Using the bully pulpit: the construction of the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia

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USING THE BULLY PULPIT: THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 'WAR ON TERROR' DISCOURSE IN AUSTRALIA

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Abstract:

This thesis makes a contribution to knowledge by providing a detailed analysis of how Australian involvement in the US-led 'war on terror' was possible. Research of this kind has become more prolific, particularly with the birth of the field of studies known as Critical Terrorism Studies; however an in-depth study of the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia remains outstanding. The thesis seeks to redress this gap.

The question being addressed in this thesis is divided into two interrelated parts. Firstly: how has Australia's 'war on terror' discourse been shaped? And secondly: under what circumstances did challenges to the dominant discourse occur?

In order to shed light on these questions the thesis uses a genealogical approach combined with the analysis of public discourse using the critical discourse analysis method. The language of then Prime Minister Howard will be the primary focus in this analysis, given that Australia's involvement in the 'war on terror' was very much an elite-led project. Attention will also be paid to the language of key ministers, political opponents and other prominent actors. The voices of those who challenged the dominant discourse will also be subject to analysis in order to shed light on the ways in which discourses are destabilized.

The focus of the study will be the time period 2001 until the end of the Howard Government in November 2007. In keeping with the genealogical method, however, consideration is also given to periods of Australia's history deemed relevant to the discourse.

The thesis has three key findings: that the 'war on terror' discourse was so dominant because Howard successfully invoked narratives of identity and sovereignty that resonated with his audience. Secondly, that despite this dominance many actors voiced dissent and did so most successfully when they capitalised on inconsistencies within the discourse. This in turn shows that normatively progressive change is possible in difficult circumstances. Finally, the thesis revealed that John Howard used the 'war on terror' discourse as a vehicle for the promotion of his reworked narrative of Australia.

Dedicated to the memory of Hannah Taylor

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Abstract

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Introduction

The principle objective I had was to build a narrative about the Australian achievement that was positive. That was my objective… You achieve that by the language you use, how you react to particular events, the emphasis you place on the history of the country, the emphasis you place on symbols. You achieve it by using the bully pulpit, if you like, of the Prime Ministership to talk about the Australian achievement. And it can have an influence.

- John Howard, 2009[1]

This is the story of Australia and the 'war on terror'. In this context 'war on terror' doesn't exactly refer to the US-led military campaign against international terrorism – the War on Terror, but rather the system of knowledge and practice that has informed Australia's involvement in this military campaign, and the lens through which terrorism and counter-terrorism have come to be understood in Australia. So to be more specific this is the story of the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia.

To date there has not been a detailed examination of the construction of the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia. As the literature review in Chapter One will evidence, existing research has explored the discourse's construction overseas, and has covered aspects of the discourse in Australia. But this analysis will make a contribution to knowledge by providing the story of the discourse in its entirety; its architecture and architects, its nature and characteristics, its strengths and weaknesses, and its effects.

Telling this story is important for a range of reasons. As the thesis will reveal, a lot is at stake in Australia's 'war on terror'. Human lives have been lost as a result of wars fought in Afghanistan and Iraq under the auspice of the 'war on terror' and through the continued prevalence of terrorist activity, considered and transparent decision making has been sacrificed, community cohesion has been undermined, civil and human rights have been compromised by new legislative measures, the scope for dissent has been narrowed and security is increasingly conceptualised as something to be achieved from rather than with our fellow human beings. The 'war on terror' was supposed to protect our 'freedoms'

[1] Nick Torrens Film Productions (2009) *Liberal Rule: The Politics that Changed Australia* [DVD] 'Fortunes of War', Episode 3.

and ‘liberties’, but has undermined both and has arguably left a legacy of hostility and misunderstanding that will be felt in Australia for many years to come.

Understanding how this discourse was constructed requires a map of sorts. The genealogy method of Michel Foucault will be utilised to provide historical context, while analysis of the language of the ‘war on terror’ will be undertaken using the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) method. This is a unique methodological combination: the cautious post-structuralism of Foucault coupled with the more transformative agenda of CDA. As Chapter One will explain, this blend is deliberately chosen because it enables the most rigorous picture of the discourse to emerge, but also because it opens space for thinking about normative change – albeit carefully – in line with the principles of post-structuralism and without an ‘emancipatory’ agenda.

Chapter summary

The thesis will proceed in slightly interrupted chronological order. The time period under primary textual examination will be 2001 until the end of the Howard Government in November 2007; however genealogy will take the focus to a number of periods in Australia’s history relevant to the discourse.

Chapter One situates the research project amongst existing literature and outlines the aforementioned theoretical framework.

In Chapter Two the constructed nature of the discourse is highlighted. This is achieved by examining interpretations of the events of 11th September 2001 in the US, Europe and Australia. This Chapter shows how key decisions, such as characterising the events as an act of war rather than a crime, and John Howard’s hasty decision to invoke the ANZUS Treaty were fateful choices that set the tone for future decisions.

Chapter Three takes issue with Australia’s history in order to better contextualise Howard’s decision to support Australian involvement in the US-led ‘war on terror’. This genealogy finds that instances of violence, fear, statism and exclusion are prominent in Australia’s quest for security, and that Howard’s choice represents something of a continuation of past attitudes and practices.

Chapters Four and Five contain the empirical textual analysis of speeches by then Prime Minister John Howard, key Ministers and other influential actors and are grouped around momentous events or periods in the life of the 'war on terror' discourse under the Howard Government. The analysis centres on finding common representations with a view to understanding how involvement in the 'war on terror' was 'sold' to the Australian public.

In Chapter Six the focus shifts from dominant representations to voices of dissent. The purpose of the Chapter is to complete the picture of the discourse and also to provide an example of how dominant discourses can be resisted and the conditions under which this might happen. It is also an opportunity to showcase the capacity of Foucault's thought to theorise agency and change.

The conclusion will summarise the thesis and will highlight some of the hopeful paths offered by those who have recognised the dangerous and destructive nature of the 'war on terror' discourse or aspects of it. The application of genealogy and Critical Discourse Analysis results in a number of key findings. Firstly, the 'war on terror' discourse was very much an 'elite-led' project, with Howard the primary architect. Secondly, the discourse relied on consistent, historically rooted representations of threat and identity for its legitimacy. Thirdly, the discourse was 'dangerous' in character, encouraging violence, exclusion and fear and arguably not decreasing the incidence of terrorism. Fourthly, that despite the dominance of the discourse, there were instances of dissent that were most successful (or gained most public traction) when they capitalised on inconsistencies in the dominant discourse. This in turn shows that it is always possible to divert course onto a more hopeful and less dangerous path. The final finding in the thesis was incidental but so compelling and striking that it could not be ignored. The textual analysis shows that John Howard used the 'war on terror' discourse as a vehicle for his new narrative of the Australian achievement and what it meant to be Australian. As the opening quote illustrates, he is quite frank about having used the position of Prime Minister to push his social agenda, but importantly the thesis evidences that this proclivity knew no bounds.

1
Literature Review & Methodology

Politicians in representative democracies often make decisions on issues with a level of complexity that ordinary citizens cannot hope to appreciate. They then proceed to sell or market their decision, which – interestingly – very seldom involves explaining the policy nuances. What led John Howard to involve Australia in the global 'war on terror' will be touched on throughout this thesis, but the prime focus will be on understanding how he and his Government 'sold' that decision to the people they represented; the nature of the system of meaning or discourse that was constructed in support of the decision; and the normative impacts of the decision.

The focus on discourse and asking 'how?' points to the post-positivist approach that this thesis takes. Post-positivism offers a more critical framework for making sense of how discourse creates social and political realities, and the relationships of power (and subjugation) that are brought about through discourse (Doty, 1993, 297; Der Derian & Shapiro, 1989, xiii).

The literature review that follows will demonstrate that to date, the questions above have not been explored in great depth. A body of work continues to emerge on the construction of the 'war on terror' discourse, or aspects of it; studies on the United States dominating. But analyses of the Australian experience are few, and this thesis is the first in-depth and comprehensive analysis of its kind.

In this Chapter I will firstly locate my research amongst the vast field of literature on terrorism, and secondly introduce the theoretical framework which underpins the thesis.

1.1 Literature review

Experts and amateurs in fields ranging from criminology, to psychology, geography, economics, mathematics and law have found themselves compelled to write on this new

‘it’ topic, and so we have seen literature emerge on suppressing the financing of terrorism[2], why people are attracted to terrorism[3], the spatial logistics of tackling terrorism[4], the economics of insuring against terrorism[5], calculating the risk of terrorism[6], and the legality of responses to terrorism[7]. Political scientists have also shown an increasing interest in the root causes of terrorism[8], in the prevalence of global terrorism[9], and in the political challenge that terrorism poses to liberal democracy and the West more broadly[10]. Within the broader field of political science, international relations specialists have tended to focus on terrorism trends in particular areas and regions[11], strategic issues related to terrorism and counter-terrorism, and the successes, failures, and repercussions of the ongoing global ‘war on terror’. While this is a severely simplified account of what exists ‘out there’ amongst the literature, the point is to illustrate at a cursory level firstly the explosion of literature on the topic post 9/11, and secondly the diversity of sub-topics amongst the field.

Closer evaluation of this work in politics and international relations reveals less diversity than is at first apparent. Although there has been a fairly recent proliferation in approaches that might be broadly referred to as ‘critical’, it remains the case that the field is dominated by a problem solving approach to terrorism and counterterrorism. For reasons that the method section of this Chapter will make clearer, the focus in this thesis will be on literature that takes a post-positivist and/or critical approach. These offer a much more nuanced account of foreign policy practices generally, and have an epistemological focus that opens a space for understanding how particular practices are made possible in relation to the ‘war on terror’ – something positivism is simply not equipped for. This then narrows the field of relevant literature considerably.

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[2] McCulloch, J. & Pickering, S (2005). ‘Suppressing the financing of terrorism: proliferating state crime, eroding censure and extending neo-colonialism’, *British Journal of Criminology,* Vol.45, No.4, pp.470-487.
[3] Horgan, J. (2005) *The Psychology of Terrorism*. Routledge: London.
[4] Cutter, S. et.al. (2003) *The Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism*. Routledge: London.
[5] Lakdawalla, D. & Zanjani, G (2005). ‘Insurance, self-protection and the economics of terrorism’, *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol.89, Iss.9-10, pp.1891-1905.
[6] Powers, M.R (2008). ‘Lanchester resurgent? The mathematics of terrorism risk’, *The Journal of Risk Finance*, Vol.9, Iss.3, pp.225-231.
[7] Greenwood, C (2002). ‘International law and the ‘war against terrorism’’, *International Affairs*, Vol.78, Iss.2, pp.301-317.
[8] Bjorgo, T. (2005) *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward.* Routledge: London.
[9] Lutz, J. & Lutz, B. (2008) *Global Terrorism*. Routledge: London.
[10] Wilkinson, P. (2006) *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response.* Routledge: London.
[11] Gunaratna, R. (ed) (2003)*Terrorism in the Asia Pacific: Threat and Response*. Eastern Universities Press: Singapore.

Some of this work has been done in the area of critical geopolitics, notably by Simon Dalby[12] and Gerard Toal[13]. Although no one in the field to date has attempted to explain the construction of the 'war on terror' itself, both authors work from the premise that the meaning of 9/11 did not manifest organically. Dalby builds on this assertion to craft an alternative framework for understanding 9/11, an important piece of literature in this context. Toal on the other hand conducts a kind of loose critical geopolitical – genealogy of the path from the 11 September attacks to the American invasion of Iraq. The brevity of the article (a short 13 pages) precludes it from covering the construction of the 'war on terror' in great detail, however, Toal's tendency to combine attention to discourse with historically contextualised analysis is alluring. His methodology – not rigorously applied in the article in question, but detailed in other works[14] – offers an interesting variation on conventional poststructuralist analysis, one which he claims enables a more culturally specific and nuanced understanding of foreign policy discourse. While Toal's theory of foreign policy as culturally embedded discourse is useful in explaining the way in which foreign policy can be attributed in some way to culturally specific attributes of the state in question; its drawback, particularly in relation to understanding the process of construction vis-à-vis the 'war on terror' is its inability to theorise how some narratives and hence some policies prevail while others do not.

A critical geopolitical approach also exhibits a lack of textual analysis, yet there are a number of authors who have addressed the construction of the 'war on terror' through a close examination of language. John Collins and Ross Glover's edited collection *Collateral Language* (2002) was a commendably early release – one of the first to examine this particular subject. The collection benefits enormously from its interdisciplinary authorship, and the focus on the rhetorical use and misuse, as well as the historical specificity of key words used in the early phase of the 'war on terror' illustrates the productive nature of language. The problem with an edited volume of this kind is that there is an obvious lack of rigorous methodology. Subsequently, there is a complete neglect of

[12] Dalby, S. (2004) 'Calling 911: Geopolitics, Security, and America's New War', in Brunn, S. (ed) *11 September and its Aftermath: The Geopolitics of Terror*. Frank Cass: London.
[13] Toal, G. (2003)'"Just out looking for a fight": American Affect and the Invasion of Iraq', *Antipode*, Vol.35, Iss.5, pp.856-870.
[14] See, for instance, Dalby, S, Routledge, P. & Toal, G. (eds) (2006) *The Geopolitics Reader*. Routledge: London.

the processes of linking and differentiation that are in many ways more critical to the production of meaning than the key words themselves.

Published around the same time, Sandra Silberstein's *War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11* (2002) is a much more meticulous analysis of the language that started the metaphorical 'war on terror' ball rolling. But for all the methodological rigor, Silberstein's thesis is unsatisfactorily simplistic; that the 'war on terror' discourse was enabled by elite rhetoric and the consolidation of the elite position by US media. Thus in the context of this thesis – which explores the construction of the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia – *War of Words* is of limited use, since Silberstein's theory has little to say about cultural specificity or about possibilities for contestation. That said, Silberstein demonstrates the great importance of all kinds of language: billboards, reports, speeches, music in shaping meaning and enabling the ascent and acceptance of particular constructions.

Textual analysis remains fairly uncommon in the field of political science, and those in this area who have looked at the construction of the 'war on terror' have done so with minimal attention to language. Although focused on the justification for US intervention in Iraq, Althaus and Largio[15] appear to use a case study – how Osama bin Laden morphed into Saddam Hussein in US official and public discourse in order to justify the invasion of Iraq – in order to demonstrate the constructed nature of foreign policy discourse and, more specifically, the 'war on terror'. The article is empirically strong and uses public opinion data to support the authors' interesting conclusion that successful enemy construction depended in this instance on rhetoric, media complicity and a preexisting poor opinion of Hussein amongst the public. Though brief and (probably as a consequence) theoretically underdeveloped; in drawing attention to the cocktail of factors upon which the construction of meaning is dependent, Althaus and Largio are – intentionally or otherwise – pointing to the productive and ubiquitous nature of power, and the need to conduct rigorous empirical research in order to make sense of this in particular contexts.

[15] Althaus, S. L. & Largio, D. M. (2004) 'When Osama became Saddam: Origins and Consequences of the Change in America's Public Enemy #1', *Political Science and Politics*, Vol.37, No.4, pp.795-799.

A. Trevor Thrall is another political scientist that has dealt with the discourse of the 'war on terror' through the lens of justifications for intervention in Iraq[16]. Thrall's aim is to build on the theory of the marketplace of ideas to enable consideration for values and culturally specific attributes. His analysis is solid and detailed, and he concludes that dominant discourses (such as the 'war on terror' or US intervention in Iraq) emerge when there is little or no competition over the elite framing of the issue at hand. While Thrall develops a convincing analysis, his method – one that purports to have the potential to explain an array of scenarios – isn't as consistent with a post-positivist epistemology as might be assumed from his claims about the framed nature of foreign policy discourse. In addition, although the importance of rhetoric is implied, his method is poorer for its lack of theorization of the language of threat inflation.

What can be deduced thus far in relation to the literature addressing the constructed nature of the 'war on terror' is that there is a tendency for some to focus too heavily on the agency of the media while neglecting the productive power of language, while others overlook culturally and historically specific intricacies by focusing too heavily on text. What each of the aforementioned articles demonstrates is the value of looking at processes of construction, and indeed most of these works come to important conclusions about how particular discourses and ways of thinking come to be dominant. But in the context of this thesis these approaches are limited. Focusing on, for instance, the dominance of the media in processes of meaning-making at the expense of historical contextualisation, cultural specificities, institutional considerations and the play of language constitutes the kind of closure of a thinking space that characterises dominant discourses themselves. This is an irony that poststructuralist approaches in particular – to be discussed below – are careful to avoid.

What is needed then in order to achieve a rigorous understanding of how the 'war on terror' was possible is an approach that is sensitive to the interplay of an array of discursive factors. Written from a poststructuralist perspective, Richard Jackson's *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism* (2005) is to date the only analysis that comes close to satisfying this criteria. Jackson employs a discourse

[16] Thrall, A. T. (2007) 'A Bear in the Woods? Threat Framing and the Marketplace of Values', *Security Studies*, Vol.16, No.3., pp.452-488.

analysis method to explore, in his words, ‘the public language of the ‘war on terrorism’ and the way in which language has been deployed to justify and normalise a global campaign of counter-terrorism’ (2005, 1). More specifically, the methodology used is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which combines textual and social analysis with a view to illuminating the relationship between discourse and social processes and opening spaces for normative change (Jackson, 2005, 24-5). The result is a very sophisticated picture of the way in which the ‘war on terrorism’ was justified and indeed sold to the American public. In the context of this research project the main limitations of Jackson’s approach are: firstly that the focus is on the United States and caution should limit applying its findings to other coalition members such as Australia or the UK; secondly that its thematic organisation restricts the emergence of a meaningful genealogy of the war’s construction; and thirdly that there is fairly limited attention given to marginalised voices, despite the fact that both Critical Discourse Analysis specifically and poststructuralism generally are well equipped to explore and theorise this important issue.

A slightly different approach to similar subject matter is employed by Krebs and Lobasz in their 2007 piece ‘Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq’. They use the principles of social constructivism to address the way in which the ‘war on terror’ discourse became dominant in the United States, and how that in turn shaped domestic debate over the invasion of Iraq. Two critical points relevant to this thesis emerge from Krebs & Lobasz’s article. Firstly, that the question of how ‘hegemonic projects’ such as the ‘war on terror’ become possible is ill-explored in international relations and foreign policy studies (Krebs & Lobasz, 2007, 449). And secondly, although they rely heavily on constructivist theory, the authors themselves concede that constructivism is not equipped in and of itself to answer these ‘how possible’ questions, so they integrate aspects of poststructuralist theory to explore ‘the place of power in the production of meaning’ (Krebs & Lobasz, 2007, 414). However, where constructivist theory is particularly useful is in relation to the use of the concept of norms to theorise how subjective ideas become ‘stable intersubjective understandings’, or common sense, and a poststructuralist approach could certainly benefit from incorporating aspects of constructivism (Krebs & Lobasz, 2007, 414). This article demonstrates the importance of empirical and contextual research on the construction of dominant

discourses. That their conclusion rests on the inability of the US Democrats to advance opposition to the invasion of Iraq is illustrative of the fact that this particular hypothesis would not transfer easily to Australia, since the ALP had a somewhat clearer alternative position on the subject of Iraq from 'day one', that is that military action against Iraq without a UN mandate would be opposed (Rudd, 2007; Kirk, 2003)**.** In sum then, this work points in a number of ways to the need to ask 'how?' in relation to the 'war on terror', and to do so in a contextually specific manner.

Although the two aforementioned texts do constitute the most significant writings vis-à-vis this thesis, there are shortcomings in relation to the failure to treat culture and history as instrumental in the construction and domination of discourse. The importance of paying heed to culture is highlighted by Stuart Croft in his book *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror* (2006). Croft uses a fusion of constructivist theory and cultural studies to address what he sees as the under-studied impact of (particularly popular) culture on the production of meaning in relation to 9/11 and the 'war on terror'. The strongest feature of the book is the way in which Croft charts the process of meaning making immediately after 11th September 2001, through the discourse's institutionalization, to times of discursive instability and strength since. It is, Croft claims, the news media, think tanks, churches, film, books, blogs and music that help determine the ebb and flow of the discourse in the same way that political elites, through their language, do. The weakness of Croft's analysis is perhaps what mainstream political science would deem its only virtue; his reconfiguration of a crisis cycle model to explain the evolution of the 'war on terror' discourse. As outlined earlier, from a poststructuralist perspective any attempt to create generic models of explanation – even if they are built on rigorous research – is an act of power that endangers open thinking space.

What Croft does for the advocacy of understandings of culture, Adam Roberts does for history. Although Roberts comes from a much more conventional IR perspective, and advances no particular theoretical framework, his message is simple: that a 'war on terror', and indeed understandings of terrorism and the 'war on terror' are counter-productive if they are ahistorical. He illustrates this by exposing eight myths, or lessons that may be learnt from history, relating to terrorism and counter-terrorism. For instance, he asserts that history tells us that addressing underlying grievances on some level and adhering to legal

norms are essential in responding to terrorism (Roberts, 2005, 109-110). At the heart of his piece is a concern that rhetoric and the imagery of war clouds actual progress in the area of counter-terrorism. Though this is a claim that is problematic from a poststructuralist perspective, it is important in illustrating the importance of historical context and the dismantling of political rhetoric.

What is most striking about the literature that treats the 'war on terror' as a social construction is the fact that there is an overwhelming focus on the United States. Whilst this is the case for obvious reasons, it leaves open the very interesting question as to how involvement in a 'war on terror' became possible in states who were not attacked on 11th September 2001. To date, no rigorous analysis has been conducted on this question in relation to Australia. As has already been noted, from a poststructuralist perspective this represents a very serious and urgent gap in the literature, since explanations advanced so far on involvement by the United States cannot answer how Australian involvement in the 'war on terror' was made possible. For that, empirical work needs to be conducted.

It is true that a variety of authors have alluded to the constructed nature of the 'war on terror' vis-à-vis Australia[17], but only a small handful have actually engaged with the some of the *processes* of construction.

In *Fear and Politics*, former Labor politician Carmen Lawrence explores the way in which fear is discursively manufactured in order to legitimise a range of dubious policies, particularly Australia's involvement in the 'war on terror'. 'Fear and terror', Lawrence claims, 'have become the staples of political and media discourse' (2006, 9), a disciplinary mechanism that has a long history in Australia, that prevents rational, evidence-based policy on a variety of issues and that serves only to 'buttress existing

[17] See, for instance: Bellamy, A. Bleiker, R. Davies, S. & Devetak, R. (eds) (2008) *Security & The War on Terror*. Routledge: London. Camilleri, J. (2003) 'A leap into the past – in the name of the 'national interest', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.57, No.3: 431-453.;George, J. (2003) 'Will the chickenhawks come home to roost? Iraq, US preponderance and its implications for Australia', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.57, No.2, pp.235-242.; Hage, G. (2003) *Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for hope in a shrinking society*. Pluto Press: Sydney.; Hocking, J. (2004) *Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-Terrorism and the Threat to Democracy.* UNSW Press: Sydney.; Kampmark, B. (2004) 'How to read an anti-terrorist kit: LOFA and its implications for Australian identity and security', *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, Vol.25, No.3, pp. 287-301.; McCulloch, J. (2004) 'National (in)security politics in Australia: fear and the federal election', *Alternative Law Journal*, Vol.29, No.2, pp.87-91.; McCulloch, J. (2002) 'Counter-terrorism and (in)security: fallout from the Bali Bombing', *Borderlands e-journal*, Vol.1, No.1.

structures of power and privilege' (2006, 125). This is a short book aimed – commendably – at a broad readership, and as a consequence there is no methodologically grounded analysis of the way in which fear becomes such a potent discursive weapon, even though she repeatedly makes the claim that fear is paralyzing Australian democracy. Yet she hints that our history, our culture and the language used by the political elite hold the key to understanding these processes.

Work in this area has been pioneered in many respects by Anthony Burke, who has in a range of pieces taken issue with the political technology of security, and the way in which the notion of existential threat is a weapon of enormous political power[18]. In the most recent edition of his book *Fear of Security,* Burke argues that involvement in the 'war on terror' has signaled the continuation of a long legacy of the political manipulation of fear and insecurity in Australia to the detriment of productive and appropriate policy. A poststructuralist approach yields rich results, a short but revealing map of how 'security' came to dominate political rhetoric between 2001 and 2007. But its brevity means that a range of discursive processes go unexplored, and many questions are left in need of greater explanation: *how* did the Howard Government successfully collapse illegal immigration and terrorism 'into a single shapeless threat'(Burke, 2008, 227)? *How* were alternative narratives silenced in favour of a narrative of security? Though Burke's work illuminates obvious gaps in the literature, his approach – insofar as it combines genealogy with attention to language and consideration of alternatives – is, with some maneuvering, well-suited to an exploration of the discursive construction of the 'war on terror' in Australia.

Drawing on critical geopolitics, and in particular Barnett's (1999) notion of 'framing' (i.e. the structuring of events in ways palatable to particular audiences), Jack Holland explores Howard's justification for involvement in the 'war on terror' between 9/11 and Iraq in 'Howard's War on Terror: A Conceivable, Communicable and Coercive Foreign Policy Discourse'. He concludes that in the period under investigation Howard justified Australia's role in the 'war on terror' through a careful framing of Australia's

[18] Burke, A. (2008) *Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety.* Cambridge University Press: Melbourne.; (2007) *Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War against the Other*. Routledge: London.; (2007) 'Security Politics and Us: Sovereignty, Violence and Power after 9/11', in Perera, S. (ed) *Our Patch: Enacting Australian Sovereignty Post-2001*. Network Books: Perth.; (2007)'Cause and Effect in the War on Terror', in Bellamy, A. et.al. (eds) *Security and the War on Terror.* Routledge: London.

place in the world; by addressing 'mainstream Australia', and by silencing opposition. Holland's analysis shows the kind of result that a post-structural approach can yield, and also demonstrates the importance of a historically situated analysis. The brevity of the article and the small time period covered raises questions about whether these patterns would be evident over the life of the 'war on terror' discourse, and also whether a rigorous discourse analysis methodology would yield similar results. This thesis seeks to provide insight into both these questions.

Finally, we come to the work of two authors in the area of international relations or more narrowly critical security studies, Katrina Lee Koo and Matt McDonald, who have focused closest on this topic to date. As the title suggests, Lee Koo's 2005 article 'Security, Australia and the 'War on Terror' Discourse' interrogates 'the politics of Australia's security practices and the discourses that enables it to function' (2005, 1). In tracing the path that led to the acceptance of the 'war on terror' as common sense, Lee Koo posits that our history of fearing the Other; the Australian penchant for a realist approach to security policy and our unwavering commitment to the US alliance, coupled with a language of threat, fear and violence begin to tell the story. But the length of the article precludes the application of a strong methodology to support her claims; it is for this reason perhaps that Lee Koo herself says there is an urgent need for greater research in this area (2005, 32-33).

In 'Constructing Insecurity: Australian Security Discourse and Policy Post – 2001' and 'Be Alarmed? Australia's Anti-terrorism Kit and the Politics of Security' Matt McDonald has also taken issue with Australia's counter-terrorism discourse. Though relatively brief articles without the scope to extensively chart the mobilisation of the discourse of counter-terrorism, McDonald's articles are important on a number of levels. Firstly because they point clearly – and in a theoretically compelling fashion – to the way in which security discourse is constructed in particular contexts; secondly because he shows it is possible and indeed sensible to combine the best aspects of both poststructuralism and constructivism in an analysis of this kind[19]; and finally because he

[19] McDonald proposes that understanding discourse though an analysis of language is best achieved by marrying a post-structural concern with relationships of power-knowledge and the disciplinary tendencies of

takes issue not only with the dominance of discourse but also with possibilities for normative change. McDonald's conclusions in relation to how the discourse came into being are not dissimilar from Lee Koo's; values-speak, identity, fear and exclusion all play leading roles, but a more nuanced understanding of their place could be achieved through rigorous textual and genealogical analysis. Indeed McDonald also articulates the need for further study when he says:

> The fact that analyses of representational strategies have been so neglected in broader analyses of security provides an important rationale for the exploration of these processes, and for illuminating important dimensions of the way security works in international relations (2005b, 176).

Two more recent articles of McDonald's provide a closer look at the representational practices employed by the Howard Government in justifying military involvement in the 'war on terror'. 'Lest We Forget: The Politics of Memory and Australian Military Intervention' explores the way in which Howard in particular used the Anzac narrative to legitimise military involvement in the 'war on terror'. He finds that in this particular context, processes of commemoration and remembrance, and the consistent reference made to a narrow view of Australia's military past have significant normative impacts that crowd out voices who speak without Howard's level of reverence.

In 'How was Howard's war possible?: Winning the war of position over Iraq', McDonald and Matt Merefield (2010) focus less on language and more on the role of norms like core Australian values and national identity, and the way in which these were appropriated as marketing tools for the Howard Government's position on Iraq. Their conclusion is interesting: that recourse to these norms didn't necessarily result in legitimacy being afforded to their stance on Iraq, but rather that this approach was successful in preventing a loss of the Government's legitimacy in broader terms.

By way of conclusion, though there has been a great proliferation of academic writing related to terrorism and counter-terrorism post-9/11, including literature which challenges the basic assumptions of this discourse, a systematic study of the detail and tactics of language and representational processes is wanting. In the Australian context,

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discourse with constructivist sensitivity to the inter-subjective nature of discursive construction (2005a, 301). The utility of this approach will be discussed below.

this is acutely apparent; although some authors – particularly those in the area of critical security studies – have engaged with the construction of the 'war on terror', their conclusions can really only be seen as speculative when compared to the longer and more rigorous international studies by authors like Richard Jackson and Stuart Croft. As such, there is a very clear gap in the literature that is in urgent need of filling. A methodologically grounded empirical analysis of how the 'war on terror' discourse has been shaped in Australia, this thesis proposes to do just that.

1.2 Theoretical framework

The question that this thesis seeks to address is divided into two interrelated parts. This section will outline the research topic, provide justifications for the research and outline the theoretical approach being employed in order to 'answer' these questions.

The first question, which will constitute the bulk of the thesis is: how has Australia's 'war on terror' discourse been shaped? It is a question that is concerned with illuminating the processes, conditions and interactions that enable particular truth claims to be produced or to emerge and triumph over others in certain contexts.

The 'how possible' question

Before clarifying some of the ontological and epistemological claims that underpin this question, the nature and importance of the 'how possible' question as a springboard for social explanation should be addressed. In a strictly theoretical sense a 'how possible' question is an attempt to account for the internal workings of a system that give rise to a particular event (Little, 1991, 4). In other words, it is a concern primarily with the processes via which certain constructions of reality gain traction over other constructions to the extent that they become discursively dominant, or 'common sense'. A Gramscian term, 'common sense' refers to a once subjective construction that becomes so intersubjectively and culturally well-established in a given context that competing claims appear nonsensical (Gramsci, 1971; Weldes, 1999, 10; Krebs & Lobasz, 2007, 411, 415). This means that the 'how possible' question is effectively an umbrella for a range of sub-

questions, some of which include: how do particular constructions become common sense? How do certain constructions achieve resonance with particular identities? How are certain subject positions created in order to achieve this resonance? How were individuals enticed, maneuvered or coerced into those subject positions? How did other constructions become marginalised in this process? What should be immediately apparent from this small sample is the way in which answers to 'how possible' questions can only be found via contextually specific empirical analysis; the aim of the research is not to arrive at a kind of generic causal formula for how certain events become possible, but rather to demonstrate the culturally and historically contingent operation of power (Doty, 1993, 299).

But why a 'how' question rather than a 'why' question? Aside from the obvious fact that 'why' questions – particularly in relation to 9/11 and the 'war on terror' – dominate international relations literature, these questions maintain a very narrow focus on motive which, as Krebs & Lobasz (2007, 411) point out, are often unknown to the actors themselves and cannot be realised in the absence of a process of legitimation anyway. In addition, 'why' questions skip important steps in explaining social phenomena; in asking, for instance, why George Bush declared a 'war on terror', a range of factors – such as the meaning ascribed to 9/11, modes of subjectivity that enabled that response, and voices that were marginalised in making such a decision – are taken as either entirely unproblematic, or of secondary analytic importance. 'How' questions seek to problematizes these issues and for that reason can be seen as vastly more critical than conventional 'why' questions (Doty, 1993, 299).

Importantly, this doesn't amount to a dismissal of the 'why' question. In fact, when reframed it remains a crucial question in the context of this thesis. Poststructural analysis is sometimes deservedly criticised for being lax on questions of morality and concrete policy implications. Asking '*why* do we care *how* the 'war on terror' discourse was constructed?' provides an avenue for addressing this perceived shortcoming in poststructural analysis. As I shall demonstrate throughout the thesis, but particularly in Chapter Six, a nuanced understanding of the theory of Foucault in particular actually evidences a fundamental concern with this sort of 'why' question. Exposing the conditions of one's existence with a view to enlarging the sphere of positive freedom was one of the driving forces behind Foucault's scholarship (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, 37). Asking 'why' involves thinking about

what is at stake in the construction of security discourses, something that will be considered throughout this thesis in reference to the 'war on terror' discourse. The short answer is that a lot is at stake, which makes the task of understanding the nature of this discourse so much more urgent.

This explains in part why the first research question in this thesis is worth answering. Illuminating the processes through which the 'war on terror' became discursively dominant in Australia; asking 'how' we went from an act of mass murder in the United States on September 11th 2001 to unqualified Australian involvement in a 'war on terror' is important also for three additional reasons. Firstly, exposing these processes enables the denaturalization of a range of dominant constructions – of subjects, of objects, of meanings and so on – and encourages a greater awareness of the way in which power operates in these productive and disciplinary ways. Secondly, and on a more theoretical level, answering a question of this kind has important implications for the theorization of power in foreign policy discourse; it goes towards explaining how it is that in the absence of an 'orchestrating subject' (Ashley, 1989, 283), great variety and possibility plus power can lead to the emergence of such narrow and dominant regimes of truth in particular contexts. And finally, an analysis of this kind necessarily considers voices and choices that are marginalised as the dominant narrative strives for hegemonic status, thus pointing to the capacity for dissent.

The place of resistance

This then points to the nature of the second question upon which this thesis will focus: which voices have been sidelined as the 'war on terror' discourse became more dominant? Based on the proposition that discourses can never be entirely hegemonic but are instead always vulnerable to destabilization (Doty, 1997, 385; Hall, 1988, 7; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, 111), an important aspect of this thesis will be pointing to instances of resistance; spaces where discursive change was or may be possible; as well as the amplification of more normatively progressive alternatives.

Exploring the possibilities for discursive change appears to be something normally credited in international relations literature to constructivism, and this almost certainly can

be attributed to the way in which traditional social constructivism is seen to be inherently more agentic than other approaches (Fierke, 2001, 123). Although constructivist theory is arguably slightly more prolific when it comes to talking change, a cursory understanding of poststructuralist literature reveals that it has a very obvious capacity to theorise possibilities for change and in fact does so while avoiding the positivist traps that constructivism frequently falls into when it comes to this matter. A poststructural approach to change centres on enlarging the sphere of positive freedom, a sphere that can be logically claimed to exist by virtue of the fact that the disciplinary and normalising effects of discourse exist in order to tame it (Patton, 1989, 266). Those influenced by constructivism in the field of critical security studies claim that change, increasingly framed in terms of 'emancipation' should be aimed at freeing the subject from structural oppressions (Booth, 2005, 181). Though an admirable goal, this is problematic insofar as it seems to suggest the existence of some extra-discursive realm, and also because a project of 'emancipation' cannot itself be exempt from the disciplinary forces that discourse exercises upon subjects. On the other hand, change, based on the thought of Foucault, is not about the subject's detachment from the effects of power, but rather of their empowerment in relation to their own subjectivity (Patton, 1989, 266).

What this suggests is that change in foreign policy discourse, for instance, relies on challenging particular constructions and offering different readings; and the extent to which this may succeed is contextually, historically and temporally contingent as well as being dependent upon other agents (insofar as competing claims resonate with them to a greater extent than dominant claims). This question of resistance is important in the context of this thesis for a number of reasons: firstly because drawing attention to marginalised voices and instances of dissent reinstates the possibility for what Jim George (1989) has called 'thinking space', a plane for debate and discussion that is resisted when discourses are most dominant; secondly because thinking about doing things differently, and listening to the meanings other actors invest in particular foreign policy dilemmas can have great ethical and normative possibility, insofar as unnecessary oppressions and violences may be avoided; and finally because understanding the conditions under which change in foreign policy discourse may or does occur, is, as Barnett (1999) has demonstrated, a critical part of grasping more fully the nature of dominant discourses.

Theory

It has already been indicated that this thesis is being approached from a post-positivist perspective, and this section seeks to clarify this in a theoretical sense prior to discussing the methodology being employed.

The literature focused on the so-called 'third debate' is expansive; the explanation here is intentionally concise. Suffice to say that the ontological framework upon which this thesis is based is – at its broadest – built on a rejection of rationalist or positivist claims about the existence of truths and facts and the ability of human beings to obtain information about them in a direct and objective fashion. Of course out of the third debate emerged a great range of approaches including critical theory, hermeneutics and postmodernism, all of which tend to be subsumed under the post-positivist umbrella, all of which challenge the way in which truth and knowledge are constituted, and all of which employ differing epistemological standpoints in order to conduct their research.

Poststructuralists also subscribe to the ontological claim that objective knowledge is an impossibility, and while this does not amount to a claim that there does not exist a material reality, it simply means that reality does not convey itself to human beings in a direct and unmediated fashion (Hay, 2006, 81). Instead, poststructuralists claim that 'reality' as it is conventionally understood is a discursive construction, a construction that is reliant upon language for its existence. Therefore, language is ontologically significant, as Hansen (2006, 18) puts it: 'it is only through the construction in language that "things"… are given meaning and endowed with a particular identity'. It is on this basis that poststructuralists and constructivists in the field of international relations have theorised the constructed nature of the concept of security[20]; a notion which is inextricably tied to this thesis. The constructed nature of security – a term used to justify, to explain and to mobilise support for foreign policy decisions such as Australian involvement in the 'war

[20] See, for instance: Burke, A. (2008) *Fear of Security*; Buzan, B., Weaver, O. & De Wilde, J. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner: Colorado; Fierke, K.M. (2007) *Critical Approaches to International Security*. Polity Press: Cambridge; McDonald, M. (2005) 'Constructing Insecurity; (2005) 'Be Alarmed? Australia's Anti-terrorism Kit and the Politics of Security'; Weldes, J. et.al. (1999) *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. ; Huysmans, J. (2006) *The politics of insecurity: fear, migration and asylum in the EU.* Cromwell Press: Wiltshire.

on terror' – becomes obvious when one considers who secures, who is in need of security, when something becomes a security issue and what is considered a security issue is heavily contingent. The question then becomes *how*, in what context and under what conditions does an issue become one of security? Based on the previous ontological claims the short answer to this question is that security is invoked through language in a process that is characterised by intersubjectivity[21] and that is contextually, historically and temporally subject. So in the context of this thesis, and consistent with the claim that language is ontologically significant, it can be said that the attacks of September 11th 2001 were a stimulus rather than an objectively meaningful event. In order for a 'war on terror' to ensue, meaning had to be injected into it in a way that resonated with the audience in question.

The question of how we may better understand this process is essentially an epistemological one. Exploring the conditions and circumstances under which discourses of security such as the 'war on terror' become dominant is best done, this author argues, by adopting a discursive epistemology. Discourse in this sense is defined as a matrix of social practices which generates the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and explained (George, 1994, 29-30). This matrix of social practices could also be understood as a system of norms, an important concept in and of itself in this thesis. Norms in this context are subjective ideas that becomes stable, accepted understandings and by virtue of that status, naturally diminish room for counter-claims or alternative ideas (Krebs & Lobasz, 2007; Price & Reus-Smit, 1998). The epistemological focus therefore is framed in terms of discourse rather than language deliberately; it enables a broader focus that can encompass the constructivist notion of norms on the one hand, and on the other it implies, Shapiro (in Der Derian & Shapiro, 1989, 14) points out, 'a concern with the meaning – and value – producing practices in language rather than simply the relationship between

[21] Intersubjectivity in this sense refers to the way in which meaning and practice arise out of interaction (Fierke, 2001, 117). Zehfuss (2002) has correctly pointed to the problems inherent in the tendency in constructivism to rely on the notion of intersubjectivity without adequately theorising it. This author sees that a poststructuralist understanding of intersubjectivity is possible and useful, insofar as meaning cannot merely be imposed upon subjects but must go arise out of some process of negotiation. That said, this process of negotiation cannot be neutral, but is an interaction characterised by the exercise of power. Thus intersubjectivity should not be seen as a necessarily equitable process of interaction but one that varies depending on the context.

utterances and their referents'. Broadly speaking the utility of a discursive epistemology from a poststructuralist perspective is that it enables a focus on the productive nature of power. Importantly though, a poststructuralist approach also implies that the author makes no claim to epistemic sovereignty. In choosing a discursive epistemology the aim is not to stand above or outside competing truth claims (Rouse, 1994, 103) – indeed Foucault objected to the possibility of truth or knowledge outside of power – but rather to speak a different language to power and expose the guises under which it operates (Rouse, 1994, 99)[22].

Specifically, there are a number of interrelated reasons why finding out *how* is best achieved through an examination of discourse. Firstly, considering dominant systems of meaning in terms of discourse illuminates the enabling role played by representation and interpretation, something that approaches ignorant of discourse, such as epistemic realism, ignore (Campbell, 1992, 4). Secondly, a focus on discourse shows the concrete effects of codes of intelligibility; in pointing to the ways in which they furnish a particular space with subjects and objects, the capacity for discourse to make things possible becomes readily apparent (Weldes et.al., 1999, 16). Thirdly, a discursive epistemology makes clear the constructed nature of identity insofar as it points to the centrality of representations of particular individuals and collectivities in the process of meaning-making (Hansen, 2006). In so doing, it activates a process of denaturalization of the supposedly given agents, the relations amongst them, and the practices to which these constructions give rise (Weldes et.al., 1999, 20). Finally, an analysis centered on discourse has an agentic capacity in facilitating the emergence of a clearer picture of what Campbell (1992, 6) calls the 'managed space in which some statements and depictions come to have greater value than others', as well as the more general instability, fixity and contingency of that managed space (Milliken, 1999, 230). In doing all of this, a discursive epistemology highlights and breaks down constructions of 'common sense' within the discourse in question; shows how a particular course of action was made possible and points to alternative readings and possibilities for normative change.

[22] This is a point of difference of great significance between poststructural and constructivist approaches, insofar as constructivists hold that new truths and knowledges of the social sciences can come out of empirical research (Katzenstein et.al., 1998, 676).

In the context of this thesis the specific epistemological focus then becomes the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia. Asking *how* Australia came to be involved in this 'war' without treating it as a world of structured knowledges and social practices runs the analytical risk of thinking and performing research in a closed space. Since discourse is dually characterised by the production of a limited set of interpretive possibilities and the difficulty of thinking outside those boundaries (Doty, 1993, 302), an analysis which ignores discourse can only conceivably be capable of theorising possibility on the terms of the discourse itself. This is certainly a complaint commonly made by post-positivists in relation to realist accounts of foreign policy discourse, which in failing to challenge foreign policy choices in terms of discourse invariably 'speak' in terms of dominant interpretive dispositions and thereby play a key role in the reification of particular identities and practices (Doty, 1996, 4-5). The focus on the *Australian* discourse is also of critical importance, since although it was the 'war on terror' discourse in the United States that gave rise to Australian involvement, this was only one enabling factor, only one answer to the very complex and contextually and historically specific *how possible* question that this thesis poses.

1.3 Methodology

How then does one analyse discourse so as to achieve the above objectives? Discourse analysis is really a methodological umbrella term for a range of approaches including social psychological methodologies that emphasise the intersubjective construction of discourse[23] but fail to address the issue of subjectivity and tend heavily toward positivism (Doty, 1993, 301). Content analysis is a popular choice for textual analysis in the social sciences (Fierke, 2007, 81) but is far too quantitative for the purposes of this thesis; analyses ground firmly in linguistics such as conversational analysis are, although methodologically rigorous, poorly equipped when it comes to theorising social practices. In a narrower sense there are a number of approaches that are consistent with the social constructionist premises of this thesis, and which have been applied in the analysis of

[23] Harre, R. (1981) 'Rituals, Rhetoric, and Social Cognition', in Forgas, J. (ed) *Social Cognition*. Academic Press: New York.

discourse in international relations. Discourse theory, devised by Laclau and Mouffe[24] is, as the name suggests less method and more theoretical framework, and it is heavily geared towards poststructuralist linguistic analysis. However, theorization of the social is more Marxian than poststructural – insofar as there is a failure to inject the place of relations of power into discursive interactions – and as a result their theory tends to overstate the place of agency in relation to discourse (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002, 54). Critical Discourse Analysis, as conceived by Norman Fairclough (Fairclough & Chouliaraki, 1999; Fairclough, 1995) also fits into this category, and, as shall be discussed below, is an approach that focuses on the relationship between language, power and social practices and is thus well-situated to be integrated into the methodology of this thesis.

Before outlining the specific approach being employed, it is useful to stipulate exactly what an appropriate discourse analysis methodology should do in the context of this thesis. The methodology chosen should essentially fill five criteria. Firstly, it should be what Milliken (1999, 227) calls 'critically self-aware', that is that it should avoid practicing the disciplinary and truth-claiming strategies characteristic of that which it seeks to critique. Secondly, in order to maintain consistency with the ontological and epistemological claims made above, the method should be geared towards constitutive analysis rather than causal analysis (Hansen, 2006, 28). This simply means that the analysis of discourse should flesh out the way in which identities, subjects, objects, structures, agents, language and practice are constitutive of one another; it should not – as many constructivists or rationalists would have it – engineer a new regime of truth by privileging the enabling role of particular discursive practices over others (Hansen, 2006, 10). Third, because dominant discourses are typified by the construction through language of particular objects, subject positions (identities) and practices, the method chosen must incorporate empirical textual analysis in order to draw out the enabling capacity of the particular discursive constructions (Fierke, 2007, 85). Fourth, a methodology must be employed which has the ability to analyse discourse in terms of its linguistic and non-linguistic elements. Weldes (1999, 110) makes clear the cruciality of paying attention to both elements which she sees as 'mutually constitutive and jointly productive of the

[24] Found mainly in their seminal work (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. Verso: London.

meanings of the social world'[25]. Finally, a method of discourse analysis that is to successfully answer the thesis questions posed above must be fundamentally concerned with power, and particularly the way it is constituted and maintained through exclusion (George, 1994, 30). It is through this focus that possibilities for critical thought and normative change are created.

The concept of discourse was popularised in large part by Foucault through his early works[26], and aspects of Foucault's approach to discourse will be employed in this analysis. For Foucault, discourse refers to ways of structuring knowledge and social practices, and discourse analysis is thus about analysing the 'statements' that enable that structuring (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, 44-78). He theorised that 'statements' are claims to meaning whose identity 'is constituted by the functioning of the field of use in which it is placed' (cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, 45). In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault sets his theory of discourse analysis apart from conventional methods:

> The analysis of statements, then, is a historical analysis, but one that avoids all interpretation: it does not question things said as to what they are hiding, what they were 'really' saying, in spite of themselves, the unspoken element that they contain…; but, on the contrary, it questions them as to their mode of existence…, what it means for them to have appeared when and where they did – they and no others. (cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, 51).

He posited that statements occur in certain contexts as a result of 'discursive formations' – sets of rules inhering in linguistic systems in particular sociohistorical contexts – thus the attention of the discourse analyst should be focused, Foucault argues, on discursive formations (Gutting, 1994, 17). A full appreciation of Foucault's approach to discourse analysis can only be achieved by a thorough reading of a number of his works from his archaeologies through to his genealogies. Rather than methodically explore the utilities and pitfalls of this particular approach, for the purpose of this thesis it is claimed that although his work is insufficient on its own to achieve the goals of this research, it offers four crucial insights that are pivotal to the methodological framework.

Foucault's concept of discourse theorises excellently the way in which discourse is constitutive for what is brought into being. The nominalist claim that objects and subjects

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[25] Also see Weldes et.al. (1999, 16); Hansen (2006, 23); Jackson (2005, 19).
[26] Particularly (1972) *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Tavistock Publications: London.; and (1973) *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. Random House: New York.

are only made meaningful through discursive formations is methodologically useful for two reasons. Firstly, the assertion that a pre-discursive subject or context is an impossibility means that only a discourse analysis can yield information about how identities produce and are reproduced or transformed by foreign policy[27] (Hansen, 2006, 23). In other words identity need only be seen in the context of the particular discourse under analysis, and not – as might be the case in a constructivist analysis – as derived from 'out there'. Secondly, this nominalism provides an avenue for theorising change; in the absence of an objective essence, subjects and objects can be both reproduced or radically transformed as shifts occur in the discursive formation (Rouse, 1994, 93-4). The methodological implication of this is that change can be judged on its own terms within the context of the discourse in question rather than having to be attributed to a potentially infinite number of 'external' factors like motive or strategic considerations.

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* Foucault points to the importance of interdiscursivity in enabling particular statements to gain traction within a discursive formation. He claimed, 'There can be no statement that in one way or another does not reactualize others' (Foucault, 1972, 98). It is this assertion that gave rise to what linguistic and poststructural analysts commonly refer to as 'intertextuality', the contention that 'any text is the absorption and transformation of another' (Kristeva, 1980, 66). Though some theorists treat interdiscursivity and intertextuality as analytically different – Fairclough (1992) for instance sees the former as relations between discourses, and the latter as relations between texts – this thesis will adopt the poststructuralist tendency to focus on intertextuality as the broad tendency of discourses to rely on other texts and other discourses for legitimacy. The degree of intertextuality in a discourse is important in ascertaining how discursive stability is achieved. Methodologically this means paying attention to processes of linking and differentiation – both between and within texts – during textual analysis (Hansen, 2006, 19). Uncovering intertextuality can be a potentially infinite process, particularly in relation to foreign policy discourse. Yet as Hansen (2006,

[27] This is another important point of difference between poststructuralist approaches and mainstream constructivism, insofar as the latter leaves open the possibility of pre-social subjects and objects (cf. Wendt, 1999). The upshot of this is that discourse analysis could then not be feasibly claimed to yield reliable information about the role of identity in making policy possible (Hansen, 2006, 24).

62-5) notes, it is possible to limit textual analysis to official discourse and still uncover important instances of intertextuality.

The third crucial insight offered by Foucault's work on discourse relates to his theorization of what Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, 48) have termed on his behalf 'serious speech acts' – statements made by privileged speakers which make a particularly acute claim to knowledge and truth. Foucault posited that the ability to carry out such an act is heavily contingent; in order for a serious speech act to be spoken and received as such, it must occur in a particularly rule-governed domain (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, 53). In security discourses, serious speech acts are particularly prolific. Buzan et.al. (1998) suggest that serious speech acts in security discourses can be termed acts of 'securitization', a twofold process reliant firstly on the designation of an issue as an existential threat necessitating extraordinary political action, and secondly on the acceptance of that proposition by an (usually domestic) audience. Identifying serious speech acts is an important part of a discourse analysis of this kind because it provides an indication of the degree of dominance of a discursive formation, it shows the extent to which the audience are complicit in its functioning, it provides a point of departure for understanding the creation of particular subject positions (including that of the speaker) and it opens up a space to think about who can speak, what they can say in a particular context and what it is about that context that enables the invocation of extraordinary measures.

Understanding successful acts of securitization such as that which occurred at the outset of the 'war on terror' can be significantly enhanced through a recognition of the power-knowledge nexus, the fourth and perhaps most critical insight vis-à-vis discourse offered by Foucault. In *The History of Sexuality Volume 1* (1978, 94-5) he outlined that power is not something that can be possessed, but is rather dispersed through social networks and is thus dynamic. Knowledge, so his theory goes, should be seen as a crucial factor in the 'historical transformation of various regimes of truth and power', not as some objective or subjective appeal to truth (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, 117). Like power, knowledge is not established by virtue of the existence of a particular truth claim or statement, but instead exists as a product of its place, and its relationship to other objects, in a discursive field (Rouse, 1994, 110). In other words, both power and knowledge can be

seen as being constituted by similar strategic alignments, and characterised as being composed of similar relations and elements (Rouse, 1994, 111). It follows from this that Foucault saw power and knowledge as operating historically in a 'mutually generative' manner (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, 114). This theory was born out of Foucault's shift from archaeology to genealogy[28], and significantly enriched his theorization of discourse. As Fairclough (1992, 49-50) observes, although this shift tended to privilege considerations of power over discourse, the broader outcome was a strengthened and more nuanced account of the way in which discourses are reliant upon and defined by contextually specific power-knowledge nexuses.

For the discourse analyst then, the question in relation to power-knowledge becomes *how* this nexus operates to enable particular practices, *how* it inheres in specific statements and strategies, and *how* it demarcates the boundaries of possibility in a specific discourse (Barrett, 1991, 136; Holland, 2008, 9). Power-knowledge becomes a theoretical tool for understanding the way in which discourses achieve stability through the symbiotic creation of power through appeals to knowledge and vice-versa. It follows that an analytic sensitivity to the place of power-knowledge is an important part of discourse analysis because it highlights the discursive and contingent nature of particular truth claims (such as 'terrorist', 'community' or 'failed state'); it draws attention to the extent to which contemporary practices are reproductions of historical power-knowledge configurations (Fireke, 2007, 9); it assists in deconstructing 'common sense'; and finally – because of the dynamic and contingent nature of power and knowledge, insofar as both are effective only to the extent that affected agents' actions are appropriately aligned – paying heed to the power-knowledge nexus points to instances of and possibilities for resistance (Rouse, 1994). Methodologically this is partially achieved by charting the ebb and flow of the nexus during textual analysis. However, given that Foucault's theory of power/knowledge emerged out of his genealogies, a nuanced account of the role played by power/knowledge in shaping particular regimes of truth is best achieved by employing the genealogy method itself.

[28] Marked by his seminal work *Discipline and Punish* (1977). This shift was reflective of Foucault's desire to explain the emergence of new and unprecedented strategies for organising, disciplining and dominating individuals and collectives.

Genealogy

Discipline and Punish (1977) sets the genealogical period of Foucault's investigations apart from the archeological phase. In exploring the advent of new techniques of punishing criminals in the 18th and 19th centuries, Foucault developed an approach that would go towards explaining how it was that in the absence of an orchestrating force, systems for the disciplining and subjugation of the subject became ubiquitous in western society. In a 1977 interview (Gordon, 1980, 117), Foucault characterised his new method as such:

> One has to… arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.

Importantly, this method was not about searching for origins, indeed Foucault rejected the possibility of locating 'origins' in history; instead genealogy focuses on 'descent' (Barrett, 1991, 131-3). This focus, Foucault argued, allows the analyst to chart the complex path of continuity, change and chance, and to illustrate the reality 'that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are (Foucault, 1971, 81). Specifically, genealogy unearths the means by which particular discursive formations come to be the way they are: their limits; their characteristics; and their institutionalization (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, 104). This necessitates a historically situated examination of subjectivity and relations of power (Gregory, 1989, xxi; Flynn, 1994, 34).

As Barrett (1991, 136) has noted, Foucault's works are fundamentally concerned with asking *how does it happen*. While his archaeologies strove to explain the nature of dominant regimes of truth, his genealogies completed his method of critique by providing a mechanism for elucidating the changes and continuities in modern ways of thinking. In this thesis, discourse analysis loosely derived from Foucault's archaeological works will be coupled with a more rigorous adaptation of the genealogical method. The compatibility of discourse analysis and genealogy has been noted by a number of authors: Milliken (1999, 230) attests that poststructuralist discourse analysis is characterised by a historically contextualised (genealogy) concern with how constructed meanings come to be stable

(discourse analysis); Hansen (2006, 82) posits that tracing the genealogy of dominant representations is a crucial aspect of discourse analysis; and Foucault himself (in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, 105) asserts that 'critical and genealogical descriptions are to alternate, support and complete each other'. Ashley (1989, 283) suggests that the only way to find answers to 'how possible' questions is via some degree of genealogy; finding out *how* social life is strategically structured in the absence of a knowing strategist cannot be achieved by reference to a 'master text' or 'founding intention', but is reliant on the analyst's capacity to unearth the 'decentered interplay of knowledgeable practices in history'.

Charting the genealogy of Australia's 'war on terror' discourse serves to fill the analytic gap left open by discourse analysis: whereas the latter points to the character of discourse; the particular subject positions and identities invoked therein; and the subjugation of alternative meanings, genealogy casts these constructions in a historical light in order to effectively draw out intertextuality and epistemic breaks, and to highlight not the foundations of discourse, but rather its architecture. Patton (1989, 265) also points to an emancipatory agenda within genealogical methodology, since it is fundamentally concerned with 'representing phenomena assumed to be inevitable or inescapable… as the result of the contingent historical circumstances, as arbitrary or no longer defensible from present standpoints'. Thus it can be seen that genealogy is well-suited to this research project.

'Doing' genealogy is a less proscriptive task than conventional methodologies demand, unsurprising given that Foucault himself was deeply suspicious of the closed nature of most popular philosophical methodologies at the time of his writings[29]. Hansen (2006) suggests that the analyst simply chose texts from certain significant periods – insofar as they are relevant to the discourse in question – and perform a type of discourse analysis that pays additional attention to the operation of the power/knowledge nexus. This means exploring the way in which power/knowledge works to shape truth and subjectivity, to discipline dissent and to quash difference; parallels or contradictions with the discourse can then be more effectively drawn. Dreyfus & Rabinow (1983, 107-9) posit that the

[29] See, for instance 'Two Lectures' in *Power/Knowledge*, and *Truth and Power* in Rabinow (1984).

genealogist's job is to 'destroy the doctrines of development and progress' and to expose instances of 'subjection, domination, and combat'. The right amount and application of genealogical enquiry, they argue, leads to the emergence of a profound visibility (1983, 107).

Foucault's concept of Governmentality will also feature sporadically throughout the thesis as a means of making sense of the relationship between subject and state. Governmentality was a concept born out of the rise in security apparatuses of states and refers to the varied means by which governments and individuals create and recreate one another. In practice, it is a theoretical tool for fleshing out the link between discursive and social practice in a particular discourse (Foucault, 2007).

Critical Discourse Analysis

Gelber (2007, 93) has observed that better results in discourse analysis can be achieved by combining elements of a number of approaches. Despite its merits, it has been recognised by both critics and followers of Foucault that his discourse theory is seriously abstract in parts, was applied by him only in a limited sense (to discourses of the human sciences), and also fails to provide a tangible means for analysing text or practice (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Fairclough, 1992). When integrated with other complementary methods, Foucault's approach to discourse becomes a much more solid framework for methodological analysis.

