNRT village unit)
OPM	<i>Organisasi Papua Merdeka</i>	Free Papua Organisation
P4K	<i>Pokok Perencanaan Pemulihan</i>	Outline Plan For Restoration of Peace and

	<i>Perdamaian Keamanan</i>	Security (TNI COIN strategy against DI/TII)
Pagar betis		Fence of Legs / Fence of Calves – cordon technique
PDI	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia</i>	Indonesian Democratic Party
Permesta	<i>Pemerintah Rakyat Semesta</i>	Total People's Government
PETA	<i>Pembela Tanah Air</i>	Defenders of the Fatherland (Japanese-sponsored Indonesian military force)
Petrus	<i>Penembakan Misterius</i>	Mysterious Shooting (covert action model for COIN)
PKI	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i>	Indonesian Communist Party
PNGDF		Papua New Guinea Defence Force
PNI	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i>	Indonesian Nationalist Party
POLRI	<i>Angkatan Kepolisian Republik Indonesia</i>	Indonesian Police Force
PPI	<i>Pasukan Perjuangan Integrasi</i>	Forces of the Integration Struggle
PRRI	<i>Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia</i>	Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia
PSI	<i>Partai Sosialis Indonesia</i>	Indonesian Socialist Party
PT	<i>Perusahaan Terbatas</i>	Limited Company
PUSPENAD	<i>Pusat Penerangan Angkatan Darat</i>	Army Information Service
RMS	<i>Republik Maluku Selatan</i>	Republic of the South Moluccas
Romusha		Forced Labourer in Japanese war effort
RPKAD	<i>Resimen Para-Komando Angkatan Darat</i>	Army Para-Commando Regiment (forerunner of KOPASSUS)
RT/RW	<i>Rukun Tetangga / Rukun Wilayah</i>	Neighbourhood Watch organisation
RVO	<i>Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie</i>	State Institute for War Documentation
Sabilillah		Faithful to God– Islamic militia, War of Independence
Satgas Merahputih	<i>Satuan Tugas Merah Putih</i>	Red and White Task Force (West Papua militia)
Satgas Papua	<i>Satuan Tugas Papua</i>	Papua Task Force (West Papua militia group)
SEAC	<i>South East Asia Command</i>	Allied military command for Burma, India, Indochina, Malaya and Sumatra.
SI	<i>Sarekat Islam</i>	Islamic Brotherhood
SOBSI	<i>Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia</i>	All-Indonesia Organisation of Workers
SOE	<i>Special Operations Executive</i>	British clandestine warfare organisation
SWPA	<i>South West Pacific Area</i>	Allied military command for pacific theatre
TII	<i>Tentara Islam Indonesia</i>	Indonesian Islamic Army
Tim Mawar	<i>Rose Team</i>	Covert action group (KOPASSUS 1990s)
Tim Susi	<i>Susi Team</i>	Guerrilla warfare cadre group (RPKAD)
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i>	Indonesian National Army (armed services less Police)
TNI-AD	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Darat</i>	Indonesian Army
TNI-AL	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Laut</i>	Indonesian Navy
TNI-AU	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Udara</i>	Indonesian Air Force
Tokubetsu Shibotai		Auxiliary Police
Tonari Gumi		Japanese-sponsored neighbourhood watch

TRIKORA	<i>Tri Komando Rakyat</i>	organisation Three Commands of the People (Irian Jaya Campaign)
UDT	<i>Uniao Democratica Timorese</i>	Timorese Democratic Union
UGM	<i>Universitas Gadjah Madah</i>	Gadjah Madah University, Yogyakarta
UI	<i>Universitas Indonesia</i>	University of Indonesia, Jakarta
UNAMET	<i>UN Advance Mission in East Timor</i>	
UNHCR	<i>United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees</i>	
UNTAET	<i>UN Transitional Authority in East Timor</i>	

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