The aforementioned Critical Discourse Analysis (herein referred to as CDA), pioneered by Norman Fairclough, is a methodology fundamentally concerned with understanding discourse in a broader social context. While the epistemological compatibility of this approach with Foucauldian discourse analysis is questionable, on a strictly methodological level it is highly useful and appropriate when it comes to operationalising Foucault's rather abstract method[30]. From the outset it should be noted

[30] A number of ontological and epistemic claims made by Fairclough clash with the poststructuralist position underpinning this thesis; notably: the claim that objective truth is a (albeit remote) possibility (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, 33); the use of 'ideology' to theorise dominant constructions of reality, which – for reasons outlined in the interview on 'Truth and Power' (in Rabinow, 1984, 60-61) – Foucault found problematic; and the manner in which Fairclough confines his notion of discourse to semiotic systems as opposed to the

that – in rejecting some of the ontological and epistemological claims put forth by Fairclough and employing only aspects of his method – the application of CDA in this thesis will bear a lesser resemblance to that outlined by its creator. It is what Fairclough called the 'three dimensional conception of discourse' (1992, 73), a framework for the analysis of discourse in its social context, that will be of most use here. Yet, since Fairclough himself characterises CDA as a methodology open to 'social and political thought relevant to discourse and language' (1992, 62), aspects of his three dimensional framework will also be slightly reworked to incorporate tools, analytic strategies and methods most appropriate for this research question.



Figure 1.1 Three-dimensional conception of discourse (from Fairclough, 1992, 73).

As the three dimensional model suggests, analysis of discourse will be conducted on the basis that language use consists of three dimensions – it is simultaneously a text, a discursive practice and a social practice (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002, 68). As such, analytic attention must be paid to each of these dimensions. Analysis of text implies paying attention to vocabulary or word use, grammar or sentence structure, as well as the broader structure of the text itself (Fairclough, 1992, 75). Importantly though, 'text' in this sense

poststructural view of discourse which necessarily extends beyond language to include social practice (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002, 67). However, as Jackson (2005, 24) makes clear, the core methodological premises of CDA – namely that discourse and social structure are dialectically related and mutually constitutive, and that discursive practices are defined by (unequal) relations of power – ensure its compatatbility with a broader poststructural approach.

refers not just to verbal or written language, but extends to broader communicative events and objects such as memorials, images, cultural paraphernalia and so on (Fairclough, 2001). Discursive practice refers in this context to the practice that gives rise to the text (production), and which determines the manner in which the text will be accepted (consumption). Phillips and Jorgensen (2002, 69) suggest that looking for instances of intertextuality – insofar as the text-producer draws from other texts in compiling the communicative event, and so too the text-consumer in making sense of the text and drawing meaning – is analytically important at this point. In addition to this though, a number of analytic notions can be included in the analysis of the discursive practice dimension to ensure a clearer picture emerges of the process of text production and consumption.

Firstly, the notion of *articulation* provides a useful lens through which to view the process of meaning investment by a texts' producer. Weldes (1999, 98) defines articulation as 'the process through which meaning is produced out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources… and temporarily fixed by establishing chains of connotations among different linguistic elements'. In other words processes of articulation are specific and loaded instances of representation, which if unchallenged and repeated often enough can make constructed depictions appear natural and can have great repercussions for social practice (policy).

Where articulation provides a way of understanding how meaning is invested in language and practice, the concept of *resonance* deals with the extent to which acts of communication are accepted by the intended audience. Defined by Shapiro as a kind of 'political acquiescence' (in Der Derian & Shapiro, 1989, 75), resonance is a crucial component in discursive exchanges, and the formulation of foreign policy in particular. The ability for privileged actors to achieve particular policy outcomes is partially reliant on creating resonance for their constructions of problems and solutions. As McDonald (2002) has noted, the degree of resonance has important implications for understanding how particular representational practices are (or aren't) successful, as well as for gauging how greater legitimacy for a policy program is achieved. In other words, resonance provides an important analytical tool for understanding *how* a policy or practice is 'sold' to an audience. In addition, incorporating the notion of resonance enables an enhanced focus on

the culturally specific nature of discourse justification. Looking at resonance in the context of creating legitimacy for Australian involvement in the 'war on terror' demands that the analyst be sensitive to what Holland (2008, 15) has called the 'unique strategically selective context of domestic foreign policy culture and the domestic political landscape'. The consequence is a vastly more nuanced and specific explanation for *how* a particular policy became possible.

Thirdly, the Althusserian (1971) concept of *interpellation* floats in the temporal space between articulation and resonance. Deeply linked to subjectivity, interpellation refers to the process in which certain individuals or groups are 'hailed' by discourses and concur with, recognise themselves in, or acquiesce to the particular depiction. Weldes et.al. (1999, 126) posit that interpellation provides a means for determining 'how compelling or convincing particular articulatory chains are to people'.

Analysing language at the level of social practice implies a focus on the broader implications of discursive practices on discourse and vice-versa. As Phillips & Jorgensen (2002) point out, discourse analysis is insufficient on its own to explore this dimension, and so it is at this point that Foucault's social and discourse theory will be particularly useful. Specifically, this means exploring the role played by power/knowledge in reifying or disturbing the discourse in question. Questions are posed which go to the heart of the critical aspect of the research project: how is power maintained? How hegemonic is the discourse? Is there evidence of periods of discursive vulnerability or instability?

With this in mind, Fairclough's three dimensional framework could be reworked for the purpose of this thesis (see figure 1.2). The framework is designed to be used in conjunction with the Foucauldian-derived discourse analysis and genealogy methodologies mentioned earlier. Given that communicative acts have meaning at all three levels, or in all three dimensions, analysis needn't necessarily proceed each time from the same point. That is to say that the framework will be used in an integrative fashion, whereby the three stages of analysis are conducted simultaneously rather than in isolation. Throughout the direct analysis of language, key terms and phrases which point to important discursive processes will be shown in bold type, with an explanation of the discursive process to follow. As a general rule, all emphasis in the texts analysed are added for the purpose of analysis, unless otherwise stated.



Figure 1.2. Altered three-dimensional framework.

Data and text selection: issues

The primary aim of this thesis is to understand *how* Australia's 'war on terror' discourse has been shaped. In order to achieve this, a methodological combination of Foucault's genealogy and Critical Discourse Analysis will be employed; the former to uncover the architecture of the discourse, and the latter to analyse a variety of texts in order to reveal the discursive processes that construct social reality and shape this particularly dominant discourse. The empirical analysis of language is crucial in drawing out the means by which – in this case – the 'war on terror' became 'common sense' to the Australian public. As was outlined in the literature review, there is a myriad of texts that can be analysed to achieve this. Confining text selection to the area of popular culture can be particularly revealing of discursive processes, as Croft (2006) and Weldes (1999, 241) have asserted; focusing mostly on voices of dissent and opposition has the potential to be very

illuminating; and the inclusion of secondary sources like academic analysis is also a common means to yield results about discourse construction. However, given that an extensive and systematic examination of the construction of Australia's 'war on terror' discourse has not yet been undertaken and that this thesis is subject to time and size constraints, cautious and modest textual selection must be made.

The most obvious way to narrow the number of texts to undergo analysis is temporally. Although historical material will be incorporated in genealogical analysis, most of what will be textually analysed will be limited to the term of the Howard Government, from March 1996 until December 2007. Focusing on this period still allows quite a wide berth for understanding the various phases of the 'war on terror' discourse: its pre-history; its inception; and periods of contestation and reification.

Lene Hansen (2006, 85) suggests that the appropriate selection of texts can be made – particularly in relation to foreign policy discourses – by ensuring they meet three criteria: 'they are characterised by a clear articulation of identities and policies; they are widely read and attended to; and they have the formal authority to define a political position'. While it would be problematic to ensure that texts relating to popular culture or centered on dissent meet these criteria, narrowing the focus to primary texts spoken by privileged speakers avoids these issues. Focusing the analysis in this manner is analytically important for a number of reasons. Firstly, and in a broad sense, giving priority to primary sources, particularly speeches, policy statements and interviews, is most consistent with the epistemological premises of poststructuralist discourse analysis (Hansen, 2006, 82). Secondly, security discourses, of which the 'war on terror' discourse is a prime example, are typically shaped by elite constructions; in speaking in terms of security, state leaders or representatives claim a right to praxis that further elevates their status as a privileged speaker and thus a privileged craftsperson of discourse (Buzan et.al., 1998, 21). As Jackson (2005, 26) points out, that the war on terrorism is an 'elite-led project', insofar as 'elites have provided the primary justifications and overall vision', means that understanding its construction is most logically achieved through analysis of their official language.

Though reference will be made to the language of various 'officials' during the thesis, textual analysis will be primarily confined to speeches, interviews and policy

statements given by then Prime Minister John Howard. If security discourses are ‘elite-led projects’, then the ‘war on terror’ discourse was – particularly in its infancy – almost a solitary affair, as Garran (2004) has highlighted. John Howard was so personally committed to the ‘war on terror’ that its discursive construction emanated most potently from him, usually leaving other senior politicians the job of discursive reinforcement. Thus the data being drawn upon for analysis in this thesis will be public material relating to the ‘war on terror’ and spoken by John Howard. These transcripts are obtained easily though the Australian National Library’s web archive of his then Prime Ministerial webpage. Other material such as legislation and speeches and statements made by senior politicians like Alexander Downer and Philip Ruddock can also be readily obtained online, as well as public advertising material such as the ‘Look out for Australia’ (LOFA) package. Text selection will be based in the text’s ability to fill at least one, but preferably two of Hansen’s (2006) three criteria: they must contain a clear articulation of identities and policies; be widely circulated; and/or have some level of authority to define a political position. Such statements can be found in both primary and secondary sources such as newspaper editorials, opinion pages and letters, academic discourse and in public statements.

In sum, it is useful to capture the study in terms of what Hansen (2006) calls a ‘research design for discourse analysis’. The diagrammatic research design displays the way in which foreign policy is constructed in relation to a primary actor/s (selves), over time (temporal perspective), and across a range of events (number of events). It also serves to capture the overall nature of the project.



Figure 1.3. Research design for analysis of Australia's 'war on terror' discourse

1.4 Chapter outline

The thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter Two explores the inception of the 'war on terror' discourse. It serves a partly descriptive or background function and includes aspects of genealogical inquiry. It outlines the general nature of responses to the attacks of September 11th 2001 throughout the world in order to contextualise Australia's response in following Chapters. It aims to clarify firstly the path chosen by the United States and its partners in the 'Coalition of the Willing' such as the United Kingdom and Australia; and secondly, it seeks to evidence the way in which other nations made quite different choices in relation to counter-terrorism.

Chapter Three employs both genealogy and CDA to determine discursive contributors to the contemporary counter-terrorism discourse at play prior to 9/11; it reveals the architecture of the discourse. This includes an exploration of: Australia's invasion anxiety; the place of the Anzac myth; the politics of exclusion left-over from the Cold War; the rise of ASIO and the normalisation of surveillance; and the ascendance of race-politics *a la* Pauline Hanson. The purpose of the Chapter is to demonstrate the way in which many of the ideas and themes of the dominant counter-terrorism discourse pre-date 9/11.

Chapter Four focuses specifically on the analysis of texts which relate to the 'war on terror' discourse just prior to and in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. It will cover themes such as: construction of 'the other' in asylum seeker policy, and the role this played in demonstrating (and testing public acceptance of) exclusionary politics; the relinquishment of international obligation & a disdain for international authority; links forged between terrorists and asylum seekers; the immediate domestic reaction to 9/11 and the ensuing 'war on terror', and the construction of opposition to this as 'un-Australian'; the invasion of Afghanistan which served to construct war as apolitical, and to normalise violence and militarism in a 'new world order' (Ali, 2002); the Bali bombings, which was construed by many as an Australian experience of terrorism; and the distribution of Australia's Anti-Terrorism Kit and its role in sustaining a politics of fear & legitimising the dominant discourse on terrorism.

Chapter Five is concerned with the period between 2002 and 2007, and focuses on the discursive factors reinforcing Australia's counter-terrorism discourse, using CDA of seminal texts to understand: the war in Iraq, which signaled a continuation of the doctrine of exclusion, militarism, disdain for international law, and realist security; Australian anti-terror laws, trading fundamental democratic principles for security in 'difficult' times; the Australian Government's response (or lack thereof) to nationals detained in Guantanamo Bay and the conceptualisation of this issue as apolitical; and the products of the politics of fear, jingoism and intolerance increasingly realized at a local level, and manifest in events such as the Cronulla riots of 2006.

Based on the findings of the Critical Discourse Analyses, themes, choices and assumptions will be illuminated, thus giving rise to Chapter Six. In it, marginalised discourses and voices of dissent will be explored, in an attempt to understand what alternative approaches might have been sidelined and the methods through which resistance was both exercised and quashed.

1.5 Summary

This Chapter has served five purposes. Firstly, it has surveyed the literature relevant to this thesis and has located a very obvious gap. Secondly, it has introduced the two-part

research question: how has Australia's 'war on terror' discourse been shaped? What voices have been sidelined in this process? Thirdly, it has outlined the epistemological premises, as well as the methodological framework to be employed in order to answer this question. Foucault's discourse analysis theory and genealogy method will be used, in conjunction with a slightly amended version of Norman Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis. Fourth, the choices for data analysis – primarily speeches, interviews and public statements by Prime Minister Howard between 1996 and 2007 – were outlined and justified. Finally, this Chapter outlined the structure of the thesis, which in conjunction with the methodological choices outlined above, is designed to provide the most nuanced and comprehensive answer to this very important *how possible* question.

2
Background

It is often said that something unprecedented occurred on 11th September 2001, a point made in reference to the terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on that day. I seek to rework this contention; not to argue that these events were somehow unexceptional, though in terms of casualties this is true[31], but to posit that something more extraordinary transpired in the days, weeks and months immediately following the events of 9/11. That is that a discursive abyss opened, a void in meaning that privileged speakers – those to whom the public looked for meaning – were seemingly ill-equipped to deal with. This Chapter will show how, when faced with a window of opportunity to respond in a potentially infinite amount of ways, including more normatively progressive approaches encouraging less violence and exclusion, the path taken was a well-trodden one.

The exploration of Australia's counter-terrorism discourse begins at its infancy, the time of interpretive chaos in the United States that swiftly resulted in the ascendancy of a neoconservative approach to security. It was in these very early days that John Howard offered near unqualified support for a US led war on terrorism, a time when other world leaders were still in the interpretive and contemplative stage. And so began a complex campaign to justify a new chapter in Australian foreign policy, one that had far reaching implications internationally, domestically and on the level of individual subjectivity.

[31] Some 3000 compared to 250,000 in the recent Bosnian war or up to one million in the Rwandan genocides of 1994 (Bleiker, 2003, 433).

2.1 The event

To speak of the atrocities of 9/11 in descriptive terms has becomes increasingly meaningless and unnecessary as time wears on[32]. The extent and reach of the incident come spectacle was such that to remind one that 3000 people in three locations – New York, Washington and Somerset County, Pennsylvania – were killed as a result of the hijacking of four aircraft, is almost nonsensical. We speak of other incidents of mass-casualty without bypassing description, because, as Boal et.al. (2005, 26) point out, 'there were no cameras at Dresden, Hamburg and Hiroshima'. The significance of the voyeurism associated with 9/11 in relation to the interpretive phase with which this Chapter is concerned, is potent. What emerged immediately was what Buck-Morss (2003, 26) eloquently terms a 'visual fundamentalism', the flailing jumpers, the crumbling buildings, the plumes of smoke and debris engulfing one of the world's great cities; these were the images – turned symbols – that captured the public. The horror precluded the possibility of complexity of meaning; 'why?' was but a rhetorical question. It must be said that this – the primitive interpretive phase – was by no means an organic process; it was dictated by two important constructed acts. Firstly, the imagery and its associated repetition and reduction served to blur the line between information and ready-made interpretation; the most popular of which was the fluttering American flag (Buck-Morss, 2003, 27). Secondly, the language acts to accompany the imagery played a pivotal role in the public sphere interpretation of the terrorist atrocities; 'America under attack'[33], 'September 11'[34], 'War on America'[35] were the headlines that adorned newspapers and magazines in The United States and around the world. As Berrington (2002, 49-50) argues:

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[32] That the event is referred to 9/11 as a matter of course is telling in itself. Derrida (cited in Borradori, 2003, 85) argues that referring to the events through the date on which it occurred reflected an immediate inability (and a later unwillingness) to process what had actually occurred. He posits that 'the brevity of the appellation (September 11, 9/11) stems not only from an economic or rhetorical necessity. The telegram of this metonymy – a name, a number – points out the unqualifiable by recognising that we do not recognise or even cognize, that we do not yet know how to qualify, that we do not know what we are talking about' (Derrida, cited in Borradori, 2003, 85). It may be added that the continued use of date as signifier indicates a (conscious or unconscious) adamancy that the deictic of the date is meaning in and of itself.
[33] Cover of 'Newsweek' 11th September 2001.
[34] Cover of 'People Weekly' 24th September 2001.
[35] Cover of 'The Sydney Morning Herald', 13th September 2001.

> Events on September 11 were firmly categorised within the context of war atrocities. In terms of media coverage, therefore, there was recourse primarily to the conventions and templates relating to war reporting rather than those typically associated with reporting disaster or tragedy.

These images and words, these discursive signifiers – which bred in many Americans a thirst for retribution – meant that the US was 'justified, even compelled, to respond with aggression' (Berrington, 2002, 49). Thus it can be said that although this interpretive phase did not determine the response of the Bush Administration, it played a key role in paving the way for the domestic political interpretation of the events of 9/11.

Although the immediate act of political interpretation in The United States was brief, the decision to understand the terrorist attacks as an act of war rather than a crime was an important one. That the Bush Administration conceptualised 9/11 as an act of war was apparent in speeches made by Bush and others in the days immediately following the events. Bush said on 14th September 'war has been waged against us by stealth and deceit' (cited in Jackson, 2005, 38). Then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld concurred: 'They were acts of war, military strikes against the United States of America' (cited in Jackson, 2005, 39). The choice to view the attacks as an act of war seemingly flowed naturally, yet from an analytical perspective the distinction between crime and war as it relates to terrorism and the 11th September attacks is far more complex than Bush, Rumsfeld and others publicly acknowledged.

According to Feldman (2002), the attacks cannot be decisively categorized as either crime or war based on conventional criteria. On the basis of the *identity* of the actors, the acts must be viewed as a crime, since it is convention that only sovereign states can perform acts of war. So too can 9/11 be understood as a crime when considering the criteria of *provenance*, since a state has jurisdiction within its borders over actions against it. Yet when considering two other criteria, 9/11 can be deemed an act of war; the *intention* of the attackers was to undermine the legitimacy – in some capacity – of The United States, a position far more consistent with warlike activity than criminal behaviour which rarely contests the state's legitimacy. Finally the *scale* of the 9/11 attacks is intuitively more akin to war than crime. It follows that it was the latter two criteria which the Bush Administration continually used to justify their interpretation of the events; time and again it was said that the *intention* of the hijackers was to undermine 'our way of life', the *scale*

was such that it was deemed ‘a national tragedy’, ‘a nightmare’ (cited in Jackson, 2005, 32-47).

Yet the Bush Administration’s decision to understand 9/11 as an act of war was not just apparent in the language being used; war went swiftly from rhetoric to policy reality in the days and weeks following 11th September 2001. The most obvious practical indicator of this was that Department of Defense (herein DoD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (herein CIA) were charged with the task of responding to the attacks, and were given a far greater role than the crime fighting agencies of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (herein FBI), the Department of Justice and the Police (Feldman, 2002, 480). This mobilisation coincided with the passage through the United States Congress of the ‘Authorisation for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists’ Resolution on 18th September 2001, and the official declaration of a War on Terror by the United States Government.

The problems associated with understanding 9/11 as an act of war rather than a crime, and framing the response in like terms are – from an analytical perspective – well documented (Campbell, 2002; M. Howard, 2002; Mandel, 2002; Grenville, 2002; Fierke, 2005; Scraton, 2002)[36]. Normatively, the associated issues are manifold.

Firstly, often cited is the hypocrisy inherent in the declaration of a ‘war’ on terror; a war on a common noun – a tactic – that the US has arguably tolerated if not supported in various forms in the past (particularly in Central and South America and against the Soviet Union during the Cold War) (Glover, 2002, 216-217). Secondly, invoking the language of war rather than crime in response to 9/11 showed, as Frederking et.al. (2005) point out, a clear commitment to a narrowly realist Westphalian political framework and a corresponding rejection of ‘global society rules’. In conceptualising the 11th September attacks as an act of war and responding to them by declaring a ‘war on terror’, the Bush Administration revealed a clear preference for unilateralism and conventional understandings of security

[36] Of note is the frequently-made point that the terrorist attacks committed on 11th September could be both understood and addressed as a crime. It is argued by some that an internationally coordinated criminal investigation would be a more effective method of dealing with al-Qaeda (and other transnational terrorist organisations) than a ‘war’ based primarily on military pursuit (Cox, 2002; Feldman, 2002; Frederking et.al., 2005). Indeed Campbell (2002) reminds us that the criminal justice system worked effectively in bringing to justice the perpetrators of the 1998 bombing of two US embassies in East Africa. He muses that in response to the trial (completed just three months prior to 9/11), a New York Times journalist said ‘it’s a good reminder that trials and investigations and all those things that we sort of view as slow and cumbersome can actually work’.

whereby military might is of premium importance in preserving sovereignty; all of which are consistent with both the Westphalia rules of politics and, more specifically, the Hobbesian rules of war (Frederking et.al., 2005, 141). This first interpretive act, this *choice* immediately resulted in the preclusion of multilateral security options and collective security frameworks. Furthermore, the decision to refer to 9/11 as an act of war and the response to it as a war had the crucial effect of justifying – at least in part – the suspension of normal politics, the abandonment of a Lockean social arrangement (Fierke, 2005, 54; Frederking et.al., 2005, 141). Finally, viewing the terrorist atrocities and America's response as war has important politico-linguistic implications; enabling a situation whereby politics is dictated by what Murphy (2003, 610), drawing on Aristotle, terms 'epideictic rhetoric'. In such a state the speech acts of those in leadership roles are central to the public's conceptualisation of crisis and response; the acts give primacy to the present, are frequently emotive, replace deliberative procedure with ceremony and dictate (rather than attempt to explain and justify) policy choices (Murphy, 2003).

It must then be asked why this choice to understand and respond to 9/11 in terms of war – an analytically and normatively problematic move on many fronts – was made; the answer is revealing of the broader ideological position and tendencies of the Bush Administration. The most immediate and obvious answer to this question is that the '9/11 as war' frame enables what Campbell (2002) terms the 'quick leap to a comfortable explanation'; whereas a crime frame necessitates deliberation, questions about causation, and is inevitably a detailed and drawn out process. Likewise, to respond with war was a clear attempt to restore (at a psychological level) a sense of national safety, sovereignty and assuredness (Bleiker, 2003, 439). Such action is reminiscent of Schmitt's concept of 'decision', whereby it is determined by the political elite that an existential threat can only be mitigated through force and violence (Burke, 2007c). Schmitt (1932, 46) makes this argument in two parts. Firstly he says: 'As long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels it in critical situations to decide upon the domestic enemy'. According to Schmitt, the very viability of a state as a political entity is dependent on their ability to conceive of a threat in a particular way consistent with a Westphalian sovereign-state framework. Thus his argument proceeds: 'If there really are enemies in the existential sense as meant here, then it is justified, but only politically, to repel and fight

them physically' (Schmitt, 1932, 49). The rhetoric of the Bush Administration in the days and weeks following 9/11 are reminiscent of a Schmittian conception of the political, and a Schmittian understanding of the utility of and justification for war.

While the desire to take swift and decisive action based on Schmittian principles was the foremost driver behind the response from the Bush Administration, one must also consider the political benefits inherent in conceiving and responding to 9/11 through a framework of war. Callinicos (2003, 9) asserts that had a 'crime framework' been chosen, a painstaking investigation into the causes of 9/11 would have ensued that would invariably have considered the role played by 'blowback' and American foreign policy more generally[37]. Instead, the choice of war enabled the Bush Administration to avert criticisms of past and present American foreign policy (by closing off the possibility of causal analysis) and further its program of military dominance (Callinicos, 2003, 9). A second, and equally relevant benefit of declaring a 'war on terror' is related to political legitimacy. Bourdieu (1998) says that a 'call to arms' has long been a very potent means by which the political elite extort legitimacy and simultaneously weaken political and civil opposition. In other words, a declaration of war, particularly when posited in the context of an existential threat, has the effect of preserving the status quo (Graham et.al., 2004, 201).

Although this declaration of war did give a significant indication as to the priorities and intentions of the Bush Administration vis-à-vis counter-terrorism, it didn't – in and of itself – answer real questions about the security framework through which the response to terrorism would be constructed. The rhetoric, speech acts and acts of interpretation by the political elite in the days following 9/11 were just that, an attempt to make sense and create meaning in relation to what had happened. Even though no ideological position or framework was conceptually equipped to deal with the new threat and the emerging security-scape (the reality that clandestine terrorist networks were capable of mass-casualty operations against a superpower) a range of choices and alternatives as to how to respond to this threat existed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. With hindsight this is often forgotten. As such, an interpretive genealogy would be incomplete or deficient

[37] Blowback refers to the 'unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from the American people', and is a term coined by the CIA and popularised by Chalmers Johnson (2000). Johnson argued prior to 9/11 that incidents of terrorism would inevitably increase so long as the United States continued a ruthless program of military and economic imperialism.

without an exploration of the main frameworks through which a response to 9/11 may have been constructed.

The Bush Administration's response marked a significant departure from the previously dominant realist framework. As such, a response to 9/11 ground in the theory of realism would have differed considerably from that which actually evolved[38]. Whilst realism is defined by its focus on the inherent antagonism between states, it is a mistake to construe that this equals a blind acceptance of conflict. It is helpful to recall that the father of classic realism, Hans Morgenthau based his theory on recognition of the centrality and complexity of power in politics while simultaneously avoiding the Schmittian conclusion that politics is reducible to violence (Williams, 2004, 634). Subsequently, by the end of his scholarly career his realism was increasingly focused on the balancing of power politics through diplomacy and mutual security (Burke, 2007, 32). Contemporary realists or neo-realists such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt derive their brand of thought from their predecessor, with subtle variation[39]. Following 9/11 most 'realists' concurred that a decisive response was necessary and indeed warranted, and most supported the invasion of Afghanistan on the basis that it was part of an effort to seek out and deal with a real and tangible threat, al Qaeda (Walt, 2001/2). But dissent from these voices in relation to particular aspects of the 'war on terror' are indicative of the fact that the response to 9/11 was not framed in truly realist terms at all.

It was discussed above that the particular type of 'war' frame chosen by the Bush Administration had the effect of precluding recourse to causal explanation; it is telling then that much of the 'realist' literature following 9/11 has been – at least in part – concerned with understanding why the attacks occurred. Walt (2001/2) posited in the aftermath of 9/11 that four important lessons had emerged from the events: that global dominance

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[38] See for instance Ikenberry, G. (2002) 'America's Imperial Ambition', *Foreign Affairs*. Vol.91, No.5, pp.44-60.; Walt, S. (2001/2) 'Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy', *International Security*. Vol 26, No.3, pp.56-78.; Posen, B. (2002) 'The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy and Tactics', *International Security.* Vol. 26, No.3, pp.39-55.

[39] Although there is some divergence in the type of realism subscribed to by theorists such as Morgenthau, Mearsheimer, Walt and Kenneth Waltz, their thinking tends to coincide in relation to issues related to the 'war on terror'. While Waltz claims that the foremost concern of states is survival, as opposed to Mearsheimer who sees power maximization as the premium concern of states; both have been critical of aspects of the 'war on terror' (see Mearsheimer & Walt (2003) 'An unnecessary war', *Foreign Policy.* Jan/Feb; Mearsheimer, J. (2002) 'Hearts and Minds', *The National Interest* 69 (Fall): 13-16.)

comes at a cost, that the US is ‘less popular than it thinks’, that failed states, not non-state actors must become the priority of US foreign policy and finally, that the US can no longer act unilaterally. This is a position that has been supported by an increasing number of Walt’s realist brethren.

No matter whether some pundits claim the Bush Administration is dominated by realists (Klarevas, 2004, 21), it is patently clear that the track taken by the US Government – unilateralism, military action against non-state actors – is in stark opposition to the thinking of realists in the academic community. Further to this, opposition to the war in Iraq from well-known realists in the United States is also indicative of the abandonment of the realist project by the Bush Administration post 9/11. In September 2002, a number of well-known realist scholars – Walt, Waltz and Mearsheimer included – placed an advertisement in the New York Times opposing the war in Iraq on the basis that it was counter to America’s security and strategic interests (‘War with Iraq is not in America’s national interest’, 2002). This is in contradiction to the Bush Administration’s argument at the time, that the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime was – for a variety of reasons – a pivotal part of the broader ‘war on terror’. Walt, Mearsheimer and others in the realist camp have argued consistently that US foreign policy since 9/11 has marked a shift away from the politics of realism, a politics which – they argue – would have been a much more intelligent framework through which to respond to the al Qaeda terrorist atrocities; one based on a realistic assessment of the security threat (as opposed to manufactured intelligence and threat conflation), a multilateral defense and intelligence based approach to dealing with failed states (rather than a unilateral military assault on random targets), and a continuing program of containment and deterrence (instead of favoring preemptive strike) (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2003).

Something more akin to a classic realist response to 9/11 was favoured by liberal Republicans and most Democrats in the United States, though this failed to translate publicly due to the dominance of Bush’s narrative (Krebs & Lobasz, 2007). Those on the liberal left of politics and academia advocated an alternate track. There is an unfortunate propensity amongst some to view the response to terrorism from the ‘left’ as uncoordinated and weak. This is arguably a result of the fact that the response constructed by the Bush Administration was – as discussed earlier – exceedingly simplistic, decisive and

constructed in a very black and white sense; hence responses that advocated complexity of meaning and a long-term policy focus were portrayed as insufficient, even dangerous. The reality is that the liberal left have been vocal opponents of Bush's plan to combat terrorism, and have (contrary to popular criticism) presented a series of alternatives.

Firstly, it is argued that the terrorist atrocities should have been addressed using existing legal frameworks. In other words, bin Laden et.al. could and should have been brought to justice via trial in the US or through an international criminal court (Hudson, 2002, 197). Secondly, critics of the 'war on terror' from the liberal left continually argue that a response to 9/11 must draw on historical knowledge and experience, rather than treating the events as something so unprecedented that tried and tested methods and past experience are useless. The most vocal critics demand that the political elite behind the 'war on terror' be more contemplative and recollective in their policy choices. What, ask Chomsky (2003), Ali (2002), Said (in Barsamian, 2003) and others, have we learned about the dangers of unilateralism? A continued military presence in the Middle East? Others argue for instance, that the counter-terrorism experience in Northern Ireland – eventually one of the most successful counter-terror campaigns – should inform present endeavours to address terrorism (Fierke, 2005; Roslton, 2002). According to this view, seeking out and isolating terrorists should be accompanied by a process of dialogue and an effort to address the source of the hostilities. 'The beginning of a non-military way out of conflict', argues Rolston (2002, 62-3):

> is the acknowledgement that there are reasons for insurgency…Conflict resolution thus depends on the denial of the first premise of state propaganda: even the enemy is a human being, with the result that people have to talk and listen and be given the space for both. Such sentiments run counter to the binary thinking which underlies war and war propaganda.

Hence the third insistence of the liberal left, that a response to terrorism addresses its causes. According to this view, though the sources of terrorism are manifold and complex, the threat will not be quashed until issues like global poverty, historical injustices, the legacy of imperialism, global inequality etc. are treated as battlefronts (Fierke, 2003, 64). As is often argued by critics of the 'war on terror', addressing the threat solely through violent and exclusionary means not only fails to recognise and deal with the

issues that belie the insurgency, it actually serves to aggravate long term hatred and hostility (Mandel, 2002). It is destructive and destabilizing, not reparative.

A fourth crucial aspect of a hypothetical 'liberal left' response to terrorism would involve strengthened international coordination and cooperation. Authors such as David Held (2004) and Richard Falk (2003) argue that the response to 9/11 represents a lost opportunity with regard to the place of international law and multilateral institutions. Held (2004, 86) argues that the terrorist atrocities of 9/11 and the recent insurgency in Iraq has demonstrated clearly that states no longer have a monopoly of force; thus in order to effectively combat these new threats, security can only be truly realized 'if nation-states come together and pool resources, technology, intelligence, power and authority'. The consensus amongst the liberal left is that despite the various imperfections in the present mechanisms for international cooperation, a transnational threat must be met with a coordinated, global response. Some even take this position to its most liberal conclusion, arguing that the best way to deal with the threat of terrorism is via the establishment of a Kantian global security community (Frederking et.al., 2005). A framework such as this emphasises the importance of political relationships and networks, respect for the rules of the international community, and the peaceful resolution of conflict (Frederking et.al., 2005, 139).

Both the realist school of thought and the liberal left advocated viable and constructive frameworks through which a response to the terrorist atrocities of 9/11 could be developed. We know with hindsight that neither was successful. Instead, what gained primacy was a dogma defined by its blend of the most extreme elements of the theories of realism and idealism: neoconservatism.

2.2 The response

There was nothing inevitable about the ascendancy of neoconservatism following 9/11. The newness of the threat meant that no framework available was conceptually equipped to deal with the fresh security reality. Indeed, Condoleezza Rice conceded in the aftermath of the attacks that there was 'nothing on the shelf for this kind of war' (cited in Daalder & Lindsay, 2003, 100). Instead of an innovative and careful effort to engage with such

uncertainty, the formative stages of interpretation discussed earlier – the deployment of particular imagery and language, the use of the 'war' frame – paved the way for a simplistic and decisive approach to 9/11. Thus, it was convenient that such an approach was, in a sense, 'on the shelf' and had been since the early 1990s: the neoconservative approach.

Also termed affectionately as 'Wilsonian revivalism' or 'democratic globalism', Mearsheimer (2005, 1) describes neoconservatism as 'Wilsonianism with teeth'. This is revealing of the fact that it combines aspects of idealism (in the promotion of 'American' ideals and a belief in moral clarity) and realism (in its reliance on force); neoconservatism can therefore be understood as an 'alliance of realpolitik with a values based foreign policy' (Mead, 2004, 90). Leo Strauss is considered the father of this uniquely American body of thought[40], which is fundamentally concerned with confronting the challenges of political modernity from an ideological standpoint (Williams, 2005, 311). Put into practice by the Bush Administration after 11th September 2001, neoconservatism is, according to George (2005, 176) characterised by:

> A radical attitude towards integral aspects of traditional strategy (e.g. deterrence, balance of power, sovereignty; arms control); support for the use of overwhelming force in the face of threat or even potential threat; support for pre-emption as official strategic policy; an inclination toward unilateralism; hostile attitudes towards global liberalism and its multilateral institutions (e.g.the UN); suspicion of strategic interdependence; its inclination towards 'thinking the unthinkable' on issues of weapons systems and force projection; and ideological representation of America's exceptionalism.

Two particularly potent features of the neoconservative dogma warrant extrapolation in the context of this Chapter: the focus on the democratic project, and a firmly held belief in the possibility of moral clarity.

Pursuing the 'national interest' through unilateralism, military might and the imposition of democracy is a hallmark of neoconservatism. Irving Kristol, the 'godfather' of neoconservatism argues that the goals of American foreign policy should go beyond 'myopic national security' and pursue an agenda based on a broader notion of 'distinctive (national) greatness' (cited in Kirkby, 2007, 31). Such a view is again derivative of the thought of Leo Strauss. Strauss was a firm believer in the ability of a state to achieve

[40] George (2005) contends that the thought of Strauss has been somewhat misappropriated by neoconservative thinkers.

political excellence; he argued that influential states are both capable of and morally obligated to draw on nationalist sentiment to impose their ideologies on other states and actors. The notion of political excellence is intimately related to Strauss' vehement passion for the classic political theory of Plato and Aristotle, and his thought reflects a deep admiration for the ancient eras of wisdom, decisive leadership, and political conflict (Drury, 1999). Platonic thought underpinned some of the most crucial aspects of Strauss' political philosophy, in particular his belief in the existence of a political elite – society's wise (c.f. Plato's 'philosopher rulers') whose place in society is to make decisions that enhance the national interest on behalf of the masses. It is on this basis that Strauss is often criticised of being anti-democratic; however Strauss' belief in the 'excellence' of a democratic system of political organisation is one of the hallmarks of his thought.

Neoconservatives hold a very deep-seated belief in the primacy of democracy. Importantly, however the type of democracy advocated by Strauss and classic neoconservatives is by no means egalitarian, it is rather a system where, as George (2005, 42) explains, 'the cleverest and strongest should rule the weak, for the good of society as a whole'. Strauss posited that 'to make the world safe for the Western democracies, one must make the whole globe democratic, each country in itself as well as the society of nations' (cited in Kirkby, 2007, 39). This aspect of Strauss' thought has had a great – some may argue worrying – impact on the foreign policy priorities of modern neoconservatives. Intellectuals Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol encapsulate the modern appropriation of Strauss' position on democracy: 'democracy is a political choice, an act of will. Someone, not something, must create it… history suggest it comes most effectively from the United States' (cited in Callinicos, 2003, 25).

The Bush Administration has clearly echoed this sentiment. Particularly since the invasion of Iraq, the 'war on terror' has been described as an overt attempt to extend democracy to troubled states; as *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002, 1) makes clear, 'freedom, democracy and free enterprise' are the only 'sustainable model(s) for national success'. The 'extension' of democracy is a noble objective from the perspective of neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz who has argued since his time as a protégé of Strauss and Wohlstetter at the University of Chicago that US foreign policy must be dedicated to and promote 'universalistic principles' (Kirkby, 2007,

41-43), yet deeply troubling for those of realist or liberal left predilection who view the imposition of democracy as a dangerous and unsustainable practice.

A second important feature of neoconservative thinking as it relates to the construction of the 'war on terror' is the concept of moral clarity, something that was overwhelmingly apparent in the rhetoric of the Bush Administration following 9/11. This is again attributable in part to the thought of Strauss. Inspired by the cultural and societal changes of the 1960s in the United States, Strauss posited that all that could save the great America from 'drift(ing) in a sea of relative values' was for the wise to reassert a collective commitment to the moral values upon which the United States was founded (Kirky, 2007, 39). One might posit that such founding values are debatable, but not Strauss. He saw embedded in the American fabric a clear moral code based on very basic religious and philosophical values; the notions of 'good' and 'evil' and – like Schmitt – the distinction between 'friend' and 'enemy'. This line of thought is manifest contemporarily as a neoconservative 'moral clarity', whereby situations and events that may be deemed highly complex by some are quickly compartmentalized in order to enable decisive action. As Wolfowitz explains: 'moral vision (and) a willingness and ability to take a hard-headed and clear-eyed view of the world' are the hallmarks of a strong, Straussian, neoconservative statesman (cited in Kirkby, 2007, 44).

If this is the case then Bush et.al. fit the criteria of a neoconservative administration. Moral distinctions and value judgments were common place in the 'war on terror', obviously as a product of the ideological assumptions of the political elite responsible, but also in order to garner support and legitimise the choices made by the architects of the response to 9/11, and simultaneously delegitimise those who propose alternative approaches. Perhaps most notably is the moral distinction made between 'good' (Americans) and 'evil' (terrorists), at once an appeal to both biblical and Platoian philosophical values. Then Secretary of State Colin Powell said that terrorism 'represents no faith, no religion. It is evil, it is murderous', while Attorney General John Ashcroft posited that 'September 11 drew a bright line of demarcation between the civil and the savage' (cited in Jackson, 2005, 68, 49). William Kristol and Robert Kagan argued in 1996 for moral clarity to take a greater precedence in American foreign policy, as it was seen to be one of the main ingredients in maintaining global hegemony; it seems they got their

wish. A clear priority of the Bush Administration was, as George (2005, 42) asserts, the imposition of a more coherent moral code on the world and itself 'for the sake of the global future'.

The evolution of neoconservatism and its infiltration into mainstream political culture has been detailed by a number of authors[41], and need not be explored further here. In the context of this Chapter it is, however, critical to shed light on *how* the neoconservative approach rose to ascendancy and filled the discursive space caused by the events of 9/11. It is certainly true that neoconservatism was gathering strength and attracting more followers long before 9/11; in particular the election of George W. Bush in 2001 saw many neoconservatives – Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Pearle, Dick Cheney, Lewis Libby, Eric Edelman to name a few – rise to positions of power within the new administration[42]. This in itself is not a sufficient explanation as to how the neoconservative vision triumphed post 9/11. The short and most accurate explanation behind the success of the neoconservative response to terrorism is that multiple and powerful actors both within and outside the Bush Administration supported and lobbied hard for such an approach. As Mead (2004, 113) argues, 'politics, strategic analysis, and personal conviction came together to ensure that for the Bush Administration, the attacks of September 11 were the opening salvo in a long, unpredictable war'. But what are the particular elements of the concoction to which Mead refers?

It has become increasingly clear in the years following 9/11 that the neoconservative think tank, the Project for the New American Century (herein PNAC) had considerable influence on the foreign policy decisions of the Bush Administration. PNAC describe themselves very candidly, as:

> a non-profit educational organization dedicated to a few fundamental propositions: that American leadership is good both for America and for the world; and that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle (www.newamericancentury,org)

[41] See, for instance, Ehrman, J. (1995) *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945 – 1994*. Yale University Press: New Haven; Thompson, M.J. (2007) *Confronting the New Conservatism: the Rise of the Right in America*. NYU Press: New York; Heilbrunn, J. (2009) *They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons*. Random House: New York.

[42] For a more detailed account of the individuals in positions of power in the Bush Administration who subscribe to neoconservatism, see George (2005, 42). Max Boot (2004) contradicts the position of George, arguing that there is 'not a neocon among (the Bush Administration's) top tier', a contention not supported in the majority of the literature.

PNAC is the ultimate expression of American exceptionalism, at the heart of their ideology is a yearning for a Straussian brand of freedom, a freedom – according to Burke (2007, 18) 'rooted in a militaristic, security-obsessed ontology with overweening global ambitions, one that refuses all contrary facts, historical or contemporary'. Active since 1997 and established by William Kristol and Robert Kagan, it is no coincidence that the goals and recommendations of PNAC vis-à-vis American foreign policy have become the centerpiece of the Bush Administration's response to 9/11. Two key documents penned in 2000, *Rebuilding America's Defences* by Donald Kagan, Gary Schmitt and Thomas Donnelly and *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defence Policy* compiled and edited by William Kristol and Robert Kagan, provide a blueprint for neoconservative foreign policy. The core of these documents is an insistence that the US Government take advantage of its military supremacy and shape international affairs in order to make the world safer for the American people; the only way this is possible, it is argued, is through a more aggressive foreign policy. Such sentiment is derived from the neoconservative thirst for a 'neo-Reaganite' foreign policy, as outlined by Kristol and Kagan in 1996; a policy where American global dominance would be 'good for conservatives, good for America and good for the world' (Kristol & Kagan, 1996, 32).

Just over a week after 9/11, PNAC sent an open letter to President Bush pledging support for the US led War on Terror (see Appendix 2.1 on p.304)[43]. In addition they outlined a number of steps – including extra support for Israel, increased defence spending and regime change in Iraq – which they argued were 'the minimum necessary if this war is to be fought effectively and brought to a successful conclusion'. That the Bush Administration fulfilled this 'necessary minimum' – support to Israel increased, defence expenditure ballooned, from $292 billion in 2001 to $583 billion for the 2008 fiscal year (Cox, 2002, 73; Higgs, 2007); and of course, Saddam Hussein was toppled – is indicative

[43] The letter was signed by: William Kristol, Richard V. Allen, Gary Bauer, Jeffrey Bell, William J. Bennett, Rudy Boshwitz, Jeffrey Bergner, Eliot Cohen, Seth Cropsey, Midge Decter, Thomas Donnelly Nicholas Eberstadt, Hillel Fradkin, Aaron Friedberg, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Jeffrey Gedmin Reuel Marc Gerecht, Charles Hill, Bruce P. Jackson, Eli S. Jacobs, Michael Joyce, Donald Kagan, Robert Kagan, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Charles Krauthammer, John Lehman, Clifford May, Martin Peretz, Richard Perle, Norman Podhoretz, Stephen P. Rosen, Randy Scheunemann, Gary Schmitt, William Schneider, Jr. Richard H. Shultz, Henry Sokolski, Stephen J. Solarz, Vin Weber, Leon Wieseltier and Marshall Wittmann.

of the fact that PNAC were highly influential in helping construct the ‘war on terror’. It is increasingly evident, and recognised by several authors, that the ‘Bush Doctrine’ of American foreign policy – the core of which is the ‘war on terror’ is drawn primarily from the recommendations of PNAC (George, 2005, 42; Kirkby, 2007). Authors such as George (2005) and Kirkby (2007) posit that PNAC enjoyed this influence largely due to the fact that key players in the Bush Administration – such as Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, Zalmay Khalilizad, John Bolton, Carl Rove, Richard Pearle and Dick Cheyney – were closely linked to the organisation (either members or signatories to documents).

The ascendancy of the neoconservative agenda post 9/11 is also attributable to a proliferation of neoconservative interest groups and academics (and those in between). Lapham (2004) contends that following the election of George W. Bush, there was a greater flow of pressure from outside politics directed at the Administration itself and the Republican Party more broadly. Furthermore, it is evident that conservative think-tanks and interest groups – particularly the American Enterprise Institute and the Center for Security Policy – are far better equipped financially than their liberal counterparts (Lapham, 2004). What is also true is that a multiplicity of sources seemingly combined under the auspice of neoconservatism to lobby the Bush Administration as a joint force that was simply unmatched by realists or those on the liberal left, as George (2005, 42) explains:

> My sense is that there are interlocking networks of people in and around the Bush administration which have put aside their reservations about each other for the sake of grabbing the historical moment, of wrenching US foreign policy away from liberals and orthodox Realists. Networks, which in a variety of ways, have bound together crucial actors in US foreign policy from the 1970s to the current Bush administration.

In sum, the success of the neoconservative frame in shaping a response to 9/11 was due, at least in part, to the coordinating of a range of actors (business executives, academics, ex-politicians etc.). Related to this is the interest group which, it has been argued, has an unparalleled influence on American foreign policy: The Israeli lobby. Made up of a number of subsidiary groups the likes of the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), the Israeli lobby has been a fierce advocate of pro-active, neoconservative American foreign

policy, and subsequently passionately supports the US led ‘war on terror’. The power held by the Israeli lobby has been well documented, most prominently by Mearsheimer and Walt in 2006. Essentially their sway during the Bush Presidency was enabled via unprecedented support from, and access to Congress; a virtual stranglehold over the Executive branch, due to the role of the Jewish population in financing presidential campaigns and determining electoral outcomes in key states; and the positions of influence held by prominent pro-Israeli politicians such as Elliot Abrams, John Bolton, Douglas Feith, Lewis ("Scooter") Libby, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and David Wurmser (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, 45).

The Israeli lobby have long been pushing for American foreign policy pundits to address the use of terrorist strategies by Palestinians to undermine Israel’s sovereignty, hence it is no surprise that groups like JINSA and AIPAC applauded Bush’s decision to launch a global ‘war on terror’. The key concern of the lobby since 9/11 has been to encourage the US Government to use the ‘war on terror’ to pursue a fundamentally neoconservative agenda; a Middle East shaped in the image of the United States (the articulated priority of neoconservative foreign policy) is seen by the Israeli lobby as a means by which Israel can achieve lasting peace and security. Indeed this was the conclusion reached by the Defense Policy Board, headed by Richard Pearle, who reported to Bush soon after 9/11 that ‘removing Saddam Hussein from power should be an objective in the US war on terrorism despite the lack of any evidence linking Iraq to the attacks or to al-Qaeda’ (cited in Beinin, 2003).

In amongst this it must be said that the media in the United States were complicit in promoting or at least enabling a neoconservative agenda. McDonald (2009, 116) concurs, arguing that ‘in the United States, mainstream media sources broadly endorsed the government’s representation of September 11 and appropriate responses to it’. Yet the media also played a critical role prior to 9/11 that facilitated the triumph of a neoconservative response to terrorism. The ‘dumbing down’ of political information and the consolidation of US news media into giant (overwhelmingly ideologically conservative) media conglomerates observed by McChesney (2002) has resulted in what Kirkby (2007, 38) terms a ‘discursive hegemony (that) has enabled the rhetoric of neoconservatism to flourish’. Indeed Norris et.al. (2003) observe that the news media in

the United States assumed the curious role of facilitator and legitimator; enabling a militaristic and aggressive response to be realised and seen as continually legitimate.

This concludes the short narrative of how neoconservatism rose to prominence in the aftermath of the terrorist atrocities of 9/11. What is clear is that a range of actors made this ascendancy – and the simultaneous weakening of alternative policy frameworks – possible. In addition to the role played by PNAC, the Israeli lobby, conservative interest groups, academics and the mainstream media, it must also be remembered that amongst the neoconservatives in the Bush Administration there presumably existed a very genuine conviction that the thought of Strauss, Wohlstetter, Kristol et.al. offered the best kind of guidance for American foreign policy. Lind (2006, 170) concurs:

> Most if not all (architects of the 'war on terror') have sincerely believed that the United States and the world would be better off if the United States permanently… dominated the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. They have believed that the hegemony strategy is the most prudent and effective way to defend the American way of life'.

Once choices were made and the neoconservative frame triumphed in the United States and it was decided that a 'war on terror' would be waged it was merely a case of filling in the detail. Copious amounts of literature exists on what this war meant from a practical perspective: increased defence expenditure, a 'National Security Strategy' focused not just on quashing terrorism but also on democratising rogue states and spreading free-market capitalism, significant restrictions on domestic civil liberties (in the name of security) through legislation such as the PATRIOT Act, etc. Hence this will not be explored further here.

It is useful to recall at this point that although the neoconservatives won-out over realists and the liberal left in the United States in responding to 9/11, this was not necessarily the case abroad, particularly amongst EU nations. Although the events of 11 September 2001 caused many states to review their counter-terrorism policies, the choices made overall reflect a differing ideological position to that of the United States. Despite widespread sympathy for the United States post 9/11 among European nations (including non EU states such as Russia), and an expressed willingness to offer support to combat terrorism in some capacity, the reality is that most European nations interpreted 9/11 and the best response quite differently to the US. Mead (2004, 110-11) explains:

> Most American allies in Europe and a large section of the domestic foreign policy establishment would have greatly preferred a more "nuanced" and "sophisticated" view of the nature of the challenge rather than simply calling it a war on terror. As former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine said, "We are threatened today by a new simplism which consists in reducing everything to the war on terrorism." They would have preferred to cope with terrorism as a police and political matter, and saw the problem with Al-Qaeda as a more dangerous but otherwise not dissimilar problem than those posed, say, by the Basque terrorists in Spain or the IRA in Northern Ireland.

The core of the divergence in opinion between the US and its European 'allies' was ideology. It is evident in speeches made by officials from Russia, Germany, France and Turkey, amongst others, that the United States is increasingly alone in its insistence to view security in a Westphalian sense. Frederking et.al. (2005) contend that the attitude to 9/11 in European states can be broadly seen to differ from the US position in two crucial ways. Firstly, they tend to view the terrorist atrocities as crime rather than an act of war. This is evident in the language of various politicians who spoke in the aftermath of 9/11 of the importance of combating the 'crime' of global terrorism (Katzenstein, 2003, 732). Curiously, the tendency to view 9/11 as a crime was more prominent in European nations with a history of terrorist incidents much greater than that of the United States (Katzenstein, 2003). The second point of divergence between US and European views of 9/11 is that most European states expressed a strong desire to respond to the attacks through a framework of collective security (Frederking et.al., 2005, 148-9). Continual reference is made in speeches by officials in Europe to the importance of combating terrorism in accordance with 'international law', and via cooperation with the 'international community' (Frederking et.al., 2005).

This position was made abundantly clear in Europe's vehement condemnation of the US in expanding its 'war on terror' to an invasion of Iraq in 2003. Key American allies in Europe such as France, Russia and Germany condemned the Bush Administration for its neoconservative unilateralism and for stepping outside the laws of the international community (Callinicos, 2003, 18). Rather than appease the United States, the European Union (with the notable exception of the UK) opted for an approach to counter-terrorism based on collective security rules combined with strengthened domestic anti-terror legislation. The EU devotes part of its struggle against terrorism to addressing root causes (if only at a rhetorical level which is still more than can be said of the United States), and

is dedicated to cross-border intelligence and policing cooperation (Fierke, 2005). This reinforces the importance of the interpretive and contemplative phase vis-à-vis the events of 9/11, illustrates that the understanding of and response to terrorist attack is based on choice and assumption, and most importantly, this serves to indicate that there were workable alternatives to the 'Bush Doctrine', not just at an ideological level but also in a practical capacity.

2.3 Australia's response

It has been widely documented – even by relatively conservative commentators such as Samuel Huntington – that under the Bush Presidency the United States found itself increasingly alone in its foreign policy choices; most Western states address security priorities in a way that is consistent with a complex, globalised, post Cold War world, while the US adopted a Manichean approach. Despite the decreasing popularity of American policy among states and evident in global public opinion more broadly (Goldsmith et.al., 2005), a handful of US foreign policy faithfuls remained; I refer here to Australia.

John Howard's interpretation of 9/11 can be broadly characterised as a carbon copy of George W. Bush's. Interestingly Howard trod carefully in his interviews in the few days following 11th September, expressing 'sympathy and support' for the United States (Howard, 11/9/01, press conference). It wasn't until the position of the Bush Administration became clearer that Howard began to echo the rhetoric of those in the Bush Administration. The following Chapters will engage in a detailed analysis of the language of Howard and other Australian officials, but it can be said in a broad sense that the early acts of interpretation and response were consistent with that posited by the US Government. In addition to this it must be said that the act of public interpretation of the 9/11 attacks was also similar to that experienced in the United States; media coverage of the events was exhaustive, commentary tended to be conducted at a superficial level – discussion of Australia's shared values with America, the need for a decisive response, and the probability that it could be 'us' under attack, dominated early debate. This was reflected in opinion polls conducted at the time. Just a few days following 9/11, Newspoll

found that two-thirds of Australians were in favour of 'America retaliating with force against those it believes responsible for the terrorist attacks'; 70% supported Australian military involvement to assist the US (Goot, 2007, 261). As such, the atmosphere in Australia was ripe for the kind of militaristic response Howard would offer[44].

Even though in the days following 9/11 Howard offered a proverbial blank cheque of Australian support for the United States, before the US themselves had even decided on a response (Beeson, 2003, 13); to argue Howard had no *choice* in this matter is to argue that power operates in some kind of vacuum, as Kevin (2004, 306) argues:

> Howard had a real choice… He could have stood back a little, as kindred countries Canada and New Zealand did – properly sharing American grief, properly co-operating at practical levels in al-Qaeda investigations, but avoiding signing up to the bombastic excesses of the war on terror.

Be that as it may, for a variety of reasons Howard signed Australia up with almost no hesitation, arguably minimal consultation, and in the process (much like his US brethren) condemned those with alternative visions as 'un-Australian'.

Several authors have noted that Howard's physical presence in Washington at the time of the 9/11 attacks played a pivotal role in his decision to respond decisively and in line with the Bush Administration (Garran, 2004; Aulich & Wettenhall, 2005). Garran (2004, 1) goes so far as to argue that it was in those formative moments immediately after the attacks that Howard made his 'decision', 'Howard's instincts told him the United States should deliver a strong military response; he trusted Bush's approach to the crisis'. That he gave a guarantee of Australian support to the United States on that very day – Howard reportedly told the American Ambassador Tom Schieffer 'we're with you, we're going to help' (Garran, 2004, 69) – indicates that this was a genuinely Schmittian decision; one taken by the leader in a time of crisis. Perhaps this explains in part why Howard's rhetoric in the aftermath of 9/11 was filled with references to 'Australia's shared way of life with America', as if to posit that Bush's crisis could be his crisis too (Curran, 2004). It must be added that Howard's personal affection for Bush probably also affected his

[44] Indeed one assumes that Government pollster Mark Textor would have urged Howard to make a decisive policy move while emotion, fear and uncertainty determined the conception of the events of 9/11 in the public's psyche.

decision to support the US. Howard is on the record as having a great deal of respect and admiration for the then US President (Beeson, 2003).

It would be erroneous to assume that Howard's decision to join the US in the 'war on terror' was based entirely on emotion or personal affection for Bush Jr.. Howard's own interpretation of events and his own ideological position arguably paved the way for this new partnership. Howard calls himself a 'Burkean conservative'; a pragmatic brand of conservatism that permits 'change in order to conserve' (Heywood, 2005, 348). And he has appropriated the words of Edmund Burke in order to justify Australia's involvement in the 'war on terror', saying 'it is necessary only for the good man to do nothing for evil to triumph' (cited in Irving, 2004, 94). In that sense the Schmittian rhetoric of good versus evil expounded by the Bush Administration sat comfortably with Howard.

He is not, however, a neoconservative. Yet, nor is Tony Blair, Bush's most important alliance partner in the 'war on terror'. Obviously one does not have to replicate the views of the Bush Administration to see merit in their policy response. What is crucial is that the ideological position of Howard and Blair accommodated Bush's policy. Blair's justification for war was at times almost humanitarian, while Howard's was closer to Bush's but focused on shared values and Australia's national security interests rather than the importance of American global hegemony (Anderson, 2002). Based on his professed foreign policy priorities, Howard is best described as having been a realist on some issues (China in particular) and a hawkish cold warrior on others like the threat of terrorism and the American alliance, whereby security is best ensured through strong political and military alliance.

That Australia's involvement in the US led 'war on terror' is the product of Howard's own political conviction and power is supported by a number of commentators. Garran (2004, 9) argues that whilst he did not act alone, the 'war on terror' – including its extension to the invasion of Iraq – is 'Howard's war', a sentiment shared by Broinowski (2005). Paul Kelly (2006, 19) goes further to explain exactly how Howard enjoys such authority over Australia's foreign policy choices:

> John Howard has introduced a new dimension to his office – the Prime Minister as national security chief. It is a multiple role – executive, political and presentational. It has been created by Howard during his prime ministership in response to events and crises. The

> upshot is that Howard has an unmatched grip on the machinery dealing with war, counter-terrorism, the military and intelligence agencies.

This is a position supported by Walter (2006) and Baldino (2005, 204), who argues that the Prime Minister's Office was, since the election of the Howard Government, almost exclusively responsible for foreign policy choices and decisions. It is true that a number of other key players were involved, at least in part, in Howard's initial decision to join the 'war on terror'. Whilst still in the United States Howard phoned foreign minister Alexander Downer and informed him of his desire to invoke the ANZUS treaty as a means of pledging support to the United States; Downer endorsed Howard's decision and has continued to be his closest political confidante and supporter throughout the 'war on terror' (Garran, 2004, 9, 72).

Even if Howard acted relatively autonomously in supporting the Bush Administration in the 'war on terror', he did justify his decision in political terms. The importance of the ANZUS alliance was initially conceptualised as a major force behind Australian involvement in Afghanistan. Interestingly, Howard had been in Washington on 9/11 to mark the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS treaty, and 9/11 represented an opportunity for Australia to make good on their previously rhetorical commitment to the United States. Although Howard initially talked-up the importance of the ANZUS treaty, it was revealed early on that the US had not actually requested directly that ANZUS be invoked, and Alexander Downer was later forced to concede that invoking ANZUS was purely symbolic (Garran, 2004, 73). One must then consider the importance of the US alliance in a more general sense in informing Howard's decision to join the 'war on terror'.

It is herein that we find one of the most compelling explanations for Howard's blank cheque of support for the US. Historically, of course, this is not at all a new phenomenon. Menzies (1970) famously declared that Australia would always look to a 'great and powerful friend' in the business of foreign policy. Since the Pacific War in 1945, the United States has been that friend. Despite a fleeting attempt by the Labor Governments to engage with the region in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the bipartisan foreign policy consensus since 1945 in Australia has been to support the United States, period. This, it is argued, is the only means by which our security can be guaranteed. This

is arguably a dated approach to security, and its merits are questionable (Beeson, 2003, 14). Yet Howard's language in the aftermath of 9/11 and during the 'war on terror' consistently indicated that it is crucial for 'Australia's security' and in 'Australia's national interest' to support its major alliance partner (Singleton, 2005, 11).

From a constructivist perspective appealing to the 'national interest' is nothing more than a rhetorical act justifying state action (Weldes, 1999); in that sense Howard's legitimising act can be viewed as an attempt to appeal to the insecurities and fears of Australians (something that will be explored in detail in the following Chapters), but it also reflects a very genuine belief on Howard's part that supporting a hegemonic United States is a viable means by which to achieve domestic security (Beeson, 2003). In some way this is true, a strong alliance with the United States enables 'intelligence sharing, military training, logistics support, trade links, scientific expertise, access to cutting-edge military equipment etc.' (Baldino, 2005, 197). Yet it ignores the dangers inherent in complying with US demands at the expense of regional engagement and cooperation.

Finally, one must also consider the political benefits Howard reaped as a result of his chosen policy path. Historically, provoked attack offers leaders an extraordinary opportunity for increased political legitimacy. With an election looming and trailing in the polls, the chance to engage Australia in what was perceived publicly as a legitimate war was arguably too good a political offering to pass up. According to McAllister (2003, 446), the Labor Party held a 13 point lead over the Liberal Party in the first six months of 2001, and looked set for defeat were it not for the vote-turning issues of border protection and terrorism. Polls throughout the world reflected the reality that voters opt to support the incumbent government in times of uncertainty and existential threat (McAllister, 2003, 448); Howard rode this wave with great success. He was remade as a war leader in the spirit of his great mentor Robert Menzies (Baldino, 2005, 204); he became the 'deputy sheriff' he had aspired to two years prior (Beeson, 2003, 12); he took on a new image as a gutsy conviction politician; and he promised Australians security against that which they feared (rationally or otherwise).

On 25th October 2001, John Howard addressed the Australian Defence Association, offering the first detailed, public explanation of the implications of Australia's involvement in the Global War on Terrorism. Of this war, he said:

> We know that our mission will not be easy. It will be prolonged and against an enemy hiding in the dark corners of the world. An enemy who will falsely portray our objective to destroy terrorism as an assault upon Islam. The war will be a new kind of war. There will be few, if any, set-piece battles to bring it to an end. Rather it will be a sustained effort, requiring sturdy patience, and the careful marshalling and coordination of resources (Howard, 25/10/12, address to the Australian Defence Association).

The material aspects of Australia's commitment to the 'war on terror': military action, intelligence gathering, law enforcement measures and legislative changes since Howard's speech, have been studied in some depth. What accompanied this material commitment was a change in the Australian political landscape. As a result of our involvement in the 'war on terror', Australia experienced a 'shift from engagement to watchfulness and security' (Wesley, cited in McDonald, 2005, 297). The focus on security became a near obsession, where asylum seekers – society's most vulnerable – became the object of our fear; the political elite frequently conflated terrorist with asylum seeker, and used the threat of terrorism as justification for the rejection of ethical responsibility to the 'other'. In the earliest days of Australia's commitment to the 'war on terror', Minister for Administration and Finance Peter Slipper said:

> There is a connection between illegals and terrorists and we ought to consider that many people that claim to be refugees are people who come from Afghanistan… It's not beyond the realms of possibility that the Taliban regime could well be sending people to Australia as terrorists under the guise of illegals (cited in Gelber & McDonald, 2006, 283).

The demonising and 'othering' of refugees and asylum seekers in Australian political discourse post 9/11 is seen to be a crucial element in the legitimisation of a military response to terrorism. It enabled the 'us' (as defined against 'them') and 'good' (as opposed to 'evil') rhetoric to take on a powerful meaning in the domestic context, translating to a greater acceptance of the 'othering' that occurred in an international context through the 'war on terror' (Lee Koo, 2005).

It was said repeatedly that military conquest was the only way to achieve security. Violent intervention, pre-emptive strike and increased defence capacity were consistently advocated over other measures such as dialogue, diplomacy and engagement. Those advocating alternative approaches or even questioning the merit of a 'war on terror' were (like in the United States) hastily discredited, shouted down as unpatriotic, or even labeled

terrorist sympathisers. And it wasn't just the political elite who were party to this process, mainstream media and parts of the intelligentsia were also involved in legitimising the Howard Government's choices, as the following Chapters will evidence. Thus it could be claimed that in 2001 Australia pledged not only to support America and the Bush Administration in a military capacity, but in a discursive capacity also (Lee Koo, 2005).

2.4 Summary

The time for choices and options seemed short-lived, and the violent and exclusionary discourse of counter-terrorism quickly became dominant. But such dominance is by no means an organic or inevitable occurrence. Political primacy, as noted by Anderson (2002, 12), must be manufactured in some capacity; a steady stream of support from the citizenry is never guaranteed. What is required for large scale decisions – like involvement in war – is not just acceptance of the terms, but the 'activation of popular sentiment' (Anderson, 2002, 12). The following Chapters will show that support or complicity is sought through language. Language is where choices, identities, difference and meaning are constructed (and excluded); it is, in Lene Hansen's words, 'relationally structured and ontologically productive' (Hansen, 2006, 17). Language was a critical aspect of the phases of interpretation and decision as outlined above, in allowing the triumph of a neoconservative world view and implicating Australia in America's foreign policy agenda.

This Chapter has provided a genealogy of sorts regarding the interpretation of the 11th September attacks. Before moving onto a discourse analysis of language in Australia's 'war on terror' discourse in Chapter Four, the following Chapter delves further into some of the periods of Australia's past that were instrumental in informing our interpretation of, and response to, 9/11.

3

Architecture of the Discourse

The extent to which discourses draw on historical discourses is a delicate epistemological question. In his seminal essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' (1971), Foucault repeatedly emphasises that history reveals not origins but the place of chance, disparity and dissension. Genealogy encourages the analysis of history to determine not truths or foundations but the many and varied events, choices and accidents that have led to our present. As Hansen (2006, 53) puts it, discourses 'might not repeat historical articulations slavishly, but they would have to relate themselves thereto'. Genealogy is therefore a means for tracing the evolution of current discourses, but also for seeing how particular representations win out over others. It may also provide an indication of where opportunities for discursive change might lie in the present (Hansen, 2006, 53).

For these reasons, this Chapter looks not for the 'source' of the 'war on terror' discourse, but rather it looks to history for the architecture of the discourse. The architecture of this discourse is coloured by the concept of insecurity, a point supported by Burke (2001, xxi) who argues that (in)security has been a 'potent, driving imperative throughout Australian history'. As I will demonstrate, the prevalence of this theme throughout Australia's (post)colonial history has played a pivotal role in enabling public support for Howard's approach to counter-terrorism.

The Chapter posits that there are four pivotal periods in Australian history that make up the architecture of the discourse. In the critique of discourse, a genealogical approach enables one to 'disturb the immobile, fragment the unified and show the heterogeneity of what was thought to be consistent' (Barrett, 1991, 132). So this Chapter is also a genealogy of sorts of the concept of security in Australia.

Genealogy pays particular attention to the construction and deployment of identity: a 'relational concept usually defined in some form of difference' and a key discursive tool in establishing and altering existing systems of power (Fierke, 2007, 97). Arguably a product of its infancy, Australia has something of an obsession with national identity, a

fact that has been observed by a number of authors (see various authors in Stokes, 1997). John Howard was particularly partial to kicking around the identity ball, happily and frequently defining Australia in terms of 'mateship', Christianity, good sportsmanship and – most often – the Anzac legend. Hollow rhetoric to some, with whom these categories may well have no resonance; Howard and politicians before him have nonetheless consistently used identity as a tool, to great political advantage. Howard has curiously remarked that 'national identity develops in an organic way over time…government and their social engineers should not try to manipulate it' (cited in Stokes, 1997, 1). As was established earlier in this thesis, the development of a national identity is not an organic procedure, but is very much a *constructed* process. Politicians have, since Australia's colonisation exploited our conception of identity for political advantage. The ease with which we utter the expression 'un-Australian' is reflective of a nation happy to paint those who challenge or simply fail the stipulated identity 'criteria' as an outsider, an 'Other'. Indeed it is arguable that the construction of a state's national identity is reliant on the concurrent delineation of an Other (Hansen, 2006, 19). Identity is thus a recurring theme of this Chapter, and indeed this dissertation. It recurs in the context of a rhetorical move[45] as well as a disciplinary measure[46] by the political elite and various institutions such as churches, schools and the mainstream media.

This Chapter will also illustrate the way in which the concept of identity is deployed in the service of the state's security project under the guise of the 'national interest'. Throughout Australia's colonised history, 'national interest' rhetoric has been drawn upon to justify and muster support for important decisions. It is one of the most potent discursive strategies undertaken by the political elite, and must be interrogated in this genealogy for a number of reasons. Firstly, because it is a tool used to curb contestation over decisions taken by states. And secondly because 'national interest' rhetoric is a strong indicator of the descent of hegemonic discourses of security, as Weldes (1999, 12) explains: 'when state officials (and others) construct the national interest, they do so out of extant resources – including linguistic, cultural and institutional resources – provided by the security imaginary'. Hence a better understanding and rejection of

[45] In the Aristotelian sense, as a 'means of persuasion' (Burke, 2001, xxxii).
[46] In a Foucauldian sense.

‘national interest’ rhetoric may illuminate marginalised means of achieving security, and enables a clearer genealogical picture of the nature of the regime of truth that is Australia’s incumbent counter-terrorism discourse.

The prevalence of ‘national interest’ rhetoric in Australian political discourse is reflective of the prevalence of the realist school of thought in Australia’s own ‘security imaginary’ (Burke, 2001, xxx), an imaginary that bolsters policy decisions predicated on constructed notions of ‘national interest’ and simultaneously rejects competing ethical considerations (Hansen, 2006, 168). A fixation with national security and sovereign survival is particularly evident in the four periods in Australian history on which this Chapter focuses. It is the task of this Chapter to illuminate these patterns in order to shed light on the nature of our present, but also to go some way towards challenging the notion that the obsession with preserving the state’s ‘physical, political, and cultural identity’ against nations and peoples – Morgenthau’s mantra (Weldes, 1999, 5) – is the best means of conceptualising and achieving security in Australia.

The claimed historical pillars of the contemporary discourse of counter-terrorism in Australia are as follows. Firstly the period of both latent and observable violence between colonisation and World War Two, a time in which violence was experienced and indeed glorified as a means of establishing a desperately sought national security and identity. Secondly, the years of the Cold War, when an atmosphere of fear of the Other was manufactured to great political advantage by the Menzies Government. Thirdly, a precedence of statism was set in the formative years of the Cold War through the establishment of ASIO, and key international security agreements like ANZUS, SEATO and the Colombo Plan. The final discursive underpinning in the architecture of Australia’s counter-terrorism discourse is the period of exclusion fostered by the rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party, which gained popularity on the back of so-called ‘culture wars’ in the United States, and through the complicity of the new Howard Government. The entry of Howard marked the beginnings of the construction of a new but not entirely unfamiliar security regime, for the new government drew from these extant resources in Australia’s security imaginary.

3.1 Violence

Many Australians of all walks, from the general public to members of the political and intellectual elite believe that Australia is a 'lucky country'[47], one of the only nations to remain largely untouched by war and violence since its colonial founding. A more discerning understanding of Australian history reveals that this is nothing more than an erroneous platitude. Violence, in fact, has been a continual and deeply ingrained feature of Australian cultural and political life since colonisation, to the extent that its prevalence as a theme in the formative years of the Australian nation has played a pivotal role in informing contemporary political discourse.

In her seminal text, *The Human Condition* (1958), Hannah Arendt theorised that the 'modern age' was experiencing a return to the Roman era in its enthusiasm for violence as a means of nation building (1958, 228). This turn, she posits, is characterised by a shift away from contemplation and rationality in politics, towards humankind as *homo faber*, consumed by the need to conquer; new body politics, she argues are founded upon 'the glorification of violence as the only means for "making" it' (1958, 228). In 'conquering' and colonising the great south land, the British settlers showed an early inclination towards the violence Arendt spoke of. One of the earliest instances of mass violence in the new colony was the killing of the indigenous population who seemingly posed the first existential threat to the survival of the colony. This was an important discursive moment in Australian political history, setting something of a tone whereby security would be achieved partially through violent means; by engaging in violent acts, by glorifying violence as a unifying and disciplinary measure, and by turning a blind eye to violence committed against others.

This culture of violence grew, as Burke (2001, 10) asserts, out of a fundamental feeling of insecurity, greed and a sense of civilisational superiority amongst the early white settlers. Despite Governor Phillip's good intentions vis-à-vis the indigenous population in the first years of the colony's establishment, the battle for continental hegemony and

[47] Donald Horne wrote his seminal work *The Lucky Country* in 1964 as a critique of the Menzies Government and the state of Australian political and economic culture more generally. The irony in the title was lost on many Australians and has come to be used more literally by patriots and optimists alike.

individual ‘security’ meant that vicious encounters soon occurred between the new population and the old. Not only were there acts of direct physical violence, some historians propose that the smallpox virus – which devastated the Aboriginal population – was deliberately spread to indigenous people in the Sydney area in order to curb the ‘security’ threat that they posed (Day, 1996, 63). This was a biopolitical ploy the British had previously used in North America against the Indian people, and was effectively a means of diversifying the violence committed in the name of security (Day, 1996, 64). After 100 years of white settlement in the Australian colonies, more than 1.4 million Aborigines had been killed, leaving a meager 60,000 (Burke, 2001, 14). By the turn of the 20th century, nationalist sentiment was building in anticipation of Australian federation, and it was in part upon the conquering of the ‘savages’ that this sentiment drew.

Ignatieff (1993, 6) argues that as a moral idea, ‘nationalism is an ethic of heroic sacrifice, justifying the use of violence in the defence of one’s nation against enemies internal or external’. By Federation, the place of violence in the Australian political and cultural psyche had been firmly cemented. In one of the most famous and lauded instances of violence in Australian history – the Eureka Stockade of 1854, 31 people: five soldiers and 25 gold diggers were killed (Clarke, 1978, 78). It was a battle over the fundamentals of security: a battle to maintain societal order on the part Victorian Government troops, and a battle over economic justice from the perspective of the diggers. Almost seven years later a group of gold miners parading the Eureka flag infamously pillaged and burned the camps of Chinese diggers at Lambing Flat in Victoria, ruthlessly attacking men, women and children, the target of their racist insecurity and fear (Clarke, 1978, 131). Though this attack was by no means glorified – indeed it was briefly but vehemently condemned by many in the media – it was a classic instance of what would become Australia’s ‘blind eye’ to violence committed against the ‘Other’[48].

This culture of violence in the emerging Australian national psyche was built upon in spectacular fashion following the First World War. A burgeoning nation, Australia needed a means by which subjects could be unified in the manner that the colonies had become. The solution was found in the Anzac legend. It has been noted by many authors

[48] The events at Lambing Flat were arguably the instigator of the decision by the colonial governments to enact legislation to prevent Chinese immigration. All had done so by 1888 (Burke, 2001, 14).

that the experience of Australian soldiers at Gallipoli provided the architects of the new Australian nation a very potent tool for unification and the creation of a national identity (see White, 1981; Burke, 2001; Stokes, 1997). Its potency is still felt today.

Broadly, the 'digger myth' or 'Anzac legend' is a reference to the claim that the Australian nation was founded on the experience at the battle of Gallipoli, and that the 'digger' is therefore a prototype of true Australian-ness (Day, 1998, 95). The myth is a prominent feature of Australian politics and culture, and is formally endorsed each year with the commemoration of Anzac day on the 25th April. It is on this day each year that Gallipoli is remembered, as McDonald (2010, 290) points out, not as the site of 'tragic and unnecessary violence' but as 'glorious bravery in the face of the odds, proving to others the worth of Australians and Australia's role in the world.

What are the effects of manufacturing a national psyche out of the glorification of sacrifice? Burke (2001, 32) posits that the effect is the normalisation of death and suffering, the realisation of Hobbes' notion of the *body politic*, 'that we glorify with our death and nourish with our blood'. We might also view the prevalence of the Anzac legend as a form of governmentality. Foucault (2007, 120) said that governmentality was to the state what techniques of segregation were to psychiatry or techniques of discipline to the penal system. Anzac orders Australians in service of security (Johns, 2008). Through processes of commemoration and remembrance – such that it has the status of almost religious observance (White, 1981, 136), and through its repetition in political and cultural discourse[49], Australians are coaxed to fashion themselves into the loyal, enterprising and patriotic digger. In this sense, Anzac becomes a means of population management in service of security – a form of governmentality.

The enthusiasm with which politicians, churches and the media latched onto the 'digger myth' and the place it retains in the Australian psyche today is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly because it has taken the tangible experience of violence from the soldiers themselves and reworked them for political reasons (a practice that is still

[49] References to the role of ANZAC are littered throughout the language of Prime Minister Howard. In an address at Australia House in London he said 'The landing on Gallipoli, which gave birth to the ANZAC spirit, became, in fullness of time, the most defining event in our history. Anzac Day remains more evocative of the Australian spirit than any other day in our calendar. The emotional pull of Anzac has grown and not diminished through time, especially amongst the youth (Howard, 11/11/03, address at Australia House London).

evident in depictions of contemporary military experience); secondly because it has cemented the primacy of realism in Australian political discourse and made it very difficult for opposition to militarism and violence to be taken seriously; and finally because its acceptance and glorification of violence continues to inform contemporary political practice in Australia.

3.2 Fear

Fear is said to be the most powerful of human emotions (Lawrence, 2006, 9). It is also a hugely influential political tool, used and misused by political elite since the birth of politics itself. Burke (2001) posits that the Australian nation has been shaped by fear: fear of the 'savage', fear of the landscape, fear of isolation, fear of invasion, fear of the 'Other'. It was upon these fears that our nation was founded. However the Cold War era set a new precedent for fear-mongering in Australia. The election of the Menzies Government in December 1949 saw the birth of a 'politics of fear', a deliberate attempt by the political elite to manipulate truth – most obviously though the use of 'rhetoric' – for political gain. If this period was not the template upon which Howard's discourse of counter-terrorism was modeled, then there are at least some very significant parallels, and the Cold War era in Australia can therefore be considered one of the critical pillars in the contemporary discourse with which this thesis is concerned.

A politics of fear thrives in a particular climate, most easily when some existential threat to a society's security – imagined or real – exists. It has been observed by many political theorists, philosophers and political leaders, from Kant to Adorno and Aung San Suu Kyi, that fear is the enemy of liberty (Robin, 2004, 927). In other words, in the political world, fear plays into conservative hands because it enables the maintenance of the status quo; broadly speaking governments retain office and progress and change is deliberately resisted (Glassner, 2004, 819). But the creation of a politics of fear is by no means an organic process. Its existence depends on the fulfillment of a number of criteria. Firstly, individuals who imagine an existential threat must respond through what Sunstein (2004, 967) terms 'availability heuristic' and 'probability neglect'. The former reaction refers to a sense of danger that is not reflective of the actuality of the threat, and the latter

encapsulates a tendency to dwell on the worst-case possibilities. However the research of Pavlov (cited in Lawrence, 2006, 9) indicates that this individual response is not necessarily natural, instead, individuals must be lured to conceptualise a threat in such terms, a task that falls to the political elite and the mainstream media.

Glassner (2004) contends that there are three stages involved in converting a threat to a narrative of fear. Firstly, there must be a *repetition* of the threat, that the political elite must become completely preoccupied by it and that the media must cover it exhaustively. Secondly that what might actually be *an isolated incident must be depicted as a trend*. And finally that both parties must engage in *misdirection*, in focusing attention away from rational consideration and reality and focusing energy on the permissible realities and fabrications. The political response to and media coverage of 9/11 in the United States and Australia discussed in the previous Chapter was a clear instance of such a process. The precedent for this, though, was largely established in the years of 'McCarthyism' in the U.S. and in the second Menzies era in Australia.

In order to understand what was so politically appealing about manufacturing fear for McCarthy and Menzies, and later Bush and Howard, it is helpful to revisit the work of some famous conservative political theorists. According to Edmund Burke, fear is something to be cherished because it supposedly enables a heightened state of political experience, forcing us to act in the world with 'greater moral discrimination' (cited in Robin, 2004, 928), and an appreciation of the reality (the experience of life outside that which we fear rather than within it) in which we find ourselves. 'Fear', wrote Alexis de Tocqueville (1835-40) 'must be put to work on behalf of liberty'.

However, the creation of a politics of fear is not necessarily some act of conspiracy in and of itself conjured to delude the public. It is often a genuine fear of change or the unknown (and corresponding partiality to the status quo) inherent in conservatism. Thus the generation of a narrative of fear is a reflexive response by conservatives in order to fortify the incumbent state of affairs against that which is unfamiliar and therefore threatening.

A critical way in which this is achieved is through the use of what Aristotle called 'rhetoric', constructing a narrative through the 'existing means of persuasion' (Dixon, 1971, 14). Each narrative of fear, therefore, is based on the same template: fortifying the

incumbent state of affairs against that which is unfamiliar. It is the rhetoric that changes. In 2001 George Bush argued that liberty and freedom would triumph in the face of Islamic extremism. In the 1950s Menzies argued that democracy must be preserved against the threat posed by Communism. Rhetoric regards as incidental the place of complexity of meaning. Indeed a crucial parallel between the discourses of the Cold War and the 'war on terror' is the vagueness of terms and their ambiguous usage. The use and misuse of words like 'freedom', 'liberty', 'democracy', 'evil' and others in the 'war on terror' discourse has been explored by several authors (Jackson, 2005; Collins & Glover, 2002).

In Cold War Australia similar rhetorical practices occurred. Robert Menzies himself proposed that 'the art of politics…is to provide exposition, persuasion and inspiration' (cited in Brett, 1992, 21). Burke (2001, 86) contends that 'in an appalling exercise in reduction', 'communism' became a potent image of the 'Other', an image which encompassed all that which was not inside Menzies' construction of the normal; and as a deeply conservative man, his conception of normal was – to say the least – fairly restrictive. As Brett (1992) notes, anyone who displayed the slightest inclination towards trade-unionism, feminism or internationalism were outside the realm of normality according to Menzies' definition, and therefore ran the very real risk of being branded a communist. The Menzies' Government's insistence that Australians must be either for or against communism (Maher, 1998b, 448) was great rhetorical grist to the fear mill, a move that has been repeated in the 'war on terror' discourse. The effect of Menzies' Cold War rhetoric was not just to frighten the public into complicity in hunting down communists within the nation – though the insistence that citizens report 'suspicious activity' to the Government (Maher, 1998b, 450) was a crucial discursive ploy – it created a climate of fear of communism and progressiveness more broadly that discredited all opposition to his Government, thus strengthening their own authority and resulting in a twenty-three year incumbency and a senate majority for much of that time (Lowe, 1999, 102).

Although it has been rightly said by many pundits that Menzies' used the Cold War for electoral advantage, it must be said also that Menzies very genuinely viewed the Cold War as an ideological battle, one in which Australia's success or failure rested squarely with him and his Government. Despite his civil libertarian inclinations Menzies vehemently believed that 'the communists' commitment to the revolutionary overthrow of

capitalism and parliamentary democracy took them outside the bounds of legitimate political conflict' (Brett, 1992, 74). According to Lowe (1999, 112), communism and the Cold War struggle struck at the heart of Menzies conservatism:

> For Menzies, the Australian birthright was linked inextricably to the fate of the British Empire, and this was how communism touched two key nerves: it not only offended his belief in an organic, classless society, Christian values and the worth of the individual, but it was also in the vanguard of decolonisation in its most destructive form. Communism threatened empires, including the British race in Australia…

So in essence, Menzies' Cold War crusade in Australia was an attempt to retain the British-Australian national identity and political culture he so passionately believed in; an attempt to maintain social norms and order by demonizing and expelling threats to the social order (Brett, 1992, 101). In order to achieve this, Menzies needed draconian legislation – such as the infamous Communist Party Dissolution Bill, restrictions on civil liberties – particularly on freedom of association and freedom of speech, and he needed support in his task from major public institutions, as well as widespread public support and minimal opposition.

The temptation to create a narrative of fear as a kind of political shortcut was perhaps too great for Menzies to resist. It was a narrative that was swiftly, but very carefully constructed. Maher (1998a, 356) notes that vocal anti-communist forces inside the media, the military, the judiciary and churches were willing accomplices in Menzies' fear campaign. The existence of the infamous 'Defence Notice' or D-Notice system (whereby mainstream media outlets agreed to impose a system of self censorship in relation to sensitive defence information) is testimony to the complicity of the media (in particular Sir Keith Murdoch) in Menzies' project (Maher, 1998b, 452). This new anti-communist political elite employed clever techniques in their creation of fear and hysteria. Glassner's aforementioned narrative techniques are strikingly evident in Menzie's Cold War discourse. Repetition is evidenced through the exhaustive coverage of the cold conflict in the media at the time. While misdirection is apparent in some of the more spurious claims regarding supposed communist sympathisers. It was claimed repeatedly that communist membership was on the rise and that Soviet spies, or in the words of the Minister for External Affairs R.G. Casey, a 'nest of communist traitors' occupied key positions in the bureaucracy (Maher, 1998b, 452), when in fact membership to the CPA

had been in sharp decline since 1945 (Maher, 1998a, 364), and not one charge of espionage was ever laid against anyone in the public service (Maher, 1998b, 467).

But the most effective weapon in the artillery of the political elite was arguably the ability to appeal to notions of Australian identity. This hinged on the simple but effective rhetorical notion that, in the words of Lowe (1999, 108) 'the Australian way of life was what communism was not'. In this process of 'Othering', Menzies went to great lengths to continually 'remind' Australians what they were; they were Christian and moral. In his Parliamentary address accompanying the introduction of the Communist Dissolution Bill, Menzies argued that 'Christianity was never the enemy of law or order' (cited in Kemp & Stanton, 2004, 147), and his colleague Percy Spender posited that overcoming the communism threat required 'faith in our civilisation and our Christian culture' (cited in Lowe, 1999, 109). These virtues were habitually positioned against communism's atheism and immorality (Lowe, 1999, 110). So too were Australians British, white and Western in Menzies' construction: herein he skillfully manipulated Australians' long held fears of invasion and isolation, by constantly reminding them that it was their whiteness and their ties with Britain and other Western powers that offered the most reliable cushion against communist infiltration and aggression (Phillips, 1983, 24). This had the important effect of demonizing the Labor Party's seemingly cosmopolitan aspirations and reinforcing the dominance of an insular, realist foreign policy framework.

Finally, Menzies drew on the familiar and clichéd images of the Anzac and the bushman in his constant references to the virtues of individual enterprise and self sacrifice. Brett (1992, 63) notes that Menzies' continual reference to these 'merits' had the effect of instilling in Australians the sense that work was their only means to prove their worth, an opportunity that would certainly be lost under socialism. Further, the role of the individual and indeed the bodies of individuals in ensuring the survival of western civilisation was said to be paramount, 'Western civilisation', argued Percy Spender, 'could only continue to survive by force' (cited in Lowe, 1999, 109).

These rhetorical acts were critical features of Cold War discourse in Australia. The Menzies Government and their anti-communist cavalcade made a concerted effort to capitalise on pre-existing discourses of fear, as well as on the climate of uncertainty, modernity and technological change that characterised the post-war era in Australia (Lowe,

1999, 103). What resulted is aptly described by Brett (1992), drawing on the work of Richard Hofstadter (1964) as a form of ‘paranoid politics’, a style in which fear is entirely disproportionate to threat and exaggeration and fabrication are widespread. Hofstadter (1964) asserts that the paranoid style is relatively common in the United States, and indeed based on the evidence presented thus far the same can be said of Australia. Just as Hofstadter (1964) points out that McCarthyism drew on past ‘paranoid styles’ such as fear campaigns against Free Masons and Jesuits, it is evident that Menzies’ ‘paranoid style’ drew heavily on extant fears and insecurities. In the same way, the ‘war on terror’ discourse in Australia has borrowed from the rhetorical strategies and paranoid style of the Cold War era.

With hindsight it seems that although the larger conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States was a potentially catastrophic one, the internal threat from communism in Australia was far less significant than the fear it inspired. But despite its discursive hegemony, there were those who weren’t convinced by Menzies’ narrative of fear; and although those individuals and groups were effectively gagged and marginalised, they were crucial voices of reason and sites of contestation. Indeed it is an objective of genealogical study to illuminate sources of dissent in order to demonstrate the mobility of power relations in society and the potential for change in the present. History has been relatively unkind to the Labor Party’s place in Menzies’ Australia. At the height of the hysteria it was very difficult for the ALP to be outwardly opposed to the regime of fear being run by the Liberal-Country Party Coalition, yet there were a number of important acts of real opposition that warrant mention here. Despite an unwillingness on the part of the ALP to directly oppose the Communist Party Dissolution Bill – due both to pressure from right-wing factions within the party on the more left-leaning Chifley and Evatt and the nature of public hysteria over the threat of communism – the then leader of the opposition, Ben Chifley, gave a contentious speech in Parliament on 9 May 1950 in response to Menzies’ introduction of the Bill twelve days prior. His speech hinged on the claim that ‘communism cannot be destroyed by legislation of this character’; he suggested that Menzies was mounting a witch hunt, and condemned the fact that the Bill abandoned the fundamental right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. He famously argued that:

> Not only does the legislation before the House provide for the banning of communism and, in effect, curtail the free expression of opinion in this country, but it also strikes at the very heart of justice. It opens the door for the liar, the perjurer and the pimp to make charges and damn men's reputations and to do so in secret without having either to substantiate or prove any charges they might make (cited in Kemp & Stanton, 2004, 151-2).

The most vocal opponent to the discourse of fear within the Parliament was – for a time – Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs in the Chifley Government whose most flagrant act of dissent was to appear as leading council for a CPA associated union member in the High Court challenge against the Act while he was Deputy Opposition Leader, a move that attracted enormous criticism from many in his own Party as well as from the Government, the media and the public (Maher, 1998b, 443-444), and forced him into reluctant acquiescence in later years.

According to Kemp & Stanton (2004, 149), the Communist Party Dissolution Bill had roughly 80 per cent support from the Australian public and was promoted by the media, but 'attracted criticism from academia, some of the churches and the Australian Council of Civil Liberties'. In addition, the Australian Peace Council, containing a range of left leaning individuals, but which Menzies claimed was merely a front for the communists, was an important voice of opposition. Lowe (1999, 105) makes particular mention of Professors William McMahon Ball and CP Fitzgerald, academics who provided a continual critique of Menzies' rhetoric and the broader Cold War discourse at a theoretical level.

These groups and individuals refused to accept the propaganda that was disseminated by the Menzies' Government, and at a deeper level they refused to be implicated in or defeated by the system of disciplinary power the Government was going to great lengths to construct. Their resistance to the narrative of fear is inspiring, and reminds us that there are other ways of thinking about security: that our national interest may be defined in terms broader than that offered by epistemic realism; that our subjectivity is not a foregone conclusion; and that our multiple and complex identities may offer new tools for thinking and operating in the world.

3.3 Statism

According to the Macquarie Dictionary (1981, 1685), statism is the principle of concentrating extensive economic, political and related controls in the state at the cost of individual liberty. In a climate of fear, the Coalition under Menzies could make decisions and implement policies that in 'ordinary' political circumstances may well have been rejected by their constituents. This period of statism is a critically important part of the architecture of the 'war on terror' discourse. It saw the establishment of key institutions implicated in the practice of counter-terrorism in Australia, and it also played a crucial role in normalising the exceptionalism and depoliticisation of security policy.

Judith Brett (1992, 4) posits that Menzies' 1942 wartime radio address 'The Forgotten People' is his 'richest, most creative political speech and one of his most influential'. It is here that the narrative of 'statism' begins, with one of the cleverest and ramifying appeals to identity in the history of Australian politics. At the heart of Menzies' speech is a clearly genuine concern that – amidst the turmoil and hardship of wartime – Labor values will triumph over that of non-Labor. As such, the speech hinges on the opposition between socialism and individualism. Central to this expression is his reference to what he sees as admirable human virtues: individual enterprise and self-reliance, religiosity and morality, patriotism and self-sacrifice. It is 'the forgotten people' – the middle class, or as Menzies preferred, the class without class – who Menzies attests are the custodians of these virtues, and who are from that moment the objects of his politics, his target market. Brett (1992, 41) points to the way in which Menzies' construction of the middle class, as a collection of individuals similar in a social, political and moral sense rather than in an economic sense, is a crucial rhetorical move, simultaneously rejecting the Marxian concept of class upon which the ALP based their politics and constructing an identity to which any Australian may subscribe.

Another significant aspect of his speech was his enthusiasm for domestic life. 'The home' he posited, 'is the foundation of sanity and sobriety; it is the indispensable condition of continuity; its health determines the health of society as a whole' (cited in Brett, 1992, 7). This sentiment would resonate with many who listened to the Prime Minister from the space of which he spoke, and who felt then and for many years after – amidst the

turbulence of war, ideological stalemate and technological change – that the home was the one aspect of their lives which they could control (Brett, 1992, 47). This arguably had the crucial effect of encouraging individual focus on the domestic while permitting increased governmental control over abstractions like foreign and security policy.

In addition to this, the 'forgotten people' speech was one of great importance in the context of this Chapter for two reasons. Firstly, it was a potent act of interpellation by Menzies. Interpellation refers to the process of constructing subject positions and then positioning individuals in those subject positions (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Menzies' speech was, to borrow Althusser's term, an act of 'hailing', a call to those who – in recognising themselves in the constructions of identity – come to identify with the politics the hailer espouses (Weldes, 1999). Thus the 'forgotten people' became Menzies' people. Secondly, this speech was the means by which Menzies redefined politics in conservative terms, as a clash of values and ideals, as opposed to the Labor tendency to view politics as a conflict of economic interests (Brett, 1992, 41). The effect of this was twofold, firstly it created a sense of vigilance in the populace, a feeling that great things were at stake if one's guard was let down; and secondly it smoothed the way for the hysteria of the Cold War, the ultimate ideological clash.

In hindsight it is apparent that Menzies' now famous speech laid the foundations for a system of 'Governmentality', whereby his political hold was derived largely from his ability to simultaneously manage individual subjectivity and society more broadly to great effect. This in turn led to the creation of what can be characterised as a kind of 'statist' regime, in the sense that individual freedom – for surely our own subjectivity is the core of our freedom – was curtailed, and government power was increased, most notably in the area of security and foreign policy. Under this regime critics were 'traumatized into silence', the foundations of democracy in Australia were seriously undermined, and controversial policy decisions were given a legitimacy which may not have been possible in a 'normal' political climate (Phillips, 1983, 44).

Although the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (herein ASIO) was established by Ben Chifley's ALP, it was molded into the organisation it is today by the Menzies Government. Maher (1998a, 377) asserts that Chifley was loath to increase the power of Australia's security institutions, and only established ASIO in 1949 at the behest

of the US and UK. Chifley's attempts to make the organisation democratically accountable were partially overturned by Menzies soon after the Coalition gained office. In July 1950 Judge Justice Reed was replaced by the Army's Director of Military Intelligence, Colonel Spry as head of ASIO (Maher, 1998b, 441). Disposing of a judicial figure in favour of a military one was an important strategic move by Menzies. It impressed the United States who saw that Australia was now the kind of serious ally in the Cold War they had wanted Chifley to be and it formed an additional link in the discursive chain he was creating, painting the Cold War as a time of exceptionalism, and security policy as beyond the realm of democratic politics.

In many ways ASIO under Menzies was an extra-legal establishment: its budget was enormous – increased from Chifley's allocation of £115,000 in 1949 to £354,000 by 1954, yet it was not subject to auditing or financial accountability (Thompson, 1954, 7); relations between the Director-General and the Prime Minister were outside the realm of acceptability as laid down in the organisation's founding charter (Cain, 1994); and information was known to be denied to the parliamentary opposition yet shared with conservative media outlets when it was politically advantageous to the government (Thompson, 1954, 14). Flanagan (1979, 12) argues that ASIO under Menzies was merely a political arm of the Coalition, not a security organisation, but a 'political police force'.

After the defeat of the Communist Party Dissolution Act in the High Court and its additional rejection in a public referendum, Menzies ostensibly thought that the fight against communism had to be waged by alternate means – in the 'shadowy byways of the security services' (Hocking, 2004, 32). The secrecy and lack of accountability of the organisation was condemned by some, and murmurs of concern continued in the general public for a number of years. It was the infamous Petrov affair that saved Menzies from electoral defeat and restored his ideological crusade. The public saw the fiasco as a sign of the value and necessity of ASIO, and Cold War alarms – which had waned slightly around the time of the referendum thanks almost entirely to the efforts of Evatt – were revived (Murphy, 2000, 128).

These events were critical in the construction of security in Australian political culture. Hocking (2004, 14) posits that it was the operation of ASIO under Menzies that created the foundations for the understanding of 'national security' now popular in

Australian political discourse. Menzies often defended the 'irregular means' (extra-legal actions) of ASIO as necessary for 'the safety of the country' (national security) (Thompson, 1954, 11). The proliferation of 'national security' rhetoric at this time reflected a wholesale rejection of alternative conceptions of security, particularly the collective-security frameworks advocated by Evatt, and a corresponding embracement of a deeply realist position.

Based on the thought of Morgenthau, the realist notion of 'national security', Burke (2001, 241) notes, rests on the understanding that it is a project of infinite duration, reliant on the ability of those in power to exercise 'control over the actions and minds of other men'. The net effect of this period in ASIO's operation has been to operationalise realist truth claims in relation to national security, some of which are: the domestic can be as potentially threatening and destabilizing as the international; security-related decisions and policy are beyond the realm of ordinary democratic politics; extraordinary incursions upon civil liberties are permissible in peace-time; and perpetual vigilance, exclusion, suspicion and surveillance are the best means of ensuring the safety of the individual and the national community. That the political elite continue to make choices based on these claims is demonstrative of the fact that they have formed the foundations of the dominant approach to security in Australia. A number of critics have described the powers afforded ASIO as a result of the 'war on terror' in statist terms; Head (2004) posits that:

> the 'war on terror' – based substantially on false premises – has become a vehicle for measures that dramatically expand the already considerable and substantially unregulated powers of the security agencies, at the expense of basic democratic rights.

The role that the United States played in establishing ASIO in 1949 was a preview of the expanded role they would seek in the Pacific region in the Cold War years. In its desire for this increased involvement they were met with enthusiasm from Australia. Australia's need for 'great and powerful friends' has become something of a maxim of Australian foreign policy, a need that is intimately tied to the aforementioned history of fear and insecurity, as well as the dominance of realist thinking in Australian foreign and security policy. Increasingly though, this position is being contested. Authors such as Beeson (2003) and Grant (2004, 7) suggest that a more independent Australian foreign policy would be beneficial for relations with the region, and may also serve to soften the

inflexible policies of the United States. However, in the mid 20th century there were few such qualms about Australia's burgeoning partnership with the US. Those that did contest this development tended to be more concerned about the decline of the alliance with Britain. In fact there was little criticism of Australia's alliance with the United States throughout the 1950s. Menzies' narrative of fear combined with the already entrenched sense of isolation and anxiety meant that a number of contentious policy decisions related to the alliance at the time faced fairly limited opposition, this is despite the fact that 'illusion of security', according to Phillips (1983, 29) would come at a high price for Australia.

It was Percy Spender – not Robert Menzies[50] – who labored over the alliance and the creation of the ANZUS treaty. Although he was only External Affairs Minister for eighteen months, Spender made some of the most significant decisions in Australian foreign policy history. His impact is such that his 1950 speech to the House of Representatives could – some technicalities aside – be mistaken for the words of John Howard or Alexander Downer. His foreign policy project was fundamentally to cement ties with the United States, and increase the defence capabilities of the nation in the face of threats from the north (Spender, 1969, 16). Once in office, Spender immediately set about his mission. His first 'achievement' was the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, established in September 1950, designed to provide material support from Britain, Commonwealth Countries in the region and the United States (who eventually contributed the bulk of the aid thanks largely to Spender's insistence) to non-communist nations in the region as a means of preventing the lure of communism (Lowe, 1994, 172). Spender described the Plan as an attempt to:

> work with these new and different nations, giving them whatever assistance we could, and which they were willing to accept, in order to help them hold fast their new independence and develop their countries in freedom and peace (cited in Lowe, 1994, 168).

[50] In his memoirs, Spender (1969, 14) said that Menzies initially saw 'no need' for formalizing the alliance with the United States. His reluctance was almost certainly associated with his staunch loyalty to Britain, as well as a fundamental unwillingness to jump on a bandwagon that had the ALP had initiated (John Curtain was particularly enthusiastic about the alliance). He did soften however, later reconciling his uncertainties and describing Australia as a 'bridge' between its two 'great and powerful friends', the UK and the US (Garran, 2004, 90).

In reality all the less-known correspondence available demonstrates that Spender's priorities were decidedly realist, focused solely on what he conceived to be the 'national interest'. In a slightly more candid explanation of the rationale behind Colombo, he articulated to Menzies that:

> the main tactical objective is to show a genuine willingness to meet the serious drift in the political and economic situation in South East Asia, as a basis for an immediate approach to United States with a view to enlisting their active participation (in the region) (cited in Lowe, 1994, 165).

According to Lowe (1994), the Colombo Plan was designed firstly to demonstrate to the United States the seriousness with which Australia viewed the fight against communism, and to prove Australia's worth as an alliance partner; and secondly to physically draw the United States – a vastly more capable military power than Australia – into the region so that Australia would have a better guarantee of security. Burke (2001, 103) adds that the Colombo Plan was a kind of disciplinary project, the creation of a West-friendly political order. From an Australian perspective this was one of the first attempts to 'purchase' security, to remake cultures and nations on our terms in order to make them less 'other' and therefore less threatening.

Spender's negotiation of the Colombo Plan paved the way for the ANZUS Treaty. He had successfully drawn the Americans into the region and simply needed to ensure their continued (and formal) commitment. Spender viewed a Pacific pact as imperative to Australia's security, particularly in the face of communist expansion in Southeast Asia, the recovery of Japan, and the decline of British power. He argued that in fact 'the future peace of the whole Pacific rested, almost solely, with the United States (Spender, 1969, 15). The US, on the other hand, saw a Pacific pact as a means of ensuring military and intelligence cooperation from a white dominion in the Cold War project, an extension of their attempt to 'tie up different regions of the world in security agreements' (Lowe, 1999, 71).

The Australia, New Zealand and United States Treaty, or the ANZUS Treaty as it became known, which provided for intelligence cooperation, military cooperation in the Pacific and equipment standardization (Dalby, 1996, 114), was signed in San Francisco on 1st September 1951. Lowe (1999, 75) notes that at the time of signing the pact received minimal public attention, yet it took only twenty years for the ANZUS Treaty to be

considered the ‘main pillar of Australian foreign policy’, despite the fact that the treaty does not obligate any party to assist the other – and is thus no real guarantee of Australian security at all (Phillips, 1983, 28). Its status as such – and its corresponding status as virtually unknown in the United States – is reflective of Australia’s continued dependence on the US for security, and also of the lack of imagination and courage in Australian foreign policy. This was starkly evident in Australia’s response to 9/11 and our involvement in the US led ‘coalition of the willing’.

Though some may view it as a relatively meaningless pact – indeed it has only been formally invoked once in its history, the ANZUS Treaty is a vital feature of the architecture of the ‘war on terror’ discourse because it has normalised a number of practices in Australian foreign policy. The first is the exploitation of Australian subservience by the United States for military and intelligence purposes. It is well known that so called ‘joint facilities’ in places like Pine Gap and North West Cape are dominated by the US (Ball, 1987, 1988). This has tied Australia’s ‘security’ to the United States in a much more intricate manner. We are now very deeply enmeshed in their strategic security web which has led to the perception in many parts of the world – particularly the Asia Pacific – that Australia is a satellite state of the US (Snyder, 2006) and the perception in Australia that our security is unquestionably and inescapably linked to America. Secondly, the treaty has entrenched a realist view of security and foreign policy. It could be argued that ANZUS has enabled foreign policy realists in Australia – across the party spectrum – to be effectively lazy in their decision making. A reliance on the US has limited and shaped our conceptions of what threatens us and our conceptions of how our security can be achieved. Finally, and at a deeper level, a western-centric understanding of security has been normalised thanks to the centrality of ANZUS in Australian political culture. Related to this is the ability for the political elite to continually manipulate and exploit notions of identity in order to justify certain policy choices. Dalby (1996, 114) asserts that ‘Australians came to understand ANZUS as an arrangement to tie Australia into the wider sphere of the Western world’. In other words Australians were led to believe that nations that ‘supposedly share a common culture and similar values could be expected to share common goals in foreign policy’ (Phillips, 1983, ix); thus reinforcing the conception that security can only be achieved alongside ‘people like us’ and against ‘Others’.

SEATO – the South East Asian Treaty Organisation – was another link in this discursive chain. Coming into force in 1955, SEATO was a mega-security-treaty, signed by Australia, New Zealand, the US, Britain, France, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand. Its remarkably ambiguous wording suggests it was more of a symbolic attempt to present a unified front against communist aggression in Southeast Asia. For Australia, the treaty was another opportunity to ensure regional commitment from the US and Britain, and a chance to create (the illusion of) a western bloc in a geographically Asian area. Burke (2001, 112-3) views SEATO as an attempt to create a sort of Leviathan prepared to take on the 'Other', as well as a means of milking a sense of security out of the insecurity associated with the process of regional decolonisation that was occurring at that time.

The longevity of Menzies' reign reflected the public 'support' the Coalition enjoyed; a support that extended to their security and foreign policy. There were rumblings of discontent in 1964 when the National Service Act was amended to make conscripts liable for international service, but the most fervent opposition to the dominant discourse to date was Arthur Calwell's reply to Menzies' announcement that troops would be sent to Vietnam to stop the communist incursion into South Vietnam (see Appendix 3.1 on p.306). The speech of 4th May 1965 was considered the best of Calwell's long political career. He condemned Menzies' decision as irresponsible, as endangering the very security he was seeking to ensure. He denounced the entire basis on which the Menzies Government had constructed Australia's place in the Cold War, particularly his appropriation of Christianity, his West-centrism, and his militaristic hypocrisy. It was an explosion of opposition and for all intents and purposes seemed to indicate a potentially destabilizing counter-narrative of security.

But when the ALP finally gained power in 1972, and again in 1983, the discursive similarities in the approach to security were striking. Although there was a period of greater engagement particularly in the Asia-Pacific region as well as a generally more idealistic approach to foreign policy and a more sophisticated conception of how security might be achieved, Australia remained largely wedded to the US in foreign policy terms, continuing intelligence & military cooperation and sending troops to the US led campaign in the 1990 Gulf War, a move that the then Prime Minister, Bob Hawke justified in terms

of ‘Australia’s interests’ (cited in Kemp & Stanton, 2004, 256). This rhetoric continued into the Prime Ministership of Paul Keating, reflecting the deep seated realism of the modern Labor Party and the institutionalised habits of mind of the Australian political elite generally.

Academics in the 1990s noted the way in which Australian foreign policy continued to be framed in realist terms, despite the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the concomitant opening up of opportunities to rethink security. Cold War thought patterns continued well into the 1990s and have certainly informed the way in which the Howard Government constructed their response to the 9/11 attacks. The dominance of the discourse was such that security continued to be measured by the level of military preparedness against potential military threats (Smith & Kettle, 1992, 25). Defence White Papers reflected this narrow understanding and – as Cheesman and Bruce (1996) note of the 1994 White Paper – rendered Labor’s rhetoric of foreign ‘engagement’ seriously hollow. It is therefore unsurprising that Labor’s supposed project of international engagement and domestic multiculturalism failed to penetrate the politico-cultural psyche of so-called ‘ordinary’ Australians. The Cold War had ended, Australian society was changing rapidly, but thinking at an elite and societal level was not keeping pace. In the US this kind of climate facilitated the so-called ‘culture wars’; in Australia a similar doctrine of exclusion was festering.

3.4 Exclusion

Burke (2001, xxv) says that exclusion is an enduring feature of security, that security is ‘a practice of identity and being through exclusion’. It is widely documented by a range of intellectuals and social commentators that technological changes and global migration experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s induced in many in the western world a sense of insecurity (Betz, 1998; Melleuish, 1998; Hunter 1996). This is considered the catalyst for a surge in the prevalence and popularity of extreme right or right-winged ‘neo-populist’ movements that occurred at this time in many states, including the US, France, Austria, Britain, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands and Australia (Betz, 1998). Central to the popularity of many of these movements was the reconfiguration of

mainstream identity, enabled via a politics of exclusion of particular minorities and special interest groups. In other words, exclusion was advocated and sometimes practiced as a means of achieving security, or at least of alleviating insecurity. In the Australian context, conservative academic Greg Melleuish (1998, 9) argued that:

> The certainties on which Australia came into being during the first decade of the 20th century have, since the 1960s, been eroded away. They have been replaced by an age of uncertainty and anxiety. Where once there was self-assuredness and a measure of unity, there is now disunity and apprehension.

Some may argue that Hansonism or Australia's culture wars, as they are sometimes called, came about as a means of restoring unity or balance. Certainly a number of authors have argued that there was a measure of inevitability about the rise of a politics of exclusion; that economic deregulation, policies of multiculturalism and broader politics of engagement and inclusion somehow predisposed Australian politics to a conservative backlash (Kelly, 1998, 90; Grattan, 1998, 78). Though there is certainly a measure of truth in these causal factors, I seek a more complex interpretation of the popularity of Hanson and the concomitant normalisation of a politics of exclusion evident in the Howard era. The manner in which that politics of exclusion was embedded in the 'war on terror' discourse will be demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five.

To begin with the politics of exclusion must be understood in the context of Australia's history, and past practices of exclusion. In constructing a discourse of exclusion, both Hanson and Howard drew on existing discourses and practices, some of which have been discussed in this Chapter. Firstly, violence against indigenous Australians in an attempt to exclude them from the colony, a potent discourse of exclusion and marginalisation that continues to define the place of Aborigines in Australian society. Secondly, the continued attempt to disbar Asians, evident from the time of federation when Henry Parkes warned against 'the countless millions of inferior members of the human family who are within easy sail of these shores' (cited in Camilleri, 1976, 12), through the violence on the goldfields and throughout the life of the White Australia Policy. And thirdly, the systematic marginalisation of opponents to the status quo such as that which occurred during the Cold War. This goes some way towards explaining why the primary targets of the politics of exclusion from 1996 were Aboriginals, Asians, the intelligentsia,

homosexuals, feminists, pornographers, ‘greens’, the United Nations, and the ABC (Adams, 1998; Dale, 1997). In a more general sense, the genealogy of Australian security shows firstly that our conception of security is defined in very narrow terms – as a need for ‘political sameness, economic prosperity and societal order’ (Burke, 2001, 3). And those that subscribe to that definition necessarily feel insecurity when any or all of those criteria are compromised. Secondly this genealogy demonstrates that there is a deeply entrenched conception that difference constitutes danger, threat and fear.

The genealogy of security has also shown that perceptions of insecurity in the electorate are seized upon by those in positions of power in order to legitimate their power, increase their influence and sometimes to reorient political culture in line with their own ideological views. It is arguable that the politics of exclusion came about partly as the result of an attempt by the conservative political elite, media and intelligentsia to mount a challenge against what they saw as Keating’s efforts to restructure Australian political culture and identity.

The 1980s saw the beginnings of the ‘culture wars’ in America, a culture of discontent and animosity that resulted in part from the ‘changing nature and constitution of the social order’ brought about by rapid technological change, economic globalisation and increased immigration (Hunter, 1996, 243). The so-called ‘wars’ that ensued were inflamed by US academics and politicians keen to capitalize on the electorate’s insecurity for political gain (Jupp, 1997, 4). It was the historian Geoffrey Blainey who imported this sentiment – albeit in a less virulent form – to Australia in 1984. In a speech to the Rotary Club in Warrnambool, Victoria he warned against complacency in the face of rising Asian immigration to Australia, and argued that the Hawke Government’s immigration policy was not supported by the majority of Australians (Ricklefs, 1997, 41). This was the sentiment that would set the tone for the politics of exclusion popularised by Pauline Hanson and legitimated and sustained by John Howard. Numerous academics such as Denis McCormack, Katherine Betts and Mark O’Connor supported Blainey’s claims (Jupp, 1997, 4), as did the conservative magazine *Quadrant*, conservative media such as *The National Times*, politicians like Michael Hodgman and then Opposition Leader Andrew Peacock, and public figures like the RSL’s Bruce Ruxton (Ricklefs, 1997, 41-2). Murray Goot has noted that support for the issues raised by these actors increased not

necessarily as a result of extant sentiment in the community, but as it received greater public airing and legitimation from prominent persons (cited in Gray & Winter, 1997, 43).

It was in 1988 that John Howard weighed into the debate. In a speech in Esperance, Western Australia, he posited that Asian immigration should be scaled back, and called for an immigration policy that 'preserves and promotes unity and cohesion of Australian society' (Jupp, 1997, 8; Markus, 2001, 87). As Opposition Leader, he had added a great deal of weight to what Hage (1998, 179) aptly terms 'the discourse of Anglo decline', a discourse which:

> Either passively mourns or actively calls for resistance against what it perceives as a state sanctioned assault on the cultural forms that have their roots in the British colonisation of Australia.

As Hage (1998) notes, and as this Chapter has sought to elucidate, elements of this discourse are apparent throughout Australian history. Although it is true that Pauline Hanson played a critical role in revitalizing the discourse of Anglo decline, it is John Howard that must be credited with its longevity. While Hanson popularised the discourse in a very overt and populist manner, Howard's more subtle discursive techniques – appeasing Hanson and reworking her politics to appear less provocative – were arguably the means by which a seemingly explosive politics of grievance[51] was transformed into a deeply entrenched politics of exclusion.

Howard's social conservatism helps explain why he capitalised on Hanson's politics of grievance. Hage (1998) posits that the 'Anglo' is that which is so central to Hanson's, Howard's – even Menzies' – conceptions of the 'imagined (Australian) community', the physical manifestation of the social order they want so desperately to preserve. Thus, although a range of processes and factors may threaten the nature of their imagined community, it is the 'non-Anglo' that becomes the physical target of their insecurity. Excluding them, and marginalising those that attempt to *in*clude them is not only an attempt to achieve some sense of security, but is also a potent discursive process, an attempt to 'remind men of the institutional prerequisites of social order' (Huntington,

[51] A term used by Brett (1998), the politics of grievance refers to that practiced by politicians such as Menzies, Thatcher, Howard and Hanson. It is a politics based on petit bourgeois ideology insofar as the virtues of self-reliance and hard work are praised while vulnerability to economic forces is capitalized upon as a source of political leverage.

1957, 473). This politics was a powerful feature of Howard's reign, evident in his reaction to the High Court's *Wik* Decision and his continued refusal to apologise to the Stolen Generations (see Burke, 2001, 198-203; Manne, 2001), his Government's treatment of refugees and asylum seekers (see Gelber & McDonald, 2006), his Government's introduction of 'citizenship tests', and starkly evident in the 'war on terror' discourse with which this thesis takes issue.

Pauline Hanson's politics of exclusion

Pauline Hanson's maiden speech, made in Parliament on 10 September 1996, provides a very stark example of the language behind the politics of exclusion. In an attempt to illustrate *how* the insecurities and fears of parts of the electorate were capitalised on for political gain, an analysis of this speech will be undertaken. The speech still stands as, Jupp (1997, 7) says, 'the clearest expression of her views'. Exploring it serves the dual purpose of better understanding the fundamental nature of the politics of exclusion, and it elucidates the discursive tactics employed in the process of constructing such a politics, particularly appeals to identity and acts of interpellation. The rise of Hanson and her popularity in the electorate arguably laid an important foundation for public acceptance of the exclusionary 'war on terror' discourse.

In analysing this speech I look particularly at patterns in the language, disguised meanings, knowledge or power relations that are normalised, and key words or phrases used – especially those that are value-laden (these are indicated in bold text). This is the Critical Discourse Analysis methodology outlined in Chapter One, and the same method will be employed in the analysis of the speech material of Howard and others in the following Chapters.

This was Hanson's first speech as the Independent member for the Queensland federal electorate of Oxley, written mostly by the far right political aspirant John Pasquarelli, whose knowledge of the international New Right added weight to Hanson's ideas. It was delivered in Parliament to a small number of Coalition MPs and none from the ALP (Kemp & Stanton, 2004, 268). So it went:

I come here **not as a polished politician**, but as a **woman who has had her fair share of life's knocks**.

Her opening words are an instant appeal to identity. In defining herself in these terms, she is revealing a reverence for old conceptions of Australian identity, that which is suspicious of authority and holds as heroic the image of the battler and the underdog (Dale, 1997, 15*)*. She is thus delineating herself as an archetypal Australian in an attempt to appeal to – hail or interpellate – those that share this notion of 'Australianness', and as part of a broader construction of Self ('us') in preparation for the construction of the concomitant Other ('them').

My view on issues is based on **commonsense**, and my **experience** as a **mother** of four children, as a **sole parent**, and as a **businesswoman** running a fish and chip shop. I won the seat of Oxley largely on an issue that has resulted in me being called a racist. That issue related to my comment that **Aboriginals** received more benefits than **non-Aboriginals**.

Describing her views as ground in **commonsense** and based on **experience** is a crucial and oft-repeated rhetorical act by Hanson. It is an appeal to what Scalmer (1999) calls 'the discourse of practical rationality', a discourse with origins in the aforementioned 'Australian battler' legend, and while once a weapon of the ALP, it is increasingly apparent in talkback radio and the rhetoric of conservative politicians, who appropriate practical rationality as a means of connecting with their audience. The language of **commonsense** and **experience** resonate, Brett (1998) argues, with a part of the electorate whose politics and grievances are intimately linked to their work, and who feel marginalised by policies that they believe give relief to 'Others' (seen to be special interest groups like Aboriginals or immigrants) and not to them. As such, the 'discourse of practical rationality' preferences practice over theory, and favours 'real-life' experience as a basis for policy development. In this sense the appeal to this discourse by Hanson is demonstrative of her deep conservatism, a fundamental belief that 'prudence, prejudice, experience, and habit are better guides than reason, logic, abstractions, and metaphysics. Truth exists not in universal propositions but in concrete experiences.' (Huntington, 1957, 456).

Hanson then moves on to lay further claim to a particular identity. She identifies herself as a **mother** and as a **businesswoman**, an act of interpellation, an attempt to 'hail'

those who share those tags. Curiously though, she states that she is a **sole parent**, which can be seen as a two-part rhetorical strategy: firstly to show that the issues with which she is concerned is somehow greater and more important than the shame or stigmatization she may face among her conservative brethren. Secondly it is an attempt to build upon the 'practical rationality' discourse; her strategy to appear as an authentic non-politician, a battler. Having clearly constructed the Self ('us', 'Australia') in just two lines, she identifies the first Other, **Aboriginals**. That they are an 'Other' is made apparent through the use of the term **non-Aboriginal** shortly after.

> We now have a situation where a type of reverse racism is applied to **mainstream Australians** by those who promote **political correctness** and those who control the various **taxpayer** funded 'industries' that flourish in our society servicing **Aboriginals, multiculturalists** and a host of other **minority groups**.

This is the first of three references made to **mainstream Australia**. Herein, Hanson is building on the construction of her interpellated subjects, her 'us'. In ascribing them majority status she lends them an extra sense of power, an increased legitimacy by virtue of numbers. In referring to the **taxpayer** she hails again, casting her net of discontent wider. It is here that the first parallels with Menzies' 'Forgotten People' speech are evident: firstly in interpellating subjects and thus constructing identities on a moral basis rather than in economic or class terms. This has the effect of glorifying the imagined mainstream as that which any subject can aspire to claim membership. Secondly, Hanson's speech paints her **mainstream** as a marginalised group in the same way that Menzies' painted his forgotten people as a silenced majority, then they both proceed to capitalize on extant grievances Hanson reminds the **taxpayers** of their exploitation at the hands of **'Aboriginals, multiculturalists** and a host of other **minority groups'**, while Menzies' pontificates on the plight of the lifter in the face of the 'leaner'. At the heart of both appeals to the **mainstream** is their fundamental conservatism; an attempt to show their proximity to the 'common ideals' (Huntington, 1957, 458) in order to gain a mandate for policy making, and a claim to able to speak for the majority based on their concomitant claim to knowledge of real and objective values obtained through experience (Dale, 1997, 9). Jupp (1997, 3) notes that 'mainstreaming', a potent rhetorical tool used to recruit

subjects to a constructed version of ‘us’ or Self and exclude the constructed versions of ‘them’ or Other – was almost absent in the cultural wars in the United States. The reason for its prevalence in the rhetoric of Hanson and later John Howard can be explained partly by its use historically as a means of creating national unity in the face of isolation and national infancy. ‘Mainstreaming’ is the means by which those who seek the hegemony of ‘coloniser culture’ interpellate subjects and spatially constitute their identity (Hansen, 2006). For instance, the Anzac legend – characterised by hard-work, self-sacrifice, mateship, loyalty and discipline – is perhaps the most popular mainstreaming tool of the Australian political elite, a legend they claim encapsulates Australianness. Their appropriation of it enables a very constricted conception of national identity, thus reinforcing the cultural ‘exclusivity, longevity and stability’ they work for (Dale, 1997,10). This is illustrative of the fact that mainstreaming as a weapon of identity construction and exclusion can be disguised in other totalizing rhetoric, in terms like ‘us’, ‘we’, ‘ours’, ‘nation’, ‘culture’, as well as in popular myths (like Anzac) and cultural signifiers (such as ‘the bush’).

Also a crucial discursive move in this section is Hanson’s reference to **political correctness**. The sentence is carefully constructed so as to pit **mainstream Australians** against those who promote **political correctness**, as if the two were diametrically opposed. The scourge of political correctness was central to the politics of Pauline Hanson and to John Howard, who, according to Ahluwalia and McCarthy (1998, 81) pioneered the assault on political correctness when he was Opposition Leader in the 1980s. Jupp (1997) concurs, arguing that Howard eagerly imported the critique of political correctness that was aiding the conservative push in the United States. Both politicians, preservers of the status quo, used the term pejoratively, as a means of describing those who challenged it (Ahluwalia & McCarthy, 1998, 79). According to Grattan (1998, 81), Liberal Party research prior to the 1996 election indicated that Keating’s perceived ‘political correctness’ – a label Howard had applied in Opposition – giving ‘special deals’ to minority groups, was breeding discontent in the electorate. Howard himself had created a reservoir of support into which Hanson would tap. Political correctness became, in this emerging politics of grievance, a term to describe the existing politics of inclusion Hanson and Howard sought to overturn. At a deeper level it marked a push for what Markus (1997) terms the ‘re-naturalisation of

bigotry', a politics that would see racism as 'free speech' and normalise the practice of exclusion. The use of political correctness rhetoric by Hanson is also a type of truth claim, a claim to authenticity and some fundamentally held reality in the face of the dishonesty of those who practice it. Herein Hanson adds to her list another 'them', the 'politically correct' left.

> Present governments are encouraging separatism in Australia by providing opportunities, land, moneys and facilities available only to **Aboriginals**. **Along with millions of Australians**, **I am fed up to the back teeth** with the **inequalities** that are being promoted by the government and paid for by the **taxpayer** under the assumption that **Aboriginals** are the most disadvantaged people in Australia. I do not believe that the colour of one's skin determines whether you are disadvantaged. **I have done research** on benefits available only to **Aboriginals** and challenge anyone to tell me how **Aboriginals** are disadvantaged when they can obtain three and five per cent housing loans denied to **non-Aboriginals**.

This section repeats the rhetorical moves already noted. In addition, she hails the disenchanted through classic use of the vernacular, saying '**I'm fed up to the back teeth'**, and she appropriates Laborite tradition in focusing on **inequalities**, another act of hailing. Importantly though, Hanson builds upon her identity construction of the **Aboriginal** Other. Hansen (2006) posits that political discourses construct radical Others in ways more complex than traditional scholarship gives credit. Understanding more involved constructions enables a more effective explanation of why certain actors cannot gain legitimate access to the political sphere as long as certain discourses remain hegemonic. Pauline Hanson established early in this particular speech the Self-Other dichotomy by pitting **Aboriginal** against **non-Aboriginal**, but here she goes beyond that construction. In rejecting the disadvantage suffered by indigenous people and noting what she argues are exclusive and special housing privileges, she begins to paint the **Aboriginal** as temporally displaced, as an Other who is additionally inferior because of their failure to capitalize on their special privileges and break with their backward identity. This becomes an assertion that there is no capacity for change in the inferior identity, and thus no possibility for inclusion in Hanson's discourse. This construction is backed by claims to authenticity **I have done research**, and to majority status, **along with millions of Australians, I am fed up.**

This nation is being divided into **black** and **white**, and the present system encourages this. **I am fed up** with being told, 'This is our land.' Well, where the hell do I go? **I was born here**, and so were my parents and my children. I will work beside anyone and they will be my equal but I draw the line when I am told I must pay and continue paying for something that happened over 200 years ago. **Like most Australians**, I **worked** for my land; no-one **gave** it to me…

Here is another act of interpellation, **I am fed up** is not just a grab of great illocutionary force, but another attempt – her fifth so far – to hail, a call to subjects who might recognise themselves in her construction. Indeed many did, Adams (1998) posits that this vague appeal to discontent was what made Hanson's politics so popular. **I'm fed up** is essentially code for, Adams (1998, 21) argues, 'it's not important that you're mad about anything in particular. It's enough to be mad in a blurry, generalized, unfocussed way.' Apparent in this passage are more claims to authenticity based on experience, **I was born here**, this time with a dash of Otherness; and an act of mainstreaming: **like most Australians**. She then draws on the sentiment of her conservative predecessor Robert Menzies, whose 'forgotten people' speech hinged on the greatness of the 'lifter' and the inferiority of the 'leaner', Hanson adds colour to this dichotomy: I **worked** for my land (non-Aboriginal, 'us', 'Australian', Self, 'lifter'), no one **gave** it to me (Aboriginal, 'them', 'unAustralian', Other, 'leaner'). This point in the speech evidences discursive stability, or the point at which the lines of identity are clearly drawn by reinforcing pre-existing constructions. Although not explicitly, signs are repeated and linked to other signs in order to constitute relations of sameness on the one hand, and relations of difference on the other (Hansen, 2006, 42). In achieving discursive stability, modes of power are generated, and it is now that those interpellated into the discourse will begin to cognify their role, as an empowered body or as an excluded one (Fierke, 2007, 78).

If **politicians** continue to promote separatism in Australia, they should not continue to hold their seats in this parliament. They are not truly representing **all Australians**, and I call on the people to throw them out. **To survive in peace and harmony, united and strong, we must have one people, one nation, one flag**.

That Hanson has achieved discursive stability is made obvious by her audacious language here. For the first time in the speech the notion of security is introduced. It is obviously a realist-based conception, linking the very **survival** of the nation, its **peace** and its sovereignty (**united** and **strong**) to the exclusion of the relevant Others. The repetition

of the word **one** makes the message abundantly clear; there is space only for the Self. What is most alarming (and telling) about this semantic construction is that it borrows from the nationalist rallying call of the Nazi regime, who called for 'Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Fuhrer' – 'One people, One country, One leader' (Markus, 2001, 156).

The remainder of Hanson's speech broadly followed these patterns, though a few additional aspects warrant brief mention. In keeping with her tendency to draw on deeply held historical insecurities common in Australian history, Hanson introduces another Other, **Asians**.

> Immigration and multiculturalism are issues that this government is trying to address, but for far too long **ordinary Australians** have been kept out of any debate by the major parties. **I and most Australians** want our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in **danger** of being **swamped by Asians**. Between 1984 and 1995, 40 per cent of all migrant coming to this country were of **Asian** origin. **They** have their own **culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate**. Of course, I will be called a racist but if I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into **my country**. A truly multicultural country can never be **strong or united**. (part omitted)

Here security-speak is drawn upon again – through the use of the word **danger** in order to conjure a sense of threat at the hands of Asian invasion. Hanson speaks to the audience of Asians in a way consistent with dominant Australian political discourse, echoing the sentiment of politicians from Henry Parkes, to Arthur Calwell, Robert Menzies and John Howard. The image of being **swamped by Asians** is carefully chosen in order to invoke a sense of impending doom that naturally flows from difference. The expression was borrowed from a 1978 speech by Margaret Thatcher, who warned against being swamped by 'invading hordes' from all corners of the globe (Ahluwalia & McCarthy, 1998). A series of negative signs are attached to the **Asian**, in an effort to achieve further discursive stability: **they** have their own **culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate.** This is followed by a broader attack on the policy of multiculturalism:

> Abolishing the policy of multiculturalism will save billions of dollars and allow those from **ethnic** backgrounds to join **mainstream Australia**, paving the way to a **strong, united country**. Immigration must be halted in the short term so that **our dole queues** are not added to by, in many cases, **unskilled migrants not fluent in the English language**. This would be one positive step to rescue many young and older Australians from a predicament which has become a national disgrace and crisis. I must stress at this stage that I do not consider **those people from ethnic backgrounds** currently living in Australia anything but first-class citizens, provided of course that they give this country their **full, undivided loyalty**.

Herein **ethnic** becomes another link in the discursive chain of Otherness, a preposterous and erroneous conflation of ethnicity itself with difference (as if Hanson's '**mainstream**' are devoid of any ethnicity). It is important to note however, that **those people from ethnic backgrounds** are seemingly designated by Hanson as a slightly superior Other compared to the Aboriginal. Her declaration that they are potentially first-class citizens if they are assimilated into **mainstream Australia** shows that while they are spatially constructed Others – from **Asia**, they are not temporally constructed Others because there is capacity for change in their inferior identity. Thus the criterion for inclusion of Asians is based on being a **skilled migrant**, being **fluent in the English language** and being self-sufficient (not in **our dole queues**).

A summary of the key rhetorical and discursive moves are contained within the table below:

GOOD		BAD	
Mainstream (Self)	Non-Aboriginal Taxpayer Ordinary Australian	Non-mainstream (Other)	Aboriginal Asian Ethnic Minority groups
<u>Associated linking signs:</u> Commonsense, experience, truth, reality English speaking, we, us, our, my, nation/al Businesswoman, skilled Strong, united, independent		<u>Associated linking signs:</u> Irrational, inexperience, political correctness Non-English speaking, they, them, internation/al Dole-queues, unskilled Weak, corruption	

Table 3.1: Key rhetorical and discursive moves in Pauline Hanson's maiden speech to Parliament.

John Howard did not challenge Pauline Hanson in any meaningful way until seven months after this maiden speech (Grattan, 1998, 85)[52]. In early May he addressed the

[52] In his autobiography *Lazarus Rising* (2010, 256-261), Howard rebukes this claim, arguing he made a number of media appearances contradicting Hanson's claims.

Australia-Asia Society because he was concerned the Hanson phenomenon was damaging Australia's interests in Asia (Howard, 2010, 261). In the address he said:

> She is wrong when she says that Aboriginals are not disadvantaged. She is wrong when she says that Australia is in danger of being swamped with Asians. She is wrong to seek scapegoats for society's problems (cited in Howard, 2010, 261).

But many in the Government's inner circle believed it was too late[53]. A range of scholars attribute Howard's response (or lack thereof) to the fact that Hanson was articulating – albeit in a more inflammatory manner – some of the grievances Howard himself shared and had capitalised on in his 1996 election campaign (Grattan, 1998; Brett, 1997; Markus, 1997; Ricklefs, 1997; Dale, 1997). Prior to this Howard had responded to Hanson's speech by defending her right to 'free speech' and admitting that he agreed with some of her comments (Dale, 1997, 14). 10 September 1996, the day that Pauline Hanson addressed parliament was indeed a dark day, but darker still was the day that the Prime Minister appeased and inadvertently promoted her new politics of exclusion. Though Hanson's political life would be brief and dogged by controversy, her legacy lived on throughout Howard's Prime Ministership. 1996 was the year, argues Andrew Markus (2001) that the ghosts of Australia's exclusionary past were palpable; the year that race-based nationalism and the exclusion it fosters reclaimed centrality in Australian politics.

3.5 Summary

This Chapter has created a genealogical map of Australia's security discourse. It has charted what this author considers to be the periods that have informed our contemporary attitudes to security, and that have therefore laid the foundations for Australia's participation in the global 'war on terror'. It has been found that discursively constituted insecurity sadly defines Australia's political attitudes, and that the political elite have, on many occasions, capitalized on that insecurity for political gain, to create (or reclaim) an

[53] Foreign Affairs Secretary Philip Flood was highly critical of Howard's failure to publicly respond to Hanson and told Howard's chief political advisor Grahame Morris that the May speech was 'seven months too late' (cited in Lyons, 2008). While Alexander Downer, Peter Costello and Amanda Vanstone had all spoken out against Hanson after her maiden speech and had been contacted by Howard who in turn discouraged them from speaking out further (Lyons, 2008).

Australia most consistent with their world view. The result has been periods dominated by violence, fear, statism and exclusion; a discourse of security restricted by the doctrine of epistemic realism; the silencing of dissent; and the continued reinforcement of a bogus narrative of Australia, an exclusive imagined community into which Others are not welcome.

4

Australia's 'war on terror': phase one

In early August 2001, the Howard Government was on the brink of electoral defeat after a protracted period of poor polling, and a trend towards Labor in state elections and by-elections conducted that year (Manne, 2004, 36). But three months later the Howard Government won a Federal Election convincingly and went on to experience consistently high levels of popularity up until their defeat in November 2007 (Nick Torrens Film Productions, 2009; Meagher & Wilson, 2006). Their electoral success during this period is owed in large part to Howard's foreign policy, especially his performance in relation to the 'war on terror' (Nick Torrens Film Productions, 2009). *His* is the operative word here. As I have indicated previously, Howard was highly independent in making and marketing decisions in this area. This is especially the case in relation to the period being examined in this Chapter. As Chalmers (2003, 2) puts it:

> Howard alone decided that Australian foreign policy should be swung unambiguously towards the American alliance and away from the focus on our region. Howard alone decided after September 11 Australia would join George Bush's war against terrorism.

This Chapter continues the genealogy of Australia's involvement in the US led 'war on terror', focusing specifically on the period from just prior to the 11th September attacks until early 2003. The underlying aim is to flesh out a detailed map of the construction of the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia by looking primarily at the speeches, interviews and press releases of the then Prime Minister John Howard. The Chapter explores four key events: Tampa; 11th September; the 2002 Bali bombings; and the 'Let's look out for Australia' Campaign (LOFA), each of which represents a key pillar in the structure of the discourse.

A number of conclusions are drawn in this Chapter. Firstly, Howard exercised a high degree of autonomy in structuring Australia's response to key security issues. Secondly, he used pre-existing, familiar representations of identity and threat to justify

action. And thirdly, he utilized (whether intentionally or otherwise) the 'war on terror' discourse as a vehicle for furthering his own deeply held views about society.

4.1 Tampa

The stranding of the 'Palapa 1' in international waters off Christmas Island on 24th August 2001, the rescue of its 438 passengers by the Norwegian freighter the MV Tampa and the political debacle that ensued when the Australian Government refused the ship entry into Australian waters precipitated an extraordinary period of renewed interest in the issue of immigration in Australian political culture. A great deal has been written on this subject, so this section seeks not to conduct a commentary or analysis of this period, but rather to explore the discursive construction of the 'asylum-seeker issue' as a critical precursor to John Howard's justifications for Australian involvement in the 'war on terror'.

The asylum-seeker issue – which in the context of this Chapter means the flurry of public discourse on the topic between the 24th August 2001 and the federal election on 10th November 2001 – may be viewed, in a discursive sense, as comprising three phases: phase one spanned from 24th August (the stranding of the Palapa 1) until the 11th September; phase two from 12th September until the announcement of the 2001 federal election on 5th October; and phase three refers to the campaign period which ended with the re-election of the Howard Government on 10th November 2001. Although a great variety of people contributed to the discourse on asylum-seekers, it is evident from the public support for the position adopted by the Howard Government[54], as well as the inability of the federal Opposition to advance an alternative argument, that the Liberal / National Coalition dominated the terms of representation and debate. More specifically though, it was Howard who – by his own admission and through the observation of political commentators and insiders[55] – dictated the issue in terms of both discourse and policy. It is

[54] According to McAllister (2003, 454), those in favour of turning back boats carrying asylum-seekers outnumbered those wishing to accept them by more than 3 to 1.

[55] Having made the asylum-seekers issue largely a matter of defence (evident in his rhetoric of 'border protection' – to be explored below) Howard himself outlined the extent to which he is personally involved in decision making in that area, saying: 'I've been as Prime Minister chairman of the National Security Committee and I can assure you that I have taken a very keen interest in all defence matters and all defence personnel matters and there really is without any disrespect to the people who've served in defence, you've

for this reason that his public language will undergo analysis in this section in order to obtain a clearer picture of just *how* what might be seen in other contexts as unpalatable legal and political measures became 'common-sense', and *how* the discourse on asylum seekers provided something of a discursive foundation upon which justification for Australian involvement in the 'war on terror' would be built.

Gelber & McDonald's 2006 study of asylum-seeker discourse in Australia found that representations of sovereignty were at the core of official government discourse. Where their article focused on the ethical implications of representations of sovereignty vis-à-vis asylum-seekers, this section is more concerned with uncovering *how* Howard represented sovereignty. Invocation of the notion of sovereignty was so dominant in this period that it underpinned Howard's 2001 campaign catch-cry 'we will ..decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come' (3/11/01 radio interview, 2ME).

Talking sovereignty is a move not unfamiliar to the Australian public, as the preceding Chapter demonstrated. Indeed fear of invasion and the preservation of sovereignty have been constant themes throughout Australia's political history (Burke, 2001). In a conventional Westphalian sense sovereignty can be understood as the 'right, by a governing power, to rule a jurisdiction and defend (it) from incursion' (Honderich, 2005, 886). Though this definition has been acknowledged by many – perhaps most notably by those in the field of critical security studies – to be seriously problematic when it comes to dealing with society's most vulnerable[56], it is entirely consistent with Howard's own understanding, which Gelber and McDonald (2006, 269) point out, can be put plainly as the 'right to exclude'. Through Howard's language it is clearly apparent that invoking sovereignty is to him a very powerful means of translating to the nation the cruciality of a

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had a situation where the Prime Minister has been very much on the watch in relation to defence matters..'. Additionally, the observation has been made that Howard ran something of a 'one-man band government' when in office (Chalmers, 2003). Revelations by Howard and other insiders made on The ABC TV Documentary series 'The Howard Years' certainly supports this proposition in relation to the asylum-seeker issue (*The Howard Years*, 2008) .

[56] See for instance: Davies, S. (2007) 'Seeking Security for Refugees' in Burke, A. & McDonald, M. (2007) *Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific*. Manchester University Press: Manchester.; Burke, A. (2007) *Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War against the Other*. Routledge: London.; Gelber, K. & McDonald, M. (2006) 'Ethics and exclusion: representations of sovereignty in Australia's approach to asylum-seekers', *Review of International Studies*. Vol.32, pp.269-289.

situation. In other words, representing an issue as one about sovereignty is a move that elevates the status of the issue markedly. Buzan et.al. (1998, 21-23) and others in the Copenhagen School call this an act of 'securitization': the presentation of an issue as an existential threat to the constituting principle of the state (i.e. sovereignty), thus justifying 'the use of extraordinary measures' and taking politics 'beyond the established rules of the game'. Importantly, from a poststructuralist perspective, an issue becomes one of existential importance *when* it is securitized, not the other way around. In other words it is very much a process of construction. Moreover, and borrowing from constructivism, an issue is securitized only when the intended audience accepts the securitizing move made (Fierke, 2007, 104; Huysmans, 2006, 103). That is to say that, in this context the Australian public must concur that their sovereignty is under threat as a result of the arrival of asylum-seekers.

On 27 August, the day after the Tampa had rescued passengers from the sinking 'Palapa 1', Howard fronted the media to announce that while the ship's captain Arne Rinnan had requested permission to offload the passengers on Christmas Island, the Tampa would not, under any circumstances, be allowed to enter Australian waters. It was in this context that he proceeded to securitize the issue:

> We.. have an **absolute right to decide who comes to this country**, and there is a concern inside the Government, and I suspect in the broader community, that we are fast reaching a stage where we are **losing that right** because of the **increasing numbers** of people, illegal immigrants, who are coming to Australia (Howard, 27/8/01, television interview, 7:30 Report).
>
> No country can surrender the **right to decide who comes here and how they come here** (Howard, 27/8/01, television interview, 7:30 Report).

This rhetoric continued throughout the life of the issue. The following day, 28 August, the notion of existential threat was built upon:

> **We cannot surrender our right as a sovereign country our right to control our borders** and we cannot have a situation where people can come to this country when they choose. We have an absolute right… I have to worry and my colleagues have to worry about a situation where **we appear to be losing control** of the **flow of people** coming into this country (Howard, 28/8/01, television interview, A Current Affair)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.1 on p.310].

What is most apparent in these excerpts is the way in which Howard has added some colour to the picture of the threat facing Australia. It is not only a threat to Australia's

sovereignty but a large problem of urgent importance, the former indicated by the use of the notion of a **flow** of people, and the latter made clear by the claim that Australia is on the verge of losing its sovereign right to **control** the **borders**. The intended effect of this kind of representation is to generate support for a policy out of fear of threat. Indeed research done by Quillian (1995) has found that prejudice against a subordinate group increases in direct proportion to the perceived size of the group. That is to say that one would expect Howard's message (Australia will turn away illegal immigrants) to achieve greater resonance the larger the threat appears. Polling conducted at this time suggests that the message was resonating strongly with Australians, with support for the Coalition jumping markedly in the days immediately following the Tampa crisis (see Appendix 4.2 on p.311).

For the remainder of the first phase of the asylum-seeker issue, Howard repeatedly ran this sovereignty argument but with one major refinement: the addition of 'national interest' rhetoric.

> We've taken this stance because we believe it is the right thing to do in our long-term **national interest** (Howard, 29/8/01, radio interview, AM Programme)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.3 on p.312].

According to Weldes (1999, 4) the national interest 'functions as a rhetorical device that generates the legitimacy of and political support for state action'. A hugely subjective expression, when used carefully it nonetheless enables the speaker to appear authoritative and closes off avenues for contestation. But using national interest rhetoric effectively is reliant on the ability of the hearer to concur with this representation. That is to say that invoking the national interest is an attempt by Howard to 'hail' Australians into a particular subject position. The degree to which the message resonates with them (i.e. the extent to which they recognise themselves in that subject position) determines the strength of Howard's representation. This raises the issue of identity: the second primary theme in the Australian discourse on asylum-seekers.

Poststructuralists regard identity as central in processes of discursive construction (Hansen, 2006). Campbell (1992, 85) posits that once an existential threat is imagined and articulated, the threatened community closes off. From the same perspective we can claim that the closed space becomes populated with particular identities in order to make sense of

the threat, to empower and instantiate certain identities and to legitimate particular policy responses. It follows that 'identity', Connolly (1991, 64) argues, 'requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty'. Howard's language on 27th August marks the beginning of the construction of two very unambiguous identities: 'them', the Tampa passengers; and 'us', the Australian community.

The dominance of the positive us / negative them dichotomy is recognised by Gelber & McDonald (2006), who claim it is used to legitimate an exclusivist notion of sovereignty; and by Saxton (2003), who – in focusing on media discourse – found the dichotomy served to enable support for government policy by painting a picture of an inferior Other from which the dominant culture needed to protect itself. The focus of this small section is to flesh out *how* through Howard's language an us/them binary was constructed. What is immediately obvious in Howard's language from phase one is that it follows a framework of identity construction observed by Van Dijk (1998, 276), that is:

a. express / emphasise information that is positive about **us**
b. express / emphasise information that is negative about **them**
c. suppress / deemphasise information that is negative about **us**
d. suppress / deemphasise information that is positive about **them**

A summary of grabs relating to identity in Howard's first television interview on the issue of asylum-seekers demonstrates this[57]:

Us	Them
• '**we** are a **decent generous, compassionate humanitarian** country'. • 'and all of this is against the background of this being one of the most **generous** countries in the world for taking refugees'. • '**we** have an **open non-discriminatory** immigration policy'.	• 'people who seek to **exploit** the generosity of Australia' • '900 **people coming in a wave**' • '(there are) **increasing numbers of people, illegal immigrants**, who are coming to Australia. **They** are coming because it is seen as easy to get into this country.

Table 4.1 Grabs from Howard's first television interview on the asylum-seeker issue.

[57] From Howard, 27/8/01, television interview, 7:30 Report.

In the speeches, interviews and media releases that followed throughout phase one of the asylum-seeker issue, Howard built on the dichotomous identities he had constructed from 27th August.

Us	Them
humane, decent, generous, fair, orderly, humanitarian, legal, stable, attractive, moral, welcoming, appropriate, credible, warm-hearted, terrific, lawful, community, strong, thriving, cohesive, unity, proud.	threatening, feigners, queue jumpers, exaggerators, unauthorised arrivals, intimidating, Islamic, illegal, coercive, non-genuine, boat people, pushy, illegal arrivals, non-meritorious, middle eastern, illegal immigrants, foreign, abnormal.

Table 4.2 Construction of identity in phase one of asylum-seeker issue.

According to Campbell (1992, 8-12) states rely upon the construction of threat, and in turn an 'Other' to bolster the constructed identity of the state itself and legitimise the policies created to purportedly protect and preserve that identity. That the asylum-seeker is painted as the primary 'Other' in this context is not surprising and in fact concurs with a pattern of security policy legitimation subscribed to by many political leaders according to Connolly (1991, 38). Whilst the status of the asylum-seeker as the radical Other is fairly indisputable in this particular discourse, it is not the only threat to the Self that features.

Hansen (2006, 41) points to the importance of allowing 'ontological flexibility' when understanding the place of identity in legitimising security policy. Understanding identity construction as more complex than the Self/Other dichotomy enables an enhanced understanding of the way in which identity is invoked in the service of dominant discourses. In phase one of the asylum-seeker issue, Howard's language evidences not only the existence of a radical Other (asylum-seeker) threatening the Self (Australian community), but a web of threatening identities with varying degrees of Otherness.

These other Others can be broadly divided into two categories: Others outside the Self, or foreign Others; and Others inside the Self, or domestic Others. Howard established a number of foreign Others during the course of phase one. The most inferior Other, that who is painted as possessing none of the qualities of the Self is the people smuggler:

> Oh look it is **vile international racket**, **people smuggling** and it does **disadvantage** many genuine refugees who are living in pitiful circumstances in refugee camps around the world whose entitlement to come to Australia as part of our refugee programme is greater than

> the entitlement of many of the people who are being **exploited by the people smugglers** (Howard, 6/9/01, radio interview, 4BC)**.**

Howard points to a less-inferior Other in this excerpt, the genuine refugee. This subject position is still a position of inferiority, given its foreignness when positioned against the Self, but is superior to the primary Other – the asylum-seeker, because it exhibits some qualities possessed by the Self, as this excerpt demonstrates:

> ..it is a solution where **Australia says we will continue to take our fair share** indeed more that our fair share of refugees provided it occurs in a **proper** fashion. And provided those who have **superior refugee claims** get first chance. Because there are millions of people **living in pitiful conditions** in refugee camps who don't have the money to buy a passage on a boat to Australia. **They don't have the money**. They don't have six or seven or eight thousand dollars. And yet according to the international agencies **their need is greater** than the need of others. And yet every time **others are able to force their self-determined priorities ahead of those people whose need is greater**, those people whose need is greater **suffer**. And that is the reason why, amongst others, we've taken the stance we have (Howard, 4/9/01, speech, Burwood).

Three differing identities are constructed here: the positive Self, Australia, who is fair, proper, generous and compassionate; the less-inferior Other, the genuine refugee, who is poor, needy, worthy, and patient. The image conjured of the struggling genuine refugee, waiting properly in the queue is compatible with aspects of the classic egalitarian, battling Australian identity. Indeed McAllister (2003, 456) has suggested that the construction of the asylum-seeker as 'queue jumper' – the third, most inferior and primary Other – may have resonated particularly strongly with Australians because Australian political culture is seen as 'utilitarian in nature and rule-based in operation, and eschews notions of individual freedom and liberty for the greater good of the collectivity'.

Four additional foreign Others are evident in Howard's construction of the asylum-seeker issue in phase one: firstly the captain of the Tampa Arne Rinnan who is positioned as a superior Other because he is simultaneously painted as a heroic victim of circumstance:

> Now, I feel sorry… I mean, I'm not blaming the Captain for, I mean, I praise him for **rescuing the people** – that was his obligation… I understand his position but the world has got to understand Australia's position.. (Howard, 30/8/01, television interview, The Today Show).

And as dishonest and a source of threat to Australia's sovereignty:

> We issued a clear instruction that **he should not cross the territorial sea-line**.. within a matter of minutes (he) said no I'm coming in because the emergency is so great… the whole basis for most of yesterday for the captain's action in crossing our territorial sea-line was the medical emergency… (which) **on the evidence available to us has proven to be wrong** (Howard, 30/8/01, radio interview, 2UE).

Secondly, Norway was depicted as an Other for criticising Australia's actions in relation to its treatment of Captain Rinnan and its refusal to take the Tampa passengers:

> The Norwegian vessel was directed to the sinking Indonesian vessel by an Australian aircraft and somehow or other some of the Norwegians are saying well that means it's our responsibility. I mean that is a bit **ridiculous** (Howard, 30/8/01, radio interview, 2UE).

> ..some of the criticism that has been made of Australia by other countries, some of it has been quite **ludicrous** given the **long and very meritorious humanitarian record this country has** and **we've taken enormous numbers** of refugees per capita, **far more than a country like Norway** (Howard, 3/9/01, press conference, Melbourne).

This excerpt is a very clear example of the use of the tactic of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation identified by van Dijk (1993), the intended consequence of which is to increase the polarisation between 'Us' and 'Them'. In this particular example, while Norway is an 'Other' far superior to the primary 'Other' – the asylum seeker, the intent is to represent 'Us' – the Australian community as under threat from additional quarters. Moreover, depicting Norway as a threatening 'Other' can be seen as an attempt to discredit the criticism they were leveling at the Australian Government without actually debating the issue. Indonesia was depicted as a third 'Other' for – argued Howard – its refusal to share the burden by taking some of the Tampa passengers, and its failure to stem the flow of 'illegal immigrants', therefore rendering it complicit in the violation of Australia's sovereignty:

> …the more international cooperation on this issue there can be the better… **we are certainly seeking** the maximum degree of bilateral **cooperation between Australia and, for example, Indonesia**.. We have to take action in the short term to protect our border integrity but we also need to achieve medium and longer-term understandings with certain countries and particularly Indonesia and we continue to work on that.. .I mean obviously **there's a flow**, as far as we are concerned, **there is a flow of people** from Middle Eastern countries **to Malaysia and Indonesia and then without a lot of let or hindrance into Australia..** (Howard, 10/9/01, doorstop interview, White House).

The final foreign 'Other' featured in Howard's discourse on asylum seekers in phase one was the United Nations. Although criticism of the UN was not as great a feature of

Howard's arsenal vis-à-vis the asylum seeker issue as some of his Cabinet colleagues[58], he was still careful to position them in the 'Other' category so as to marginalise their competing account of the asylum-seeker issue. Typically, he did this by representing the United Nations as threatening Australia:

> …we won't be the first democratic country to be **attacked by** sections of **the United Nations**. I mean, the Americans have been attacked, they're regularly attacked. It seems in the eyes of some in the **United Nations** that the really democratic countries in the world are easy game for **attack** (Howard, 4/9/01, radio interview, 3LO).

A critical component of Howard's discourse on asylum-seekers was the creation of domestic 'Others'; targeted because of some degree of opposition to the Government's stance; but dramatically painted as enemies of the Australian community due to their opposition to the 'national interest'. Whilst the main internal 'Other' was the Australian Labor Party (ALP), Howard variously discredited lawyers pursuing legal action against the Government over Tampa, broadsheet editors, ex-politicians such as John Hewson, Malcolm Fraser and Neville Wran, those on the Left and those generally critical of the Government's stance, and provided Australia with a blanket representation of them as threatening the national interest:

> …it is not easy and that is something that should be accepted and understood by the **Government's critics**. This is a very difficult issue for Australia and that is why instead of trying to score **cheap political points** about wedge politics **my critics** and particularly the **Opposition** should have sat down and thought about what was **a good outcome for Australia**… I don't think the Opposition has covered itself in glory on this issue and certainly has not acted according to **Australia's national interest** (Howard, 6/9/01, radio interview, 4BC).

The representation of identity in Howard's asylum-seeker discourse is summarised in the figure below. The motivation behind Howard's construction is two-fold: refining and reinforcing the identity of the Self by excluding certain other identities and ascribing particular attributes to both; and secondly to actively marginalise alternative voices who would seek to paint the issue and the desirable policy response in terms contrary to Howard.

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[58] Such as the then Trade Minister Mark Vaile, who painted the UN as emotive, inaccurate and as lacking credibility in the eyes of Australia; then immigration minister Philip Ruddock who labeled the UN 'misguidedly critical'; and then foreign minister Alexander Downer who said 'it is important that the United Nations examine the facts very carefully when they look into issues like this, rather than just listen to the howling of the political critics of the government or people who are pushing a particular political barrow' (Gelber & McDonald, 2006, 285).



Figure 4.1. Representation of identity in John Howard's asylum-seeker discourse.

The representational strategies of phase one of the asylum-seeker issue were carried through phases two and three. There were, however, some key additions in these periods. Where phase one – from Tampa until the 11th September attacks – was primarily about establishing the terms of the debate, phase two – from 9/11 until the announcement of the 2001 federal election – was characterised by a discursive focus on blurring the boundaries between the issues of asylum-seekers and terrorism so as to construct the mega-issue of border protection. In order to do this, Howard sharpened his rhetoric when talking about the asylum-seeker issue to focus exclusively and succinctly on the themes of sovereignty and identity. The former was phrased clearly in terms of the 'national interest' and 'protecting our borders':

> We remain very strongly of the view that everything the Government has done has not only been in the **national interest** but also legal (Howard, 14/9/01, joint press conference, Canberra).
>
> I am absolutely determined that **this country will protect its borders** against illegal immigration (Howard, 16/9/01, television interview, 60 minutes)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.4 on p.313].

The representation of identity in this phase focused purely on the asylum-seeker Other, and on conflating that with the emerging identity of the terrorist Other, which – as a result of the US terror attacks – was a much reviled, greatly inferior and ready-made subject position:

> …we are not trying to exaggerate links between **terrorism** and **illegal immigration**. However, every country has a **redoubled obligation in the light of what has happened** to **scrutinise very carefully who is coming into this country** (Howard, 19/9/01, radio interview, AM programme).

> ….we had the view, before what happened in the United States, that this country had a right to decide who came to this country and in what circumstances. I'm not deliberately extrapolating from one set of circumstances to the other but, nonetheless, I'm making the point that if you maintain a strict border protection policy you have a better chance of screening out **people who you don't want in this country** (Howard, 19/9/01, radio interview, 5DN).

Howard's failure to mention explicitly either the terrorist identity or the asylum-seeker identity but instead frame the threat in vague terms as people unwelcome in Australia is a clear indication of his conflation of the two identities in order to add greater legitimacy to his border protection policy.

Phase three – from the federal election announcement until the election itself – saw Howard build on these themes and hone them further and more intently. Border protection – the mega-issue Howard had spent phase two building – in fact became the clear centerpiece of the Liberal Party's reelection campaign which is hardly surprising given the huge levels of community support for the government's stance on both asylum-seekers and the 'war on terror' (McAllister, 2003). Three key incidents in relation to the asylum-seeker issue took place in phase three and were framed by Howard in terms entirely consistent with the broader discourse. They were: the 'children overboard' affair, whereby it was alleged (though later proved false) that 'illegal immigrants' onboard the HMAS Adelaide had thrown children into the water as an act of intimidation directed at the Australian government; the sinking of the SIEV X south of Java killing 353 asylum-seekers; and the death of 2 asylum-seekers after their boat, the SIEV 10 was set on fire.

'Children overboard' was a particularly relevant discursive incident, and an opportunity for Howard to hone his previous construction of the asylum-seeker. Indeed the enthusiasm with which he denigrated the supposed perpetrators in the absence of concrete

evidence, and his failure to renege on comments made when it was revealed the allegations were false is indicative of the fact that 'children overboard' really was an opportunity to further 'Otherise' the asylum-seeker, and further legitimate the government's policy of exclusion. Some of his constructions of these particular asylum-seekers are as follows:

> It **doesn't speak volumes** for some of the people on the vessel – suggestions that children were thrown overboard. That is a **sorry reflection on their attitude of mind**… **we are a humane nation** but we're not a nation that's going to be **intimidated** by this kind of behaviour (Howard, 7/10/01, doorstop interview, Menai).

> I don't want in Australia **people who would throw their own children into the sea**, I don't and I don't think any Australian does.. this is an attempt to **morally blackmail** Australia, I think it is. **Genuine refugees don't put their own children at risk**, they become refugees in the name of the preservation of the safety of their children. There's something to me **incompatible** between somebody who claims to be a refugee and **somebody who would throw their own child into the sea**, it **offends the natural instinct** of protection and delivering security and safety to your children… it's a determined attempt to **intimidate** us and we have to understand that. **They'll be treated humanely** and they have been and they will be and I want to thank the men and women of the Australian Navy for doing this very **difficult**, very **disagreeable** thing… (Howard, 8/10/01, radio interview, 2GB).

The representational tactic of constructing the negative Other and juxtaposing that identity against the positive Self, in particular the national father and his family, was one that Howard used almost without fail when discussing the asylum-seeker issue in the lead up to the federal election, even when it was related to death and tragedy. Talking about the sinking of the SIEV-X, Howard said:

> …we will maintain a policy of not allowing asylum seekers, **illegal immigrants** to come to the Australian mainland. That is our policy and we have said that we are not going to be, confronted by **illegal immigration**, we're not going to become the destination for the machinations and the **evil** trade of **people smugglers**. What's happened over the last few days is so sad and appalling…. It's **not the fault of the Australian Government**.. there are other people who are waiting to come to Australia as refugees and have been waiting for a long time in very difficult conditions and if you take **others** then you put them ahead of those people who've been waiting and have been assessed as refugees.. I would point out that already **we take more refugees on a per capita basis than any country in the world except Canada. Australia is one of only nine countries that has a resettlement programme**.. compared with other countries **we are quite generous**.. **we're more generous** than many of the countries from which our critics, our international critics come, **far more generous** (Howard, 25/10/01, radio interview, ABC regional radio).

Then two weeks later the same tactic was employed in reference to the fire on board SIEV-10 and the subsequent death of two people:

> … we've demonstrated that for the last 40 years by the way **we've absorbed people from all around the world**, **we've embraced** the habits and the attitudes and the cultures of our own **mainstream**, if I can put it that way, **Australian life**… There are **only nine countries that have resettlement programmes, of which Australia is one**… it is a very difficult issue.. the vessel was, according to the Navy report, was **deliberately set on fire** when it became apparent it was going to be boarded. What **they** are doing is disabling and, therefore, **sinking a vessel** so **they** can't be towed back into Indonesian waters. That's what's happening. Now, this is all designed, of course, to make Australia take **them** back.. we have to see that that is what is involved… We can't have a situation where if people act **desperately** enough and in a sense **intimidate us** into taking **them** then **we** will take **them**. I mean, that is basically what is occurring (Howard, 9/11/01, radio interview, 5AA).

Gelber and McDonald (2006, 282) posit that the construction of the asylum-seeker as not just an Other, but a complex radical Other who is – in addition to the attributes outlined in table 4.2 – unnatural, selfish, morally corrupt and irrational, is designed to encourage Australians to see asylum-seekers as 'less worthy of ethical consideration... because their conduct was fundamentally inconsistent with the values of Australians'. That in the context of an instance of tragedy and death Howard conscientiously contrasted the two identities, thus making the disparity more palpable to the listening audience, supports this point.

To end this section on the asylum-seeker issue and its place in informing the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia, the issue of resonance will be more closely examined. Though the question of *how* policy choices become 'common-sense' in particular contexts is mostly concerned with the nature of the constructions surrounding that policy choice, the extent to which those constructions are accepted by the audience is also important.

The Coalition received an extraordinary boost in popularity immediately following the Tampa crisis (see Appendix 4.2 on p.311). Goot & Sowerbutts (2004, 6) found in their analysis of polls conducted on this issue that, as a general trend:

> prior to the election, upwards of two-thirds of respondents supported the policy of refusing to allow boats carrying asylum-seekers to enter Australian waters or thought the Government was doing a "good job" in its handling of "the refugee problem".

So it is clear that Howard's construction of the asylum-seeker issue did resonate with the Australian electorate, but how exactly?

Resonance was outlined in Chapter One as a conceptual means for understanding the extent to which acts of communication are accepted by the intended audience. A construction that resonates with an audience is normally reliant on the ability of the speaker to link political action to prominent narratives of history, culture and identity

(Jackson & McDonald, 2008, 3) such that the audience member deems that action as reasonable and thus offers their agreement or political acquiescence (Der Derian & Shapiro, 1989, 75). What this suggests is that there is an intersubjective component to resonance, meaning that whether or not a construction resonates with a group is dependent on their acceptance of that construction as meaningful. However, the degree of intersubjectivity is always contextually dependent, and it would be foolishly over-agentic to assume that audiences always decide which constructions succeed and which ones fail.

It was stated at the outset of this section that the asylum-seeker issue was securitized, that is, constructed as existentially threatening to the community and thus given the status of extraordinary importance. Buzan et.al. (1998, 31) argue that securitising moves are more likely to resonate with an audience when they come from actors with the power to define security. Indeed Burke (2008, 244) argues that it was the securitising move itself made by Howard that led to the political acquiescence of the Australian electorate. 'Securitisation', he says, 'has the effect of robbing people of agency, choice and freedom'. While it is true that the agency of the audience was severely restricted *after* the securitisation of the asylum-seeker issue, the Australian public did play the deciding role in legitimising Howard's construction of the issue as an existential emergency. The representation of the asylum-seeker issue as one of security resonated with the electorate in part because Australians are – as a number of commentators have recognised – trusting of authority on such matters (Marr, 2007, 5; Goot & Sowerbutts, 2004; Burke, 2008, 243). Furthermore, it could also be argued that Australians are partial to gallant leaders who take a decisive stance on matters of security (Mackay, 2010).

But securitizing the issue was not in itself enough to generate the long-term support and legitimacy that Howard's asylum-seeker policy enjoyed. This was reliant on Howard's ability to represent the issue in ways which resonated with Australians and the consistent repetition of those representations. As was outlined in detail above, this representation centered around the twin-themes of sovereignty and identity.

The construction of sovereignty upon which Howard's discourse on asylum-seekers partially relied was concerned with generating a sense of vulnerability and fear of invasion in the community. His articulation of the problem as one of **border control**, designed to inhibit the **flow of unauthorised arrivals** can be viewed as an attempt to 'hail' the

Australian fearful of invasion. The linguistic resources or 'cultural raw materials' (Milliken, 1999, 239) from which Howard moulded the Tampa crisis and later the asylum-seeker issue conjured a familiar ontology, that deeply ingrained fear of invasion outlined in Chapter Three. Framed in these terms the boat floating off shore quickly became an existential emergency where 'we' were under siege once again from 'them', such was the success of this interpellation.

This raises the significance of the subject positions constructed through Howard's discourse. The successful resonance of constructions of identity in asylum-seeker discourse is undoubtedly a major contributing factor to the popularity of Coalition policy in this area. But the reasons for this resonance are complex, and there are a number of probable explanations. Firstly the general attempt to construct a radical Other and thus enforce a division between the threatened Australian community and the asylum-seeker can be seen to have achieved particular resonance with racially prejudiced Australians. As outlined in Chapter Three, the rise of Pauline Hanson and the failure of Prime Minister Howard to rebuke her indiscriminate racism were a clear indication that 'fantasies of white supremacy' – as Ghassan Hage (1998) has eloquently termed it – still linger. Thus one would expect Howard's construction to resonate with many Australians in this respect.

More specifically though, Howard's construction of this Other as Middle Eastern may have been responsible for such high degrees of resonance among racially prejudiced Australians. Although the asylum-seeker was rarely referred to explicitly as Middle Eastern in Howard's language, it was constructed as such by a process of linking. That is by positioning the asylum-seeker identity alongside words that infer Middle Eastern heritage. For instance:

> …these people are coming in through Indonesia. It is easy to get into Indonesia, many of **them** are coming through Malaysia, many of **them** fly from **Afghanistan** and the **Middle East** to South Eat Asia, **they** have easy entry into a country like Malaysia became there's an unrestricted right of entry I understand from **Islamic** countries to Malaysia (Howard, 29/8/01, radio interview, AM programme).

This articulation can be seen to have hailed Australians wanting fewer migrants from the Middle East, which prior to Tampa in 2001 was 55% of respondents to the Australian Election Study (Goot & Sowerbutts, 2004, 18).

A degree of complexity, related to the act of 'dog whistling' can be added to this possibility however. The expression 'dog whistling' was popularised in Australia as a direct result of the Tampa crisis. Several political commentators claimed that Prime Minister Howard constructed his language in a way that sent a specific message to some members of the audience, while remaining inaudible to others[59]. Dog-whistling then, is an analogy as Wright (2000) outlines:

> Blow a dog whistle, and you won't hear much to get excited about. But the target of the whistle – the dogs – will detect a sound beyond the audible range of the rest of us, and will react to it. Two quite different messages are contained within the one action of blowing the whistle: the one benign, the other designed to be heard and heeded only by the ears tuned to it.

Fear (2007, 5) claims that Howard is a master of the dog whistle and that it has been at the core of his political success on issues like asylum seekers and the 'war on terror'. The concept of the dog whistle can be seen as another way of understanding how a particular construction successfully hailed one subject, while failing to interpellate another. Consider for instance the following statement referred to on page 11:

> …we are not trying to exaggerate links between **terrorism** and **illegal immigration**. However, every country has a **redoubled obligation in the light of what has happened** to **scrutinise very carefully who is coming into this country** (Howard, 19/9/01, radio interview, AM programme).

Applying the dog whistle concept, it can be argued that two messages could be drawn from this statement. The first is the 'benign' or apparent message: *given the global circumstances, we have to be vigilant about who is granted asylum in Australia*. The second is the 'whistle' or the hidden meaning: *the connection between terrorism and illegal immigrants is Islam, which is a culture and religion incompatible with Australian values. History has taught us that in order to protect our Australian way of life security policy must come above humanitarian concerns*. The trick of the dog whistle is three-fold. Firstly, it simultaneously hails those ambivalent about the policy (who hear the benign message) as a result of the perceived reasonableness of the construction; and those

[59] See for instance Oakes, L. (2001) 'A Sly-Dog Race Card', *The Bulletin*, July 11.; Ramsey, A. (2001) 'Forget the Rest of the Pack, It's the Race Card', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 October.; Seccombe, M. (2001) 'The Wages of Spin', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 November. In 2000, Tony Wright wrote an article in The Age linking the tactic of dog-whistling to Howard, particularly in relation to his handing of Pauline Hanson's maiden speech.

passionate about the policy (who hear the whistle) because it speaks to particular prejudices, fears or memories they hold. Secondly, it is, from the perspective of the speaker, deniable insofar as they can claim ignorance or simply reject claims that their message had a double-meaning. Howard frequently responded to suggestions of dog-whistling as 'ridiculous'. Thirdly, and most importantly from a discursive point of view, dog-whistling has the effect of reinforcing the kind of vague ideological categories that encourage division in the community and grant further legitimacy to policies of exclusion. In other words the dog whistle can be a process of discursive reinforcement.

It is perhaps important to add that resonance can be achieved through omission. That is to say that a construction may resonate with an audience member by virtue of what it is and what it says, but also because of what it fails to say. A good example is the deliberate failure by Howard and senior Cabinet members[60] to depict asylum-seekers on a human level, but rather refer to these human beings as numbers, select pronouns such as 'them' or 'they', vague descriptors like 'the people', 'those people' or 'cargo', and to deny the Australian public as much humanising information as possible. Indeed the Senate inquiry into the 'children overboard' affair found that this was an actual order given to the Department of Defence (Fear, 2007, 26). Had asylum-seekers been depicted as human beings who had suffered and wished to make a life for themselves and their families (for example), it is very probable that Howard's policy would not have enjoyed the same degree of support. Though those with prejudiced sentiment may have still been interpellated into the discourse, more ambivalent audience members may very well have rejected Howard's policy as inhumane and inconsistent with the generosity Australians are supposedly known for.

So far it has been claimed in relation to identity that prejudiced Australians were hailed into Howard's discourse on asylum-seekers on those grounds via his construction of the threatening Other, and that ambivalent Australians – or those without sufficient racist sentiment to mobilise them to support the policy purely on that basis – may have been

[60] MacCallum (2002, 6) points particularly to Philip Ruddock in this regard, who, during an interview with the 7:30 report on August 13th 2001 referred to six-year-old Shayan Badraie – an Iranian asylum-seeker – as 'it' four times. This, MacCallum argues, had the effect of depriving the child of 'both gender and humanity', and was part of a broader campaign by the Government to counter a scathing report by ABC's *Four Corners* about the detention of asylum-seekers.

interpellated by the perceived reasonableness of the policy construction (which as part of the dog whistle technique and via omission was carefully constructed to appear as such). To this one other significant possibility can be added.

In their 2004 study Goot & Sowerbutts deduce that views on law and order help explain support for the Government's policy on asylum-seekers amongst some of the population. Those who generally favour harsher penalties for people who break the law overwhelmingly supported Howard's stance (Goot & Sowerbutts, 2004). This suggests that these audience members would have been hailed into the discourse by constructions relating to queue jumping and the supposed illegality of seeking asylum, as well depictions of asylum-seekers as dubious characters and potential criminals and terrorists. As Gelber (2003, 29) points out:

> The idea of a queue and the hostility expressed towards queue jumpers in the context of a line for theatre tickets, are well known elements of liberal democratic orders. This is why the use of the terms queue and queue jumpers has such resonance.

For audience members passionate about law and order, or those who simply concur with the narrative of Australia as fundamentally egalitarian, the image of the queue jumper, the criminal or the potential terrorist raises questions about cultural compatibility, which is exacerbated by Howard's construction of the fair, generous, decent, lawful and orderly Australian. The point to be made here is that while the basis of the concern about a foreign Other is fundamentally the same for those who support Howard's policy on the basis of identity, the way in which subjects are hailed into the discourse may differ.

The construction of the asylum-seeker issue across the three key phases and the representations of sovereignty and identity contained therein are summarised in the table below. These depictions have clear historical roots outlined in the previous Chapter. Moreover, this construction represents a continuation of the revival of race-politics initiated by Hanson and Howard in the mid 1990s (Markus, 2001), and provided the basis upon which the 'war on terror' discourse would be framed. Howard's articulations had successfully interpellated a majority of Australians into a fundamentally exclusivist and statist discourse, and providing he remained consistent in those articulations, that audience would keep listening. This then, is a classic example of the Foucauldian notion of 'governmentality' (Foucault, 2007). That this act of securitization occurred with such

success is illustrative of a power shift away from the individual actor in favour of the state, signaling the emergence of a political technology of security able to simultaneously affect subjectivity, nationhood and geopolitics (Burke, 2001, xxxv).

Phase	Sovereignty	Identity
1) establishing terms of the debate / discourse	- invasion from flow of people - exclusion in national interest - right to border control	- radical negative Other = illegal immigrant (asylum seeker) - positive threatened Self = Australian community - additional threatening Others
2) constructing mega-issue of border protection	- previous themes reiterated + - protect our borders	- previous themes reiterated + - asylum-seeker/terrorist as refined radical Other
3) making border protection core of election campaign	- previous themes reiterated	- further evidence of radical Other as incompatible with Australian identity

Table 4.3. Summary of construction of asylum-seeker issue 24/8/01– 10/11/01.

11th September

The attacks upon Washington and New York occurred a mere two weeks after the Tampa entered Australian waters and was subsequently boarded by the SAS. The timing provided the Howard Government with an opportunity to justify Australia's response to 11th September in terms of existential threat and binary identity relatively easily, since the discursive foundations for such arguments were already firmly in place, and were almost entirely uncontested by the federal opposition and the mainstream media[61]. Still, a great deal of effort – primarily from Prime Minister Howard – went in to ensuring public support

[61] With the exception perhaps of *The Australian* newspaper – which appeared initially supportive of Government policy towards asylum seekers but from August 28th began to editorialize against the Government's stance – mainstream media outlets were broadly uncritical of Government policy during the asylum-seeker issue. They failed to contend but rather tended to reproduce the dominant representation of the issue; particularly the image of asylum-seekers as 'illegal' and 'queue jumpers', and the suggestion that Australia was existentially threatened by a tide of illegal entrants (see Saxton, 2003; Ward, 2002).

for Australia's initial involvement in the US led 'war on terror'[62]. This section looks at Howard's representation of the terror attacks and the construction of the 'war on terror' between 11th September 2001 and the federal election of 2001, with a view to understanding *how* Australians came to overwhelmingly support Australian involvement in the 'war on terror' during this period.

That there existed widespread public support during this period is virtually indisputable. In a September Newspoll poll, only 12% of respondents said they were dissatisfied with Howard's response to the terrorist attacks on America (Goot, 2002, 73), and several polls registered greater than two-thirds of respondents were in favour of Australian military involvement in the war (Goot, 2007, 261). What this indicates is that Howard's constructions gained significant traction in the community, that his representations 'resonated' with the audience. The empirical examination of 92 items focused on the 'war on terror' – comprising 1 Hansard document; 17 press conferences; 31 radio interviews; 15 television interviews; 13 doorstop interviews; and 15 addresses[63] – revealed that Howard's construction revolved around four key themes: the expression and generation of emotion; the construction of threat; binary identity; and the marginalisation of critics of the Government's position.

Before exploring these themes, it is important to note and take a closer look at the contexts in which Howard's representations were delivered. The bulk of material related to the 'war on terror' was delivered via the talkback radio format[64], as the graph below shows:

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[62] Howard in fact saw it as his personal mission to continually garner support for Australian involvement in the 'war on terror', saying 'I have a very strong view that you should never take for granted the continued support and acceptance, you should constantly be advocating an argument… I have a responsibility to continue to communicate with the Australian people..' (Howard, 24/10/01, press conference, Perth).

[63] This category includes formal addresses, policy launches, and the Great Debate held in the lead up to the federal election.

[64] Talkback radio can be defined as radio that 'mixes calls from listeners, commentary on public affairs, pre-arranged interviews and newsbreaks' (Ward, 2002b, 21). John Howard used this medium more than any previous Prime Minister or federal politician (Ward, 2002b, 23). Judith Brett (2004, 91) claims this penchant is reflective of Howard's desire to interact directly with voters rather than face the 'adversarial and probing' press gallery. Ward (2002b, 23) concurs but adds that talkback radio enabled Howard to 'play to his own strengths as a political communicator'. Whatever the motivation, it is certain that the degree of scrutiny is far less in a talkback interview than other mediums, and that by increasing the number of such interviews at the expense of press conferences, doorstop interviews etc., journalists are often forced to put together information for the public from Howard's talkback radio appearances (Ward, 2002b, 25).



Figure 4.2. Source of John Howard's speech material related to 'war on terror', 11/9/01 – 10/11/01.

In the context of this thesis, the disproportionate privilege given to talkback radio for the provision of information, or the conveyance of representations, can be seen as significant. This is particularly so given that – as Adams and Burton (1997) have pointed out – listeners of this medium hold a clear preference for simplicity and assuredness in political argument over complexity and deliberation. Though it is the *content* of Howard's language and the representations contained within them that is the primary means by which meaning was given to the 'war on terror' and Australia's place in it, channeling this information via a sympathetic and less-investigative medium would undoubtedly have helped his message resonate with the public.

Emotion

Australians were deeply moved by the 11th September attacks (Williams, C., 2002, 15). As outlined in Chapter Two, this was partially due to the fact that there was exhaustive and often graphic media coverage of the events on Australian television. However, the translation of immediate and more innate senses of shock and horror into feelings of sympathy and solidarity occurred through language. Framing the events of 11th September 2001 in emotive terms was a key pillar of Howard's construction of the attacks and the subsequent 'war on terror'. This framing took two main forms: Howard's articulation of personal experience; and the more general expression of sadness and emotional solidarity.

Robert Garran (2004, 1) makes the very valid point that by virtue of his physical presence in the US on September 11th 2001, Howard was 'profoundly affected' by the events of that day, and while the sincerity of his sentiment is not in question, the repeated articulation of his quasi-first-hand account of the attacks is of great discursive significance. In the only four interviews with the Prime Minister[65] in the week following the attacks, Howard's personal experience in the United States on that day was a key point, and it was also mentioned in the context of justification for the deployment of Australian forces in the 'war on terror'[66]. The effect of this is twofold: firstly it operates as a kind of truth claim or appeal to authentic knowledge which then enables him greater power and legitimacy in deciding how Australia should respond; and secondly it adds greater credence to his appeal to emotion, particularly important since Howard was not considered a particularly emotive or charismatic leader in ordinary circumstances.

Emotive language in reference to the attacks was present in Howard's language throughout the sample under analysis in this section, but was undoubtedly most potent in the period immediately following 11th September. In one relatively brief interview with John Laws on 12th September, emotion dominated:

> It's **difficult** to overstate the sense of **shock** that people feel in the United States. And it's **difficult** for me to overstate the sense of **empathy** and **sorrow** and **solidarity** we **feel** for the American people at a time like this.
>
> I just can't overstate the **sympathy**, the **solidarity**, the **empathy** I **feel** for the American nation and the American people at the present time and I know that I speak for every Australian in saying that.
>
> …to all of us, it's just quite **unimaginable**. **I couldn't believe** and I'm sure that everybody in Australia, many of whom have been up all night, I understand, watching it on television, I don't think anybody could have believed something like this could have occurred.
>
> I don't think any of us can be other than very **heavy-hearted** and **sombre** today
> It's a very, very **sad** day. It's not just a **sad** day for America, which it is, but it's a very **sad** day for the world

In the two weeks after 11th September Howard used the following words and phrases to convey emotion to the Australian public:

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[65] by Alan Jones (Howard, 17/9/01, radio interview, 2UE), John Laws (Howard, 12/9/01, radio interview, 2UE), Mike Munro (Howard, 12/9/01, television interview, A Current Affair) and Ray Martin (16/9/01, television interview, 60 Minutes)

[66] See Howard, 31/10/01, speech, Sydney; and Howard, 25/10/01, address, Melbourne.

> horror, loss, tragedy, terrible, numb, awful, distressed, tragic, compassion, condolence, closeness, I just feel so desperately sorry, you…feel that your heart has been ripped out, lonely, grieve, mourning, passion, angry.

This use of emotive language operates to hail members of the public who concur with Howard's feeling of shock and sadness. As Stech (1994) points out, graphic and incessant images of tragic events will normally illicit emotional responses in the viewer. As long as those images remain fresh in the mind of the viewer emotion tends to override reason in digesting what exactly has occurred. Howard's expression of grief and sorrow was bound to resonate with most Australians, who – in being drawn into his representation – look to him for explanation and reassurance.

If repeated often enough emotive language becomes more than a mechanism of interpellation and actually functions to foster a sense of grievance and victim-hood (Jackson, 2005, 36). Research done in the area of social psychology has shown that the effect of Howard's early expression of emotion vis-à-vis 11th September was not to instill fear in Australians – as has been suggested by a number of analysts[67] – but rather to breed anger (De Castella et.al., 2009). Using appraisal theory[68], these authors found that Howard's appeal to emotion, together with the attribution of blame to the terrorist Other and his conviction that the event would be decisively dealt with (both of which will be explored below) mobilised feelings of anger amongst the Australian community. Whether or not it was Howard's intention to arouse this emotion is a moot point, but what can be said is that arousing anger in the service of a political agenda is a tactic that has been employed by many political leaders and aspirants throughout history (Ost, 2004) – including, as mentioned in the previous Chapter, Pauline Hanson. Provoking feelings of anger helps explain complex problems and provide a sense of direction in responding to an issue. It also fosters vengeance and increases the chances of support for violent policy responses (Jackson, 2005, 36). Thus it can be claimed that appeals to emotion in Howard's

[67] See, for instance, Lawrence (2006).

[68] Appraisal theory is used in this context to understand how an audience interprets particular constructions and which emotions result from that interpretation. Certain components, it is argued, are necessary for the production of particular emotions. While fear relies on a feeling of inability to cope with a situation that is relevant to the audience member but difficult to comprehend in some sense; anger is resultant when a relevant and incongruent event is deemed possible to cope with and there is a clear Other upon which blame can be attributed (Smith & Lazarus, 1993, 238).

early speeches helped frame the 11th September attacks as something with which Australians should be angry and thus against which they should be eager to retaliate. It follows that later justifications for Australian involvement in the US-led 'war on terror' centered on hailing this angry subject. In effect we can see that the discourse functioned to conflate emotional solidarity with the Americans into practical solidarity.

Realism, the Howard government and the 'war on terror'

Howard's framing of the 11th September attacks and the way in which Australia would respond was dominated by notions of threat, danger and militarism. What underpinned this framing was a politics of realism, and it is worth briefly fleshing out the nature of the relationship between the realist tradition and Howard's foreign policy, particularly as it relates to the 'war on terror'.

Determining the extent to which John Howard was a foreign policy realist is not the intention here. But prior to making the claim that Howard's construction of the 'war on terror' discourse was rooted in a politics of realism, it helps to momentarily consider the origins of this position. What can be said with considerable certainty is that Howard espouses one of the most fundamental tenets of realism: that, as Michael Wesley (in Marsh, 2003, 165) puts it, 'security is the sine qua non of any rational foreign policy: for without security there can be no commerce, no government policy or social activity unaffected by nagging feelings of insecurity…' This sentiment was made clear in Howard's foreign policy manifesto before the 1996 election, 'A Confident Australia: Policies for a Coalition Government'. Foreign policy under Howard, it said, would be 'driven by an enlightened realism: by a commitment to practical measures to advance Australia's national interests within a framework of liberal values, the rule of law and practical international co-operation' (Robb, 1996, 2); would strengthen ties with our 'natural' friend the United States (Robb, 1996, 21); and would reject 'unrealistic notions of global idealism' (Robb, 1996, 5). This was enshrined in official government policy in the 1997 White Paper, a document partially authored by the Prime Minister himself (Sheridan, 1997), and which spoke of foreign policy as 'about the hard-headed pursuit of the national interests', and 'not a matter of grand constructs' (DFAT, 1997, iii). The language of

realism permeated the 2003 White Paper, as well as various personal statements on foreign policy by Howard, perhaps most notably in his 2005 speech at the launch of the Lowy Institute, where he reiterated the sentiments of almost a decade prior with a 'war on terror' twist (Howard, 31/3/05, address).

Robert Garran, who has written what is perhaps the closest to an explanation for Howard's commitment to 'the war on terror' and the war in Iraq, argues that Howard is fundamentally 'a child of the realist tradition' – albeit with a neo-liberal twist, and that his decision to join the 'war on terror' was inextricable linked to his 'view about the nature of power in the modern world', and 'the importance for Australia's security in supporting the United States' (Garran, 2004, 104-110). That Howard's foreign policy is inspired by a politics of realism is supported by a range of authors[69], and it should thus be unsurprising that it is central to the representational strategies associated with his government's foreign policy discourse.

Four key representational strategies served to normalise a realist approach to the attacks in the Australian context: militarism (and the use of the language of war); lack of immunity; the centrality of the US-Australian alliance; and the dawn of a new era. In many speech items these strategies worked simultaneously, and can be seen as a kind of super-charged rhetorical attempt to make a military response seem inevitable and Australian involvement in a 'war on terror' appear imperative.

The language of conflict and war was evident in Howard's first interviews after the attacks:

> Well I think now is the time for calm but **lethal** responses... We can use words, but in the end it's deeds that really count.. (Howard, 12/9/01, radio interview, 2UE)
>
> … it's nothing short of an **act of war** (Howard, 12/9/01, radio interview, 2UE)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.5 on p.314].

As discussed in Chapter Two, interpreting the attacks as an act of war is of great discursive consequence: it infers that exploring causality is unimportant, implies that the victim bears

[69] See, for instance: Cheesman, G. 'Facing an Uncertain Future: Defence and Security under the Howard Government', in Cotton, J. & Ravenhill, J. (eds) (2001) *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs, 1996-2000.* Oxford University Press: Melbourne.; Camilleri, J. (2003) 'A Leap into the Past – in the Name of the National Interest', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.57, No.3, pp.431-453.

no responsibility for the incident, and provides a space in which violent response is seen as acceptable and even desirable.

Making this 'act of war' politically relevant to Australians was done firstly by warning Australians that such carnage could occur on 'our soil':

> ...**nobody is immune** from the possibility of this kind of outrage and all of us have to take that on board (Howard, 12/9/01, press conference)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.6 on p.315].

And secondly by articulating the centrality of the American alliance vis-à-vis Australian security:

> .. I've indicated that in the message that I sent to the President that we would be resolute in our **solidarity with the Americans** in what they might do (Howard, 12/9/01, radio interview, 2UE)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.7 on p.316].

Constructing the relevance of the 11th September attacks to Australia in these terms is a very obvious attempt to hail the Australian fearful of invasion, particularly those with whom the Japanese bombing of Darwin resonates. The critical nature of the US alliance had been articulated throughout Howard's Prime Ministership as well as during other periods in Australian history, such as at the time of the Vietnam War (Garran, 2004). As such there is an intertextual dimension to this particular strategy by Howard, and it encourages a greater degree of resonance for his construction.

Claiming that the 11th September attacks represented the start of a 'new era' was a cornerstone of George W. Bush's construction of the 'war on terror', and it was also used by John Howard to cement support for military action:

> ... it is in many respects a **very different world** (Howard, 12/9/01, radio interview, 2UE)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.8 on p.317].

Richard Jackson (2005, 96-8) points out that the rhetoric of a 'new era' serves a number of purposes: firstly, by claiming an event is somehow extraordinary and unprecedented, the public is more likely to accept the use by officials of extraordinary powers and resources; and secondly, it is another means by which exploring causality is discouraged, since it is deemed as beyond the realm of historical experience. In addition to Jackson's suggestions, framing 11th September as marking a new era can also be seen as an attempt to discursively position John Howard (or George W. Bush in the American context) as the gallant,

decisive leader and the provider of national security. It is demonstrative of the Schmittian concept of the state of exception, and points to a commitment to a particular interpretation of sovereignty whereby the sovereign is vested with the power to suspend normal legal order, at his/her discretion, to combat an existential threat to the state (Schmitt, 1932). It could be argued that the language of exception resonates with those who see national security policy as an elite project, as something about which they are happy to defer to authority. The effect of invoking the state of exception in this context is that a range of policy responses – from military action to the enlargement of executive power in the name of combating terrorism – appear legitimate and perhaps the only option.

There is empirical evidence that the message of retaliation resonated with Australians in the days even before the 'war on terror' was declared: 70% of respondents surveyed by Newspoll supported the involvement of Australian armed forces in any US retaliation (Goot, 2007, 261). Although there is a range of possible explanations for why Australians favoured retaliation so heavily – including, for instance the sheer horror of the attacks or the media coverage of the constructions of George W. Bush – it is likely that Howard's ability to quickly and effectively frame the attacks and the response in realist terms played a significant role. As Burke (2001, 235) asserts, realism operates as a regime of truth that functions discursively to severely constrict the ways in which 'security can be conceived, thought and performed' (Burke, 2001, 226). Talking about 9/11 in terms of war and conflict, constructing an environment of threat and danger, and offering military action as the best form of response had the very Hobbesian effect of bolstering the authority of the sovereign. His promise of security is viewed as the best assurance against anarchy, danger and the chaos of the state of nature (Campbell, 1992, 68).

Identity

Identity lay at the centre of the construction of the 'war on terror' discourse in much the same way as the discourse on asylum-seekers. Constructing the evil terrorist Other was a relatively easy discursive process for Howard for a number of reasons. Firstly, the horror of the attacks themselves provided a space in which an Other could be readily inserted. And secondly, there was a strong intertextual dimension to the representation of the

Muslim / Middle Easterner as Other. Oil embargos and the 1979 Iranian Revolution were framed in dominant discourse in a way that incited intense levels of misunderstanding and fear amongst western populations (Said, 1997). And in the Australian context, the asylum-seeker Other was a construction very fresh in the minds of many. That said, it cannot be claimed that the evil terrorist Other emerged from the 11th September attacks in an organic fashion; as Jackson (2005, 59) asserts, the establishment of the two key identities in the 'war on terror' discourse – the 'good guys' and the 'bad guys' – was reliant on a process of careful and deliberate construction. The perpetrators of the attacks could have been represented in any number of different ways: as criminals (rather than ideological crusaders); as people driven to horrifying destruction as a result of grievance and injustice (rather than the incarnation of evil with no rational explanation for their behaviour); or indeed the response to the attacks could have been constructed with very little reference to identity at all, and instead be based on pragmatism, cause and effect and rational policy consideration rather than vague, ideologically-charged and grossly over-simplistic dichotomies[70]. But, as Krebs & Lobasz (2007, 425) point out, the language of pragmatism and consideration invites a degree of contestation that the rhetoric of identity does not. The language of identity offers defined categories, a sense of clarity, a vision of a unified and empowered Self, a site of blame, a target for response, and a sub-human Other against which violence and hate can be justifiably and rightly perpetrated.

In order to gain currency, or achieve resonance with Australians, Howard's construction of categories of 'us' and 'them' differed in some respects from such constructions in – say – the US and the UK[71].

[70] Stephen Walt, for instance, offers a realist assessment of the 'war on terror' and suggestions on how it should be reworked. The essence of his argument is that he agrees with the basic premise of the 'war on terror' (prior to the invasion of Iraq) insofar as it is aimed at eradicating al-Qaeda and replacing the Taliban. However, he contends that the approach of the Bush Government should be re-prioritised to include a focus on the reconstruction of Afghanistan and improving relations with the Arab and Islamic world (Walt, 2001/2). In a later piece on the same subject, Walt also advocated an end to military imposition of democracy and a return to a 'balancing' approach to military presence in the Middle East; the development of a nuclear bargain with the world whereby the United States' nuclear arsenal is actively downgraded; and the use of leverage to bring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to an end (Walt, 2005).

[71] For more on the construction of identity in the US context see Jackson (2005); for the importance of culturally specific understandings of policy justification see Holland (2008); and for how this worked in the context of intervention in Iraq see Jackson & McDonald (2008).

Constructing the Self

The Self was represented in the early stages of the Australian 'war on terror' discourse in three primary ways: as people of freedom; the children of Anzacs; and as not racist.

The dominant representation of the Australian Self in Howard's language was a fundamentally Anglo-Celtic, Christian and capitalist identity, but was conveyed by reference to freedom, democracy, civilisation, and modernity. This is evident in an interview on 12th September 2001 with John Laws (Howard, 12/9/01, radio interview, 2UE), excerpts from which follow:

> ...it does represent an attack on all of **us** and it does represent an attack on the **civilised world**..
>
> ..we can hope and **pray** that there is no more but we just don't know...
>
> ...the **free world**, people who love **freedom** and the **sort of life** we have in Australia, should empathise and **identify with the Americans**..

This rhetoric had been refined further by the time Howard formally presented his case for Australian involvement in the 'war on terror' to the Australian defence association (Howard, 25/10/01, address, Melbourne):

> Bin Laden's hatred for the United States, and for a world system built on **individual freedom**, religious tolerance, **democracy**, and the international **free flow of commerce**, is non-negotiable. These virtues of the **modern world** are an affront to bin Laden.
>
> ... there is bipartisan agreement in Australia, just as there is a consensus among the **civilised nations of the world**, that this terrorism must be stopped.
>
> I know that each one of (the Australians being deployed to the 'war on terror') will be foremost in the minds and **prayers** of Australians until they come home safely, they will certainly by in mine.

The discursive effect of representing Australia in these terms is twofold: firstly it serves to demarcate the Self from the Other, by ascribing specific and positive values to the Self that simultaneously work to hail the audience member into a fundamentally 'good' community (who, after all objects to being part of a 'free' world?), and paint a picture of the enemy (those who do not posses these 'good' qualities). The choice of adjectives whose conceptualisation is partially reliant on imagining its antonym (i.e. freedom/oppression, democracy/authoritarianism, civilisation/barbarism) assists this greatly. Secondly, the Self

is rhetorically positioned in a way that infers its very essence – freedom, democracy, civilisation – is at risk, thus working to validate military action against the enemy.

Defining the Self in terms associated with the Anzac myth was also a significant feature of the construction of identity in this early phase of the Australian 'war on terror' discourse. Though Howard rarely made explicit reference to the Anzac legacy, its rhetoric was implicit in many speech items, and was obviated by references to 'mateship', and the imperative of standing shoulder-to-shoulder with allies:

> The terrorists will be defeated if we hand onto our **essential Australian mateship**, we treat each other decently and we **work with our friends and our allies** around the world to make certain that we work this out.. our **egalitarian sense of mateship** gives us that.. capacity to **pull together in adversity**.. (Howard, 14/10/01, The Great Debate)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.9 on p.318].

Appealing to the Anzac myth – that is, the view that the Australian nation was founded upon its experience at Gallipoli in World War I (McDonald, 2010) – serves to 'hail' a large number of Australians into the discourse. Indeed as several commentators have recognised (McDonald, 2010; Tranter & Donoghue, 2007; McKenna, 2007; McKenna & Ward, 2007), the scale of Anzac Day 'celebrations' and the extent to which many Australians regard the Anzac myth as central to their sense of identity have increased remarkably after Howard's election in 1996. Thus it can reasonably be claimed that Howard's articulation of Australian involvement in the 'war on terror' in this fashion would have achieved a high degree of resonance. In addition, tying Australia's commitment to military intervention alongside the US to the Anzac myth works to construct conflict as an act of courageous bravery and heroism rather than a site of violence and tragedy.

Finally, the Self was defined in Howard's discourse as 'not racist'. Again this was not always the explicit construction, but it is the message that belies Howard's constant reference to Australians as fundamentally decent and tolerant:

> ... overwhelmingly Australians are **decent**, **fair-minded** people (Howard, 21/9/01, radio interview, 3AW)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.10 on p.319].

This rhetorical approach was being simultaneously employed in asylum-seeker discourse, and combines the tactic of positive self-presentation with racism denial. The discursive

effect of this representation of the Self is significant. Firstly, as van Dijk (1993b, 181) argues, denials of this kind:

> ..express ingroup allegiances and white-group solidarity, defend 'us' against 'them', that is, against minorities and anti-racists. They mark social boundaries and re-affirm social and ethnic identities, and self-attribute moral superiority to their own group.

In addition to this, denials of racism framed in this manner operate to marginalise people who criticise the 'war on terror' discourse on the basis that it is a fundamentally racist or discriminatory one. Denying the charge of racism and instead claiming to represent tolerance and decency challenges the legitimacy of such claims and those who dare to utter them (van Dijk, 1993b, 181). Last, representing the mainstream, or the majority as tolerant and decent while attributing racism to the 'fringes' helps to cement the identity of the Self as inherently 'not racist', thus opening a discursive space in which the derogation of the Other can be viewed as reasonable.

Constructing the Other

Three themes dominate Howard's construction of the terrorist Other also: they were represented as a radical enemy; as subhuman; and 'already here'.

Constructing the radical enemy was achieved by reference to the scourge of Nazism and the portrayal of our 'way of life' as being under threat. The two are discursively linked in Howard's narrative, where World War II is seen as an ideological battle between evil fascists who sought to challenge the 'way of life' of the good democratic allies:

> ..much has already been said about the obligation on all of us who care about the **way of life** we have taken for granted.. over the years we know the obligation and the responsibility of this country to work with our friends and our allies.. All of the **history of the 20th Century** instructs us as to the folly of imagining that **people and groups with evil intent** will look kindly on those who walk away from the challenge they present to **free people**. That was the experience of the world between the **wars** and it's been the experience of mankind in all history (Howard, 18/10/01, address)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.11 on p.320].

In addition to working to elevate the existential importance of the 'war on terror' and Australia's place in it, framing the conflict and the enemy in this manner serves to remind

people that evil is not addressed by looking at root causes (Krebs & Lobasz, 2007, 429). World War II holds particular resonance for Australians. It was the most expensive military campaign and involved the largest number of Australians, and was the only conflict to have extended to Australian shores (Australian War Memorial, n.d.). Invoking WWII and constructing the terrorist as a radical enemy akin to the Nazi / Japanese Other simultaneously works here as an act of hailing, to legitimate and glorify military action and to marginalise those who suggest terrorism should be addressed through non-military means.

Howard's speech items also attributed certain characteristics to this radical enemy, which, taken together, result in a framing of the terrorist Other as subhuman. He variously described terrorists as: monstrous, appalling, cowardly, deranged, fanatical, despicable, evil, insidious, obscene, barbaric, callous, brutal, cold-blooded, foul, low-life(s), and as people who don't deserve to be part of the world.

Perhaps the most critical aspect of the construction of the Other in the early 'war on terror' discourse in Australia however, was the way in which Howard portrayed the enemy as 'already (or almost) here'. This was achieved by linking the subhuman radical enemy to Islam in general, to asylum-seekers, to Arab-Australians, to people of Middle-Eastern descent and to Australia's neighbour, Indonesia:

> ... border surveillance and border protection and greater scrutiny of **who comes to this country** is clearly one of the things we have to do as a consequence of what's occurred (Howard, 16/9/01, television interview, 60 Minutes).
>
> He's (Pakistani President Musharref) come out very strongly against **terrorist** activity as had the President of **Indonesia – the largest Muslim country in the world**. This is not a reaction against **Muslims**. I want to emphasise that **Islamic** Australians, Australians of **Arab** descent, should not be marginalised and generically pursed and criticised and vilified as a result of what has happened (Howard, 21/9/01, radio interview, 3AW).
>
> ...there is **evidence of sympathisers** and **connections** (in Australia) and in the sort of world in which we live at the present time you've got to take all precautionary action that you can (Howard, 4/10/01, press conference).
>
> ...I had a discussion with Mr. Blair some ten days ago.. we in fact had quite an extensive discussion about the aftermath of the **terrorist** attack and about how our society would have to adjust. Interestingly enough one of the things he did say to me during that discussion is that they in Britain would have to review their attitude towards **asylum-seekers** (Howard, 8/10/01, press conference).

We may make a similar claim about Howard's attempt to link terrorism and Islam/Middle Eastern/Arab that was made in relation to his attempt to link asylum-seekers to the same categories. That is that framing the terrorist as Muslim/Middle Eastern/Arab works to hail Australians who either: are racially prejudiced; want fewer migrants from the Middle East; or who fail to hear the inherent race 'dog-whistle' and are persuaded by the perceived reasonableness of the claim (i.e. that the terrorist attacks were perpetrated by Muslim people, there are Muslim people in Australia, among asylum-seekers and living in voluminous numbers on our doorstep, therefore we need to be vigilant). As was the case with asylum-seeker discourse, this construction of the enemy as 'already here' works to justify harsh, exclusionary and even violent measures directed towards them.

Thus it can be seen that identity played a pivotal role in ensuring widespread support for Australian involvement in the 'war on terror'. The unambiguous construction of oppositional forces – the good (free, courageous, decent) Self and the bad (terrorist, subhuman, Muslim) Other, worked to generate very significant modes of power and exclusion. This in turn operated to ensure that violent and exclusionary behaviour achieved the status of common-sense.

Marginalising critics

Some mention has already been made of the way in which representations of identity and sovereignty worked to marginalise competing narratives. But it is important to highlight that sidelining and even maligning those who sought to challenge the government's position on the 'war on terror' was not just an added bonus of certain representations, rather it was a discursive strategy in and of itself. And it was a cornerstone of the early construction of the 'war on terror' discourse.

The inability of the Opposition Labor Party to advance an alternative to Howard's dominant narrative has been recognised by a number of authors (McDonald, 2005, 311; Williams, C.,2002, 16), and is clear in the primary documents under examination here.

Indeed even the minor parties struggled to speak outside the discourse[72], and even when they did[73], their representations gained little traction in the popular media or the broader community. This can be at least partially attributed to Howard's ability to discursively construct the declaration of a 'war on terror' as somehow natural, and Australia's involvement in that response as 'above politics':

> ..I wouldn't expect on that issue there'd be any difference but then you can't be certain, the **Labor Party has said up to date that it's supporting our response** to the attack on the United States and I welcome that and I think **it's important that Australia speak with one voice** to the rest of the world (Howard, 28/9/01, television interview, ABC Stateline)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.12 on p.321].

This representational strategy operates as a kind of truth claim; an appeal to knowledge that aids a power shift towards Howard – the custodian of the true knowledge, and away from those who would seek to politicise or contest his policy choice. It is again an invocation of Schmitt's state of exception, an issue and a time where the norms of deliberation and consultation shall not apply.

To an extent it could be reasonably claimed that the Australian media were complicit in this invocation. A number of authors have recognised their highly uncritical coverage of these events; with the multicultural broadcaster SBS the only clear exception (Osuri & Banerjee, 2004, 169), the remainder – print, radio and television – 'largely followed the Government's agenda during the (2001 election) campaign' (Simms, 2002). Wright-Neville (2005) attests that the tabloid media has been particularly guilty of often hysterical coverage relating to the 'war on terror'[74], and specifically about the threat of Islam in Australia. A cursory examination of media material from this period demonstrates that the mainstream media in Australia rarely deviated from the sanctioned vocabulary;

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[72] In the Senate sitting of 17th September 2001, Bob Brown of the Australian Greens used the term 'evil' a number of times in his address; Aiden Ridgeway of the Australian Democrats spoke of Australia's 'moral obligation' to stand beside its 'American brothers and sisters' (Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 17/9/01)

[73] In the Senate sitting of 17th September 2001 Senator Natasha Stott Despoja of the Australian Democrats focused her response to the 11th September attacks on the need for a measured response by the United States, and the importance of a multilateral and diplomatic approach to combating terrorism; Bob Brown of the Australian Greens referred to the attacks as a 'criminal tragedy' (as opposed to an act of war), and spoke extensively of the importance of addressing poverty and inequality in any attempt to achieve greater global peace and security (Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 17/9/01).

[74] Also mentioned in Williams, C., 2002.

and themes of realism, militarism, and binary identity permeated coverage. Material that challenged the government's position or spoke outside the discourse was relegated to the opinion pages, and thus attributable to the left-wing rather than the 'mainstream'. In a sense during this period – between 11th September and the 2001 Federal Election – Howard had successfully marginalised potential critics within the media before they had even engaged in criticism.

To summarise, the construction of the 'war on terror' in the period between the 11th September 2001 and the 2001 federal election was reliant on four key representational strategies: the expression of emotional solidarity in order to arouse anger in Australians and encourage support for practical solidarity with America; the framing of the attacks and the best response in realist terms; the establishment of clear identity boundaries based on an intrinsically good and threatened Self and an evil and dangerous Other; and the construction of the issue as one 'above politics', therefore marginalising potential critics and compelling the media and political opposition to reproduce the dominant discourse. This discourse became dominant in this period for these reasons, and also thanks to Howard's ability to draw public support for Australian involvement in the 'war on terror' via discursive links to asylum-seeker discourse and Australia's broader security narrative.

4.3 2002 Bali bombings

The next significant phase in the construction of the 'war on terror' discourse was precipitated by the 12th October 2002 bombings in Kuta, Bali which killed 202 people, 88 of whom were Australian. The bombings occurred at a time when Howard and his government were experiencing declining levels of popularity: a Morgan poll found that an election conducted in early October 2002 would have resulted in an ALP victory, albeit a marginal one (Morgan, 2002a). In addition, the increasing sense that a war in Iraq was looming – the possibility of which had been raised in August – left Australians slightly less supportive of the broader 'war on terror'[75]. Though it is a moot point whether the

[75] An ACNielsen poll taken in September 2002 found that just under half (47%) of respondents were 'satisfied' that the government was 'acting in the best interests of Australia in regards to the war on terrorism' (Goot, 2007, 262).

government deliberately framed Bali in order to improve their popularity[76], it is almost inarguable that Howard framed the bombings in a way that would increase support for the 'war on terror' and Australia's role in it. This section seeks to illustrate *how* he achieved this. The fundamental claim is that the construction of the 2002 Bali bombings – herein referred to as the Bali bombings – was aimed at bolstering domestic support for a range of measures associated with the 'war on terror', and for that reason is characterised by the same themes evident in the early 'war on terror' discourse: emotion, the politics of realism, binary identity, and the marginalisation of criticism. It seems reasonable to assume that these themes were reiterated because of their prior success, and although their discursive effects are in many instances broadly similar to what was outlined in the previous section – framing an issue in realist terms operates, for instance, to normalise militarism and sideline collective security approaches, while appeals to binary identity help justify the perpetration of violence by the Self towards the Other – the content of the constructions differ in line with the altered circumstances (Bali represented a more direct attack on Australia than the 11th September attacks).

The data under analysis here is confined to speech items where Prime Minister Howard made explicit reference to the Bali bombings between 13th October 2002 and the end of 2002. The composition of this material is outlined below:



Figure 4.3. Source of John Howard's speech material related to 'Bali bombings', 13/10/02 – 31/12/02.

[76] Which it did – by 8th November Roy Morgan polling found that the Coalition had increased its popularity by 3.5% to 52.5% (Morgan, 2002b); and John Howard's personal approval rating as Prime Minister rose 7 points to 61% just one week after the attacks (Shanahan, 2002b).

Emotion

In their examination of Australian media coverage of the Iraq War and its lead up, Hirst & Schutze (2004, 176) found that images of John Howard as a sensitive, emotive leader were prevalent in the nation's leading newspapers immediately following the Bali bombing. The centrality of emotion in Howard's Bali bombing discourse is also borne-out by the contents of his early speech items on the topic. While his personal expressions of emotion can be viewed as an attempt to appear a 'sensitive, trustworthy statesman', as Hirst & Schutze (2004, 176) claim, there is an added dimension of complexity to his emotional constructions. This is related to the need to represent the trauma of the Bali bombings as directly relevant to all Australians – not just those who were present or personally affected. This was achieved firstly by 'interweaving individual and collective emotion'[77] (Hutchison, 2008, 18), and secondly by coaxing Australians to be angry and vengeful, culminating in the construction of the Bali bombings as Australia's 9/11.

Representing first-hand, individual grief as collective Australian grief was achieved primarily by filling the discursive space with shared meanings and cultural references. This encouraged Australians who were initially untouched by the attack to view it as a tragedy that could so easily have involved them or someone they knew, and as an attack not just on these individuals but on the nation. Constructing the Bali bombings as relevant to *all* Australians was a key feature of Howard's discourse, and is readily evident in the following excerpts from his first press conference on the topic:

> ...my dominant preoccupation now is as best as I can in a **tragic** situation.. express a sense of **collective concern** to those **Australians** and **mothers** and **fathers**, and **brothers** and **sisters**, and everybody else who have got people in Bali at the moment who they can't find. All of our thoughts ought to be with them because it's a **terrible time** for them and they deserve our **sympathy** and our support as best as we can give it in these very **difficult** circumstances (Howard, 13/10/02, press conference).

> ...this is a huge **national tragedy** for **Australia** and for **Australians**, and it is something that the **Australian community** should as far as possible confront and respond to **together** (Howard, 13/10/02, press conference).

[77] Although Hutchinson's claim relates to media discourse on the Bali bombings, the empirical study of Howard's speech items showed that a similar discursive process of representing individual grief as collective Australian grief was central to Howard's discourse also.

> This event is a **terrible** reminder that terrorism can touch **anybody anywhere** and at **any time** (Howard, 13/10/02, press conference).

Howard also encouraged Australians to translate this sense of emotional solidarity into a desire for justice, and he did this by encouraging a feeling of anger:

> This is a vile crime which has claimed the lives of an as yet uncounted number of Australians on Indonesian soil. All of us have a right to feel **a sense of deep anger** and a **deep determination to do everything we can**, as a **nation** and as a **community**... to **bring to justice** those who are responsible for this crime. **We owe it to those who died**, **we owe it to those who have been injured** and **we also owe it to a proper sense of justice** (Howard, 14/10/02, address)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.13 on 322].

Drawing on trauma literature, Hutchison (2008, 3) claims that witnesses – including those who 'witness' from distant places via media – make immediate sense of traumatic incidents by absorbing the emotional responses of others, and assembling meaning out of extant discourses. When we consider that Howard's immediate response to Bali hinged on the expression of grief, anger and a thirst for vengeance; that this emotional display dominated media coverage of the attack (Hirst & Schutze, 2004); and that the dominant interpretive frame for an event of this kind was 11th September, it becomes easier to see *how* Howard's construction of the Bali bombings as Australia's 9/11 achieved resonance with Australians[78].

Realism

Having framed the Bali bombings as Australia's 9/11, the next discursive step involved constructing the best response, and representing that response as the only alternative. In doing this, Howard relied on representational strategies similar to those he employed in the early 'war on terror' discourse: the language of threat and danger. The critical exemption in this regard was the language of militarism. Though he constantly referred to the cruciality of Australia's commitment to the 'war on terror', Howard was very careful to

[78] Although Howard never explicitly referred to the Bali bombings as Australia's own 9/11, this was the clear subtext of his framing of the bombings. This was discursively reinforced by the Federal Opposition, whose leader, Simon Crean said "I think we get something of a better understanding as to what Americans must have felt on September 11" (Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 14/10/02, p.7501), and by the mainstream media more generally (Hirst & Schutze, 2004, 174).

represent the bombings as a crime – not an act of war as was the case with the 11th September attacks. And he repeatedly stated that the perpetrators would be brought to justice 'in cooperation with Indonesia' (Howard, 14/10/02, television interview, Channel Seven News). This reinforces the realism behind his approach: to use the language of militarism in reference to Indonesia would have been very foolish and potentially a strategically dangerous choice. Instead, Howard's construction positioned the Bali bombings as a manifestation of the worldwide terrorist phenomenon, an event that should be dealt with via the justice system; while the scourge of terrorism more generally was to be addressed through the continuation of the US-led 'war on terror'. It was on this latter construction – that the Bali bombing reinforced Australia's need to be involved in the 'war on terror' – that Howard focused most of his energy.

The claim that Bali necessitated continued involvement in the 'war on terror' would probably not have achieved overwhelming resonance with Australians had it been explicitly constructed this way, particularly considering that critics of the government's position were claiming that this involvement was instrumental in the choice to target Australians in Bali (to be discussed further below). So, Howard broke this argument into two related constructions, which, individually were more likely to resonate with individuals, but when taken together, sent the message that Australia's continued involvement in the 'war on terror' was imperative.

The first construction was that the Bali bombings proved that 'terrorism is everywhere':

> The warnings of the last year or more that **terrorism can touch anybody, anywhere, at any time** have been borne out by this terrible event (Howard, 13/10/02, press conference)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.14 on p.323].

This rhetoric built on the 'no one is immune' strategy used in the early 'war on terror' discourse, but it had an extra dimension of threat because Bali had seemingly proved that claim, and made it additionally relevant because it occurred on 'our doorstep'. It is a representation with a high level of intertextuality – having been used a year prior, and – as outlined in Chapter Three – during the Cold War in Australia; and its purpose in the context of the discourse on the Bali bombings is to draw support and compliance by arousing fear. Clearly it had great resonance with Australians: a poll taken in late October

found that two-thirds of respondents believed that Bali meant an increased threat of terrorist attacks occurring in Australia (Newspoll, 2002). By December an even greater proportion – 79% – believed Bali had proved Australia was 'now a real terrorist target' (cited in Goot, 2007, 264).

Howard built on this representation of threat and danger by claiming that fighting a 'war on terror' at home and abroad was the only way it could be addressed:

> Is it easy to stop terrorism? No, it's not. **It certainly won't be stopped by people imagining if they roll into a little ball and go over into the corner, it will go away because it won't**.. it **requires the united action of the world** and it requires a determination of people who want to live in peace and freedom and see their young travel the world without fear. **It requires those people to work together and fight terrorism** whenever it rears its head (Howard, 13/10/02, television interview, 60 Minutes)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.15 on p.324].

Like the initial 'war on terror' discourse, Howard frames the continued need to fight terrorism as akin to the great ideological battles of history, particularly World War Two and the Cold War. By placing the 'war on terrorism' on-par with these epic battles, he can legitimately warn against the dangers of inaction, and it enables him to speak, once again, the Schmittian language of exception in relation to counter-terrorism measures at home.

In sum, the construction of the Bali bombings in realist terms functioned firstly to mitigate the need to deal in cause-and-effect, and secondly to legitimate Howard's counter-terrorism project abroad – through continued involvement in the 'war on terror' – and at home, through more stringent domestic security arrangements and policies.

Identity

Identity was so central to the construction of the Bali bombing discourse that almost every speech item under examination was instrumental in creating the overall picture of subjectivity. A range of identities feature in this picture, and they were attributed varying degrees of Selfhood and Otherness. But at the core of the discourse were four identities, two 'Selves' and two 'Others': the dual Self identity is firstly the internal, concrete identity of the young, heroic and innocent Australian, and secondly the international and more abstract identity of the good, advanced member of the West. In a similar conceptual

manner, the dual Other identity is firstly the internal, concrete subject: the potentially evil Muslim, and secondly the international and more abstract ‘more evil than evil’ terrorist. This is perhaps made clearer in the figure below:



Figure 4.4. Representation of identity in John Howard’s Bali bombing discourse.

The arrows in figure 4.4. indicate the relationship that exists between the identities according to the discourse, which may be summarised as follows:

- the Australian is generous and decent towards the Muslim
- the Muslim is backward, disloyal and therefore incompatible with the Australian
- the member of the West is welcoming and tolerant of the Muslim
- the member of the West is admirably eradicating the terrorist
- the terrorist is attacking the way of life of the member of the West
- the terrorist barbarically murdered the innocent Australian

In order to draw out how these relationships were established, we shall look more closely at each of the four identities, the manner in which they were constructed, and the way they functioned in this and the broader ‘war on terror’ discourse.

Constructing the Self: the young, heroic, innocent Australian

An enormous amount of energy went into Howard's representation of the victims of the Bali bombings, particularly in the days immediately after 12th October. The victims were not just Australian, they were young, masculine, sporty, heroic, fun-loving and innocent Australians:

> 12 October 2002 will be counted as a day in which evil struck.. **young innocent Australians** who were engaging in an understandable period of **relaxation** and whose **innocence** was palpable.. Many of us will feel the poignancy of this attack coinciding with the end of the **football season** in Australia. So many **young people** in that club that night were members of **Australian rules football** teams, **rugby league** teams and **rugby union** teams. They were having a bit of **fun** at the end of a **hard season**. It is that.. cruel injunction, which makes something such as this that much more despicable and something that all Australians will utterly repudiate to the depths of their being (Howard, 14/10/02, address).

> ...the people whose lives have been taken are in the main **young Australians** with so much ahead of them. That's what's so terribly sad. It's always sad when anybody dies but **young** people they've got their lives ahead of them... I mean so many of the people caught up with this are **young blokes** who finished a season of **sport** and they go off to have a bit of **fun** in Bali. Now what could be more **naturally Australian** than that (Howard, 14/10/02, television interview, A Current Affair).

Portraying the victims of the 'brutal mass murder' as just *Australians* may not have aroused the audience to anger in the same way that Howard's very specific and emotive representation did. The sport narrative holds enormous meaning for many Australians who are linked to it as a spectator, participant or both. Sport arouses in Australians an overt patriotism that nothing else does, and has historically been at the core of defining our identity (Bruce & Hallinan, 2001, 260), validating qualities of mateship, larrikinism, political indifference, heroism and perseverance (Hirst & Schutze, 2004, 175). Invoking sport then serves to 'hail' a great many Australians, while attributing particular qualities to the bombing victims and those who murdered them. The addition of youth to this portrayal, which conjures notions of innocence and vulnerability, compounds this representation. Fundamentally, constructing the Self as a young, innocent Australians functioned to frame the Bali bombings as more traumatic, and its perpetrators as more abhorrent. In the context of the broader 'war on terror' discourse, this framing functions to legitimate Howard's claim that Australian values – mateship and so on – and the

Australian ‘way of life’ – as a fun-loving, sporting nation – are under attack from terrorism.

Constructing the Self: the good, advanced, member of the West

In order to effectively link this new young Australian identity to the pre-existing ‘war on terror’ discourse, Howard reintroduced a broader notion of the Self that had been central to the early ‘war on terror’ discourse. Recalling the good, advanced Australia, and building upon this representation through the attribution of membership to a Western community was the means by which Howard discursively tied the murder of Australian citizens to necessary involvement in the global ‘war on terror’. The Self was essentially the same as that constructed a year prior, an Anglo-Celtic, Christian and capitalist identity, represented by reference to freedom, democracy, civilisation, and modernity. But on this occasion Howard worked particularly hard to frame the Self as a member of the West:

> ... in the main **we’re western**, I think that’s the main reason (Australians were targeted). The common thread is an anti-western thread. There were **Americans** and **Canadians** and **New Zealanders** and **Europeans** in that nightclub, there were more **Australians** than any others but the common theme undeniably in these attacks is an anti-western theme and **we are westerners** and forever have been and forever will be and that’s one of the reasons why we get caught up (Howard, 14/10/02, television interview, Channel Seven News)[for additional examples see Appendix 4.16 on p.325].

This representation served a number of important functions. Firstly, it constructed a space in which to house subjectivities. Secondly, it operates as a hailing mechanism, interpellating into the discourse those Australians who see themselves, however abstractly, as part of an imagined Anglo, judeo-Christian, predominantly English-speaking community of states. That this was a successful hailing is supported by a poll taken in late October which found that 54% of respondents believed ‘Westerners’ were specifically targeted; only 25% believed the bombings were aimed at Australian citizens (Newspoll, 2002). Thirdly, it outlines the values that are under siege – democracy, women’s rights – and makes a strong case for the need to fight for them. Fourth, and to be discussed in more detail below, constructing the Self as fundamentally Western allowed Howard to dismiss critics who claimed the Bali bombings may have been resultant of Australian policy. And

finally, this representation of identity worked to demarcate the good, advanced, Western Self from its evil counterparts.

Constructing the Other: the more evil than evil terrorist

The evil terrorist identity slotted effortlessly into the space opened by the Bali bombings. But in service of the broader discursive objective of increasing support for the broader 'war on terror', there was a need to build upon that identity in a way that encouraged new passion and enthusiasm for the fight. This was achieved by framing the terrorist as more evil than had previously been thought – as more evil than evil. Though the kind of adjectives used to describe the terrorist were broadly similar to the early 'war on terror' discourse – wicked, cowardly, brutal, barbaric, savage, evil and so on – it was the manner in which the terrorist Other was positioned in relation to the young, innocent Australian Self that resulted in this framing:

> ..I remain moved and upset by what's been done to Australians in such a **wicked** and **indiscriminate** and **evil** fashion. It is just **so wrong that people who are doing nothing other than letting off a bit of steam in a holiday resort**, in many cases after a long football season, that these **evil**, **despicable** people should destroy the lives of some, and maim others, and burn them, and oh it's just awful (Howard, 14/10/02, radio interview, 2UE).

> The **wanton, cruel, barbaric** character of what occurred here last Saturday night has **shocked our nation to the core**. I know the anguish that so many are feeling... the sense of **bewilderment and disbelief** that **so many young lives with so much before them** should have been taken away in such **blind fury, hatred and violence** (Howard, 17/10/02, address).

This articulation of identity works to frame the terrorist as an Other who has sunk to incomprehensible levels of evil. That the attack 'shocked' the 'nation to the core', and that the terrorist targeted 'people who (were) doing nothing other than letting off a bit of steam at a holiday resort' implies that this is a renewed and far more grotesque enemy than was previously imagined. Given that the evil terrorist Other was an identity with which most Australians were already well-acquainted, it's fair to say that Howard's representation of the Bali terrorists would have resonated relatively easily. In the same way that the rhetoric of a 'new and dangerous era' functioned in the early 'war on terror' discourse, we might

argue that this rhetoric of a 'renewed and more dangerous than we thought' enemy operates to legitimate practices that might be otherwise unpopular. In other words, fighting a 'war on terror' – rather than just pursuing and brining to justice the perpetrators of the Bali bombings – appears necessary because we are dealing with an exceptional threat.

Constructing the Other: the potentially evil Muslim

Perhaps because it was such an effortless discursive construction, there wasn't a great deal of rhetorical attention paid to the more evil than evil terrorist after about 20th October. Though the terrorist identity was continually prominent, there was increasing focus on the enemy within, and a great deal of energy on Howard's part went into constructing the potentially evil Muslim. At the heart of this representation was the suggestion that Muslims are essentially disloyal to Australia. In propagating this message Howard claimed:

> And I take the opportunity to say again that **this is not targeting Islam in Australia**. There are **several hundred thousand Australians of Muslim faith** and **they** are part of **our community**, **they** should be respected. And in return, **they should continue**, as they have in the past, **to behave as part of our community** as well (Howard, 1/11/02, radio interview, 3AW).
>
> ...people coming to this country whether they're **Islamics** must be.. must understand that **when they come to Australia they make a decision to accept**, they can't cherry pick **the Australian way of life**. I mean, people have to sort of, they have to take the good with the bad and things they don't like, well they've got to live with them because that's the nature of **our society**. I mean, I've always seen the **modern tolerance** and diversity of **Australia** as being a situation where you take people from everywhere.. (Howard, 21/11/02, radio interview, 2UE).

The above quotes have a strong intertextual quality, invoking the conditional citizen clause present in Pauline Hanson's speech examined in Chapter Three:

> I must stress at this stage that I do not consider **those people from ethnic backgrounds** currently living in Australia anything but first-class citizens, provided of course that they give this country their **full, undivided loyalty**.

The drawing of discursive boundaries between the identities of the Self and the Other is starkly evident in these excerpts and indeed in much of Howard's rhetoric during the Bali bombing discourse The classic technique of positive Self-presentation is present in both

instances, and operates to legitimate and soften the negative Other-presentation. Evident too is what van Dijk (1993) calls 'the numbers game', the deliberate use of vague figures to inspire fear, prominent in racist discourse. Like Howard's previous representations of the Other, particularly in asylum-seeker discourse, it is fair to say that this construction would resonate with many Australians by virtue of its reasonableness: that people of all faiths need to act as part of the community in order for a society to operate harmoniously. This 'reasonable' line of argument would be a recurring feature of the Howard Government's 'war on terror' parlance: in 2005 Brendan Nelson publicly said that those who don't accept Australian values should 'clear off', while Peter Costello said that if immigrants don't agree with Australian values they should 'go elsewhere' (Grattan, 2005). There was a simultaneous proliferation in car bumper stickers emblazoned with the slogans 'Fuck Off We're Full', 'we grew here, you flew here' and 'love it or leave it', some of which were still increasing in popularity in parts of Australia in 2010 (Guest, 2010).

Howard's construction of identity may also resonate with sections of the audience who hear a 'dog-whistle', or a hidden message: that Muslims are different and fundamentally incompatible with Australians, and they might be terrorists. In the context of the broader discourse the representation of the potentially evil Muslim functions firstly to legitimate the tightening of domestic security, including the introduction of more stringent counter-terrorism legislation; and secondly to justify violent and exclusionary practices against Muslims as part of the 'war on terror'.

This sample of offerings from Howard's speech items during the Bali bombings discourse demonstrates the instrumental role played by identity, particularly in enabling his core message – that the Bali bombings necessitated renewed Australian involvement in the 'war on terror' – to gain traction in the community. Though there were complexities in the construction of identity that were not explored in depth here, such as the existence of additional, less radical Others like Indonesia and the Balinese, it is sufficient in this context to claim that all depictions of identity served to reify the identity of the Self. In sum, the complex process of identity construction in the Bali bombing discourse can be seen as an important step in making terrorism – a previously international phenomena, which Australia was obligated to fight against by virtue of its connection to affected states – directly relevant to Australians. The message to emerge was that Australians and

Australian values had been impacted upon in a monumental way. Terrorism had struck Australia, and potential terrorists were in our midst.

In conclusion, what the discourse on the Bali bombings evidences is an immediately clear pattern of representation in relation to the broader 'war on terror' discourse by Prime Minister Howard. At its core are three key strategies: drawing on the wellspring of genuine emotion to encourage a sense of national grievance and vitriol; speaking the language of threat and danger thus normalising and necessitating a response ground in the politics of realism; and constructing subject positions that legitimate a violent and exclusionary response. Marginalising those who attempted to contest the Government's rhetoric or policy choices was also a crucial tactic and will be explored in more depth in Chapter Six. Opinion data appears to show that dominant representations resonated with Australians, and we can thus reasonably claim that Howard succeeded in constructing the Bali bombings as necessitating renewed support for Australian involvement in the US-led 'war on terror'.

4.4 'Let's look out for Australia'

'Let's look out for Australia' (herein LOFA) was the title given to phase one of the Howard Government's National Security Public Information Campaign, which began on 29th December 2002. In continuing the genealogy of the 'war on terror' discourse, this section seeks to conduct an analysis of LOFA in order to ascertain whether its representations were consistent or otherwise with the broader 'war on terror' discourse, and to reflect upon the package's discursive effect. LOFA comprised television, radio and print advertisements, as well as a package distributed to all Australian households containing an information kit, a letter from the Prime Minister and a fridge magnet. Though individual aspects of the package have been analysed by others[79], this section will consider the entire content of phase one, including speeches, interviews and media releases

[79] McDonald (2005b) focused particularly on representations of the threat of terrorism in the LOFA booklet; while Tilley (2004) analysed the content of the Prime Minister's letter which accompanied the package sent to all Australian households.

by Prime Minister Howard related to LOFA. In keeping with the methodological approach of the thesis, both text and visual imagery will be scrutinised in the analysis.

The circumstances surrounding the release of LOFA are of great significance in assessing the representational role it played in the broader 'war on terror' discourse. The LOFA campaign, whose total cost was $18.5 million, was put together by the high-profile advertising agency Brown Melhuish Fishlock (PM&C, 2003, 75; 120), but was personally and directly supervised by the Prime Minister (Crawford, 2004; Morris, 2002). In Chalmer's (2003, 1) words, LOFA 'was the PM's baby'. Howard first mentioned his intention to put-together a 'public education campaign' on 21st November 2002, two days after the acting Attorney General Chris Ellison announced a non-specific security alert (Howard, 21/11/02, television interview, The Today Show; Howard, 21/11/02, radio interview, 2UE). The campaign launch, held on 27th December 2002, came just two-and-a-half months after the Bali bombings and at a time when there was still a great deal of public discussion about Bali itself and about terrorism more generally. In demonstrating the need for an information campaign, Howard did not hesitate in invoking the Bali bombings and 9/11:

> ..the unpalatable fact is that since the **11th of September** last year and, more particularly since the **12th of October** this year, we do live in a different world and we have to take appropriate steps (Howard, 27/12/02, press conference).
>
> ...this campaign is necessary, given the new security circumstances in which we have found ourselves, particularly as a result of the **11th of September** and the **12th of October** (Howard, 27/12/02, press conference).

The beginning of the campaign also coincided with speculation about a possible war in Iraq; and by early February, when the first LOFA packages were being received by Australian households, a forward deployment of Australian troops was already on the way to the Persian Gulf (Howard, 23/01/03, radio interview, 2UE). When asked about the LOFA package in a doorstop interview in early February, Howard discursively linked the brochure to 9/11, Bali *and* Iraq:

> In the end with all these things you have to...try and in a reassuring way remind people that we are living in a different environment. And the world has changed since the **11th of September** and since **Bali** and we have to understand that, that is relevant to the **fight against terrorism**, it's relevant to **the spread of weapons of mass destruction** because

> sooner or later if we don't do something about both they will come together with rather terrifying consequences for mankind (Howard, 2/2/03, doorstop interview, Sydney).

What we can draw from this is that Howard saw LOFA as performing an important legitimating role: one that reaffirmed the cruciality of the 'war on terror'; the changing nature of the war; and Australia's place in it. Achieving this relied on the content of the various aspects of the package, the extent to which they were consistent with previous representations relating to the 'war on terror', and the acceptance of these representations by the Australian people.

Identity

Representations of identity dominated the LOFA campaign. As Younane (2006) has pointed out, the campaign proposed a very specific definition of the national Self in order to reassure citizens who felt threatened by terrorism, and also to encourage them to support the government's counter-terrorism agenda. What was quite a detailed depiction of identity was neatly tied to the campaign's subheading 'protecting our way of life from a possible terrorist threat'. It was, more specifically, the rhetoric of 'our way of life' that operated to simultaneously construct the identities of the Self and the Other. The phrase was one of the most prevalent in the campaign material, as the table below demonstrates:

Campaign item	Number of times 'way of life' appears
1. Print advertisement	3
2. LOFA booklet	3
3. PM's letter	2
4. TV advertisement	2
5. Radio advertisement	2
6. Fridge magnet	1

Table 4.4. Appearance of 'way of life' in LOFA campaign items.

‘The Australian way of life’

Understanding the genealogy of this particular phrase is an important part of making sense of its place in the ‘war on terror’ discourse. The rise in public language of the phrase ‘The Australian way of life’ (which I shall refer to from now on as TAWOL, and which encompasses variations such us ‘our way of life’ and ‘the Australian way’) is closely tied to immigration and perceived changes in the population make-up of Australia, and is also related to the nature of Australia’s place in international affairs. Specifically, it came into use in the 1950s, when there was a substantial increase in migrant intake from non-British nations, and when Australia’s international identity was shifting – from a fledgling child of Britain to an active and worthy participant in world affairs, marked by an emerging alliance with the United States and a new-found status as a bulwark of freedom in the Cold War (White, 1981, 158). In response to these changes, government nurtured the national identity by reference to TAWOL, as an attempt to cushion rapid post-war societal changes experienced by ‘old’ Australians, and simultaneously encourage ‘new’ (migrant) Australians to assimilate as quickly as possible. It also served as a way of rhetorically responding to the increasing sense in the community that Australians were threatened both externally (from Russia and the communist effect), and internally (by new and different people in the community).

The clear subtext of TAWOL from its very first usage was ‘we live a particular way, we will not change / if you want to live here you must live like us’. And although to many migrants this was a very vague direction, on a personal level TAWOL was linked very closely to ‘suburban patterns of production and consumption, coupled with an ordered, family-centered lifestyle’ (Harris & Williams, 2003, 213). On a more abstract level TAWOL was about an emerging international identity as a free, democratic member of the West, an identity that was constantly under threat by virtue of Australia’s geographic location (White, 1981). Those who have written about the use of TAWOL have recognised its manifold functions: as encouraging consumerism and economic expansion (White, 1981, 164); as reinforcing the perceived superiority of Anglo-Australian institutions and values and the concomitant need for these to remain unchanged (Markus, 2001, 15); as reifying sexist stereotypes relating to the place of women in society (White, 1981, 168;

Winter, 2007); as legitimating dominant foreign policy practice by fostering a fortress mentality and invasion anxiety (Harris & Williams, 2003, 215); and as a means of making the most basic, every day practices of the individual relevant to, and a part of, the most abstract practices of the state (Burke, 2001, 66). We might then argue in summary that TAWOL is invoked as a means of preserving the status-quo, and as a Governmentality mechanism – operating to optimise the usefulness of the individual in the broader project of government (Dean, 1999, 20).

Though TAWOL fell into disuse in the late 1960s, it returned with the rise of John Howard who showed an immediate affection for this rhetorical device from his time as Opposition Leader in the mid 1980s. The conditions in this period – partially outlined in Chapter Three – were ripe for the use of this kind of rhetoric: increasing migration from non-English speaking countries; changing patterns of global economic and political interaction; and a backlash in parts of the community against the policy of multiculturalism, arguably inflamed by the publication of Geoffrey Blainey's 'All for Australia' (Harris & Williams, 2003, 213). Under Howard, TAWOL became a tool for re-injecting a very narrow set of values and interpretations into Australian political discourse. It spoke of his vision of a nation marked by classlessness, consumerism, cultural homogeneity, conservative social values, and a dislike of cultural non-conformity. This imagined 'way of life' was incredibly important to Howard's political ideology and broader vision for Australia. Hage (2003, 71) argues that Howard sees TAWOL and the values which he claims underpin it as 'a trans-historical unchanging core... responsible for giving society its enduring character amidst all the changes it can experience'. And once elected as Prime Minister, it became his job to recover and restore this 'way of life', which had been undermined by elitist intellectuals, radical social movements and leftist politicians (Hage, 2003, 75).

Australians as good, ordinary people & vigilant subjects

The genealogy of TAWOL gives some indication as to the construction of identity in LOFA, whose prominent subheading was 'protecting our way of life from a possible terrorist threat'. As it had in the past, TAWOL operated to interpellate citizens into a

discourse of exclusion and fear based on a vague notion of national Selfhood, and on the basis that the Self was existentially threatened.

Constructing the good, ordinary Self was achieved through both words and imagery. Words already prominent in Howard's 'war on terror' vocabulary were drawn upon in the LOFA campaign. The most prominent and frequently used adjectives to describe the good Self were combined in the claim that:

> ..the way of life we all value so highly must go on. Australians are **friendly**, **decent**, **democratic** people, and we're going to stay that way.

This appeared in the LOFA booklet, and in the print, TV and radio advertisements. As they had in the 'war on terror' discourse more broadly, these adjectives functioned as a kind of positive self-presentation, and worked to simplify the issue and the identities involved as a classic case of good versus evil. The position of these adjectives in the above excerpt is also significant, indicating firstly that the 'way of life' is tied to a 'friendly, decent and democratic' nature, implying that those who do not share this 'way of life' do not exhibit these attributes; and secondly that it is these fundamental attributes that are under threat, and must be fought for so that 'we' can 'stay that way'.

It was images, however, that worked most powerfully in LOFA to construct the good, ordinary Self (see Appendix 4.17 on p.326). The kind of vision that dominated the campaign were stereotypical images of Australian culture: the beach, barbeques and backyard cricket. In addition was a smiling Anglo-Australian woman beside a female police-officer; and a happy multi-ethnic classroom. These pictures serve as a description of 'the Australian way of life', one marked by the innocent pursuit of leisure, unity and classlessness, deference to authority, and racial tolerance. This visual depiction of TAWOL functions on a number of levels: it attempts to hail Australians into the discourse by luring them with familiar and culturally engrained stereotypes; it works to mobilise Australians to defend this seemingly wonderful and positive lifestyle against both external and internal threats (this is assisted by the distinct absence of negative imagery vis-à-vis identity); it legitimates the use of exclusionary measures in the pursuit of security (because we are fundamentally good and tolerant); and it sets up a criteria for normality so as to make it easier to identify those who do not share TAWOL. In sum the text and imagery in

LOFA can be seen to construct a distinctly ordinary, fundamentally good Self, who must become a vigilant and obedient subject in order to protect that very identity.

The unusual, suspicious and different Other

LOFA constructed Otherness in a very interesting manner. Whereas previous constructions of otherness in the 'war on terror' discourse attributed particular attributes to the enemy, LOFA does not represent the enemy in an explicit manner at all. But in asking Australians to 'look out for Australia', and to report 'unusual or suspicious' behaviour, the government clearly has an enemy in mind. Upon closer inspection we find that by virtue of its lack of definition, the Other is simply not the Self.

The underlying message in LOFA is that the guide for identifying the Other is the extent of a person's adherence to TAWOL. Difference – in lifestyle, in belief, in dress, in behaviour, in language, in appearance – is not just distasteful, or antithetical to Australian values but may actually constitute an existential threat. As Younane (2006, 8) points out, the suggestion in LOFA that difference should arouse suspicion encourages audience members to fill-in-the-blanks, to 'create their own image of how terrorists look and talk, or where they might live'. In doing this it is only natural that pre-existing stereotypes and discursive frames are drawn upon. So we can reasonably assume that the Other – the one that threatens 'our way of life', the one who is different, the one who is suspicious – is tied to the terrorist/Muslim Other of the broader 'war on terror' discourse.

Thus it can be seen that whilst the representation of identity in LOFA differed from previous periods in the 'war on terror' discourse in that it did not explicitly define an Other, it was largely consistent with the broader discourse, particularly in its depiction of the fundamentally good Self. What was most notable about the construction of identity in LOFA was the way in which both Selfhood and Otherness was imagined through the lens of 'The Australian way of life'. The use of this rhetorical device has a long history in Australian politics and would thus have resonated with many Australians, its ultimate vagueness would also have increased the possibilities for resonance in the community. Under the banner of TAWOL, words and images operated in LOFA to demarcate and

normalise particular imagined identities, and to mobilise those who concurred with this depiction to action as supporters of government policy and as vigilant subjects.

Realism

Consistent with the broader 'war on terror' discourse, the politics of realism was the second dominant theme in the LOFA campaign. This was achieved using familiar terminology and representational strategies, most notably the language of threat, danger, lack of immunity and a new and different era; the invocation of 9/11 and the Bali bombings; and a narrow militaristic portrayal of best response.

The notion that terrorism posed a new and existential threat to Australia and Australians was a prominent aspect of the items in LOFA. This was achieved firstly by constructing the risk of terrorism in Australia as real and serious. The following phrases featured in LOFA campaign items[80] in service of this construction:

Protecting the Australian way of life from a **possible terrorist threat** (in campaign items 1, 2, 6)

Australia is **not immune** (in campaign items 1, 2, 4, 5)

look out for Australia (in campaign items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)

Secondly, the claim that the world had changed worked to construct the new and existential threat of terrorism:

Terrorism has **changed the world** (in campaign items 1, 2, 4, 5)

we live in a **more dangerous world** (in campaign item 3)

And thirdly, the notion of threat was compounded by the suggestion implicit in LOFA that it was a ubiquitous threat, not confined to a particular location but perhaps obviated by 'unusual videotaping or photography', 'suspicious vehicles', 'suspicious accommodation

80

Campaign item
1. Print advertisement
2. LOFA booklet
3. PM's letter
4. TV advertisement
5. Radio advertisement
6. Fridge magnet

needs' or 'a lifestyle that doesn't add up' (in campaign item 2, p.9). Terrorism was portrayed as such an omnipresent threat that 'suspicious' activity (in campaign items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) in and of itself could indicate a potential attack.

As McDonald (2005b) points out, the choice to represent the issue of terrorism in these terms represents a strong commitment to the politics of realism, whereby the world outside Australia's borders is viewed as anarchic and dangerous, threatening the very existence of the state itself. Moreover, this representation serves to raise to status of the issue of terrorism, suggesting that extraordinary and unprecedented response mechanisms may be required. In other words, it encourages audience members – should they accept the government's claims – to feel sufficiently threatened to allow and even support the government's counter-terrorism agenda.

Invoking the recent memories of the Bali bombing and the 11th September attacks operated in LOFA to back the aforementioned claims, and to serve as a reference point for an otherwise nebulous security risk. Though the timing of the campaign – not three months after the Bali bombing – ensured that the references to terrorism evoked memories of the attacks, explicit mention was made of past attacks in the Prime Minister's letter:

> It is a sad fact that since the terrorist attacks on **11 September 2001 in New York and Washington**, and particularly since **the terrorist atrocity in Bali when eighty-eight Australians were killed** and many seriously injured, we live in a more dangerous world.

And also in the LOFA booklet (p.4):

> Like many countries, Australia has been on a heightened security alert since **11 September 2001**. Security measures were stepped up further in 2002: after the **Bali terrorist attack in October**.

The construction of threat, danger and a new era, as well as the attempt to accentuate the magnitude of the issue by invoking the memory of Bali and 9/11, worked in support of the third and perhaps most notable 'realist' representational strategy in LOFA: the portrayal of the best – perhaps only – response as a combination of militarism, intelligence, policing and civic vigilance. Both words and images were instrumental in this representation. In the TV and radio advertisements Australians were assured that:

> Our **security agencies** have been upgraded, and are ready to detect, prevent and respond to terrorism.

In the print advertisement and the LOFA booklet, readers were given this same assurance, but were also presented with a plethora of 'new measures' instituted by the Howard government. This list (expanded in the LOFA booklet), dominated by security jargon, operated as a powerful discursive mechanism. It simultaneously portrayed an exclusively realist response as necessary and inevitable, acted as a promotion of the Howard government who were clearly dedicated to protecting Australia and fighting terrorism, closed the discursive space for alternative approaches, and generally legitimated the Howard government's broader 'war on terror' discourse.

Imagery in the campaign operated similarly. The picture of a smiling woman with a female police officer reminds the viewer two important things, that they are *not* an expert, but that they must be a vigilant citizen. While the LOFA booklet was littered with images of the uniformed (male) experts of the national security bureaucracy, as well as pictures of infrastructure, military equipment, and counter-terrorism drills. These provided an interesting contrast to the 'ordinary' images of barbeques and cricket games. The implicit message was that there are two players in the counter-terrorism project, the ordinary Australian and the government/national security bureaucracy, and the former should be subservient to the latter on matters of national security.

In sum, a politics of realism permeated the LOFA campaign. It was evident in references to threat, danger and a changed world, and in the representation of militarism as the best form of response. These constructions drew upon and reified the existing discourse on terrorism, legitimated the Howard government's counter-terrorism agenda and also narrowed the space for alternative approaches.

Importantly, LOFA aroused a strong sense of discord in the community despite the dominance of the Government's argument. This will be explored in more detail in Chapter Six. Broadly though, it is evident that the discursive processes prevalent in LOFA's promotion are similar to those employed in representing 9/11 and the Bali bombings.

4.4 Summary

This Chapter has found that key periods throughout the 'war on terror' discourse exhibit similar representational themes. Prime Minister Howard's construction of the asylum-

seeker issue was reliant on a narrow and obsessive depiction of sovereignty on the one hand, and an adversarial portrayal of identity on the other. Together they served as a strong discursive foundation for Howard's response to the 9/11 attacks.

Representations of 11th September and the Bali bombings were very similar. Firstly, they hinged on the articulation of emotion in order to arouse a sense of solidarity and anger in the audience. Secondly, both these events were represented in starkly realist terms, evident in the language of threat, danger and lack of immunity. This portrayal operated to interpellate Australians into the discourse based on a sense of vulnerability and insecurity, and also worked to legitimate Australia's involvement in the 'war on terror'. Thirdly, representations of identity functioned to arouse in the audience animosity between the imagined Self and Other in order to help justify violent and exclusionary measures directed against the enemy as part of the 'war on terror'.

In the three aforementioned periods: Tampa, 9/11 and the Bali bombings, the systematic marginalisation of criticism – to be explored in more detail in Chapter Six, and the broad reproduction of the government's message by the mainstream media was also a crucial aspect of the discourse's dominance.

Finally, the LOFA campaign worked to reinforce Howard's 'war on terror' discourse, and did so by conveying information in terms of identity and a politics of realism. By the end of February 2003, despite some contestation, Australians remained steadily supportive of the 'war on terror' and the nation's involvement in it according to poll data[81]. This was substantially due to a highly consistent pattern of representation by Prime Minister Howard.

In sum, the various phases outlined in this Chapter worked to reify a militaristic, exclusionary and statist response to the threat of terrorism by appealing to representations that resonated with the electorate. In doing so the narrow foreign policy choices of the Howard government were obscured so as to appear as the natural and inevitable nature of the provision of security by the state.

[81] Little data was taken on this issue during 2003. However, Goot's (2007, 261) analysis of poll data over an extended period found that between December 2002 and October 2004, a clear majority of respondents were in favour of Australian military involvement in the war against terror.

5

Australia's 'war on terror': phase two

The invasion of Iraq by the US-led 'Coalition of the Willing'[82] certainly marked a departure point for the 'war on terror'. In the United States, the Pentagon (under Donald Rumsfeld) and State Department (under Colin Powell) were at odds regarding this new course; the latter expressing a preference for seeing Afghanistan out and continuing the fight against terrorism through police and intelligence avenues (Garran, 2004, 119). Why Howard emphatically supported this neo-conservative turn is a question this Chapter will explore. The short answer is that Howard viewed Iraq as a test of the alliance that overrode his realist persuasions (Howard, 2010, 460; DeBats, McDonald & Williams, 2007, 240). What this Chapter is more concerned with is understanding how Howard and his government maintained legitimacy during this second phase of the 'war on terror'. The primary finding is that justificatory tactics for involvement in the 'war on terror' (and for its associated policies) were entirely consistent with phase one of the discourse. That is to say that the key issues were predominantly constructed through representations of threat and identity.

This Chapter continues the genealogy of Australia's 'war on terror' discourse by looking at the period 2002/3 to 2007. This period can be characterised by greater discursive volatility than the previous phase. While there were times when Howard's representations were successful and the discourse appeared stable, there were also several key stages where public support waned and cracks in the discourse appeared. To elucidate the nature of this ebb and flow the Chapter examines representational practices contained primarily in the speeches of then Prime Minister John Howard. The way in which he sought to justify continued Australian involvement in the 'war on terror', and the political

[82] The White House released a list outlining the countries that comprised the 'Coalition of the Willing' on 27 March 2003. 49 countries were on the list, and the statement said: 'the population of coalition countries is approximately 1.23 billion people. Every major race, religion, ethnicity in the world is represented. The coalition includes nations from every continent on the globe'. However only four countries contributed forces to the invasion: The United States, The United Kingdom, Australia and Poland ('Coalition of the Willing shrinks again', 2008).

effects of these justifications are what this Chapter seeks to understand. In so doing, four sections will follow, each representing a key pillar in the latter phase of Australia's 'war on terror' discourse: Iraq, the Anti-Terrorism Bill Number 2 2005, the Cronulla riots of 2005, and casualties of Australia's 'war on terror' – Habib, Hicks and Haneef.

5.1 Iraq

To many Australians, involvement in military conflict in Iraq represented a strange and illogical turn in Australia's 'war on terror'. Despite this, John Howard's commitment to stand beside the United States in this installment of the conflict was unwavering, and so he was forced to embark on one of the most difficult justificatory projects of his political career. This section explores how John Howard constructed meaning in the process of attempting to secure popular support for Australian involvement in war in Iraq. In order to do this, a range of speech data will undergo analysis. Though the language of some senior ministers and opposition members will be drawn upon in the analysis, it is the interviews and speeches of John Howard that will comprise the vast bulk of the data. This is because Howard was the key decision maker in relation to matters of defence and national security during his time in office (Chalmers, 2003, 2; Garran, 2004, 59). In fact, Howard actually restructured the formal decision-making process through the creation of the National Security Committee of Cabinet as a means to enhance his control over these matters (Dodson, 2005; Howard, 2010, 238). And it was he who determined the parameters of debate and formed the fundamental justifications vis-à-vis Iraq. Speech material was chosen for analysis on the basis that it mentioned the word 'Iraq' in the text in the context of possible military involvement, the result is 169 speech items taken from the time period spanning from 30th January 2002 – one day following President Bush's 'axis of evil' State of the Union address – until 20th March 2003, the day military action commenced in Iraq. The source of the data – outlined in the chart below – is broadly similar to samples analysed in the previous Chapter, with a proportionally high number of talkback interviews.



Figure 5.1. Source of John Howard's speech material related to Iraq, 30/1/02 – 20/3/03.

What sets the issue of Iraq apart from other periods that have been subject to analysis in this thesis so far is that – unlike the 'war on terror' or the asylum seeker issue – John Howard was unable to secure popular support for his position throughout the life of the issue according to most opinion polls. According to Goot (2007, 269), out of twelve polls conducted prior to war asking whether Australian forces should be involved in a US-led attacks, none showed a majority in favour. Understanding the process of representation vis-à-vis Iraq is still important however, even though it was not strictly successful. Firstly, it could be argued that opinion polling doesn't give a foolproof gauge as to whether Howard's justifications for Australian involvement in Iraq were successful – indeed eventual involvement did not cause sufficient dissent to prevent the Howard Government winning the 2004 election, and it did not appear to negatively impact upon public support for Australian involvement in the 'war on terror', of which Iraq was purportedly a part. So in a sense it could be claimed that justificatory processes were effective on some level. Related to this, it could also be reasonably claimed that *any* public support for Australian involvement in Iraq constitutes a win for Howard, particularly given the tangential link to the 'war on terror' and the eventual discrediting of the central 'WMD' argument. Thus understanding *how* Howard managed to persuade just under half the population to support

his position is important. Perhaps more interestingly in the broader context of this thesis, however, is understanding how Howard's representations created not support, but dissent. As I shall elucidate in Chapter Six, many of Howard's key arguments provided opportunity for critique by establishing parameters for judgment. For instance, his 'lessons of history' argument – that the experience of WWII had shown the world the dangers of leaving threats unchallenged – invited the counterpoint that Australians did not want to be involved in another protracted and bloody conflict like Vietnam. Making sense of *how* these spaces for thinking and possibilities for change are created is an important part of appreciating the dynamics of the 'war on terror' discourse, and to do that we must understand the representations that preceded and inspired them.

Howard's first key representational strategy was to make the issue of Iraq relevant to Australians by claiming Iraq represented the next stage in the 'war on terror'. Almost certainly an attempt to ride the wave of popular support for the 'war on terror', Howard tried to make the link in a number of ways leading up to war. Firstly was his repeated claim that:

> ...the campaign against terrorism doesn't end with a successful operation in Afghanistan (Howard, 30/1/02, doorstop interview, New York).

Secondly was what he actually termed 'the potential threat link':

> ...the link with September 11 is, what I would call, the potential threat link...There have been associations between Iraq and terrorist groups. And there has been an accommodation of certain terrorist groups within Iraq... when you have a country that is threatening and has the capacity to deliver destruction on other countries, September 11 has told us that we should not assume it won't happen to you or to somebody else and that you should be willing to do something about it (Howard, 10/09/02, radio interview, 2GB).

Thirdly came a claim that would be pivotal to Howard's arsenal, that terrorist attacks may be more lethal if Iraq's non-compliance was not addressed:

> ...we must maintain our commitment to the war against terrorism. The ultimate nightmare, I say again, would be if weapons of mass destruction were to fall into the hands of terrorists. That would be the ultimate nightmare and that is why it is essential that countries such as Iraq.. .. have to be disarmed (Howard, 14/11/02, doorstop interview, Canberra).

And finally was the contentious insinuation that Australia's experience of terrorism in Bali provided additional justification for involvement in military action against Iraq:

> We lost 88 Australians in Bali because of a willful act of international terrorism... And I will, amongst other things, be asking Australian people to bear those circumstances in mind if we become involved in military contact with Iraq (Howard, 9/3/03, television interview, TV One).

Whether or not he sincerely believed this to be the case, Prime Minister Howard clearly wanted Australians to view involvement in Iraq as a natural extension of the nation's commitment to the 'war on terror'. This message was conveyed at a deeper discursive level also, through the use of representational strategies consistent with the broader 'war on terror' discourse. Specifically, these centered on: the familiar rhetoric of 'the national interest', the notion of threat, the construction of binary identities and the marginalisation of criticism.

The national interest

At the core of Howard's set of justifications for Australian involvement in Iraq was the claim that the policy was in 'the national interest'. Rolling off the tongue with an ease and frequency that suggested reference to a very clear and objective reality, 'the national interest' operated in the discourse on Iraq in a very powerful manner. This brief section demonstrates that it is a powerful social construction and a rhetorical tool serving a number of interrelated purposes.

Firstly, claiming that a policy in the national interest is a tool of legitimisation. It operates to elevate the status of an issue to one of critical importance and usually of considerable complexity. Thus the speaker appears to be privy to certain information that the audience is not. In the case of Iraq Howard certainly did claim to have intelligence information relating to Iraq's weapons that he could not share with the public. In this sense appealing to the national interest can also be viewed as a truth claim, or an appeal to knowledge.

Secondly, and flowing on from this, speaking in terms of the national interest provides authority to act. Once a policy is successfully defined as legitimate and pressing it becomes the *responsibility* of the government to act. Thus the speaker is endowed with the *power* to make authoritative decisions (Hansen, 2006, 50).

In this mutually generative system of power-knowledge, the issue and policy response is given an objective character, detaching it from historical context. In this manner resonant appeals to the national interest operate in much the same fashion as successful securitizing moves, by closing off avenues for contestation.

Indeed invoking the national interest can act directly as a tool for marginalising, preempting or responding to criticism. In the discourse on Iraq, Howard claimed his responsibility to act in the national interest overrode the need to act in accordance with public opinion:

> ....I'm sure that it's the right decision in the **Australian national interest**. Now I respect that others can reach a different view, or only share half of it (Howard, 10/3/03, joint press conference, Wellington).
>
> In the end the decision... will be based on our assessment of **the national interest** and if **the national interest** is believed by us to require a course of action which at that particular time may not enjoy popular support in opinion polls, well we'll still do it (Howard, 14/3/03, radio interview, 3AW).

Additionally, the national interest can function to marginalise calls for ethical foreign policy or for international responsibility (Hansen, 2006, 50). With roots in political realism, the national interest often amounts to a claim that the state and the national community override most other considerations (Morgenthau, 1951). This was certainly a feature of Howard's arsenal when confronted with suggestions that war in Iraq could undermine international cooperation and the authority of the United Nations.

Finally, the national interest can – in a contextually specific manner – operate as a hailing mechanism. When Howard referred to 'the national interest', he referred not to an objective reality but to a very specific constructed notion of both the nation and what is in the interests of the nation, constructions that are intimately tied to white Anglo-Australianness. As Camilleri (2003, 449) asserts: 'the "national interest" becomes another linguistic device which conveys the same culturally and ideologically charged view of the world and of Australia's place in it'. This very specific articulation hails audience members who concur with or who see at least some validity in the construction, and in turn those audience members are interpellated into Howard's discourse.

Whether 'the national interest' works as a justificatory tool and fulfils the functions outlined above is of course dependent on the extent to which it resonates with the public.

Though it is difficult to ascertain this directly, there are a number of reasons to believe that this type of rhetoric does resonate with Australians. Firstly, Errington & Van Onselen (2007, 371) point to the frequent use of 'the national interest' rhetoric by Howard throughout his tenure as leader and across a range of policy issues. It is difficult to imagine a politically savvy Prime Minister like Howard – who was very conscious of public opinion (Errington & Van Onselen, 2007, 318), and who was counseled on such things by a team of very astute pollsters and strategists led by Mark Textor[83] (Marr, 2003, 232; Peisley & Ward, 2001; Ramsey, 2007) – repeatedly employing rhetoric that was anything less than a proven success. Secondly, it has been suggested that Howard's 'national interest' rationale for war in Iraq was the reason that he didn't experience the same degree of public condemnation as Tony Blair – whose decidedly neo-Wilsonian rationale focused almost solely on WMD and international security (Darwall, 2005). This thesis has shown a number of instances where – on questions of national security – Australians appear to respond positively to realist-based arguments, and Howard's choice to frame the case for Australian involvement in Iraq in terms of the national interest does work in the context of Iraq to evoke notions of sovereignty and threat familiar to Australians. That the national interest rationale was employed by other government members (see Appendix 5.1 on p.328), both senior ministers and backbenchers, would have increased the chances for resonance, since repetition acts as a kind of discursive reinforcement.

In sum, 'the national interest' was a key component of Howard's case for Australian military involvement in Iraq; it was present in his first utterances on the subject, and spearheaded his address to the nation on the first day of military conflict. Although it did not ensure popular support for his position, it almost certainly assisted his case, firstly by providing the public with a broader justification and one they felt was more relevant to them; and secondly by making up for the absence of a strong moral argument[84].

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[83] In fact the slogan devised by Howard, Textor and the campaign director Lynton Crosby for the Liberal Party's 2001 election campaign – a slogan that would have been exhaustively tested for resonance – was 'Putting Australia's Interests First – Certainty Leadership Strength' (Marr, 2003, 232).

[84] The empirical evidence explored in this thesis shows that 'the national interest' is a rationale used more frequently when the moral foundations of a policy position are dubious. Hence the prevalence of this rhetoric in relation to asylum seekers, and on the issue of Iraq. This is almost certainly done to reinforce the imperative that moral concerns are subsidiary to matters of national security and survival, a realist proposition that is deeply ingrained in Australian security culture.

Threat

Consistent with representational strategies in the broader 'war on terror' discourse, Howard's justification for Australian involvement in Iraq drew heavily on the notion of threat. Specifically, it was a portrayal of threat underpinned by a politics of realism, and so was constructed by reference to sovereignty, danger, militarism and the centrality of alliance. What is interesting about Howard's construction of threat vis-à-vis Iraq is that although the fundamental message – that Iraq *did* represent a threat to Australia's security – remained the same throughout, the nature of the threat was built upon over the course of the issue. By the time conflict began, Howard had effectively provided the public with what resembled a tower of threat – built on the foundation of WMD (argument A) – that conveyed four interrelated reasons why Iraq was threatening and dangerous:



Figure 5.2. Howard's tower of threat posed by Iraq.

Howard's tower of threat was undoubtedly about building upon the sense of threat so as to improve his chances of public support, but also about making the threat of Iraq more relevant to Australians: the mere thought of Iraq possessing dangerous weapons may not have constituted a cause for serious concern for some, but the prospect of these falling into the hands of terrorist may have, particularly after the Bali bombings. Worse still for some

may have been the thought of a rogue regime in Australia's region being emboldened to use her WMD.

What lay at the core of Howard's articulation of threat was an argument central to the 'war on terror' discourse: that we live in a different era, and that no one is immune to the threats of this new world:

> ....the **world was changed** on the 11th of September 2001.. I mean **we are living in a world that's quite different** from the one we both grew up in where you thought of aggression in terms of the armies of one country rolling across the borders of another.. **We're dealing with a new and different menace** of international terrorism and if international terrorism gets its hands on chemical and biological weapons that is an awful and lethal menace to all the liberal democracies of the world and **Australia is no exception** (Howard, 14/3/03, television interview, The Today Show).

This Schmittian claim functions to discursively connect the issue to the proposed policy response so as to encourage public support; a 'new era', a 'different dispensation' suggests that new, different and perhaps even unusual policy responses are required, such as the unprovoked invasion of a sovereign nation who seemingly poses no direct threat to Australia's security.

Adding an extra dimension to the construction of threat was Howard's argument about the 'lessons of history'. This argument took a number of forms, but the core message was that the experience of history demands that Australia support US-led action against Iraq. One approach was to warn of the dangers of appeasement, a lesson learned as a result of World War II:

> ...**we have learnt in the last century**, particularly in the 1930s that **appeasement** in the long run, and I'm not suggesting that circumstances now are on all fores ith the 1930s, they're clearly not but **in the long run if you feed the appetite and the potential threat of a dictator you are not rewarded with kindness**. You are rewarded with more brutal behaviour and they interpret your action for what it is – a sign of weakness – and **they are emboldened to do even more outrageous things** (Howard, 24/1/03, radio interview, 3AW).[For additional examples see Appendix 5.2 on p.329]

Another was to reiterate the cruciality of the American alliance for Australian security (a lesson learned in the Pacific War), and the concomitant need to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our closest ally (a tradition established at Gallipoli):

> Australians, particularly the older generation, **remember the vital help rendered to us during World War II by the United States**. And together we have fought on many battlefields and done many things in pursuit of the values we share. We face as close

> friends the threat around the world of weapons of mass destruction... (Howard, 10/2/03, joint press conference, Washington).

> We are fighting now for the same values **the Anzacs** fought for in 1915: courage, valour, mateship, decency (and) a willingness as a nation to do the right thing, whatever the cost (Howard, cited in McKenna, 2007).

> ...**we should remember that in the end there is only one country that can help with us to guarantee our security and that is the United States**....given our position in the world the importance of that American alliance and given the history of this country in **World War II** and what the Americans did then **we shouldn't lightly forget** that. It is a very important consideration (Howard, 16/2/03, television interview, 60 Minutes).

A third historical analogy articulated by Howard in order to bolster his construction of threat was that of Pearl Harbour, an oft-invoked meta-narrative in the American 'war on terror' discourse (Jackson, 2005, 41).

> In the end, all of these things involve questions of judgement. We're not talking about proving to the, beyond reasonable doubt, to the satisfaction of a jury at the Central Criminal Court in Darlinghurst.. I mean if you wait for that kind of proof, you know, **it's virtually Pearl Harbour** (Howard, 13/3/03, questions & answers following address to The National Press Club).

And finally Howard invoked the fresh memory of the Bali bombings in service of his construction of threat:

> ...if chemical and biological weapons ever got into the hands of terrorists **we could have even more horrific outcomes than occurred in Bali**... (Howard, 10/3/03, joint press conference).

The 'lessons of history' argument was deployed by other senior ministers (see Appendix 5.3 on p.330), serving to discursively reinforce Howard's message and thus making historical analogy a cornerstone of Howard's construction of threat. The reference to history is common in political discourse and functions on two primary levels: overtly it helps to explain contemporary and often complex events and issues by way of comparison and contextualisation (Jackson, 2005, 40). Discursively it operates as a kind of meta-narrative, providing a ready-made frame of meaning through which experience is understood and knowledge is ordered. In this sense depending on the specific referent, historical analogy can be an efficient means of: assigning identities to actors; mobilising emotions such as fear, moral outrage or nationalism (Hansen, 2006, 130); attaching sometimes very narrow interpretations to events (Jackson, 2005, 41); and narrowing the

range of choice vis-à-vis action or policy response. The extent to which historical analogy fulfils these functions is dependent on whether the referent resonates with the community. Choosing high-profile and/or catastrophic historical issues and events – such as Nazi Germany and the events of World War II and the Pacific War; conjuring 'nation building' (and heavily mythologised) moments such as the experience at Gallipoli; or – in the case of reference to the Bali bombings – reopening fresh national wounds, hails the national memory, and works to interpellate audience members into the discourse. In other words, the appeal to history worked in conjunction with Howard's construction of threat to make the issue of Iraq relevant to Australians.

Identity

The discourse on Iraq comprised a number of identities, but the two central actors were the good Self, played primarily by Australia, and to a lesser extent by members of the Coalition of the Willing (The USA, The UK and Spain); and the bad Other, variously represented by Iraq, the Iraqi regime and Saddam Hussein.

Constructing the good, brave, Western Self

The construction of the Self in Howard's language centered on representing Australia as fundamentally good, brave and Western. This representation was built upon Howard's claim that the Self abhorred military conflict. Though this may seem an incongruous proposition in the context of justification for war, it actually functioned to construct a principled and valiant Self, confronted with no alternative but to take action against barbarism on behalf of the civilised world.

Positioning hatred of war as something fundamental to the Self, and thereby foreign to the bad Other (Iraq/Iraqi regime/Saddam Hussein), was the most prevalent articulation of identity in Howard's discourse on Iraq. Out of 169 speech items it is mentioned in some manner 92 times:

> **I would like to see the matter solved without resort to force, of course**, **we all would**. **Nobody wants another military conflict**, can I just make that very clear, **we all abhor**

> **military conflict**. But it would be completely unnecessary if Iraq were to fully comply with the United Nations' resolution (Howard, 23/8/02, radio interview, 3AW). [For additional examples see Appendix 5.4 on p.331]

In addition to the representation of the good Self as moral (abhorring war), the Self was also portrayed as ethical, acting in accordance with international law and norms. In the early stage of the discourse this was expressed by reference to a desire to see the issue resolved through the United Nations:

> **We support the United Nations process**, indeed, we urged that upon the United States some months ago (Howard, 13/12/02, radio interview, ABC AM programme).
>
> **I want it resolved through the United Nations**, all people do, you do, and **I'm working to that end** (Howard, 19/12/02, radio interview, 6WF).

By March 2003, when war was inevitable, the ethicality of the Self was articulated through the claim that existing Security Council resolutions provided the Coalition with the legal authority to use force to disarm Iraq:

> ..if a decision is taken to participate in military action to enforce disarmament on Iraq then that decision will be **completely in accordance with the legal authority already contained in a series of Security Council resolutions** (Howard, 17/3/03, press conference, Canberra).
>
> The decision taken by **the government is in accordance with the legal authority** for military action found in previous resolutions of the Security Council...(which) provide for the use of force to disarm Iraq and restore international peace and security to the area (Howard, 18/3/03, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, p.12509-10).

The brave Self construction grew out of the 'hatred of war' claim: despite the fact that we despise war – so the articulation went – we must confront this issue:

> ...nobody in their right mind wants military conflict. But **you can't walk away from this issue, you can't just rub your hands and say well I'm going to forget about it** and let them keep their capacity to develop nuclear weapons, the world is not as forgiving as that and we'd be stupid if we imagined that that is a solution (Howard, 20/1/03, television interview, Sunrise).
>
> There is a temptation, as some have argued, Australia should sit on the sidelines, to be a spectator, to do very little either diplomatically or militarily, to leave the heavy lifting to others**... I don't believe sitting on the sidelines is either good for Australia nor do I believe it has ever really been the Australian way** (Howard, 13/3/03, address to the National Press Club).

Australian bravery in the face of adversity and difficulty was a feature of the identity of the Self in the Bali bombing discourse, and it is a very clear evocation of the Anzac myth. It serves to remind Australians that 'we' are a principled people who fight our own fights, and that military action is not just acceptable and permissible – it is honorable.

Finally the primary Self in the Iraq discourse was framed as Western, a representation that was also consistent with the broader 'war on terror' discourse. This was articulated both overtly:

> **Australia is a western nation**. Nothing can, will or should alter that fact (Howard, 13/3/03, address to the National Press Club).

And in a less explicit but more colourful manner:

> ... we also have an interest as a **freedom loving democratic country** in seeing that regimes that can, through the possession and potential use of weapons of mass destruction, represent a threat to stability.. (Howard, 18/7/02, radio interview, 6WF).

> ..these are challenging times for countries like Australia that **value freedom and tolerance** (Howard, 20/11/02, address to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia).

> No **civilised country** wants a military conflict (Howard, 10/1/03, press conference, Canberra).

Representing the Self in this way serves three primary and interrelated purposes: it is an act of hailing, beckoning domestic audience members who concur with this depiction; it works to bolster the case for Australian military involvement against Iraq, since what is at stake are fundamental values and universal norms; and it functions to position the Self in a superior position to the Other.

In sum, the Self was constructed in the discourse on Iraq as a good, moral, ethical and law-abiding identity, prepared to stand-up for treasured norms and values alongside other Western nations on behalf of the international community. These representations were discursively reinforced by other government members [see Appendix 5.5 on p.332], and were broadly consistent with patterns of identity construction already identified in other aspects of the 'war on terror' discourse.

Constructing the bad Other: barbaric Saddam / rogue-state Iraq / dictatorial Iraqi regime

Howard's language constructed what might be seen as one primary Other with multiple identities. Barbaric Saddam:

> ..he is a **terrible ruler**, he **murders** and **tortures** people, he **denies people the most fundamental human rights**. I mean **he used poison gas** against the Kurds in his own country, used **poison gas** in the war against Iran, they routinely **execute** people on the barest suspicion, I mean we're not dealing here with just a tough ruler (Howard, 20/9/02, radio interview, 3AW).

Rogue-state Iraq:

> **Iraq has used weapons of mass destruction**, not only against a section of her own population but also against Iranian forces during the Iraq-Iran war. Moreover **Iraq has been aggressive towards her neighbours**, as evidenced by her invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, Israel and Bahrain. **Iraq supports Palestinian suicide bombers**, who cause such death and destruction in Israel. **Iraq also has a long history of giving support to terrorist groups**. What is more **Iraq has been in continuous breach of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council for more than a decade** (Howard, 21/11/02, address to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia).

And the dictatorial Iraqi regime:

> I wonder if she's thought about the million and a half ordinary people who have been **killed by this regime** over probably a 20-year period. I wonder if she's thought about the ordinary children of Iraq whose parents' only crime was to be political opponents of Saddam Hussein, and are now detained in the most **appalling conditions in Iraqi gaols** (Howard, 5/3/03, radio interview, 2UE).

The construction of these three closely related identities was conducted in such a way as to create a very broad and very negative enemy Other who is defined by their lack of adherence to the norms and values of civilised Western society. This construction then represents an invocation of the civilised / barbaric dichotomy, a dichotomy which works to rationalise and justify activity that may be morally questionable in ordinary circumstances. As Campbell (1992, 103) highlights, this dichotomy positions the Self as 'the higher and regulative ideal to which the other is lower and inferior'. In imperialist discourses it operated to sanction dispossession and enslavement, in the context of Iraq, portraying Saddam / Iraq / the Iraqi regime as barbaric helps to justify unconventional, preemptive military action, or at the very least allay moral concerns about that action. Who, after all deserves fair treatment or moral concern if they can be described as:

the enemy Other: Saddam / Iraq / Iraqi regime
Monstrous, dangerous, pariah, cruel, inhuman, horrific, notorious, tyrannical, terrible, liar, obfuscator, murderer, torturer, indiscriminate, aggressive, bad, dictatorial, deceitful, fanatical, mad, stubborn, irresponsible, undemocratic, rogue, tricky, brutal, impudent, evil, killer, rapist, evasive, horrible?

Table 5.1. Adjectives used in the language of Howard & Senior Ministers to describe the Other.

The point here is not to question the brutality or oppressiveness of the regime of Saddam Hussein, but to demonstrate how the establishment of a barbaric identity and the positioning of that identity against the civilised Self was a key part of Howard's justification for Australian involvement in the war in Iraq and for garnering public support for that involvement. He was assisted in this by a range of Government members, many of whom were seemingly fixated with the barbarism of the Hussein regime [see Appendix 5.6 on p.333]. This portrayal appeared to resonate well with Australians: a Lowy poll found that amongst those in favour of Australian involvement in Iraq, the removal of Saddam Hussein was the most compelling rationale (cited in Goot, 2007, 280). This was despite the fact that Howard was adamant that regime change would only be a welcome consequence of military action, not a justification in and of itself (Howard, 13/3/03, address to the National Press Club).

Othering beyond the Self/Other dichotomy was prevalent in this discourse also, and was an important aspect in justification for Australian involvement in Iraq. Despite Howard's insistence that his desire was to work within the bounds of the United Nations, the UN was assigned a degree of Otherness that was linked to its identity as something of an out-of-touch and ineffective institution:

> .. if the United Nations were to do its job, if the United Nations had done its job over the last four years, we would not be in the situation that we are... It's Iraq's failure to comply and the failure of the United Nations to enforce compliance, which is really the issue at stake.. (Howard, 12/9/02, television interview, The Today Show).

France was also assigned inferior status, and was represented as self-interested and cowardly:

> ...we won't achieve that peaceful disarmament if we continue to have spoiling tactics from, say the French, who appear intent on saying no to everything irrespective of its merit.. the French are playing a spoiling role. They don't appear to me to be trying to find a solution.

> They appear to be trying to advance France's prestige in the international community vis-à-vis the United States (Howard, 14/3/03, television interview, The Today Show).

Attributing Otherness beyond the core enemy Other works in this context to reinforce the identity of the Self, particularly the principled and brave component. And it reminds audience members that the Self does not concur with the representations made by these identities; in other words this construction of identity can operate as a tool for marginalising criticism.

Marginalising criticism

Much of Howard's rhetoric in the 'war on terror' discourse worked to sideline critique. In relation to Iraq three particular approaches are worthy of note: the preemptive method of avoiding debate and discussion; the reactive method of demonizing critics; and the more discursive attempt to stifle protest through the 'support our troops' mantra.

Howard avoided tough questions and vigorous discussion on the issue of Iraq from the outset in two ways. Firstly, by claiming that he would only make a decision in relation to Australian involvement when the United States requested assistance, and secondly by refusing to answer what he called 'hypothetical questions'. Often these were coupled:

> Look, **I'm not going to hypothesise** in advance about something that has not happened. I repeat that **if we were to receive a request then we would consider it against Australia's national interest** (Howard, 6/9/02, doorstop interview).

This tactic infuriated the press ('The hypothetical war', 2003), and was a very effective way of avoiding deliberation on the issue.

In reaction to the greatest public display of criticism vis-à-vis Howard's position on Iraq – mass protests on 16th February 2003, Howard criticised the behaviour of protesters in return, and marginalised them with words:

> ...people are perfectly entitled to lawfully protest in Australia. We are a democracy **and I don't think there will be any peaceful, spontaneous demonstrations in the streets of Baghdad** over the weekend (Howard, 15/2/03, press conference).

> I do know also that **demonstrations do give comfort to the Iraqi leadership**... **people who demonstrate** and who **give comfort to Saddam Hussein** must understand that and

> must realise that it's a factor in making it that much more difficult to get united world opinion on this issue, which in the end is the best guarantee there is of finding a peaceful solution... (Howard, 20/2/03, radio interview, 5DN).

The clear message to protesters and to Australians more broadly was that dissent was ill-placed and even harmful to international security, that those who were opposed to Howard's stance were naive about the reality of the situation and about international politics more generally, and that Howard would not be engaging their concerns.

After Australian troops were pre-deployed to the Gulf, an interesting marginalisation tactic can be identified in Howard's language, one that became more prolific as war drew closer. As Jackson & McDonald (2008, 20) observe, the 'support our troops' mantra was common in the language of Bush, Blair and Howard in relation to Iraq. In Australia, this first appeared after the forward troop deployment:

> ...whether you agree with being involved or not, there is surely an argument in the name of **giving our troops a fair go**... (Howard, 23/1/03, radio interview, 2UE).

Once Australian involvement was officially announced the mantra was prominent in Howard's language:

> ...I ask that all Australians – regardless of whether they support our participation in the coalition – **show their support for those who have been ordered to undertake this mission**, give special thought to their loved ones and do your best to **support and look after them**. You have a right to protest... but direct those protests to the government, to me, not to those who are overseas on our behalf (Howard, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 18/3/03, p.12512).

The call to 'support our troops' is particularly resonant in the Australian context, partly because of the sense of reverence tied to military service and sacrifice (McKenna, 2007), and also as a result of the collective public shame over the treatment of service personnel upon their return from Vietnam. Demanding that Australians support the troops interpellates audience members by evoking these national narratives and memories. The commonsense message that is derived is that criticism over Australia's participation should be tempered with a respect for those directly involved. This may have partially contributed to a shift in favour of Australian participation in Iraq once the war began: several polls found majority support (though only barely) in the final weeks of March (Goot, 2007, 271).

This section has demonstrated how the Howard Government used specific representations of identity and threat to legitimate their decision to participate in the invasion of Iraq as part of the broader 'war on terror'. Importantly, these representations didn't necessarily facilitate public *support* for the war, rather they ensured that the Government didn't experience a significant loss of legitimacy as a result of their decision (McDonald & Merefield, 2010, 201). Sidelining critics was also a crucial part of this process. The critics in this debate were numerous, and the following Chapter will explore in more detail some of the key counter-narratives they advanced.

5.2 Anti-Terrorism Bill (No.2) 2005

42 pieces of federal legislation designed to combat terrorism were passed in Australia in the five years following 11th September 2001 (Dalla-Pozza, 2007, 1). The most ambitious and contentious amongst these was undoubtedly the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No.2) 2005, herein referred to as ATB#205. This section seeks to understand how this piece of legislation was justified by Howard and his Government, whether the representations employed were consistent with broader 'war on terror' discourse, and how ATB#205 functioned in the context of the wider discourse.

The Anti-Terrorism Bill (No.2) 2005 was introduced to Parliament on 3rd November 2005 and despite the Prime Minister's insistence that the Bill be passed 'immediately' (Ellison, in Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 3/11/05, p.12) it was referred, at the behest of the Australian Democrats in a recalled Senate to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee for consideration and report by 28 November 2005. At the core of the proposed legislation was reputedly a desire to increase the capacity for Australian intelligence and law enforcement agencies to seek out and combat the threat of terrorism, particularly that organised within the country. In brief, the main provisions were: an increase in the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation's (ASIO) powers; broadening of the definition of a terrorist organisation; broadening of the crime of sedition; the introduction of control orders; and new powers to

be afforded to the Australian Federal Police (AFP), including shoot-to-kill, stop and search powers and preventative detention measures[85].

What was curious about ATB#205 is that while it attracted a huge amount of criticism in the context of the short Senate Committee hearing process (to be discussed in Chapter Six), the general public was strongly in favour of the Bill. Whilst it is true that the public offered only marginal support for the contentious shoot-to-kill and sedition provisions[86], polls found that there existed overwhelming public support for the Bills' other provisions. A majority of respondents in an ACNielsen poll in July 2005 expressed support for the following measures designed to combat terrorism: a national identity card; random bag searches; more security cameras in public places; detention of terrorist suspects without charge for up to three months; life imprisonment for funding a terrorist organisation; and the deportation of terrorist suspects (Goot, 2007, 267). A poll conducted by Ipsos Mackay at the same time found that almost two-thirds of those surveyed believed that additional powers afforded to police and ASIO following the attacks of September 11th 2001 should 'be increased further to prevent a terrorist attack on Australian soil' (Goot, 2007, 268).

So how did the Howard Government achieve such support for this legislation in the face of not insignificant public condemnation? Certainly there is a causal link between ATB#205's warm reception and high levels of fear of terrorism amongst Australians[87]. But we must question *how* this level of fear came about, particularly when we consider that at this time, fear of terrorism amongst the Australian public was far greater than the actual

[85] For additional and expanded information on the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No.2) 2005, see Harris Rimmer, S. et.al (2005) *Anti-Terrorism Bill (No.2) 2005: Bills Digest No.64 2005-06* Parliamentary Research Service: Canberra.

[86] Only 35% of those surveyed in an ACNielsen/Herald poll in October 2005 supported the police being given shoot-to-kill powers in relation to terrorism (Humphries, 2005). Sedition provisions were also unpopular – 50% voiced concern about restrictions on free speech according to a CoreData survey (Colgan, 2005).

[87] An ACNielsen poll taken in August 2005 revealed that 71% of respondents thought a terrorist attack in Australia was likely, some within that believing it was very or extremely so (Goot, 2007, 264). Similarly, a *Sydney Morning Herald* poll conducted in April 2004 found that 68% of those surveyed expected that terrorists would strike Australia 'before too long'('Australians expect terrorist strike', 2004), while an ACNielsen global consumer confidence index taken in 2006 revealed that 'fear of terrorism and war among Australian consumers (was) the highest in the Asia Pacific region and on a global scale Australia is ranked seventh and third respectively'(AC Nielsen, 2006).

threat[88]. The answer lies in the way in which the Howard Government represented the threat of terrorism and the ATB#205, and the extent to which these representations were consistent with the wider discourse and resonated with the audience.

Threat

The circumstances surrounding the introduction of the ATB#205 are illustrative of the centrality of threat in justifying contentious national security measures. Howard claimed that the impetus for the legislation was the London Bombings, and the threat of home-grown or domestic terrorism that the bombings had made palpable (Howard, 8/8/05, media release). On 2 November 2005, the day prior to the introduction of the ATB#205 to Parliament, Howard held a joint press conference with the Attorney General Philip Ruddock to declare that the Government had 'received specific intelligence and police information' that gave 'cause for serious concern about a potential terrorist threat' (Howard & Ruddock, 2/11/05, joint press conference). This move had the effect of affording greater legitimacy to Howard's earlier insistence that the Bill be passed hastily; ten days previously he had said 'I hope it will be passed by parliament before Christmas. It would be in the **national interest** if it were' ('Terrorism laws to be in place by Christmas: PM', 2005).

These circumstances were an important component of Howard's construction of threat. Building on the pre-existing construction of threat was a critical step in justifying the measures in the ATB#205, for without a fresh and challenging source of danger, changes in the counter-terrorism regime may have appeared unnecessary. This is not to suggest that the intelligence warning was fabricated or that domestic terrorism did not pose a threat in Australia. Rather the point is that these circumstances were exploited by Howard in order to articulate to Australians the grave danger posed to the state by terrorism, and assure them that the Government would respond without reserve. The

[88] See Michaelsen, C. (2005) 'Antiterrorism Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to the Terrorist Threat?', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 28, pp. 321-339; Lawrence, C. (2006), *Fear and Politics*. Scribe: Melbourne; Wright-Neville, D. (2003) 'Searching for the truth about the terror threat', *The Age*, 26 March.; White, H. (2005) 'Without answers, terror laws should be rejected', *The Age*, 31 October.

construction of threat in this instance was achieved through four key representational strategies. Firstly, through the direct articulation of threat:

> We are unfortunately living in an era and at a time when unusual but necessary measures are needed to cope with an unusual and **threatening** situation (Howard & Ruddock, 8/9/05, joint press conference) [for additional examples see Appendix 5.7 on p.334].

Secondly, by illustrating the ubiquitous nature of the threat:

> This country is **not immune** from the possibility of a terrorist attack. It is not. And people who think it is are just kidding themselves. And people who think we don't need to take preparatory action are also kidding themselves (Howard, 3/11/05, radio interview, 2UE) [for additional examples see Appendix 5.7 on p.334].

Thirdly, he referred to the exceptional nature of the situation, thus implying the concomitant need for exceptional measures:

> [w]hat we have entered is a **new phase**, something we never contemplated a few years ago, and we have to adapt and change the law to accommodate that (Howard, 9/11/05, radio interview, 2GB) [for additional examples see Appendix 5.7 on p.334].

And finally, he positioned himself as the sovereign state's gallant leader: prepared to make the hard decisions; defiant in the face of higher authority; and always with the protection of his people at heart:

> I can guarantee that if I get any information as Prime Minister that requires me to act to further **protect the public** I will, **irrespective of any criticism** that is made (Howard, 8/11/05, press conference) [for additional examples see Appendix 5.7 on p.334].

The majority of Australians supported the legislation because Howard's construction of threat resonated with them to some extent. Linking the ATB#205 to representations of threat and lack of immunity helped justify harsh counter-terrorism measures because Australians felt threatened by terrorism. A special report analysing public opinion on defence and terrorism at this time by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (McAllister, 2008, 24) found conclusively that two-thirds of Australians believed the nation would suffer a major terrorist in the near future. Similarly, the overwhelming majority believed that the terrorism was a new reality of everyday life (McAllister, 2008, 2), showing that Howard's 'new era' of threat had traction in the community. More fundamentally, however, Howard's construction of threat resonated with Australians because it was wholly consistent with his wider narrative of terrorism and of counter-

terrorism. The representational practices were familiar, and so the legislative response appeared common-sense. There might also be a culturally specific explanation of resonance in this instance. A number of authors have claimed that Australians are happy to defer to authority, particularly on matters of security (see Hirst, 2004; Marr, 2007; White, 2008). Our fundamental obedience and respect for what Hirst (2004, 124) terms 'impersonal authority' is most palpable at times of perceived existential threat. Couple this tendency with a subtle yet deeply engrained ambivalence towards democratic principles also discussed by Hirst (2004), and a clearer picture emerges as to how Howard's framing of the ATB#205 enabled the passage of measures that might in other contexts inspire revolt.

Identity

Representations of identity functioned in the ATB#205 discourse as a critical justificatory mechanism. Identity simultaneously illustrated representations of threat, provided a deserving target of the new legislation (the bad Other), and alleviated the potential for ethical concern (the good Self).

The good Self was constructed in Howard's language through the attribution of positive adjectives like **fair dinkum**, **sensible**, **peaceful**, **fair**, and **Anglo**. At a deeper level, his speeches and interviews on the ATB#205 evidence the reappearance of the main identity frame used during Tampa and the Bali bombings, the 'Australian community':

> These laws are designed to protect the **Australian community** at a time of unprecedented and different threat (Howard, 26/9/05, radio interview, AM Programme) [for additional examples see Appendix 5.8 on p.336].

Representing the Self as an Australian community works in this context – as it did in relation to Tampa and Bali – to encourage the perception that it is not just *Australia* under siege, but a very specific concept of nation. It is not just our physical safety that is at risk, but the essence of our Self as a group. In etymological terms, 'community' is used in this discourse with little connection to its Latin route *communis*, which implies relations born out of a shared humanity (Zournazi, 2007, 38). Rather it is used in a much more contemporary fashion, indicating a collection of people of a 'similar character; agreement;

identity' (The Macquarie Dictionary, 1981, 385). The existence of 'community' is then dependent on practices of exclusion applicable to those who are perceived to be dissimilar in character, thought and identity. This in turn opens a discursive space for the construction of the Other, against whom the community must be protected.

In the context of the ATB#205, the Other is defined through the terrorist/Muslim frame. The Muslim is clearly delineated as the threatening Other by virtue not just of their difference but also of their supposedly inherent predisposition to terrorist activity. Consider these excerpts from an interview of John Howard on the John Laws program (Howard, 9/11/05, radio interview, 2UE):

> There's always a case for constantly looking at regulations to make sure that things such as propensity to **anti-social** behaviour or **propensity to terrorism** is even more closely examined.
>
> [**i**]**mmigration** and **cultural diversity** has become such a normal thing in Australia that we never really imagined that people who'd grown up in Australia or who had embraced Australia as their country would want to **engage in such terrorist acts**.
>
> There's no doubt.. that (the majority of terrorists are Muslim) is true, the common thread of the contemporary **terrorist threat** is **perverted**, **fanatical Islam**.

In the same way that the construction of the Self was reinforced and normalised through the use of adjectival discursive chains, the Other is identifiable by words like: **evil**, **hostile**, **wicked**, **killers**, **perverted, fanatical, immigrant, criminals**, and **irrational**. Whilst Katrina Lee Koo (2005) makes the important point that 'most Australians would agree that.. imprisonment without charge, denial of basic legal rights and abuse of human rights are inconsistent with the stated goals of a democratic state like Australia', the portrayal of the people against whom these measures are directed helps explain *how* this has become *possible*. Identifying an Other and defining them in these terms firstly adds legitimacy to the particular security project – in this context the passage of draconian counter-terrorism legislation – and secondly provides someone from whom the security of the Self can be purchased.

This evidences a process of identity construction consistent with previous phases of the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia. It is a key aspect of Howard's success in

mustering support for the ATB#205 because it interpellates into the discourse those who concur with his representation of them as good members of the Australian community.

Chapter Six will look closely at voices of dissent, particularly as expressed during the Senate Committee hearing. A very short period was allowed for submissions, yet a significant response to the Senate inquiry was generated which evidenced discontent with the Government's counter-terrorism laws and strategies more broadly. Outside this though, the ATB#205 passed hastily without much fanfare. Its effect was not only to strengthen the Government's means for physically dealing with terrorism, but to reify the 'war on terror' discourse, by reinforcing its terms of representation and reminding the public of the need to be secured.

5.3 The Cronulla Riots

On 11th December 2005, an estimated 5000 people converged on Cronulla beach in Sydney's south in a show of force against 'Lebanese' Australians[89]. The primary catalyst was an alleged attack on two lifesavers by Lebanese youths, which according to participants and sympathetic locals was a microcosm of the disrespectful, aggressive and undesirable conduct of Lebanese Australians they had been subject to at Cronulla beach for some time (see J. Lattas, 2007). The question of *how* the Cronulla Riots became *possible* has been covered in some detail (see, for instance, Johns, 2008; A. Lattas, 2007; J. Lattas, 2007; Perera, 2006). In most analyses there is the suggestion that the engineered demise of multiculturalism, hostility to asylum seekers and the disdain for the Arab/Muslim Other resultant of issues and policies related to the 'war on terror' were instrumental if not causative of the Riot. This in turn is indicative of the pivotal role played by language – specifically the lexicon of the 'war on terror' analysed so far.

But rather than exploring the language relating to this issue, which is almost certain to yield results similar to previous phases of the 'war on terror', and which has already been covered to some extent by others (Johns, 2008; Perera, 2006), I want to show how the

[89] Andrew Lattas (2007, 301) notes that 'Lebanese' in this context was shorthand for new Middle Eastern and/or Muslim immigrants who came from a range of countries including Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Cronulla Riot provides a neat example of the enabling role played by non-linguistic practices. Non-linguistic elements - such as the organisation of space or a national symbol – are a critical component of the 'war on terror' discourse because they contain meanings that have the potential to reproduce or change dominant narratives (Jackson, 2005, 18). But they are inextricably linked to linguistic practices, insofar as they carry important information or representations that have origins in language (Bourdieu, 1991; Weldes, 1999). So we might imagine non-linguistic aspects of discourse as vessels of meaning which in certain instances have a hugely enabling power, a power that may prove far greater than the sum of the linguistic parts from which it is comprised.

What I want to consider specifically is the organisation of space and subjectivity in relation to the Riots. To do this, I will explore three dominant and interrelated non-linguistic elements on display at Cronulla whose meaning was legitimated by the 'war on terror' discourse and its associated policies.

Space anxiety

The physical space of the beach has come to have intense resonance for Australians. It signifies relaxation and leisure (A. Lattas, 2007, 303), it embodies the hegemony of white masculine race and culture (Perera, 2006, 36), it reminds us of heroic national sacrifice on foreign shores like Gallipoli and Kuta, and it acts as the symbolic barrier between safety and chaos. In the context of the Cronulla Riots, these representations collided and 'the beach' became a vessel of meaning filled beyond capacity.

The 'war on terror' discourse has been primarily responsible for reinforcing the conviction that the Arab/Muslim Other must be spatially confined. Be it in an offshore or remote Australian detention centre, in a military prison in Guantanamo Bay, or in Sydney's western suburbs, Australians have learnt that particular spaces are allocated for 'them'. Going beyond these defined spaces – crossing the boundary – thus constitutes not just an offence, but – by virtue of the inherent danger of the Arab/Muslim Other – a threat. The encroachment of the Other onto the holy grail of Australian spaces – the beach, and the distinctively whitewashed Cronulla beach in particular – represented a transgression that

could not be ignored. And so on the 11th December 2005 that beach embodied the continued fight to secure Australia.

Sanctioned vigilantism against the Arab/Muslim Other

Many policies and initiatives associated with the 'war on terror' discourse actively encouraged the public to survey and pass judgement on the behaviour of the Arab/Muslim Other. Most notable amongst these was the 'Let's look out for Australia' (LOFA) package, but there were other initiatives by State governments and by industry (for some examples see Appendix 5.9 on p.337) that called upon individuals in the community to take an active role in protecting Australia from the threat of terrorism. It was noted in the previous Chapter that LOFA was particularly vague in outlining the kind of suspicious or unusual behaviour that should cause concern and necessitate action. In fact in these campaigns the individual is encouraged to make their own assessment, to "use your judgement and common sense" ('Let's look out for Australia, p.7). But common sense and individual judgement are far from objective. As this thesis has demonstrated so far, 'common sense' in relation to the Arab/Muslim Other is intimately tied to successful representations of them as a different, incompatible and threatening identity.

A significant proportion of surveyed Riot participants and sympathisers claimed that it was the behaviour of Lebanese Australians at Cronulla beach, and the failure of local police to deal with this festering issue, that instigated the Riot (J. Lattas, 2007). This behaviour was characterised as uncivilised, obviated by their inability to relax; as disrespectful, marked by a lack of manners, irreverence towards the elderly and white women, and their penchant for kicking the soccer ball in the path of other beachgoers; and as delinquent, evidenced by their tendency to start fights, break rules and cross boundaries (see A. Lattas, 2007 & J. Lattas, 2007). The scenario at Cronulla presented some locals with a classic and resonant instance of unusual Arab/Muslim behaviour, and the alleged lack of policing fanned the already extant imperative to get involved in securing 'Australia'.

When we remind ourselves that the 'war on terror' discourse has encouraged civilian involvement in ensuring law and order, it is not beyond the realm of possibility

that participants in the Riot engaged in violent vigilantism because they felt threatened by the unusual or different behaviour of the Lebanese Australian. Certainly ethnographic work conducted by J. Lattas (2007) indicates that the perception of difference was forefront in rioters' minds. The uncivilised, disrespectful and delinquent 'Leb' fast became an unAustralian, incompatible, criminal Other in the charged atmosphere of 11th December 2005. These were meanings with their origins in language but on display in non-linguistic form on Cronulla beach: contrasts between bikini clad Anglo women and covered Arab women; between beach towels and soccer balls; between surfer and terrorist. As Andrew Lattas (2007, 302) eloquently puts it, the perceived unusual behaviour on display at Cronulla beach leading up to the Riot simply reinforced for participants and sympathisers the status of the Arab/Muslim Other as a fundamentally 'disordered subjectivity that had no place in Australia'.

The bashing of two lifesavers by Lebanese Australian youths aided this conviction. Both Johns (2008) and Perera (2006) point to the lifesaver as an important symbolic element in the Riot. The lifesaver is an iconic and in some contexts sacrosanct cultural entity who embodies the spirit of voluntarism, bravery, masculinity and sacrifice that defined the Anzac hero. Like the Anzac, the lifesaver selflessly offers his (markedly male, Anglo Saxon) body in order to watch over and protect 'us', and so the suggestion that lifesavers had been attacked was for some the ultimate transgression by the depraved Arab/Muslim Other.

This in turn led to the mobilisation of Anzac mythology in justifying violence against the Lebanese Australians and in inhibiting deliberation about cause and effect. Some participants explicitly invoked Anzac:

> This is what we're fighting for... our fathers, our grandfathers, fought for these beaches, and now it's our turn (cited in Johns, 2008, 9).

Anzac has been a common thread in representations of threat and identity in the 'war on terror' discourse, a discourse which has endorsed vigilantism and violence against the Arab/Muslim Other in the name of security. Cronulla served as the new front for this fight in December 2005.

The rise of the Australian flag

A number of factors have led to the increased visibility of the Australian flag in the last decade. It is to some extent symptomatic of an international increase in patriotic fervour, particularly in countries like the US and the UK (Rowe, in Cubby, 2009). But it is also attributable to greater public prominence of the Australian flag itself – cloaking Pauline Hanson, fluttering ubiquitously during the Sydney Olympics, adorning bodies in the form of tattoos, stickers and apparel in an unprecedented fashion, and more prevalent than ever before on days of national significance. This is not an organic occurrence though. The rise of the Australian flag and associated formal and informal national symbolism (the southern cross, chants like 'Aussie Aussie Aussie, Oi Oi Oi', songs like Advance Australia Fair and Waltzing Matilda, and even commercial 'Aussie' icons like Holden) is intimately tied to the push for a specific form of nationalism by Prime Minister Howard. In their recent documentary exploring Howard's reign, Nick Torrens and Garry Sturgess refer to this as an 'uncritical nationalism', focused on military narrative, commemoration, symbolism and veneration of Australia's history. According to Torrens and Sturgess this resonated deeply with Australians who rallied to Howard's call for renewed Australian nationalism, and who increasingly shared 'his deep passion for its symbols' (Nick Torrens Film Productions, 2009, Ep.3)[90].

Howard's bid to make the flag more prominent was discursively reinforced in official policy and by the media. In 2004 John Howard and then Education Minister Brendan Nelson spearheaded a campaign to reinstate 'values' in public education, requiring that schools fly the national flag (or miss out on vital funding) and prominently display the government's 'Values for Australian Schooling' chart – which featured the flag and an image of Simpson and his donkey of the 'Anzac legend' (see Appendix 5.10 on p.341) (Guerrera, 2004). In the media, talkback radio hosts Alan Jones and John Laws have explicitly called for more people to display the flag ('Up go those flag sales as the radio boys rally round', 2003).

[90] This claim is supported by reports showing increases in flag sales and the increased popularity of national insignia in tattoo and other forms in post-2001 Australia (Cubby, 2009; 'Up go those flag sales as the radio boys rally round', 2003; 'Young wear patriotism on arms, legs, wherever', 2007).

Schatz and Lavine (2007) have observed the proliferation of state-sponsored symbolism in The United States in response to the attacks of 11th September 2001. Though not nearly to the same extent, this was also the case in Australia. Threat provided a solid foundation upon which the flag could be flown and it was an integral symbolic component of Australia's involvement in the 'war on terror'. It was prominent at formal ceremonies and in documents like LOFA, and it adorned the coffins of the victims of both Bali bombings (Newstead, 2005). The flag therefore functioned in two primary ways in the Australian 'war on terror' discourse: it worked to demarcate the good Self from the terrorist Other; and it played to Howard's broader desire to foster a resurgence in Australian nationalism.

Benedict Anderson (1991, 145) asserts that national symbolism – particularly flags and anthems - provide for the 'physical realisation of the imagined community'. In visual terms alone the Australian flag – with the Union Jack the most prominent component – conjures notions of whiteness, of Empire and of Anglo dominance. When we consider all the additional meanings and narratives that have been attached to the flag throughout Howard's tenure – in particular militarism, rejection of otherness (particularly in relation to Aborigines), and Australian achievement and greatness – it becomes feasible to claim that the flag has come to symbolise a more narrow imagined community. The flag that Howard so vehemently promoted, the flag that adorned Pauline Hanson in 1996, the flag that was ubiquitous on Cronulla beach in December 2005 was a non-linguistic expression of not just Australian exceptionalism but cultural exceptionalism; in this context the flag does not represent being *Australian* but being a particular *type* of Australian.

In her poignant essay on the Cronulla Riots, Suvendrini Perera (2006, 49) points to the haunting familiarity of the belligerent territoriality on display via the medium of the Australian flag:

> The Australian flag, with its affirmation of enduring racial kinship with "British stock," is inscribed on bodies in multiple forms: blazoned on bikinis and backpacks, tattooed on to arms and torsos, painted on faces like war paint, wrapped around shoulders like a trophy: a performance of native-ised territoriality that echoes other enactments of territorial ownership: *We decide who comes on to this beach and the manner in which they come*.

On the beach that day, the flag affected subjectivity in a way that words alone could not have. The physical image inscribed upon the flag and the constructed meanings contained

within it dictated that there was no room in the imagined community for the Arab/Muslim Other; thus it served as a tool of exclusion. Pictures taken on the day (see Appendix 5.11 on p.342) evidence the effects of a spectacular and tragic collision of the 'war on terror' discourse and Howard's broader socio-political agenda.

In terms of the Riots themselves, the immediate reaction in the media appeared to be one of disgust at the events that had taken place on 11th December 2005 – even the conservative Daily Telegraph ran the headline 'Race Riots: Our Disgrace' on 12th December. But this shame dissipated fairly rapidly and was replaced by the Federal Government's approach, which was to claim that Cronulla was an isolated incident and a 'law and order' issue, and was not symptomatic of racist attitudes in the community. This view was put forward first by Howard, who said:

> I do not accept that there is underlying racism in this country. I have always taken a more optimistic view of the character of the Australian people (Howard, 12/12/05, press conference).

And it was publicly shared by a number of others, including the treasurer Peter Costello and New South Wales' Premier Morris Iemma (AAP, 2005a). Ethnographies conducted in relation to the Riots reveal a similar attitude amongst Cronulla locals, many of whom blame a lack of policing, too much alcohol and excessive heat for the events (see A. Lattas, 2007; J. Lattas, 2007). Denying racism has been an important representational tactic in Howard's arsenal both throughout and preceding the 'war on terror' discourse; it enables reaffirmation of the fundamentally good Self, attributes racist attitudes to the margins rather than the 'mainstream', and thus sanctions and reifies racist and exclusionary practices.

What might be said in sum of the Cronulla Riots is that it represented a local actualisation of the 'war on terror' discourse. This is evident in the three central non-linguistic components explored above, which all evidence strong consistencies with representational practices apparent in key periods during Australia's involvement in the 'war on terror'. The notion of threat underpins the space anxiety exhibited at Cronulla on, and in the lead-up to, 11th December 2005; and a fixation with identity – the threatening and menacing Arab/Muslim Other on the one hand, and the threatened and good Self on the other – enabled violence to be perpetrated in the name of protecting the imagined

community. The following Chapter will look at who spoke out against the riots and how they shaped their arguments. These proved important counterpoints to messages of exclusion and violence promoted by the rioters and other complicit actors. In sum the impact of the Cronulla Riots was to reinforce division in the community and to legitimate the 'war on terror' discourse through linguistic and non-linguistic processes.

5.4 Casualties of the 'war on terror' in Australia: Habib, Hicks & Haneef

A cornerstone of the 'war on terror' was the extraordinary detention of terrorist suspects – extraordinary in the sense that their detention was not determined by regular criminal law. In the Australian context, three men were detained as a direct result of the 'war on terror' on the basis that they were suspected of either engaging in or being associated with terrorist activity: Mamdouh Habib, David Hicks and Mohamed Haneef. The issue lasted almost the entire life of the 'war on terror' discourse under examination in this thesis insofar as Habib was arrested and detained from 5th October 2001, and Hicks was released from prison 29th December 2007. Public interest in the issue of extraordinary detention as part of the 'war on terror' waxed and waned over the years. But broadly speaking the Howard Government had sufficient support for their stance in relation to the three men, notwithstanding significant instances of dissent (especially in relation to Hicks towards the latter period of his detention in Guantanamo Bay).

This section seeks to explain how the extraordinary detention of the three aforementioned men – Habib, Hicks and Haneef – was justified to the Australian people. This will involve asking a series of sub-questions, such as: how was it that suggestions of rendition and torture were effectively dismissed by many as the ramblings of a dishonest and devious man? How was Australia the only Western nation to consent to the trial of one of its citizens under the Bush Administration's highly controversial military commission process? And how was an innocent man detained without charge for 12 days, publicly defamed and stripped of his visa? Answers to these questions will be sought by looking at the way in which Prime Minister Howard and senior ministers represented the three cases in question and the issue of extraordinary detention more broadly. Specifically, this data includes speeches, interviews and Hansard contributions from Howard, Attorney General

until 2002 Daryl Williams, Attorney General for the remainder of the discourse Philip Ruddock, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, and Immigration Minister at the time of the Haneef case, Kevin Andrews. Material was taken from key periods from each case that drew comment from the above politicians and has resulted in analysis of approximately 200 speech articles.

There were a number of key findings from the analysis. Firstly, John Howard clearly set the framework for representation, but tended to be less involved in the construction of this issue than other periods of the discourse. Instead, his key ministers were much more actively involved and he frequently refused to answer questions, directing them to particular ministers instead. Secondly, representations are remarkably similar across the three cases, despite their very varied nature. Thirdly, these representational practices are highly consistent with the broader discourse, that is to say that threat, identity and the marginalisation of criticism are all prevalent themes. Finally, there was considerable public dissent in relation to this issue (though not sufficient to force a change in the Government's stance). In fact the issue of extraordinary detention of Australians served as a destabilising factor for the whole 'war on terror' discourse both internationally and in Australia. This was primarily because there were inherent contradictions and fissures in a discourse that emphasised principles of Western liberalism on the one hand, yet sanctioned indefinite imprisonment without charge on the other. The dissent generated by the cases of Habib, Hicks and Haneef will be explored more fully in the following Chapter.

Threat

Reminding Australians of the threat posed by terrorism was a key way in which Howard and his ministers spoke about extraordinary detention. One of the most prevalent representational themes across the three cases was that the 'war on terror' constituted a 'new era'. The discourse analysis so far has shown that representing the 'war on terror' in this way functions to justify extraordinary measures purportedly in place to combat terrorism. The 'new era' claim functioned in the same way in this instance, constructing the detention of Habib, Hicks and Haneef as necessary in the circumstances.

All the key ministers whose language is under scrutiny here employed this representational tactic, and it was common across the three cases:

> ...in those circumstances, look **inevitably while a war is going on against Al-Qaeda**, there's been an overthrow of the Taliban, **there has to be a very strong policy put in place to secure our communities** (Downer on Habib and Hicks, 6/5/03, radio interview, AM Program).

> Well look the point I'd make is that in war situations, and **this is a war against terrorism**, **military commissions** have been the **normal** way in which matters that require a trial are addressed (Ruddock on Hicks, 22/1/04, radio interview, ABC).

> Well, that's the **reality**, **we are living in an entirely new situation**, not one that I don't think, you know, we could reasonably have expected, but **it's a new situation**, and **we have to act quite responsibly in terms of trying to protect the national interest and the security of Australians** (Andrews on Haneef, 17/7/07, radio interview, 2GB) [for additional examples see Appendix 5.12 on p.344].

The central claim in the language here is that the 'war on terror' represents a new scenario with which Australia must grapple, thus rendering previous approaches to war and security redundant. In its place – claimed the Howard Government – were new approaches, necessary to effectively deal with this exceptional situation. Echoes of Schmitt's state of exception are palpable, and the effect of constructions such as these is to normalise policies and actions that would be deemed unacceptable in other contexts. This kind of construction also sends the clear message that in times of threat, liberty should be compromised for the sake of security. Thus it works to legitimise not only the extraordinary detention of terrorist suspects, but the broader 'war on terror' itself.

The detention of Habib, Hicks and Haneef was also justified by reminding Australians that terrorism was a constant threat about which they should never become complacent. In justifying extraordinary detention, one of Howard's key constructions in the 'war on terror' was taken up with great enthusiasm by his key ministers – that 'we are not immune':

> If there was a **terrorist attack** in **Sydney** or **Melbourne**, I think people would not only be horrified but they would be very angry about the people who committed that act of terror and people who supported terrorist organisations. So my attitude is influenced by the gravity of the charges (Downer on Hicks case, 27/3/07, television interview).

> ...**we have to be prepared** to face a range of possible eventualities that **might even impact upon us here**, and **you need to be prepared**, and you need to also see that you **do everything you can to avoid** some possible **terrorist event** occurring (Ruddock on Hicks and Habib, 16/3/04, radio interview, 2GB).

> **People who imagine that you will buy immunity from a terrorist attack by retreating from one part of the world are deluding themselves**. Terrorists don't work like that. If they drive people of goodwill out of one part of the world, they switch their attention to another and that has been their pattern and that will continue to be their pattern (Howard on Haneef, 8/7/07, joint press conference with Philip Ruddock, Sydney) [for additional examples see Appendix 5.13 on p.345].

This message was also sent via reference to 'Bali', which became shorthand for the Bali bombings in public discourse after the October 2002 bombings. Citing Bali in the context of 'war on terror' policy was a clear attempt to illustrate the Government's claims about the possibility of terrorism at home:

> You had **the tragedy of the Bali bombing.** You had the activities in which Willie Brigitte came to Australia and was involved in clearly activities that were designed to occasion some harm here in Australia. And finally you had the tragedy of the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. **It is naïve to believe that Australia is in some way immune on the mainland**, to date nothing has happened. But **we have clearly been targeted and all Australians can see the evidence there that we have been targeted** (Ruddock on Hicks, 10/12/04, meeting).

> …**we've lived through Bali,** the bombing of our embassy in Jakarta and so on – we feel very strongly about the fight against terrorism and winning that fight against terrorism. So if any Australian is out there supporting any terrorist organisations, I have to say that we don't have a lot of sympathy for those people (Downer on Hicks, 28/3/07, radio interview, 3AW) [for additional examples see Appendix 5.14 on p.346].

Repeating the claim that Australia is a potential terrorist target encourages the audience to concur with the Government's insistence that as a society under threat we err on the side of security rather than liberty.

The final way in which threat was conveyed in the context of the discussion over extraordinary detention was by portraying the cases of the three men as (serious) security issues rather than (trivial) criminal matters:

> In, in the **criminal case the presumption is in relation to innocence**. In my view **when it comes to character** then there should be a **presumption in favour of the national interest and national security** (Andrews on Haneef, 31/7/07, radio interview, 2GB).

> If they came back to Australia, according to the advice I have, **they could not be prosecuted and they would just go free**.... I wouldn't be particularly comfortable with a situation where somebody who against whom these allegations have been made in effect was **set free** without some kind of trial of the allegation (Howard on Habib and Hicks, 2/7/04, radio interview, 3AW).

> ...under **Australian law**, on the information that we have, **there is no offence for which they could be charged** in Australia. And so **returning them to Australia would be to free them** (Ruddock on Habib and Hicks, 16/1/04, press conference).

> ...where somebody is charged with charges as **severe**, as **grave**, as these **charges**, those charges should be heard and the **military commission is an appropriate place for them to be heard** (Downer on Hicks, 26/9/05, press conference, Adelaide).

By suggesting that a 'normal' approach would see terrorists roaming the streets, and claiming that the existing system is ill-equipped to try such dangerous men, these representations function to make extraordinary detention seem legitimate in the circumstances, and perhaps even preferable. Elevating the status of the three cases to 'security' as opposed to crime works to make the men seem more threatening and makes the extraordinary measures more palatable.

The detention of Habib, Hicks and Haneef was in part justified by reaffirming the preexisting message about the threatening nature of the new, post 9/11 world. Constructing the 'new era', and reiterating the danger posed to Australia by terrorism, and representing terror cases as security rather than criminal matters works to hail the fearful. Representations of threat like these were being propagated elsewhere in the 'war on terror' discourse and were therefore familiar to the audience. Claims of threat - particularly when accompanied by the suggestion that a situation of 'exception' exists –achieves resonance because it takes on a parental quality, According to Burke (2007, 5) it 'mobilises feelings of love, identification, dependence and trust between leadership and people, and… legitimises them as an exercise of protective authority'. We can deduce that this sense of trust and acquiescence is compounded when the audience is reminded that in the absence of extraordinary measures they themselves could fall victim to terrorism. Representing threat in this manner therefore operated to interpellate listeners, thus working to normalise the Government's message about the legitimacy of extraordinary detention in the 'war on terror'.

Identity

Representing identity was central to the way in which the Howard Government justified the extraordinary detention of Habib, Hicks and Haneef. Across the three cases and the

language of key ministers, this representation took the form of positive self presentation and negative other presentation, a tactic that has been prevalent at other periods of the discourse.

The good Self

The good Self in language about extraordinary detention was the protecting, principled and reasonable Australia (Howard Government) / United States. This Self was protecting because they were engaging in extraordinary detention measures in order to fulfill their obligation to protect their people:

> I don't think **governments** have any greater **responsibility** other than **to provide for the safety and security of their own people**. It's an important and fundamental human right (Ruddock on Habib & Hicks, 16/3/04, radio interview, 2GB).
>
> As you know, we've been **concerned** about the Hicks case because of **our concern about terrorism**.... **when we've seen what's happened to Australians in Bali** and other places – obviously that is a **massive concern to us** (Downer on Hicks, 28/3/07, radio interview, 5AA).
>
> I mean let's say that I failed to act when the Federal Police provide me with information... They say to me this is quite important. If I was then to ignore that information, Alan, and then something went wrong, I think people would rightly say that I had failed **my duty** (Andrews on Haneef, 31/7/07, radio interview, 2GB).

The Self was also depicted as principled, achieved by consistent reference to their doggedness in the fight against terror, even in the face of condemnation of extraordinary detention measures. Being tough on terrorism was portrayed in this respect as a principled and noble act, and the Government was constructed as men prepared to make the hard decisions:

> ...people who are out there campaigning for Mr Hicks may wonder why **the government takes a hard line on this issue**. And I've explained this to Mr Hicks's lawyers and I've explained it to other people: **the reason we are tough on this issue is because we're tough on terrorism** (Downer on Hicks, 26/9/05, press conference).
>
> The point I would make is that these are, **these are issues that have to be dealt with**, and **I don't think you can make yourself a small target by failing to respond** (Ruddock, 9/6/06, radio interview, ABC Radio National).
>
> ...this will be a long fight. It will go on for years and it is an international fight. **It is not something that you can cherry pick your fields of combat and battle**. The fight against

> terrorism is a global contest because terrorism is a threat to the global ideals of free societies built on the principles of western liberalism (Howard, 14/7/07, address).

Finally the good Self was portrayed in the discourse on Habib and Hicks as reasonable in the way in which they housed and treated the detainees. The public was fed the message that despite the heinous nature of their crimes, the 'enemy combatants' were treated with the dignity that was afforded US high security prisoners. This portrayal of a reasonable Self was also prominent in discussions of the trial of Hicks under the military commission system, which was represented as fair and likely to achieve a just outcome.

> ...they have **access to medical attention**, they are being **provided with three culturally-appropriate meals a day** and they have daily **opportunities to shower and to exercise** (Williams on Hicks, 17/1/02, radio interview, ABC World Today).

> ...the **conditions at Guantanamo Bay** (are) consistent with the conditions in a **high security prison in the United States** (Downer, 27/3/07, radio interview, ABC).

> ...we remain satisfied that the changes made in the **Military Commission** procedure would produce a **fair** outcome (Howard, 2/8/05, radio interview, ABC).

> **We've** negotiated a number of modifications to **ensure** what we believe will be a **fair** outcome for them (Ruddock, 16/1/04, press conference).

The bad Other

Constructing the detainee as a bad Other was of course a pivotal means of ensuring support for their extraordinary detention. There were some remarkable similarities in the way in which Habib, Hicks and Haneef were represented as the bad Other, in addition to which each was assigned their own unique negative identity.

What was common across the three cases was that the detainees were portrayed as terrorists, as guilty, and as men of poor character. The depiction of the three men as terrorists and therefore probably guilty of their alleged crimes was achieved by reference to terrorism, terrorist organisations, and the suspicious behaviour of the men:

> ...he has been detained because **he was involved with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban**... (Downer on Hicks, 6/5/03, radio interview, AM Program).

> Habib acknowledged that **he spent time in Afghanistan** after some initial denials and others there I am informed have claimed that **he trained with al-Qaeda**. Now that is an **offence under our law** but it was not an offence at the time when he was alleged to be in Afghanistan and so the point I've made is he can't be prosecuted for his alleged activities

> under Australian law that was not in place at the time but that doesn't any the less mean that it's not a **concern to us** (Ruddock on Habib, 27/1/05, radio interview, 2UE).
>
> ...he had or has **had associations with** the people accused of the **terrorism** offences in the UK and that that association **wasn't just a trivial association**; it wasn't simply because he was related to some of those people (Andrews on Haneef, 17/7/07, radio interview, 3AW).
>
> ...he was arrested at Brisbane Airport, when **he was seeking to leave Australia**, and I'm advised **he had a one-way ticket** (Andrews on Haneef, 17/7/07, radio interview, 2GB) [for additional examples see Appendix 5.15 on p.347].

Habib and Hicks in particular were subjected to a deliberate smear campaign in order to justify their extraordinary detention. The continual articulation of guilt and terrorist activity worked to normalise their status as enemy combatants legitimately detained as part of the fight against terrorism. The case of Haneef was slightly more nuanced in this respect. Though Kevin Andrews implied Haneef's guilt in order to justify the revocation of his work visa and his continued detention, Ruddock and Howard took a different approach. On a number of occasions they explicitly reminded Australians that he was entitled to a presumption of innocence while police conducted their enquiry. Importantly though, this was followed by the qualification that the 'war on terror', as a new and difficult era, necessitated the kind of measures being employed in the Haneef case (for examples see Appendix 5.16 on p.348). Thus there was still a clear attempt to justify extraordinary detention measures in this case, but they tended to rely on representations of threat rather than identity.

Portraying the three detainees as men of poor character was also a common feature of the Howard Government's language in justifying extraordinary detention measures:

> ...nothing new came out of that interview last night except Mr **Habib's unwillingness now to answer the question as to whether or not he was in Afghanistan**. And **at other times it has been claimed that he was not in Afghanistan**... (and) the difficulty I have is in believing somebody who **claims an Australian was present and witnessed torture**, when the advice given to me is that **no Australian saw or witnessed any such events** (Ruddock on Habib, 14/2/05, television interview, Sky News).
>
> ...if **Mr Hicks** and his lawyers want to try to **circumvent justice** by going to some other country and they think that will help them, that's a matter between him and that country (Downer on Hicks, 26/9/05, press conference, Adelaide).
>
> ALAN JONES:

> Yes, just, it's been reported today that Dr Haneef's been offered a swag of medical jobs in India. Why wouldn't he have worked there if that's where his wife and child were?
> MINISTER ANDREWS:
> Well that's a very interesting question. **It's a very interesting question why he wasn't in India for the birth of his child**, for example. These are matters which there are elements of **suspicion** on the part of the police and elements of suspicion which I share (Andrews on Haneef, 31/7/07, radio interview, 2GB).

In addition to this, each man was assigned his own unique 'bad Other' identity. These representations involved tapping in to existing and emerging identity stereotypes in the Australian imagination in order to create a more nuanced account of why each detainee deserved to be subjected to extraordinary detention measures. Habib was constructed as 'the usual suspect', the Muslim immigrant who didn't integrate and cannot be trusted. He was the manifestation of the Muslim male bogeyman.

Habib's identity was also fashioned by what was not said. That is to say that in stark contrast to Hicks, whose confused identity was obsessed over in public discourse, the Habib case was characterised by an astonishing nonchalance, as if his detention was a logical consequence of some essential identity. This is an excellent illustration of the way in which dominant discourses function to 'fill in' missing details for audience members. Habib's identity didn't need to be constructed in a huge amount of depth because it was being built in other areas of the discourse, and representing him as a Muslim migrant (and thus not 'Australian') was sufficient information for the audience to draw other assumptions:

> The person is a 46 year-old Sydney **man named Mamdouh Habib**. He **emigrated to Australia** in the early 80s **from Egypt**. He is believed to be also an **Egyptian citizen**. The records of his movements show that he left Australia last in August 2001...It is alleged that **he trained with Al Qaida** (Williams, 18/4/02, doorstop interview, Perth).

> When he returns to Australia, we will obviously-- We - I mean, you know, ASIO and the Australian Federal Police and the New South Wales Police - will monitor his activities and **we will make sure that at no time he becomes a threat to the security of the Australian people** (Downer, 28/1/05, doorstop interview, Adelaide).

This was a successful approach by the Government, who – even despite Habib's eventual release without charge – secured popular support for their handling of the Habib case. Dissent in relation to Habib tended to be lumped in to campaigns for both Guantanamo detainees, and was confined to the fringes, the reserve of civil libertarians, family members and human rights advocates (Stewart, 2003).

David Hicks presented a more difficult case for the Government in that justifying the extraordinary detention of what appeared to be a pretty ordinary young, white, Aussie guy meant there was more work to be done in constructing his identity as dangerous and threatening. Several representational tactics were employed by the Howard Government in this attempt. One curious approach was to paint Hicks' as a bludger for using taxpayers money to partially fund his legal battle:

> We do though, have a budget that we can draw on for a number of things. First of all, to provide some financial support for the legal defence of Australians who get into difficulties overseas and can't afford a defence. Hicks' team has drawn down on that.
> **NEIL MITCHELL:** Really? How much?
> **MR DOWNER:** That is about $300,000.
> **NEIL MITCHELL:** So the Hicks team has already got $300,000?
> **MR DOWNER:** Yes, to help them with their legal costs on the grounds... that they can't afford legal counsel. So he has done that and he has got about $300,000 worth of support. You're right (Downer, 28/3/07, radio interview, 3AW).

But the most consistent way of representing Hicks was by way of contrast to more positive identities. Preexisting constructions of terrorists as evil Middle Eastern Muslims meant that representing Hicks solely as a dangerous terrorist was insufficient to create resonance for the Government's policy of support for extraordinary detention measures. Instead, portrayals of Hicks as a dangerous terrorist were often juxtaposed against superior identities like the Australian soldier, the police or Bali victims. The effect was to lure sympathy and support away from Hicks and towards a policy position that stood up for society's heroes rather than its losers:

> Now, as to the circumstances in which he's being held it needs to be remembered that he was captured with the Taliban in Afghanistan. He has had significant training with al-Qaida. **He is among the Taliban and al-Qaida prisoners who have already engaged in breakouts** in Mazar-e Sharif and in Pakistan. There have been suicides by some of the prisoners. **There have been guards killed by some of the prisoners**. Now, in those circumstances the prisoners must be treated as **dangerous** and it's entirely appropriate that the American authorities, the military authorities who are detaining **Hicks** and others, do treat them as potentially **dangerous** (Williams, 17/1/02, doorstop interview, Perth).

> ...people should remember **in all of the talk about the rights of Mr Hicks** and others, **think of the danger that the Australian SAS are subjected to and I don't think people should lose sight of that fact**. It is still a very dangerous operation and **those men are representing all of us there and they are Australia's frontline in the fight against terrorism** (Howard, 25/1/02, radio interview, 3AW).

> I went up to **Bali** after the **Bali bombing** and was with the **families** and saw the **devastation**. When you see the **impact of terrorism**, then it does have a **very big impact** on you. **If there was a terrorist attack in Sydney or Melbourne**, I think **people would** not only **be horrified** but they would **be very angry about the people who committed that act of terror and people who supported terrorist organisations** (Downer, 27/3/07, television interview, Today Program) [for additional examples see Appendix 5.17 on p.349].

The outcry against Hicks' detention – to be dealt with in the following Chapter – was significant, and this was primarily because constructing him as 'the worst of the worst' was so difficult given preexisting stereotypes about terrorists. In addition, there were echoes of the Aussie larrikin identity in Hicks, and this was assisted by the snippets of humanising information provided to the media by his father Terry.

The consequence of this discursive struggle was essentially a polarised electorate. By the end of the Hicks' saga there existed two parallel identities: the loser who had deliberately chose terrorism and who had thereby betrayed Australia; and the messed-up kid who had made poor choices and ultimately ended up in the wrong place at the wrong time. The former construction was arguably much more palatable to conservative voters, who believe in taking full responsibility for ones actions and were more inclined to make a meaningful distinction between society's heroes and losers. The latter construction was more likely to resonate with those on the left. The larrikin narrative has historically been associated with the Australian left, particularly during the Hawke years, and ideologically the left tend to be more sympathetic to the indiscretions of human beings. As such, the Hicks case was a polarising issue in Australian politics. The Howard Government's justification tended to resonate with the conservative element in the electorate, while the more liberal element saw too many contradictions in the Government's justification and were instrumental in fashioning a counter-narrative about extraordinary detention.

The opinion data can be said to broadly reflect this hypothesis. Conservative tabloid newspaper *The Daily Telegraph* conducted many polls throughout the life of the issue, finding consistently high rates (approximately 80%) of support for the Government's stance on the Hicks case (see for some examples Brew et.al., 2007). Towards the end of the issue in January 2007, Newspoll found that 27% of poll respondents were in favour of the Government's handling of the Hicks case, while 56% were opposed. Supporters were

2.5 times as likely to be Coalition voters, while opponents were twice as likely to be ALP voters (Newspoll, 2007).

The Haneef case presented the Howard Government with another challenge, and whilst his detention without charge was justified primarily through representations of threat, Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews relied heavily on representations of identity to justify Haneef's treatment. Andrews cancelled Haneef's visa during the investigation on the basis that Haneef had failed a character test, as such he was forced to publicly justify this move and in so doing was instrumental in legitimating Haneef's extraordinary detention. The primary identity assigned to Haneef was the new suspicious Other, the new terrorist bogeyman whose only defining feature was their lack of membership to the Australian community.

It appears in hindsight that in a short space of time every attempt was made by Andrews to paint Haneef as a subject deserving of extraordinary detention. Factual information was clearly secondary to innuendo and speculation, humanising information was avoided, his personal and professional life was called into question, and his visa was cancelled under the guise that he was sufficiently 'criminal' to warrant deportation[91]. Notably, approximately 80% of Andrews' media appearances during the life of the issue were talkback radio interviews. It was discussed in the previous Chapter that conveying a message via a sympathetic and less investigative medium like talkback radio improves the chances of the message resonating with listeners.

The extent to which the Government's representation of identity in relation to Haneef resonated with the community is difficult to ascertain. What can be said is that by the end of the saga, even though most Australians thought that the case had been poorly handled, most thought that extraordinary detention measures for terrorist suspects were warranted (Wright and Marrinner, 2007). Thus it can be deduced that representations of both threat and identity worked towards legitimating the extraordinary detention regime and therefore must have resonated with a majority of the audience.

> ALAN JONES:
> It's pretty rough, isn't it, I mean when **doctors can become terrorists, it's hard to know where to look next**, isn't it?

[91] Usually the cancellation of a visa on character grounds leads to deportation, but in Haneef's case he was detained at Villawood Immigration Detention Centre in Sydney while the AFP conducted their investigation.

KEVIN ANDREWS:
Well, **that's the reality**.. (Andrews, 17/7/07, interview, Radio 2GB)

NEIL MITCHELL:
Is it correct that Dr Haneef - when leaving the country it's suspected had no intention of leaving to visit his wife?
KEVIN ANDREWS:
Well all I can say is that **he was leaving the country on a one-way ticket**.
NEIL MITCHELL:
Yes but he said he was going to see his wife and bring her back. Do you believe that?
KEVIN ANDREWS:
Well that's what he says (Andrews, 17/7/07, interview, Radio 3AW).

It's a very interesting question why he wasn't in India for the birth of his child (Andrews, 31/7/07, interview, Radio 2GB).

...the Government regards this provision as extremely important in terms of **being able to decide whether or not someone comes or stays in Australia**. A visa to be in Australia is not an inalienable right. **A visa to be in Australia is** given, **conditional** upon certain things, and one of those things is that the person was and is of **good character**. And the **Government reserves the right** to say that if they believe a **person is not of good character**, that they're **suspicious about a person**'s association, then **that person should not remain in Australia**. And I think **that's what the Australian people would demand of us** (Andrews, 21/8/07, doorstop interview).

The first excerpt points to the way in which Haneef was constructed as the new terrorist Other, the manifestation of prior warnings that terrorism is everywhere. The next two excerpts show how Haneef was constructed as a suspicious Other, acting in ways inconsistent with 'normal' (read: Australian) behaviour. The final quote shows the crucial link between identity and threat. It is an attempt to hail Australians by reference to the community of which Haneef (and all other non-citizens) is not a member. Community, belonging and exclusion were prevalent themes throughout the discourse and worked – as they do in this context – to justify the case in point and the broader social project underpinning Howard's commitment to the 'war on terror': a hostility towards multiculturalism, an unwavering commitment to the Howard/Bush alliance, and a desire to galvanize a white washed narrative of the Australian achievement.

Reinforcing the message

Determining the extent to which the dominant message about extraordinary detention was reproduced by other actors is complex given the length of the period in question. There were many who challenged the dominant line and this will be explored as part of the following Chapter. But it has been observed by several commentators (Wright & Marriner, 2007; Sales, 2007) that there was an ambivalence about extraordinary detention measures in Australia up until about 2005. Until this time dissent was confined to the fringes and the mainstream media and the ALP tended to reinforce the Government's line. Challenges tended to be on policy or process rather than in relation to the constructions of threat and identity which underpinned and legitimated the policy[92].

Those who were particularly guilty of reinforcing the Government's representations were conservative opinion columnists[93], talkback radio hosts[94] and tabloid newspapers[95]. In a case study of media coverage of the Haneef case, the Australian Press Council (2008) found that the up until it was clear that the case was deeply flawed, the nation's main broadsheet newspapers were totally committed to reinforcing the Government's message. But even when the broadsheets had adopted a more critical perspective the nation's tabloids continued to take an inflammatory approach; one might argue that an Australian link to an international terrorism conspiracy is the kind of sensationalism that sells tabloid papers. Less than a week prior to the charges against Haneef being dropped, the Adelaide *Sunday Mail* ran an article entitled 'Gold Coast Terror Plot', detailing that Haneef was perhaps involved in a plot to blow up a prominent Gold

[92] The only way in which the ALP meaningfully challenged the Government's stance prior to 2005 (when Opposition Leader Kim Beasley began to sense a wider discontent in the community and registered the ALP's opposition to the Government's stance more fully) was when then Opposition Leader Mark Latham demanded in early 2004 that Hicks and Habib be brought home. However, he reinforced the Government's representation of the men as terrorists when he qualified his stance by saying terrorism laws should be made retrospective in order to see the two men charged (Fitzsimmons, 2004).

[93] See for instance Piers Akerman (2005) 'Prime time TV and 30 pieces of Silver' *The Daily Telegraph*. 8 February; (2006) 'Why Hicks will never win public sympathy', *The Daily Telegraph*. 26 December.; Tim Blair (2007) 'Ultimate treachery of a flawed, fickly, fatty', *The Daily Telegraph*. 31 March.; Mark Dunn, (2001) 'Traitor', *Herald Sun*. 13 December.

[94] Particularly Alan Jones. Some of the exchanges in which he engaged in discursive reinforcement are referred to in excerpts in this chapter.

[95] The Daily Telegraph was particularly inflammatory in its coverage of the three cases and were unwavering in their reproduction of representations of the three men as threatening terrorists. On the day Hicks pleaded guilty the front page of the Daily Telegraph screamed 'Low-life' (Sales, 2007).

Coast skyscraper (Doneman, 2007). Evidence that increased the suspicion against Haneef – claimed the *Sunday Mail* – was that there was a photo of him and his family in front of the building, that he was part of a group of doctors 'familiarising themselves with the operations of planes at a Queensland premises', that documents referring to destroying structures had been seized from his apartment, and that he had:

> ..planned to leave Australia the day before or after September 11 – the anniversary of the terrorist attacks on New York (Doneman, 2007)

In addition to being painted in the article as a dangerous terrorist, Haneef's identity was demonised. He was characterised as foreign (non-Australian), and as a man worthy of extraordinary detention measures:

> Investigators are looking through 31,000 electronic pages, most of it in **Hindi** (Doneman, 2007)

> Haneef is now known as **prisoner D17858** and is currently being held in cell 1 of the detention unit at Brisbane's Wolston Correctional Centre , which houses mostly protection **prisoners** and **sex offenders** (Doneman, 2007).

This kind of discursive reinforcement, which was common in media coverage of Habib, Hicks and Haneef, had the effect of normalising the representations of threat and identity emanating from the Government so that extraordinary detention appears to be an entirely legitimate response to their alleged indiscretions.

Marginalising criticism

Quashing criticism when it arose was an important tactic for the Howard Government in ensuring public support – or at least acquiescence – for its position on extraordinary detention. As with other periods of the discourse, there were a number of popular approaches. One was what might be referred to as 'portfolio pushing', when ministers refused to comment on the basis that the subject matter was not within their portfolio:

> I don't want to speculate on that. You'll have to put the question to his (the Attorney General's) office (Downer on Hicks, 22/3/02, doorstop interview).

> Look Mr Ruddock is dealing with that, let him speak for the Government on that issue. I'm not going to express a view on that, Mr Ruddock is handling it back in Australia (Howard on Habib, 28/1/05, doorstop interview).

> This is an ongoing investigation and it's inappropriate to comment in detail on those matters (Ruddock on Haneef, 3/7/07, press conference).

Another common tactic was to claim that to comment on an ongoing legal matter would be inappropriate, or to claim that the issue was not a political one. But the most prevalent approach was to marginalise the sources of criticism. This involved referring to critics in a condescending and inflammatory manner; claiming that dissent constituted a 'soft' attitude towards terrorism and national security; and accusing critics of having 'misplaced' sympathy:

> ...people should remember **in all of the talk about the rights of Mr Hicks** and others, **think of the danger that the Australian SAS are subjected to** and I don't think people should lose sight of that fact. It is still a very dangerous operation and **those men are representing all of us** there and they are **Australia's frontline in the fight against terrorism** (Howard, 25/1/02, radio interview, 3AW).

> I think the problem here is that a lot of people in the **Labor Party** and some of the other **minor parties are trying to make a bit of a hero of this character Habib**... I think if the Labor Party want to make a hero of Mr Habib they're doing this country an enormous disservice. And **it is not a valuable contribution to the security of our country** (Downer, 18/2/02, radio interview, 2UE).

> ...we have been howled down by the sort of '**Save David Hicks**', '**David Hicks is our poster boy**', '**a hero of the anti-American, anti-Bush movement**', we've been howled down by them. Vicious letters to the editor, columns, **Labor Party** abuse and so on...there was an absolute howl of outrage from the '**We Love David Hicks**' campaign (Downer, 31/3/07, doorstop interview).

> The **Australian Federal Police have done wonderful work in the name of this country**. They are legendary in South East Asia in the work they did in tracking down the **murderers of our citizens in Bali** and **they deserve our support**… **They are part of the frontline in the fight against terrorism in this country** (Howard, 24/7/07, press conference).

This kind of language functioned to portray those who challenged the dominant discourse as radical, out of touch with reality, and as willing to compromise the security of the country. Contrasting the identity of the 'terrorist' with the exceptionally good Australian – SAS soldiers, troops, the police, and victims of terrorism – is an attempt to simplify a complex issue into the good – those worthy of sympathy and support, and the bad – those who are unworthy. The broader message that underpins these marginalising tactics is one that was present throughout the discourse: that national security is an apolitical issue to be dealt with by the leader and his inner circle.

In conclusion I return to the question which this section sought to answer: how was the extraordinary detention of Mamdouh Habib, David Hicks and Mohamed Haneef 'sold' to the Australian people? Notwithstanding significant dissent (in relation to the Hicks case in particular), the Howard Government successfully justified extraordinary detention measures through representations of threat and identity that resonated with the audience. Far from portraying the men as criminals who were innocent until proven guilty, the three men were constructed as dangerous and evil terrorists. Discussion of the cases of the three men were always accompanied by articulations of the threat of terrorism, and the concomitant imperative to take a new and exceptional approach to security.

Through their failure to challenge or provide alternatives to these representations, other key actors like the ALP and the mainstream media reinforced the Government's message. The net effect was the creation a matrix of meaning whereby indefinite detention and the negation of human rights were seen as an inevitable – and indeed important – component of the fight against terrorism.

5.5 Summary

A number of key observations of phase two of the 'war on terror' discourse can be made in conclusion. Despite a degree of volatility, Howard and his Government were broadly successful in continuing to sell the 'war on terror' and its associated policies throughout this period. In justifying involvement in Iraq, contentious anti-terror laws, and the extraordinary detention of terrorist suspects, the Howard Government was consistent in representation. Practices that were dominant in phase one of the discourse, centering on the construction of threat and identity, carried through with great success in phase two. In most instances they were constructions that resonated with the community and were reinforced by other key actors such as the mainstream media and the Federal Opposition.

The Cronulla Riots evidenced the way in which non-linguistic practices function to enable action. As a localisation of the 'war on terror' discourse, the Riots demonstrate how the Howard Government's constructions of threat and identity were deeply engrained in the community by late 2005.

The way in which the Haneef case raised themes of citizenship and exposed the lack of humanity afforded to non-citizens and those not part of the Australian community provides an interesting connection to the start of the discourse. It reiterates the inextricable link between Howard's social agenda – overturning multiculturalism and reconfiguring the nature of Australian community – and Australian involvement in the 'war on terror'.

The key difference from phase one was that the latter phase was characterised by much greater discursive instability, this was primarily because the discourse became more complex and Howard perhaps became more audacious in the kinds of policies undertaken as part of the 'war on terror', but is also because voices of dissent gained momentum in their opposition to the discourse. As such, inconsistencies and fissures in the discourse became more prevalent. These instances provide an insight into the ways in which dominant or hegemonic discourses can lose legitimacy. It is the question of opposition and change to which this thesis now turns.

6

Dissent in Australia's 'war on terror' – a genealogy

The preceding Chapters mapped the evolution of the dominant 'war on terror' discourse using the genealogy method. This Chapter takes the same approach to understanding dissent in the 'war on terror'. Exploring resistance enables the full and final picture of this discourse to emerge; its inconsistencies, changes, limits and weaknesses provide a clearer indication as to how particular constructed meanings gained currency whilst others did not. Further to this, charting dissent using genealogy will show how resistance to domination comes about in particular contexts and will shed light on the necessary conditions for resistance, who is most likely to precipitate or lead an instance of resistance and when resistance is most successful.

To do this, I will return to some of the key pillars of the 'war on terror' discourse that informed Chapters Four and Five, focusing on counter narratives and instances of dissent that impacted upon the discourse or gained traction in some way. Ultimately, this Chapter will conclude that resistance to the 'war on terror' was about *harnessing* hegemony – that is, using the terms of the discourse to challenge aspects of it. Few could successfully *challenge* hegemony, or resist the discourse in its totality. Rather, dissent in this context was characterised by the identification of fissures and inconsistencies, and resistance to placement in particular subject positions. Together, these forms of resistance resulted in a number of very effective instances of opposition to the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia.

6.1 Why Foucault?

Foucauldian theory underpins this Chapter for two main reasons. Firstly, for methodological consistency; in his seminal essay *The Subject & Power*, Foucault (1983,

222-223) said that in analysing discourses and the relations of power that underpin them, it is 'politically necessary' to look not only at their sources of strength, but at their sources of fragility. In order to complete the picture of Australia's 'war on terror' discourse, resistance to it must be understood. As I shall explain, Foucauldian theory offers a method for this analysis. Secondly, Foucault is used because his work is particularly well equipped to theorise resistance to techniques of power that impact on subjectivity. Having demonstrated that the 'war on terror' discourse was underpinned in large part by appeals to identity, a theory of resistance that can account for this is necessary.

Foucault's 'theory' of resistance

Perhaps the most frequent and enduring criticism of the work of Michel Foucault relates to his depiction of human agency, or the lack thereof as his critics see it. The focus in much of his work on disciplinary mechanisms in society, on regimes of truth and on power as pervasive and ubiquitous is construed by many as rendering the subject a passive agent. But I would argue that this is simultaneously something of a misreading of Foucault's work, an unwillingness to accept what he meant by resistance, and a failure to really understand what it was Foucault was trying to achieve via his work.

To expand on these claims, and to elucidate Foucault's 'theory' of resistance, it is necessary to revisit his idea of power. Foucault's work was fundamentally about charting the nature of systems of domination, subjection and normalisation in society; implicit in this was understanding relations of power that underpin these systems which – using his own definition of power as a relation that exists only when freedom does – necessarily meant exploring resistance.

That is not to say that his body of work was wholly consistent; his ideas developed over time. And it is predominantly his later work from which we can glean a loose 'theory' of resistance. However, the point should be made that his early work does not contradict his thoughts on resistance, or ignore the possibility of resistance. *Discipline and Punish* in particular is often cited by the aforementioned critics who see no room for agency in

Foucault[96]. But as Sawicki (1998, 97) points out, *Discipline and Punish* was not a portrait of modern society, nor was Bentham's Panopticon employed as a symbol of modern society, rather, *Discipline and Punish* was a genealogy evincing some of the practices of subjection found within modern society. Furthermore, whilst there is no reference to resistance in *Discipline and Punish*, this does not equate to a lack of agency, because agency exists as a precondition for the disciplinary measures outlined in the study. Without the possibility of agency being exercised, there is no power relation because there is nothing to tame or direct.

There are four interrelated points to make about Foucault's theory of power before moving on to that of resistance: first, power is a relationship where one person tries to control the conduct of the other (Foucault, 2003a, 34). Second, power is complex and always present (Foucault, 2003a, 34). Third, power exists in order to tame freedom and so power exists only when freedom does, or as Foucault put it:

> Power is exercised only over free subjects and only in so far as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realised (Foucault, 1983, 220-1).

And fourth, there are different degrees of power which inversely affect the degree of resistance (Foucault, 1983, 224). Patton (1998) explains this power spectrum as having domination at one end, an 'asymmetrical' power relation whereby one is permitted a high level of control over another's actions; and at the other end, a relation whereby there is a high degree of uncertainty, allowing space for self creation and determination.

Resistance, as Foucault sees it, is in a kind of symbiotic relationship with power; the yin where power is yang. Resistance featured slightly in *The History of Sexuality Volume 1* (1978), but was more fully developed as a concept in later essays, lectures and interviews. A short 1981 interview with Didier Eribon entitled 'So is it Important to Think?' explored themes of agency following the election of the left to power in France (Foucault, 2003b); the essay 'The Subject and Power' (Foucault, 1983) provided a kind of overview of his work to date and something of an explanation for his focus on power,

[96] See for instance Taylor, C. (1984) 'Foucault on Freedom and Truth', *Political Theory*, Vol.12, No.2; and Hartsock, N. 'Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?' in Nicholson, L. (ed) (1990), *Feminism/Postmodernism*. Routledge: New York.

followed by a brief exploration of how power works; a little known interview titled 'The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom' (Foucault, 2003a) sheds a lot of light on Foucault's ideas of power and freedom, and in which he vehemently defends these ideas; his 1984 essay 'What is Enlightenment?' touches on the enlightenment notion of freedom and his own; and finally, *The History of Sexuality, Vol 2: The Use of Pleasure* (1985) explored ideas of human freedom via the experience of pleasure.

Notwithstanding the fact that Foucault would probably have been averse to his thoughts on resistance being labeled a 'theory'[97], I propose that a loose theory of resistance can be gleaned from his work. The first and perhaps most important point to make about Foucault's concept of resistance is that like power, it is omnipresent. Foucault (2003a, 34) said that:

> Even when the power relation is completely out of balance, when it can be truly claimed that one side has "total power" over the other… there is necessarily the possibility of resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance (of violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable of reversing the situation) there would be no power relations at all.

Secondly, resistance should not be understood as liberation. Though liberatory practices are a legitimate and often important form of resistance, Foucault was suspicious of the notion of total liberation because of its essentialist implications (Foucault, 2003a, 26). An alternative, a summit or end point in the project of resistance is a furphy in the eyes of Foucault because new systems bring with them their own regimes of truth and hence their own methods of normalisation and subjection (Foucault, 1983, 231).

Critics of this particular point[98] accuse Foucault of radical relativism and ask why bother resisting then? This question leads to the third crucial aspect of Foucault's concept of resistance which is that it is at the heart of self creation. Foucault championed resistance – despite total liberation being an impossibility – because he believed in the need to minimise domination (and with it normalisation and subjugation) and encourage relations

[97] In the opening lines of 'The Subject and Power' (Foucault, 1983, 208), Foucault said his thoughts represented neither a theory nor a methodology. Though he was referring explicitly to the contents of that particular essay, his other publications seldom use the term 'theory' to describe his works. In an interview with Roger Pol Droit (in Patton 1979, 115) Foucault said he hoped people would view his publications as 'little tool boxes' from which ideas could be used however the user sees fit.

[98] Again, see for instance Taylor, C. (1984) 'Foucault on Freedom and Truth', *Political Theory*, vol. 12, no. 2; and Hartsock, N. 'Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?' in Nicholson, L. (ed) (1990), *Feminism/Postmodernism*. Routledge: New York.

of power where the maximum amount of space for change and choice is present (Foucault, 1983). Foucault (1983, 232) famously said that 'everything is dangerous.. we always have something to do', and he labeled his position on resistance as 'a hyper – and pessimistic activism'. The fact that Foucault himself was an activist both in his professional career and his personal life – with involvement in the gay rights movement, intellectual activism at various universities at which he taught, work on prison reform and attitudes to psychiatry – is testimony to his insistence that dangerous normalising practices can and should be resisted (Mills, 2003). By dangerous Foucault meant modes of power which inhibit human capacities, as opposed to modes of power which allow development and self-directed use of those capacities (Patton, 1998, 72). It was in his final works that Foucault advocated 'practices of the self' as a form of human agency, applied via the enlargement of individual spheres of positive freedom and the engagement in self-mastery[99].

The final point to make regarding Foucault's notion of resistance is that although the possibility of resistance inheres in every relation of power, we cannot seek a formula for predicting the circumstances in which it will come about. That is because, as Patton (1998, 73) emphasises, resistance is a complex process that occurs when particular human beings react to a state of domination imposing limits on their autonomy (where autonomy is defined as a capacity to govern one's own actions). But, as Patton (1998,74) puts it:

> What kinds of action a human body is capable of will depend in part upon its physical constitution, in part upon the enduring social and institutional relations within which it lives…. (and) upon the moral relations which define its acts.

Without going into a lengthy examination of Patton's interpretation of Foucault on this matter, the crux of the claim is that Foucault saw resistance as a complex relation and the circumstances in which it might be victorious in the struggle with power as varied and contextually dependent. Subsequently, analysis of it should be done on a case-by-case basis, and developing an overarching theme for predicting or understanding resistance is neither possible nor useful.

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[99] See in particular Foucault (2003a) 'The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom' and 'Technologies of the Self' in Rabinow, P. & Rose, N. (eds) *The Essential Foucault.*; also, Foucault (1985) *The History of Sexuality, The Use of Pleasure: Volume Two* explored the use of pleasure as a means by which human beings might engage in practices of the self independent of dominant ethical, religious and societal regimes of truth.

With the fundamental principles of Foucault's concept of resistance in place, I shall now focus on how this theory might assist in making sense of dissent in relation to Australia's 'war on terror' discourse. First of all, we have established – via Foucault – that resistance is the deliberate alteration of a relationship or relationships of power (Moss, 1998, 5), and that it is a possible outcome in any power relation. But Foucault had more to offer on what the most fertile conditions for resistance might be. In *The History of Sexuality Volume 1* (1978, 86) Foucault said that 'power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms'. In other words, in the perpetual struggle between power and freedom, opportunities for resistance to power are enhanced when the mechanisms of that power are exposed – be it by a third party or via discursive contradiction. Similarly, in the aforementioned interview 'So is it important to think?' (Foucault 2003b, 172) Foucault said transformation is 'entirely possible' when 'people begin to have trouble thinking things the way they have been thought'.

This is strikingly similar to the notion of 'immanent critique', a form of struggle theorised by Adorno, Horkheimer and others from the Frankfurt School, and the emancipatory framework – particularly in relation to security discourses – favoured by Welsh School critical theorists. Immanent critique involves locating possibilities for change by exposing inconsistencies or weaknesses in discourses, and mounting challenges within the parameters of the discourse itself (Booth, 1991; Wyn Jones, 1999). The difference in what Foucault is proposing is subtle yet significant. Epistemologically the position is similar: capitalising on fissures in a dominant discourse in order to initiate dissent and/or change; but ontologically the two positions are very different. Critical theorists champion resistance with a view to facilitating emancipation. As outlined above, this is problematic because a state of emancipation is a new regime of truth that naturally carries with it potentially dangerous normalising effects. Foucault championed resistance with a view to thinking the unthought and testing the boundaries of possibility in the present. Sawicki (1998, 102) makes the crucial point that this did not constitute a rejection of Enlightenment values like human dignity, autonomy and reason on Foucault's part. On the contrary he rejected the tendency to imagine these ideals as part of some alternative, future social order, and insisted that they be demanded in the present.

Herein is the reason why Foucault's thoughts on resistance have been favoured over more proscriptive theories of resistance like 'immanent possibility' – a more modern adaptation of immanent critique common in the Critical Security Studies field[100]. Utilising the latter would have necessitated the provision of some utopian alternative for dealing with international terrorism. While this thesis is concerned with conceptualising more normatively progressive guidelines for the practice of security, discussing 'alternatives' is problematic for reasons I will explain below. The primary concern though is understand how the dominant 'war on terror' discourse was constructed on the one hand, and how it was contested on the other. Understanding these dynamics of discourse link back to concerns around change and provide a picture of the conditions of our existence and pointers on how we might make things different. Foucault's theory provides a theoretical base for understanding how actors resisted the discourse and the extent to which they were successful in doing so.

So we know what resistance is and the circumstances in which it may manifest itself. But where to look for instances of resistance? In understanding the construction of the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia I explored language. From a poststructuralist perspective resistance too is constructed, and is therefore reliant on language for its own existence (Hansen, 2006). As such, dissent in the 'war on terror' discourse will be understood by analysing linguistic and non-linguistic practices of marginalised voices using the same methodology outlined in Chapter One and employed to analyse dominant voices in Chapters Four and Five.

Foucault's thoughts on the *practice* of resistance shed light on the nature of dissent likely to be uncovered in this Chapter. At an intellectual level, Foucault certainly advocates genealogy as a means of exposing practices of domination and allowing space for alternative modes of being (Foucault, 1971, 1983). But in the context of the sort of popular resistance to the terms of the 'war on terror' discourse with which this Chapter is

[100] For instances of the use of immanent possibility as a framework for understanding resistance see McDonald, M. (2005b) 'Be Alarmed? Australia's Anti-terrorism Kit and the Politics of Security', *Global Change, Peace and Security*, Vol.17, No.2:171-89); Gelber, K. & McDonald, M. (2006) 'Ethics and exclusion: representations of sovereignty in Australia's approach to asylum-seekers', *Review of International Studies*. No. 32, pp.269-289.

concerned, Foucault alludes to two primary methods. The first is captured in the following passage from 'The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom' (Foucault, 2003a, 37):

> One escaped from a domination of truth not by playing a game that was totally different from the game of truth but by playing the same game differently, or playing another game, another hand, with other trump cards. I believe that the same holds true in the order of politics; here one can criticise on the basis, for example, of the consequences of the state of domination caused by an unjustified political situation, but one can only do so by playing a certain game of truth, by showing its consequences, by pointing out that there are other reasonable options, by teaching people what they don't know about their own situation, their working conditions, and their exploitation.

What Foucault is outlining is the possibility for resistance that inheres in all discourses, no matter their dominance. To paraphrase Roland Bleiker (2000, 277), discourses are not invincible, they may contain cracks, and it is within these cracks that the potential for human agency lingers. Social movement theory offers what might be seen as an analytically neater way of conceptualising this form of resistance. Using Gramsci's (1971) notion of hegemony, i.e. a system of thought which permeates society at a given time and operates to uphold the status quo, social movement theory holds that opposition movements can 'harness hegemony' in order to challenge it (Maney et.al., 2005). This means using the terms of the dominant discourse – speaking its language, appropriating its terms of representation – to create change.

Alternatively, social movements may 'challenge hegemony' by rejecting the terms of the dominant discourse altogether in the quest for change. This is the other primary means of resistance to which Foucault's work refers. In his own personal activism and in his writing he encouraged people to push boundaries, to operate at the fringes, to unearth subjugated knowledges and to refuse the imposition of identity by apparatuses of the state (Foucault, 1983; Gordon, 1980; Rabinow, 1997). Challenging hegemony is a more strategically difficult method of resistance, and indeed Foucault (1978, 96) says that successful instances of this form of opposition throughout history are few. This comes back to the issue of resonance, which was discussed at length in Chapter One. Just as constructions in service of the dominant discourse must resonate with the intended audience, so too must constructions opposing the dominant discourse. It follows then that efforts to challenge a discourse on its own terms (harnessing hegemony), have a greater

chance of succeeding because the discursive groundwork has already been laid. Challenging hegemony is most likely to succeed in an environment where there are significant cracks in the discourse and a corresponding culture of popular discontent (Maney et.al, 2005; Bleiker, 2000).

Another area in which Foucault's notion of resistance is not necessarily deficient, but can be propped up by recourse to another theory relates to the role of mass media in practices of resistance. In 'The Subject and Power', Foucault (1983) noted a trend identifiable in instances of modern day resistance: '(t)hey are "transversal struggles: that is, they are not limited to one country". Here Foucault was laying the foundations for a concept of resistance that takes into consideration the global nature of modern politics and communication. Roland Bleiker (2000) has built on this foundation and created a sophisticated account of transversal agency that accounts for – amongst other things – the role played by modern media in the kind of transformation of values that precipitates change in today's world. 'The local can become instantly global' (Bleiker, 2000, 278) and the speed and scope with which modern communication occurs provides seemingly unlimited scope for the dissemination and exchange of ideas. In support of his claim, he cites the environment in East Germany leading up to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Widespread access to West German media was highly instrumental in disseminating 'subversive' values, eventually leading to the emergence of a counter discourse which was hostile to the dominant state ideology (Bleiker, 2000, 180-2). Bleiker's contention is that modern day resistance is more about the 'slow transformation of values' (Bleiker, 2000, 34) than outright rebellion and revolt and that the analysis of resistance should reflect this.

That is what this Chapter seeks to explore. Using discourse analysis underpinned by Foucault's loose theory of resistance – with the addition of the 'challenging / harnessing hegemony' framework drawn from social movement theory, and Bleiker's thoughts on the role of media – I will revisit six of the key pillars of the 'war on terror' discourse covered in Chapters Four and Five: the Bali bombings, the 'Look Out For Australia' package (LOFA), the Iraq War, the Anti Terrorism Bill No.2, 2005 (ATB#205), the Cronulla Riots, and the detention of Mamdouh Habib, David Hicks & Mohammed Haneef. I will explore instances of resistance to the dominant discourse: illuminating the nature of the relationship between power and freedom, what form the resistance took, how the dissent

came about, the role played by the media in aiding or obstructing dissent, and the extent to which it affected discursive change. I will conclude by assessing the extent to which the instances of resistance were 'successful' insofar as they reduced processes of subjection and domination previously attributable to the 'war on terror' discourse, and whether there are any recurring themes or lessons which can be gleaned from the genealogy regarding resistance to dominant discourses of this kind.

6.2 A Genealogy of Resistance to the Dominant 'War on Terror' Discourse in Australia

The 2002 Bali bombings

Though Prime Minister Howard was by far the dominant actor in shaping the representation of the Bali bombing, the intersubjective nature of discourse means that a range of actors were involved in the process of meaning-making. Because of Howard's discursive control, however, even the loudest dissenting voices were forced to frame their accounts as direct criticisms of a particular aspect of Howard's response, rather than a wholesale rejection of his policy approach or the advancement of a distinct alternative approach. As a general rule, critics of the Government's reaction to Bali were swiftly sidelined, and this was done in a way that was wholly consistent with the marginalisation of those who advanced alternative narratives in relation to the 'war on terror' more broadly.

The first to speak outside the sanctioned vocabulary was then Anglican Primate Dr. Peter Carnley. He said in an address to the Perth Synod in Perth a week after the bombings:

> The targeting of a nightclub, which is known to have been popular with young Australians on holiday, suggests that this terrorist attack was aimed both at Australia, as one of the allies of the United States of America and, at the same time, at what is seen by militant Muslims to be the decadence of western culture (Carnley, sited in Brennan, 2004).

The media construed this to mean that the 'the Bali bomb attack was an inevitable consequence of Australia's close alliance with the United States' ('Anglican Church

blames Bali bombing on Iraq stance', 2002). Although Carnley was arguably trying to advocate an understanding of Bali based on cause and effect and measured consideration, his alternative account from the perspective of the public was that Bali was resultant of aspects of Howard's foreign policy. Letters to the Editor in tabloid newspapers were hostile to Carnley's proposition, construing it as attributing blame for the attacks on the Howard Government. The Sydney Morning Herald, however, were more sympathetic to Carnley's position. An editorial published on 21 October 2002 said "Dr Carnley makes an important point which cannot be ignored" and urged readers to contemplate the Howard Government's penchant for War in Iraq in the light of the Bali attacks ('The Australian Response to Terror, 2002). Gerard Henderson, Executive Director of the conservative think-tank 'The Sydney Institute' delivered a rebuke the following day on page 13 of the same paper, but did so by discrediting Carnley's opinions as 'rhetoric' and a 'clumsy intervention in the secular debate' (Henderson, 2002).

In late November 2002, Brian Deegan, whose son Josh was killed in the Bali bombings, wrote an open letter to John Howard that was published in The Australian newspaper. His criticisms were perhaps more specific and direct than Carnley's, but were similar insofar as they drew links between the attacks and Coalition foreign policy. He posited that Australians were targeted in Bali as a product of the position taken in relation to the 'war on terror', and thanks to Howard's overzealous commitment to the US alliance, particularly in relation to Iraq (Deegan, 2002). Howard's reaction was to paint Mr Deegan as a grieving father and to gently dismiss his criticism as a divergence of views about foreign policy priorities (Howard, 22/11/02, radio interview, 5AN). Letters to the editor indicated that public reaction to Deegan was split between those who saw merit in his claims and those who saw a man just looking for someone to blame (Letters to the Editor, *The Australian*, 25/11/02). Though Deegan's challenge relating to Australia's involvement in the 'war on terror' really failed to gain traction – that is it didn't resonate in the community to the extent that it became one of the dominant narratives for thinking about the Bombings, what did was his insistence that both the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister come clean about how much information they had prior to 12 October 2002 in relation to a possible terrorist attack in Bali. The result was the Blick Inquiry which reported in December 2002 and found that – while available travel advice was poor – there

was no prior intelligence warning about a possible attack in Bali, thus exonerating the Howard Government and rendering Deegan's dissent no longer newsworthy[101] ('Questions continue over Bali attack warnings', 2002).

Additional attempts to challenge the dominant narrative in the aftermath of Bali, though less prominent in the public domain, tended to come from academics and foreign policy commentators. These critiques focused on the way in which the 'war on terror' had the capacity to negatively impact upon important regional relationships[102]; and also on the way in which the tragedy of Bali was being misappropriated to justify domestic incursions upon human rights and civil liberties[103].

In responding to these various criticisms, Howard employed the same tactic of marginalisation that he had during the asylum-seeker issue, and the early 'war on terror' discourse. As McDonald (2005, 312) puts it, the approach of Howard and his Government was to sideline critics by insinuating that they held a 'lack of concern about Australian security and Australians generally'. In the Bali bombing discourse, this was the message implicit in Howard's claim that Bali occurred not as a result of his Government's policy choices, but because terrorists were targeting citizens of the West. This became the blanket rhetorical move that Howard used to both preempt and respond to a variety of criticisms in the aftermath of Bali, but particularly to those like Peter Carnley and Brian Deegan who claimed a correlation between Australian foreign policy and the Bali bombings:

> I'm quite certain that **terrorist organisations are hostile to Australia and to all democratic societies**. I would counsel those people who might be running that argument to have a look at what has happened to French and German civilians that have been killed.. the reality is the French and German Governments have taken a neutral position in relation to some of these issues, but it hasn't spared their citizens... **terrorism with an anti-western flavour strikes indiscriminately at people and countries irrespective of the stance they take on particular issues** because it is the practice of democracy, and the

[101] Brian Deegan remained an opponent of the Howard Government's 'war on terror' and the War in Iraq, and he stood as an independent candidate in the Federal seat of Mayo against Alexander Downer in the 2004 Federal Election (Browne & Thomas, 2004). After 2002, his opinions were rarely sourced by mainstream media unless it related to anniversaries of the Bali Bombing or the welfare of Bali victims and their families.
[102] Geoff Kitney (2002), a political commentator for the Sydney Morning Herald argued in an opinion piece that Howard's approach to combating terrorism: centered on assumptions about western cultural and political superiority, militarism and traditional alliances, posed a very real threat to Australia's strategic relationships with countries in the region, particularly Indonesia. He posited that the continuation of Howard's approach was likely to increase the threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in the region rather than reduce it.
[103] See McCulloch (2002) 'Counter-terrorism and (in)security: fallout from the Bali bombing', *Borderlands e-journal*. Vol.1, No.1.

> ideals of freedom, and the character of our societies that they despise, rather than our stance on particular issues (Howard, 14/10/02, radio interview, 2UE).

Howard ran this line from his first press conference in Bali, then consistently throughout the life of the issue, and it was arguably this tactic of marginalising critics before they had spoken which afforded his stance such popularity and severely restricted the extent to which people could speak outside the discourse.

A few days after the bombings Howard refined his preemptive strike on voices of dissent by drawing on a claim he used in the early 'war on terror' discourse – that failing to confront evil is immoral and unwise:

> ...**you don't fight terrorists by running away from them**. And anybody who imagines that you can purchase immunity by speaking softly of terrorism is not only taking a position that's **morally bankrupt** but also **ignoring the experience of history** because.. people are struck down indiscriminately irrespective of whether their country has spoken loudly or softly of terrorism (Howard, 15/10/02, television interview, Sky News).

We can see the two rhetorical strategies operating together at a later date, operating as a very potent weapon for suppressing dissenting views:

> The suggestion is that because of our alliance with the United States, because we've taken a strong line against terrorism, because what we support what the Americans and the British are trying to do in Iraq – that argument is wrong. It's a morally bankrupt argument. It also makes the completely inaccurate argument that in some way you can buy yourself immunity if you roll yourself into a little ball and go over in the corner and say nothing about evil things and do nothing about evil things. Terrorists don't dispense violence according to some hierarchy of disdain.. Other western countries who perhaps haven't been as upfront in some of the things they have said and done as Australia has been – I mean there were 20 German tourists killed in a synagogue in Tunisia and a lot of French people and the list goes on (Howard, 18/10/02, radio interview, 3AW).

This strategy also made it very difficult for the federal Opposition to advance an alternative position, lest they come across as operating outside the national interest. This difficulty was compounded by Howard's insistence that the bombings be responded to in a 'bipartisan' fashion:

> ...we're dealing with an **unprecedented event in the history of our country**... I accept that this is an event that has horrified Australians **beyond the partisan political divide** and that Australians want of their political leaders right now a **united and cohesive response** and they will have no patience, and rightly so, with the use of this issue for partisan political remarks or partisan political point scoring (Howard, 15/10/02, joint press conference).

The precedent for this claim was set in the early 'war on terror' discourse, when Howard claimed that Australia's response to 9/11 was 'beyond politics'. In a similar fashion, underlining the importance of bipartisanship in relation to the Bali attacks functions to shift power away from the opposition and minor parties, towards the Government, and Howard in particular. It also works to invoke a Schmittian state of exception, another period where, in the interests of the state, the norms of deliberative democracy are inappropriate (Schmitt, 1932).

In summary, the kind of dissent evident at the time of the Bali bombing could be characterised as harnessing hegemony, because prominent opponents like Deegan and Carnley set out their arguments using dominant language and assumptions about terrorism but capitalised on inconsistencies in the emerging dominant discourse. What clearly sat uneasily with them – and others with whom their claims resonated – were the arguably conflicting imperatives of preventing and fighting terrorism on the one hand, and championing a legally dubious war abroad on the other.

Although the kinds of critiques voiced by Peter Carnley and Brian Deegan did gain some traction in the community – insofar as they were views not uncommon in letters to the editor and on talkback radio (Beeson, 2002) – the ability of Howard and his senior ministers to consistently shout down their arguments and replace them with the carefully articulated Government-line, plus the fact that the mainstream media tended to reinforce this position and rarely gave space to dissenting views (Hutchinson, 2008; Hirst & Schutze, 2004) meant that in a broad sense, the public remained highly supportive of Howard's response to the Bali bombings. That – via the Bali bombing discourse – Howard had successfully convinced Australians to personally recommit to the 'war on terror' is beared-out by polling data, which found that two months after Bali, support for Australia taking an 'active role in the fight against terror' was as high as it had been after 9/11 (Goot, 2007, 263).

Let's look out for Australia

McDonald (2005b) rightly points out that 'domestic reaction to the Australian government's anti-terrorism kit was far from an endorsement of the government's claims

about its goals'. Indeed it was not only the kit that attracted criticism, the broader campaign aroused a level of discord in the community from which the 'war on terror' discourse had previously been seemingly immune.

In addition to the usual suspects – a range of political commentators and academics[104], politicians were immediately critical of the government's National Security Public Information Campaign. The ALP criticised the campaign on the basis that it was too expensive (Brook, 2002); that the money should be spent on more practical counter-terrorism measures (Banham & Delaney, 2003); that it failed to give practical information (Morris, 2002); and that it constituted a public relations exercise on the part of the Howard government (Guerrera & Miller, 2003). The Australian Greens chided the exorbitant cost of the campaign, and described it as a further weapon in an ongoing politics of fear (Oquist, 2003).

But the most effective voice of dissent was Brisbane Lord Mayor Jim Soorley, who called on Australians to return their LOFA mail-outs to the government, saying on ABC radio:

> The terror possibilities in this country are very remote. We have not had a terrorist attack in Australia. So why, why this anxiety and fear? This is propaganda. John Howard as the Goebbels of Australia. So I think people should just put on the envelope, "Return to Sender". Let the letter, let the magnet and the booklet go back. If he's got $15 million to spend, spend it upgrading airport security. Spend it where there is a small possibility of a real threat (Hall, 2003).

His suggestion was filtered widely through media and viral emails[105], and precipitated the return of 150,000 anti-terrorism kits ('150,000 terror kits returned to Govt., committee told', 2003). This certainly indicates that the LOFA campaign failed to resonate with some Australians. Tilley (2004, 30) claims that letters to the editor at the time reflected an even split between those who saw LOFA as blatant fear-mongering, and others who deemed the campaign an excellent community service.

Although in one sense the en-masse return of the LOFA packages to The Prime Minister could be seen as challenging hegemony, on closer examination it is actually a

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[104] Of note, high profile social researcher Hugh Mackay published an article entitled 'A letter, not from the Prime Minister' in *The Age*, in which he reworked the Prime Minister's LOFA mail out letter into a lengthy critique of Howard government policy.

[105] See email sent to this author at Appendix 6.1 on p.350.

very effective example of harnessing hegemony. In initiating the campaign Jim Soorley lambasted the Howard Government for failing to use the money for more practical counter-terrorism measures like airport security, an argument that was echoed by his Labor colleagues (Banham & Delaney, 2003). This can be seen as an instance of harnessing hegemony because the crux of this argument still relies on dominant assumptions regarding the threat of terrorism, and it relies on resonance generated from these dominant arguments for its own legitimacy. Soorley and others who resisted this aspect of Australia's 'war on terror' were almost certainly mobilised by what they saw as a glaring inconsistency in the Government's constructions: by all accounts desperate to eradicate the scourge of terrorism yet slow to move on substandard airport security ('Airport security upgrade costs spook tourism industry', 2002). Contradictions such as this lead to the Government being labelled 'opportunistic', exploiting the risk of terrorism for their own political gain (Banham & Delaney, 2003). This in itself was a fundamental discursive fissure given that a cornerstone of Howard's line of argument in the 'war on terror' discourse – as shown in Chapters Four and Five – was the need for discussion about the response to terrorism to be depoliticised.

By way of contrast, Greens Senator Bob Brown challenged hegemony in opposing the LOFA campaign, as his media release clearly shows:

> Kits are $15m Misspent - Brown
>
> The $15m spent on Mr Howard's terror kits would have been much **better directed to schools, hospitals or preventing some of the 1000 traffic deaths** of Australians in the coming year, Greens Senator Bob Brown said today.
>
> "There is great public awareness and common sense about **criminal behaviour including terrorism**," Senator Brown said.
>
> "Fear is a potent political weapon: Mr Howard knows that from the Tampa campaign. **This is more a political campaign** than a public service.
>
> "The best thing he can do to reduce the fear and risk for Australians **is reverse his unnecessary involvement of our nation in the coming attack on Baghdad.**
>
> "This is a fearful period. Everyone knows that. Australians are ill served by being asked to wake up each morning with a magnetised reminder that this is another day of terror," Senator Brown said (Brown, 2003).

It is Brown's construction of terrorism as criminal activity that makes this argument an instance of challenging hegemony. With this fundamental construction in place it becomes easier for Brown to place responding to terrorism alongside priorities like schools, hospitals and traffic deaths rather than as the defining political priority of our time, as in the dominant discourse.

Though Brown's argument failed to gain the traction of Soorley's, it still played an important role in a tide of opposition towards the Government's campaign. Also instrumental in this was the liberal media, particularly on television. Both 'The Chaser' and The 7:30 Report's John Clarke and Bryan Dawe satirised the LOFA campaign to great effect, making a mockery of the campaign in its totality, but particularly of the fridge magnet in the package (see Appendix 6.2 on p.351). The discursive impact was that to audiences of these shows with whom the parody resonated, the package was seen as not just political opportunism and a misuse of funds, but as outright absurd.

To what extent did this surge of resistance gain traction amongst the wider community? A good indication of the level of support for LOFA is the public response to the hotline set up as part of the campaign – whereby people could report suspicious behavior. Figures showed that LOFA was gaining some degree of traction in the community with 2615 calls taken in the first week of operation (Marriner, 2003)[106].Outside this, there is no quantitative polling data related specifically to the LOFA campaign, so it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Howard's message resonated in the community. However, opinion data reflects sustained support for the Coalition during this period: Roy Morgan polling found that on a two-party-preferred basis support for the Coalition actually increased by two percentage points between December, when LOFA was launched, and the end of February, at the height of the campaign (Morgan, 2002c; Morgan, 2003) while Newspoll registered steady support for the Coalition on a two-party-preferred basis over the same period, and by the end of February 2003 support for the Coalition was identical to that which saw them elected in 2001 (Newspoll, 2003).

Though this does not amount to evidence that LOFA was well-received, it does indicate that it did no damage to the government's standing. When we take into account

[106] This, however, was well short of the 336,000 calls a week the government had prepared to cope with (Marriner, 2003).

that the predominant political agenda item at the time was intervention in Iraq, about which Australians were generally unenthusiastic[107], it is fair to say that LOFA was broadly accepted by the community, and may have even helped the government in the face of declining support in relation to Iraq. As Kampmark (2004, 295) notes, public debate over the campaign subsided very quickly after the distribution of the mail-out. With less than 1% of the population openly opposed to LOFA, it can be reasonably claimed that the campaign broadly resonated with the majority of Australians. Given that – as this section has demonstrated – the campaign was based on familiar representational strategies, culturally engrained depictions of identity and reassuring references to the dominant security narrative, its acceptance in the community is unsurprising.

The discursive effect of the LOFA campaign – notwithstanding a significant degree of open criticism by the community – was that it operated to reify the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia. Certainly the continued operation of the National Security Public Information Campaign[108], and the sustained popularity of the terrorism hotline several years after its establishment would appear to support this claim (Packham, 2008).

Iraq

The international condemnation of proposed military action against Iraq was extensive, and the grounds for criticism were diverse. Australia was no exception in either regard. Howard's representations in the discourse on Iraq created not only a basis for public support, but also for dissent. In fact all six of the most prominent counter-narratives that emerged in response to Howard's choices were fashioned out of his constructions.

Though it is true that the degree of public dissent on Iraq is a positive reflection of the health of civil society, it could be seen as disconcerting that the primary counter-

[107] A majority of Australians were opposed to Australian military action against Iraq according to three polls taken over the LOFA campaign period – December 2002 to February 2003 (Goot, 2007, 270).

[108] At the time of writing the NSPIC was still operational. Phase two of the campaign, entitled 'Every piece of information helps' was launched in September 2004; and phase three 'National security. Every detail helps' began in August 2007. According to the Attorney General's website, the campaign 'continues to remind Australians to remain vigilant and to report possible signs of terrorism to the National Security Hotline on **1800 123 400**.' And as was the case with LOFA, later phases of the campaign also included television, radio and press advertising, as well as transit and outdoor advertising (Attorney-General's Department, n.d.)

narratives failed to speak outside dominant representational structures. This says something about the hegemony of the larger discourse of security, and also points to the shortcomings of immanent critique as a benchmark for emancipation. Here I shall outline the primary counter-narratives to Howard's discourse on Iraq. This is important in painting a fuller picture of how representational practices can be both enabling and constraining, and also in drawing out instances of discursive instability – a critical component of the genealogy of the 'war on terror' discourse.

Counter-narrative 1: War in Iraq is not in Australia's national interest

This claim was advanced primarily by politicians in the ALP and The Australian Democrats. This counter-narrative worked to challenge Howard's consistent claim that he would act in the national interest, and those who advanced it often provided a competing account of what constituted Australia's national interest, one that was more humanitarian and cosmopolitan:

> Australian involvement in a war in Iraq without UN authorisation is **not in Australia's national interests** or in the interests of maintaining international peace and security (Member for Hotham & Opposition Leader Simon Crean, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 19/3/03, p.12868).
>
> I believe our **national interest** lies in **peace** and **diplomacy in** our region (ALP Member for Newcastle Sharon Greirson, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 10/2/03, p.11356).
>
> Not only is this war fundamentally wrong and fundamentally immoral but also it is **contrary to Australia's national interests**. It will damage our relationships in our region, it will damage the global multilateral institutions upon which a middle-sized power such as Australia depends so much and it will damage our security against the threat of terrorism (ALP Member for Melbourne Lindsay Tanner, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 19/3/03, p.12873).
>
> It continues to be fundamental to our **national interest**, and to the interests of our region, that we support the **United Nations** system and respect the rule of **international law**, **equality** and **justice** (ALP Member for Charlton Kelly Hoare, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 11/2/03, p.11550).
>
> Not only is this action immoral; it is **against Australia's national interest**. As a middle power, **Australia's national interest** lies in a world where countries **abide by the rule of law** and where the United Nations Security Council is responsible for international **peace**

> and security (ALP Senator George Campbell, in Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 19/3/03, p.9735) .
>
> We should not assume for ourselves the role of bounty hunter, policeman or deputy sheriff. It is not in our character and it is not part of our identity or history. **It is not in our national interest** (Democrat Senator Andrew Murray, in Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 19/3/03, p.9758).
>
> **This does not further Australia's national interests**; it diminishes them (Senator Andrew Bartlett, in Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 18/3/03, p.9514).

Counter-narrative 2: War in Iraq will increase the risk of terrorism in Australia

Several high profile opponents to the Iraq war advanced the argument, both before and during the war, that involvement in a US-led war in Iraq would make Australia less – not more – secure. Some specifically claimed that it would make Australia and Australians more vulnerable to terrorist attack:

> ....there is the distinct possibility that **if we were to take part in operations against Iraq** that **it would increase the risk to Australia through terrorism** (former chief of the Australian Defence Force General Peter Gration, cited in 'Bali attacks renew calls for action against Iraq', 2002).
>
> There'll be **100,000 or more terrorists sign up to Osama bin Laden** - generations of **hate directed towards the US and its partners** in this undertaking (former vice-chief of the Australian Defence Force Admiral Ian Knox, cited in 'Defence disquiet runs deep', 2003).
>
> I have believed all along that **our involvement in this war will increase our profile**, obviously, and with that profile will **increase the risk of terrorist attacks on Australians and Australian interests** (former senior analyst at the Office of National Assessments Andrew Wilkie, cited in 'War could make Australia more vulnerable to terrorist attack', 2003).
>
> ...by taking this unequivocal supportive stand of the United States.... **we've made ourselves a terrorist target. Like it or not, we are a terrorist target now**. We are one of the top two or three in this thing - the US, the UK and us. And to make us a terrorist target in a region that is full of terrorism is dumb and unforgivable (former leader of The Liberal Party John Hewson, 2003).
>
> The reality is, if this turns out to be Islamic extremists responsible for this bombing in Spain, it's more likely to be **linked to the position that Spain and other allies took on issues such as Iraq** (Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty, cited in 'Terrorism, the PM and the facts', 2004).

This narrative seemingly had significant traction in the community: twelve polls conducted between September 2002 and December 2005 showed an average two-thirds of respondents believed involvement in Iraq increased the risk of terrorism against Australia or Australians (Goot, 2007, 283). The claims of these high-profile Australians worked to undermine Howard's insistence that Iraq was a key battlefront in the 'war on terror', and that loyalty to The United States guaranteed Australian security. This counter-narrative sprouted from the same representational framework of threat and danger, but fed on the flaw in Howard's logic, reframing good security policy as defensive and regionally focused rather than preemptive and ambitious.

Counter-narrative 3: The humanitarian cost of war in Iraq will be too great

In their study of civic dissent over war in Iraq, Sloboda and Dardagan (2005, 222) found that the most popular and sustained reason for opposition was the concerns over the humanitarian impact of war. We may attribute this to the plethora of non-government organisations and charities – from the United Nations[109] to Oxfam Australia[110] – who in the lead up to war warned of an impending humanitarian crisis should war proceed. In Australia the humanitarian counter-narrative gained some traction in the media and in the community. For the four major organisations at the centre of enormous anti-war demonstrations in Australia[111], this was a core organising principle and rallying call[112]. It was the principle upon which anti-war speeches by high profile dissenters like Bob Brown and John Pilger were based[113]. And, according to a survey of participants, it was what

[109] See Nolan, T. (2003) 'Humanitarian disaster looms in Iraq: UN', *The World Today ABC*. 14 February. Available at http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s784529.htm , accessed 10th June 2009.
[110] See Hewett, A. (2003) 'War in Iraq will make a humanitarian tragedy into a disaster', *Online Opinion*. 9 January. Available at http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=1520 , accessed 10th June 2009.
[111] At least 500,000 Australians joined worldwide protests on 15th February 2003 (Wade et.al., 2003). According to Fray and Overington (2003), 'up to 10 million people marched across 600 towns and cities.. in the biggest coordinated anti-war protest in history'.
[112] For more on this see Trewhella, D. (2005) 'How can Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Support the Peace Movement? An Investigation into the Resurgence of the Peace Movement in Australia', *paper presented to the International Conference on Engaging Communities*, Brisbane, 14-17 August 2005. Available at http://www.engagingcommunities2005.org/abstracts/S67-trewhella-d.html
[113] See in particular Bob Brown's Senate Address on Tuesday 4th February 2003 (Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 4/2/03).

inspired many Australians to join mass protests against the war in February 2003 (‘Australia: Protesters express deep disgust with war plans’, 2003).

We can conceive of this as a counter-narrative because – as outlined in Chapter Five – one of the main constructions of the war in Iraq was as a humanitarian intervention. The representation of Saddam Hussein as a despotic and barbaric ruler, of Iraqis as an oppressed people, and of the Coalition of the Willing as a principled liberating force was a cornerstone of Howard’s justification for Australian participation in Iraq. Counter-claims not only questioned the humanitarian grounds for war, but actually functioned to undermine the identity of the good Self as one who seeks peace and justice.

Counter-narrative 4: The US-Australian alliance is too close

Howard’s framing of Australian involvement in Iraq as linked to the US alliance also created a foundation for contestation. Howard’s insinuation was that standing shoulder-to-shoulder with The United States was important for Australia’s security, and it was attacked from a variety of angles and by a range of actors. The counter-narrative that emerged from this dissent, and which appeared to gain significant traction in the community, was that the US-Australian alliance was too close. A number of non-Coalition politicians claimed that a healthy alliance should be based on independence and respect:

> We are Australia, not the United States. We ought to respect the alliance we hold with them. But, when we have an alliance which we treat with respect, **we should sometimes differ** (ALP Member for Denison Duncan Kerr, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 18/9/02, p.6583).
>
> We have seen here in Australia that even overwhelming opposition from the electorate will not stop a **government that is determined to make its international masters happy** (Greens Senator Kerry Nettle, in Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 17/9/02, p.4291).
>
> ...the fact that we have such a strong alliance with the United States **does not mean that Australia should always agree with the United States** (ALP Member for Rankin Dr. Craig Emerson, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard 18/9/02, p.6652).
>
> By linking the future safety and security of our nation so closely and so strongly with that of another stronger nation and **by basically relying on the US** maintaining its role as the sole global hyperpower, **we are in effect weakening our own sovereignty and our own**

> **ability to make independent decisions on defence and foreign policy issues** (Democrats Senator Andrew Bartlett, in Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 3/3/03, p.8861).

Significantly, a group of former Liberals united under the banner 'Liberals against war in Iraq' and protested the Howard Government's stance on a similar basis:

> A war has to have a strong moral imperative and I don't think I've seen the imperative here, I can't see any reason… except **to please our American masters** (Former Liberal frontbencher Peter Deakin, in Banham & Delaney, 2003).

Others challenged Howard's claim that the US were guarantor of Australia's security:

> Generally, **there is little that the US has done for us**.. (Independent Senator Shayne Murphy, in Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 5/2/03, p.8496).

> Just as **there were no American boots on the ground in East Timor**, there should be no Australian ground forces in Iraq (Member for Werriwa Mark Latham, in Commonwealth of Australia House Of Representatives Hansard, 5/2/03, p.10928).

Particularly after the Bali bombings, Howard's portrayal of an Australia that sticks by its mates did more harm than good to his rationale for war. Talkback radio and letters to newspapers revealed a concern amongst the public that the Bali attacks were a result of Howard's loyalty to the US on Iraq (Shanahan, 2002a). Paul Kelly's (2002) article published soon after the attacks stated: 'we need to be an independent nation making our own independent assessments'. According to opinion polls conducted between August 2002 and January 2003, Australians concurred that the alliance with the US was 'too close' (Goot, 2007, 287). Though this counter-narrative did not challenge the realist underpinnings of Howard's representation, it reconstructed alliance as based on honesty, independence and progress as opposed to blind loyalty and tradition.

Counter-narrative 5: Iraq does not pose a threat to Australian security

A fifth counter-narrative emerged at the eleventh hour when senior intelligence analyst Andrew Wilkie resigned from the Office of National Assessments in protest over the Howard government's position on Iraq:

> **Iraq does not pose a security threat** to the US, the UK, Australia or any other country at this point in time...Their military is very small, the weapons of mass destruction program is

> fragmented and contained ... and there is no hard evidence of any active co-operation between Iraq and al-Qa'ida (cited in Gilchrist, 2003).

Wilkie's claims echoed – albeit with added authority – the concerns of a number of others, including former Defence Department chief Paul Barratt: that there was insufficient evidence to show Iraq was a direct threat to Australian security (Morris, 2003). This narrative was still built on dominant assumptions about security, but completely contradicted Howard's primary rationale for war. It was suggestive of the need for a more evidence-based approach to security, one where resources are conserved for more tangible and imminent threats. It could be suggested that this counter-narrative was particularly well-placed to resonate in the community, given Australia's historically defensive approach to security, and the negative association surrounding past participation in offensive military conflict – Vietnam. As the war progressed this narrative gained momentum, culminating in the confirmation by the Iraq Survey Group that Iraq's WMD were non-existent (Hermant, 2004).

Counter-narrative 6: Abu Ghraib scandal exposed the fundamentally unethical nature of the war in Iraq and Australia's place in it

Revelations that Iraqi prisoners were being subjected to physical, psychological and sexual abuse at the hands of coalition forces in Abu Ghraib prison exposed new flaws in Howard's Iraq discourse. The story dominated the Australian media in early May 2004, and commentators, politicians and the public immediately demanded to know the extent to which the government was aware of prisoner abuse. A Senate Hearing confirmed speculation that information had been directed to the Howard government by a number of sources as early as June 2003 ('Abu Ghraib, the PM and the Defence Force', 2004; Clarke, 2004; 'Government ignored Abu Ghraib warnings: Kelly', 2007; Wilkinson, 2004).

In a discursive sense, non-coalition politicians were quick to craft criticism of the government out of aspects of Howard's own war narrative. Reliance on the civilised / barbaric distinction left Howard extremely vulnerable to the claim that Abu Ghraib evidenced a not-so-clear-cut identity boundary after all:

> The engagement of the occupying powers in these acts has called into question much of the rhetoric we have heard regarding the war in Iraq. From the outset, the British, the US and

> the Australian governments have cast this war as a battle between **good and evil** (Senator Natasha Stott Despoja, Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 11/5/04, p.22786).

> It has certainly undermined the standing of the coalition in Iraq because it has undermined the **moral authority** that we have sought to bring to Iraq and to justify the coalition's role there (ALP Senator Chris Evans, Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard 11/5/04, p.22782).

The Abu Ghraib scandal also gave credence to extant criticisms about the Howard government's respect for international legal norms. The net result was the emergence of a counter-narrative focused on the fundamentally unethical nature of the Iraq war and Australia's involvement in it. This narrative can be at least partially credited for the revival in public concern about the detention without trial of David Hicks ('Fears on tactics in Cuba, 2004); a return to majority opposition to Australia's presence in Iraq (Morgan, 2004); and a sharp decline in the proportion of Australians who believed the war in Iraq was justified[114].

These six narratives together formed the basis for a very strong tide of resistance against Australian involvement in war in Iraq, a tide that saw support for the war wax and wane throughout the period in question. All six narratives operated by harnessing hegemony: taking dominant themes in the 'war on terror' discourse – the national interest, threat, good versus evil, realism, and morality – capitalising on contradictions within those themes, and reworking them to convey an anti-war message.

The role of the mainstream media in the struggle between power & resistance in this particular instance should not be underestimated. Though news media gave significant airtime to voices of dissent, a number of media commentators claim that overall, the Australian news media were negligent in their coverage of the debate; and furthermore, that some media outlets were actively pro-war (Manne, 2005). The main offender according to Hobbs (2010) and Manne (2005) was Rupert Murdoch's News Limited Press, which accounts for almost 70% of daily newspaper sales in Australia. According to Hobbs (2010) Murdoch's broadsheet *The Australian* and tabloid papers such as *The Daily Telegraph* showed a clear neoconservative bias and contained far less voices of opposition

[114] 62% of respondents believed the war in Iraq was justified in April 2003, 45% in December 2003, and only 31% in May 2004 (Goot, 2007, 278).

than rival papers such as *The Sydney Morning Herald.* The upshot of this is that there was potentially a bias towards the dominant discourse which prevented widespread dissemination of dissenting views and available counter narratives.

Iraq constituted something of a point of departure in the sense that there was considerably less support or acquiescence for Howard's position than in previous phases of the 'war on terror'. Several of Howard's representations failed to resonate with Australians, acting instead as an enabler for opposition and critique. This occurred when actors and audience members recognised the flaws and inconsistencies in major discursive practices. Whilst the major counter-narratives that emerged out of the Iraq discourse did not affect the kind of change that saw a collapse in the 'war on terror' discourse, the combined force of these narratives acted in a destabilising manner.

Anti Terrorism Bill No.2 2005

The Anti Terrorism Bill No.2 2005 (herein ATB#205) was one of the most controversial aspects of Australia's 'war on terror' discourse. Unique to the ATB#205 in terms of the wider discourse was the way in which opinion appeared so polarised. On the one hand supporters of the legislation amongst the public were unwavering according to polls, and – as demonstrated in Chapter Five – Howard's message was discursively reinforced by a range of actors from Government members to the Opposition Leader[115], talkback radio hosts and the tabloid papers. On the other hand, opponents were vociferous in their condemnation of the legislation and of Howard more generally. The sources of this dissent were diverse – past Prime Ministers, politicians from across the spectrum, academics, lawyers and civil libertarians. 294 submissions from individuals and groups were received by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, demonstrating a significant degree of active dissent (Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee inquiry into the Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No.2) 2005', 2005).

[115] The press reported that then Opposition Leader Kim Beazley supported the Bill before even seeing it (McGrath, 2005), a move he slowly backed away from once debate over the Bill began. His eventual position was one of in principal support, with reservations about sedition provisions. Labor proposed a number of amendments to the Bill, which were rejected by the Government, but supported the Bill in the end (Topsfield, 2005).

Prior to its introduction to Parliament, Howard had to secure backing for the proposed legislation from the State Premiers and Territory Chief Ministers. Though all seven agreed in principle to strengthened legislation at a Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting on 27 September 2005, once the draft legislation was received by the Premiers and Chief Ministers, ACT Chief Minister Jon Stanhope posted a copy on his website, much to the chagrin of John Howard who labeled Stanhope's actions as 'irresponsible' (AAP, 2005b). It is Stanhope – who eventually withdrew support for the Bill – who must be credited with the initiation of public debate on the Bill, a point noted by the Parliamentary Library's Bills Digest (Harris Rimmer et.al., 2005, 4). Stanhope himself conceded that little debate had occurred amongst political representatives. 'Mine', he said, 'has been a lonely position, at least among my political peers. What agitation there has been… has mainly come from legal academics and civil libertarians' (Stanhope, 2005).

This was partially true. Howard had announced the changes in September but it attracted little attention from major media outlets. Limited criticism began to emerge following Stanhope's own dissent: The Greens focused their outrage on the 'shoot-to-kill' provision contained within the draft[116], and on the threat posed to human rights as a result of the increase in executive power proposed by the Bill (Nettle, 2005). The Australian Democrats voiced concern about various aspects of the Bill and insisted that existing State and Commonwealth law was sufficient to combat the threat of terrorism in Australia (Allison, 2005). They also lamented the impact of the Bill on the Muslim community, arguing that the proposed laws fed into extant stereotypes of Muslim people and were thus 'counterproductive to seriously tackling the sort of things that lead to extremism and politically motivated violence' (Bartlett, in Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 3/11/05, p.11-12).

The position of the Australian Labor Party was profoundly ambiguous, particularly from the perspective of the public. The then leader of the Opposition Kim Beazley framed Labor's concerns poorly early on in the debate, arguing that tough new laws were imperative, but that the draft laws neglected practical measures such as tightened airport

[116] Section 105.23 (p.37 of the original draft Bill) permits the AFP to cause death to a person subject to a preventative detention order if (a) 'the AFP member believes on reasonable grounds that doing that thing is necessary to protect life or to prevent serious injury to another person (including the AFP member); or (b) if the person is attempting to escape being taken into custody by fleeing'.

security. Though his argument may have held some merit, Beazley's failure to draw attention to the controversial aspects of the draft Bill was seized upon by the media who portrayed his blunder in a harsh, but perhaps deserved light. The headlines: 'Anti-terrorism laws do not go far enough: Beazley' told the public, who were at this stage still uninformed about the specific content of the draft Bill, that counter-terrorism was effectively an apolitical issue ('Anti-terrorism laws do not go far enough: Beazley', 2005). From then the ALP were at pains to refashion their argument to emphasise the threat posed by the Bill to civil liberties, and the 'outrageous' manner in which they claimed Howard attempted to gag and hasten debate on the Bill (Crean, 2005, 62). In what appeared to the public to be something of a 'back-flip', Beazley stated – less than one month after his initial response – that 'we're getting dangerously close to undermining the values which we're struggling to protect from terrorist assault' ('Shoot-to-kill plans aren't new, PM says', 2005). The ALP built on this by proposing a number of amendments to the Bill, including the abandonment of sedition provisions, a sunset-clause of five years rather than the projected ten, and the inclusion of tighter checks on the intelligence agencies (Harris Rimmer et.al., 2005, 5). Despite the fact that none of these were adopted by the Government, Labor eventually supported the Bill, much to the disgust of The Greens and Democrats who rejected it in its final format (Topsfield, 2005).

It is also important to note that dissenting views were held by Petro Georgiou and George Brandis of the Liberal Party, who both called for an independent statutory monitor to oversee the operation of the new laws and report regularly to Parliament, and by former Liberal Party Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser. 'These are powers', he argued, 'whose breadth and arbitrary nature, with lack of judicial oversight, should not exist in any democratic country. If arbitrary power exists, they will be abused [sic]' (in Grattan, 2005). The late Independent MP Peter Andren and Labor Party MP Harry Quick were, in the end, the two lone voices that opposed the legislation in a formal capacity (Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 30/11/05, p.78).

In addition to political opposition to the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No.2) 2005, the aforementioned 294 submissions received by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee was demonstrative of a wider network of dissent. Though several submissions expressed support for the Bill, the majority voiced concern over some aspect

of the proposed legislation. Such submissions came from an enormous array of groups and individuals: think tanks; lawyers; legal, foreign policy and other academics, as well as academic institutions such as the Gilbert & Tobin Centre of Public Law at the University of New South Wales; businesses; journalists, including Fairfax and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC); a range of non-government organisations and interest groups including the Australian Muslim Civil Rights Advocacy Network (AMCRAN), the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) and Amnesty International; religious organisations; and a large number of individuals who identified themselves as concerned citizens[117]. The Committee Chair, Senator Marise Payne observed that submissions came not only from the 'usual suspects', but from a body of citizens genuinely interested in the issue and eager to engage with it (Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 28/11/05, p.68). The volume of feedback received in such a short space of time – only one week was permitted for submissions – is further evidence of this (Bronitt & Stellios, 2006, 957). The bulk of public concern evidenced by individual submissions related to sedition provisions contained within the Bill. In response to this the Howard Government requested that the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) conduct a review of the laws, but only after they had been enacted (Bronitt & Stellios, 2006, 930).

Despite the diverse nature of opposition to the ATB#205, there was a common counter-narrative: that the rule of law – the mark of a civilised society – was being seriously undermined. This counter-narrative capitalised on a huge disjuncture in Howard's 'war on terror' discourse that pitted a superior, civilised and advanced western democracy against draconian, extra-legal and discriminatory legal measures that wouldn't be out of place in a modern dictatorship. Hence counter-narratives reworked the construction of the Self, retaining the claim to civilisation but reworking the meaning by tying this feature closely to the primacy of the rule of law. This is another illustration of the 'harnessing hegemony' tactic at work, or in Foucault's (2003a, 37) phrasing, 'playing the same game differently'.

[117] For a complete list of submissions received by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee see: Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee inquiry into the Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No.2) 2005', p. 215-27.

A formidable opponent to the main counter-narrative was the conservative media, who at best reported on the legislation in simplistic language that served to reinforce the dominant 'politically sanctioned vocabulary' (Lee Koo, 2005), and at worst lent outright support to the legislation. Consider the following statements from John Laws and Alan Jones, and from a *Daily Telegraph* editorial in relation to the ATB#205:

> [t]hey've not been quite as draconian as they will be, and I'm pleased that they will become more draconian (John Laws, 2005).
>
> I must say on behalf of my listeners that I do want to congratulate you, they would want me to do that, on acting in the national interest (Alan Jones, 2005).
>
> ..nothing will persuade that myopic minority -- not capital city bombings, not suicide attacks, not the bellicose rhetoric of fanatics threatening repeated 9/11-style terror -- that the risks of an assault on our country, our citizens, are real. Australians who value the freedom we cherish above all others in this country -- the freedom to live without a constant fear of terrorist attack -- will see the need for the new laws and welcome their speedy implementation ('Threat proves need for anti-terror laws', 3/11/05).

Despite resistance to the ATB#205, only six out of 52 recommendations were adopted before the Bill was passed on 7th December 2005[118]. We might attribute this to a number of factors: the Government's restriction of debate over the Bill; the fact that the Government held control of the Senate at this stage; and the distraction provided by the introduction of drastic IR laws at the same time as the ATB#205. Fundamentally though, passage of the ATB#205 occurred because it was broadly tolerated – if not supported – by the Australian public. The Bill was an audacious undertaking, and many of its provisions would have been simply unthinkable in other circumstances. But the entrenched nature of the 'war on terror' discourse and Howard's construction of ATB#205 in terms broadly consistent with this discourse made drastic measures to combat terrorism appear common sense.

[118] The recommendations adopted were as follows: a slight adjustment was made to the sedition provision to ensure that there must be express intention to use force or violence; detainees were granted the right to contact guardians and legal representatives; safeguards were put in place for detainees under 18 years of age; the requirements for the provision of control orders were tightened; accountability of the AFP to the Commonwealth Ombudsman in the issuing of control orders was made explicit; and detainees were granted the right to know the reasons for the application of a control order upon them (Senate Legal Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee inquiry into the Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No.2) 2005', 2005).

The Cronulla Riots

In the previous Chapter, I claimed that the Cronulla Riots were a localisation of the 'war on terror' discourse. In response to this highly publicised event, there was a significant amount of rhetoric from news media and government condemning the behavior of participants as appalling. But, as Chapter Five outlined, the dominant frame in the aftermath was that the riot was a law and order issue, not a race issue. Subsequently, police were afforded new powers by the NSW Government and had a greater presence in both the Sutherland Shire and the Western Suburbs in the weeks following the riot (Evers, 2008, 424). A dramatic media-endorsed manhunt (see Appendix 6.3 on p.354) for key perpetrators ensued and by mid-2006, with the majority of suspects 'caught', the story's newsworthy status died off (Clennell, 2006).

The dominance of this narrative meant that counter narratives operated very much in the background on this issue. But there were many individuals motivated to action as a result of the Riots themselves, and the dominant response by government and popular media, and their actions did make an impact. At the core of these counter narratives was the recognition that racism and intolerance played a significant role in the events of 11 December 2005. There was also an awareness of the need to rework the very strong symbolic influences at play, particularly the beach, and the Australian flag.

Three months after the Riots, Surf Life Saving Australia (SLS) launched the 'On The Same Wave' project in partnership with The Department of Immigration and Citizenship. The program was the initiative of SLS's national diversity manager and Dr Jamal Rifi, a General Practitioner and President of Lakemba Sport and Recreation Club who both saw the dominant image of SLS as a white, Anglo-Celtic organisation as problematic, particularly in the wake of the Cronulla Riots (Damouny, 2011). The SLS website describes the project as follows:

> The OTSW program provides support to young Australians of all backgrounds, to become part of the beach experience, and to engage with SLS around Australia. The partnership aims to achieve greater harmony between all beach users and promote a culture that the beach is there to share. It further aims to develop inclusive practices within SLS and individual clubs to more effectively attract members from a broader Australian population demographic (Surf Life Saving Australia, 2011).

The program has been directly responsible for the recruitment and training of lifesavers from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds; for engaging with those communities to create a dialogue about beach safety; and for promoting cultural awareness and a positive attitude to diversity amongst surf clubs and their members (Damouny, 2007). At a discursive level, the program operates to refuse dominant subject positions like the jingoistic, intolerant beach guardian, and the unintegrable, disrespectful Arab Other; and to rework the meaning of 'the beach' as a space of diversity, recreation and welcome rather than a site of hostility. The program has been supported by state and territory governments nationally, but its long-term impact has been marginal. Many of the recruits did not pursue lifesaving, and anecdotal evidence suggests 'Muslims' have not returned to Sutherland Shire beaches in the numbers that creators of 'On The Same Wave' were hoping (Elliot, 2010). Notwithstanding the fact that the initiative was well meaning and has had important discursive and practical effects, what this suggests is that the power of dominant ideas about the place of Muslims on the beach are very strong. This in turn is undoubtedly attributable to deeply entrenched mythology about the beach discussed in Chapter Five, and the reinforcement of this mythology by the exclusionary 'war on terror' discourse.

Another counter narrative to emerge in response to the Cronulla Riots centered on the meaning of the flag and / or the way it was used. In anti-racism rallies in Sydney and Melbourne the week following the Riots, several protesters made use of the flag to promote a message of inclusion or to encourage debate (see Appendix 6.4 on p.355). These were people for whom the sentiments underpinning the Riots had no resonance, and who saw an important opportunity to create a new subject position for the flag-bearing Australian linked to inclusiveness and a celebration of difference. The organisation Ausflag used the Riots to publicly promote changing the national flag to something more reflective of Australia's indigenous heritage and multicultural makeup (Jones, 2006). And organisers of the 2007 Big Day Out concerts discouraged attendants from wearing or carrying the flag for fear of aggravating extant tensions (McManus, 2007). But it appears these instances of dissent failed to gain much traction. There was widespread outcry in response to the Big Day Out 'flag-ban' plan, including bipartisan political condemnation at state and federal level (McManus, 2007; 'Iemma attacks Big Day Out flag "ban"', 2007),

and on Australia day 2009 the popularity and prevalence of the Australian flag appeared to be at an all time high (Cubby, 2009; 'When patriotism becomes provocation', 2009).

This raises an interesting point. Moves to rework the use of the flag or physically change the look of the flag are fundamentally methods of harnessing hegemony because at their core they retain the centrality of the flag as a national symbol. Yet the Big Day Out flag ban can be characterised as challenging hegemony, since the right of patrons to possess this symbol was jeopardised. That the ban attracted such vociferous opposition indicates the entrenched nature of dominant views about the flag and its place in Australian society; in such an environment direct challenges to that view are swiftly shut down and can in fact have the reverse effect, reinforcing its importance and increasing its prominence. On the other hand, whilst the harnessing hegemony approach has not yet resulted in changes to the flag, the dialogue continues and gained further momentum in 2011 with a number of high profile Australians publicly declaring support for a new flag (Huxley, 2011). In time, the continued efforts of campaigners and protesters may well be instrumental in the 'slow transformation of values' that Bleiker (2000) sees as the key instigator for change.

Habib, Hicks & Haneef

The extraordinary detention of Mamdouh Habib, David Hicks and Mohamed Haneef for terrorism related offences generated significant criticism and opposition in Australia, and in fact functioned as a significant destabilising factor in the broader 'war on terror' discourse. Criticism was confined to the fringes during the formative years of the 'war on terror', so it was the protracted Hicks case that attracted the most public interest and hence receives more attention in this section. Despite the nuances of dissent pertaining to each case, three clear counter-narratives emerged in response to the Government's construction of extraordinary detention.

Counter-narrative 1: Civilised nations don't treat people this way

The most prominent counter narrative to emerge in response to this issue was that civilised nations don't treat people this way. The narrative centered on themes like the rule of law and human rights, and capitalised on major contradictions in the 'war on terror' discourse, particularly the civilised / barbaric distinction and the fundamental claim expounded by leaders like Howard and Bush that the 'war on terror' was about defending the core values of western liberalism and democracy. For many Australians, these claims appeared hollow because the Government openly championed indefinite detention of terror suspects in conditions that appeared to contravene basic human rights.

It was on this basis that opposition to the detention- without-trial of Mamdouh Habib and David Hicks first sprouted, but as Sales (2007, 91-2) outlines, resistance was confined to the fringes:

> Even though there were two Australians at Guantanamo during 2002 and 2003, the public interest in the pair was negligible. Newspaper clippings show an inconsistent stream of stories, often buried on inside pages…. Concern about Hicks was very much confined to the so-called 'elite' – lawyers, intellectuals and human rights campaigners. The broader public seemed to be in step with the Prime Minister.

It must be said though, that this resistance laid crucial foundations for stronger dissent in later years. From early 2002, The ALP made it clear that it was unacceptable on a legal and moral basis that Habib and Hicks be held without trial (Rudd, 2002). Notably, Opposition Spokesperson for Justice and Customs Daryl Melham boldly published a piece in the national broadsheet *The Australian* slamming the Howard Government's inaction on the issue:

> An Australian citizen should not be detained without charge. This is **a fundamental legal and human rights principle** that must be vigorously asserted. Unfortunately, however, the Australian Government has already abandoned this principle in the cases of David Hicks and Mamdouh Habib (Melham, 2003).

In 2002 *The Sydney Morning Herald* published an editorial challenging the Government's position on legal and human rights grounds:

> This is an appalling muddle. It cannot be accepted that an Australian should be held anywhere for so long without charge. The ancient writ of habeas corpus to require a jailer to produce a prisoner in person and state the reasons for detention is more than a quaint

> historic relic. **A basic principle that a person should either be charged and tried with due process, or be released underpins the freedom Australians take for granted** ('Bring Hicks, Habib home to justice', 2002).

Similar lines of argument were evident in press releases and media appearances by politicians on the left, civil libertarians, lawyers, and think tanks (Banham, 2002; Grattan, 2003).

These arguments gained significant momentum amongst the broader community on the 5th anniversary of Hicks' arrival in Guantanamo Bay. Mamdouh Habib had been released without charge in 2005 after spending in excess of three years in US custody, and those who had been advocating for proper treatment of both Hicks and Habib ensured the 5th anniversary of Hicks' imprisonment was used to maximum effect (Sales, 2007, 192, 212). Arguably spurred on by revelations about prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib in May 2004, and by the incessant lobbying by Hicks' charismatic and endearing military lawyer Major Michael Mori, suddenly parts of middle Australia concurred with the fringe: civilised nations don't treat people like this. Rallies were held to mark the 5th anniversary, the story was increasingly present in mainstream media, and organisations like Getup! gained greater attention for their 'Bring David Hicks Home' Campaign; the culmination was that according to *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 71% of Australians wanted Hicks home by late 2006 (Sales, 2007).

Perhaps the most significant push came from Coalition politicians including Bruce Baird, Judi Moylan, Danna Vale, Barnaby Joyce, Petro Georgiou and Warren Entsch (Quinn, 2006; Coorey & Banham, 2007) who lobbied Howard to act on Hicks' detention. At the core of their argument was the claim that basic tenets of western liberalism were being violated, and enough was enough.

> (H)e has already done four years and done four years in the **most inhumane conditions**… **he should have the opportunity to have his case heard… this is an offence against the principle of law** (Danna Vale, in E.Jackson, 2005).

At its core, this counter narrative challenged Howard's construction of identity, exposing the rhetoric of the good Self as incongruent to the practice, and reworking the notion of the Self in the process – thus initiating criticism by 'harnessing hegemony'.

Dissent swelled because many audience members no longer identified with the dominant portrayal of the Self.

This was also true of the Haneef case. A whirlwind by comparison to the drawn-out affair that was the Hicks and (to a lesser extent) Habib cases, it did not attract the kind of groundswell opposition mentioned above. Criticism of Haneef's detention was led by legal experts, who were insistent that his legal and human rights were being contravened. The Law Council in particular made a number of public claims to this effect (The Law Council of Australia, 2007a, 2007b).

Before the flaws in the Haneef case became apparent, the Federal Opposition and the media were disinclined to challenge the dominant argument, i.e. that Haneef was potentially a dangerous man with terrorist connections and therefore deserving of extraordinary detention. In fact the complicity of the media in reinforcing the dominant political discourse in the early stages of the case has been recognised by The Australian Press Council (Australian Press Council, 2008). Yet, once the case began to unravel, seeds of dissent initially planted by legal experts began to grow.

By the time the full picture of the bungled case began to emerge, the tide turned against the Howard Government. In broad terms the media began to editorialise against the Government on this issue (Australian Press Council, 2008), the Federal Opposition demanded a full judicial inquiry (FOI documents raise conspiracy questions in Haneef case', 2007), and public opinion was that the Government had overstepped the mark (Grattan, 2007; Kerr, 2007). It is probable that the Hicks' case had created a foundation of dissent and suspicion upon which opposition was built vis-à-vis Haneef's treatment, and the farcical nature of the case – riddled with flaws and contradictions – in the end certainly made resistance easier. Fundamentally though, the fervor with which the Government 'went after' Haneef smacked of political opportunism once it became clear that Haneef posed no threat at all. The image of Haneef huddled in a near-fetal position (see Appendix 6.5 on p.356) that had come to characterise the case made this fissure all the more unpalatable and the 'civilised self' held virtually no resonance any more. By the end of the year the Howard Government had lost office and Howard had lost his own seat. Though the Haneef case was arguably only a small nail in their proverbial coffin, it is notable that

the new Labor Government set about reviewing counter terrorism legislation as a matter of immediate priority once in office (Coorey, 2008).

Counter-narrative 2: Fair go

Arguably the strongest and most interesting counter-narrative to emerge in response to extraordinary detention was fashioned out of the notion of the 'fair go'. The narrative grew following the inception of the lobby group 'Fair Go for David', founded by David's father's first wife, Bronwyn Mewett in 2002 with the aim of keeping Hicks' story in the press (Sales, 2007, 90). But throughout the duration of the Hicks' case, particularly from 2005, many actors contributed to this counter-narrative and it played a pivotal role in undermining the dominant narrative and in drawing attention to Hicks' plight. Its prevalence also meant that it was a readily accessible counter narrative in the Haneef case as well.

In 1998 John Howard said: '(O)ur society is underpinned by those uniquely Australian concepts of a fair go and practical mateship' (cited in Brett, 2005, 33). A 'fair go for all' was one of five key principles underpinning Howard's rebranding of the Coalition in their 1988 publication *Future Directions* (Howard & Sinclair, 1988, 1), and he frequently championed the term as a core Australian value throughout his time in office. *Future Directions* loosely defines a 'fair go' as compassion, realism and reasonableness. Seventeen years after its publication, large sections of the population were seeing this as hollow rhetoric rather than a guiding principle for the Government. Groups like 'fair go for David' harnessed hegemony to expose this contradiction.

Overall, there was an obvious general contradiction in the idea of the 'fair go' as espoused by the Howard Government and the way in which David Hicks' was being treated. But there were a number of unstable constructions upon which this counter-narrative was built. Firstly, the 'war on terror' discourse relied heavily on notions of citizenship, nationhood and community membership. Attempts by the Howard Government to paint Hicks' as an 'other' perhaps worked in the initial years of his incarceration but fell flat in the face of portrayals of Hicks as a human being and ultimately

an Australian citizen worthy of assistance. Particularly after 2005, many Australians were ill-at-ease with the failure of the Government to 'look after one of our own' (Sales, 2007).

Secondly, Howard's portrayal of Hicks' as the 'worst of the worst' proved a shaky construction of identity. Dominant constructions of the terrorist Other were invariably Arab Muslims or variations thereof. Hicks' didn't fit this bill from the beginning, and as time wore on and his supporters chipped away at the dominant representation of Hicks, his credentials as bin Laden's protégé were waning. His father Terry played the primary role in this discursive shift: in the media as often as possible, he humanised his son at every opportunity without apologising for his behaviour. Speaking about David in an interview arranged by Amnesty International (2007), Terry Hicks said of David:

> He's always interested in the footy, the cricket, what's happening in the family, that sort of thing…. they're your kids and you stand by them. If your kid commits murder, or runs drugs or whatever, you stand by them. If you don't you're not a parent.

It was these kinds of representations that gained traction in the community. Snippets from newspapers and media clips from 2005 onwards, when the issue was gaining public momentum, show that the picture of Hicks used most frequently had changed from the incriminating rocket launcher shot to more relaxed portraits amongst his family (see Appendix 6.6 on p.357). Letters to the Editor and comments on talkback radio around this time indicated that while people were unimpressed by his alleged activities, he should be allowed his day in court or brought home. The characterisation of Hicks' as a monster held little resonance by 2005, and had arguably been replaced in the mainstream mind by a portrait of an idiot kid who made some poor choices but deserved a fair go.

By the fifth anniversary of Hick's imprisonment, this counter narrative was very strong. The lobby group Getup! launched an advertising blitz complete with roving billboards and prime time television advertising spots with an image of Hicks' as a cheery and innocent child (see Appendix 6.7 on p.359), accompanied by a voiceover of his father pleading with listeners: "I love my son, but I've always said if he's done wrong he should have to face the consequences. I only ever wanted David to be given a fair trial" (Dabelle, 2007). A piece by Ray Martin on Channel 9's *Sunday* program in February 2007, in which Martin said he was 'ashamed to be an Aussie', questioned what had happened to the Aussie fair go in relation to Hicks. And he went so far as to point out to viewers the

dichotomy in Howard's rhetoric of the 'fair go' and the practice of prolonged detention without trial. Ultimately the Howard Government was not acting in a reasonable or compassionate manner, and that offended the moral code of the vast majority of Australians for whom a 'fair go' is the ultimate Australian value (Gough, 2006).

At the time of the Haneef case the 'fair go' counter-narrative was a kind of ready-made frame through which Australians could make sense of the case. To an even greater extent than Hicks, the representation of Haneef as a security threat and potential terrorist was riddled with holes and contradictions born of the dominant discourse. The fact that the case itself was flawed merely reinforced this counter-narrative. Opinion pieces and news items in the media honed-in on the contradiction between the rhetoric and reality of the land of the fair go[119], and even talkback radio hosts and listeners weren't convinced by the dominant line[120]. For many audience members the Governments' constructions were not resonating. The huddled man didn't look at all like a terrorist – he looked like a wronged and afraid man; the man who missed the birth of his child wasn't 'one of us', but he was still just a bloke earning an honest wage to support his family; an Indian doctor from the Gold Coast didn't sound like someone who should be put in immigration detention, he sounded like someone from whom the Government were scoring cheap political points.

Curiously, at the same time an enormous public backlash was underway against the Government's WorkChoices legislation, and those opposed focused squarely on the contempt with which the Howard Government was treating the Australian tradition of a

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[119] See for example O'Connor, M. (2007) 'Where's the 'fair go' for Dr Haneef?', *The Courier Mail*, 29 October. Available at http://www.news.com.au/opinion/wheres-the-fair-go-for-dr-haneef/story-e6frfs99-1111114747420 ; Viellaris, R. (2007) ''Fair go' call for Haneef', *The Courier Mail*, 20 July. Available at http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/fair-go-call-for-haneef/story-e6freoof-1111113998021 ; Barns, G. (2007) 'Haneef, Andrews and the web of hypocrisy', *Crikey*, 30 July. Available at http://www.crikey.com.au/2010/07/30/this-day-in-crikey-monday-30-july-2007/ ; Koutsoukis, J. (2007) 'Farewell from the land of the 'fair go'', *The* Age, 29 July. Available at http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/haneef-leaves-the-country/2007/07/28/1185339324698.html

[120] Alan Jones conceded on 30 July 2007 that Haneef looked like 'a pretty open-faced, innocent bloke' (Jones, A. (2007), 'Dr Haneef 30 July 2007', *Radio 2GB*, 30 July. Transcript available at http://www.2gb.com/index.php/listenlive/images/stories/contactus/some%20url/images/stories/contactus/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3931&Itemid=134); while talkback callers voiced their suspicions regarding the case: "I just see it as a total bungle. I just can't see now why Andrews is sort of casting about desperately trying to clutch for straws", "Where there's smoke, there's fire", "They've made it a whole big issue in an election year where their motives had to be under suspicion" (Roberts, K. (2007) 'Andrews is protecting his political hide over Haneef: Beattie', *The World Today*, ABC Radio, 1 August. Transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2007/s1993903.htm)

‘fair go’ (Probert, 2005). The campaign had enormous exposure and was hugely successful, arguably increasing public sensitivity to this supposedly intrinsic value. And though not to the same extent, the Haneef case led many Australians to see Howard’s counter-terrorism legislation as an affront to the ‘fair go’ in the same manner as his industrial relations legislation. The insistence on the centrality of the ‘fair go’ in Howard’s Australian story had in a sense become his undoing, and his abandonment of it – evident in the Haneef case and in WorkChoices – the ultimate betrayal for those who once supported him.

Counter-narrative 3: What sort of alliance is this?

In response to the prolonged detention of David Hicks, a third counter narrative emerged unique to his case, built on the contradictions inherent in the construction of Australia’s alliance with The United States. Around the fifth anniversary of Hicks’ detention, murmurings of anger at the Howard Government for seemingly failing to ‘stand up’ to the American Government moved from the political, legal and intellectual fringes to the mainstream.

Campaigns such as ‘Bring David Hicks Home’ by the organisation Getup! focused on the failure of the Howard Government to defend the basic rights of one of its citizens. The text of its petition to the then Foreign Minister Alexander Downer read:

> Dear Mr Downer All Australians have the right to receive a fair trial. **The British, Spanish, and French Governments have all refused to allow their citizens to be tried in Guantanamo Bay. Even the Americans have removed their citizens from Guantanamo Bay** and ensured they face a fair trial at home. As Australian Foreign Minister **you should have the courage to do the same**. We demand that you act immediately to bring David Hicks back here to face an Australian court (Getup!, 2007)

Hicks’ US lawyer Major Michael Mori accused the Howard Government of kowtowing to the Bush Administration (‘Lawyer calls for Hicks’ return’, 2006); while a Coalition backbench revolt in 2007 led to demands from within the Party that Howard ‘bring (Hicks) home like the Brits did’ (Coorey & Banham, 2007), a sentiment present in public discourse from early 2005 following the simultaneous release of Mamdouh Habib

and the final four British detainees from Guantanamo Bay while Hicks languished (Sales, 2007, 198-200).

The reason this argument caused such difficulty for the Government was because one of the key elements in the 'war on terror' discourse was the construction of the US / Australian alliance as pivotal to both our identity and our security, as a nation with whom we shared a special relationship. Yet there was a clear contradiction in this rhetoric and the reality that Howard was either too cowardly to stand up to Bush, or that our friendship was more than a little one sided. Neither possibility was palatable to the public and this was reflected in increasing support for Hicks' repatriation at the time, and a corresponding wish for greater independence from the United States (Dupont, 2007).

Thus it can be seen that the three key counter-narratives on extraordinary detention operated by 'harnessing hegemony', capitalising on contradictions in the Government's constructions and reworking (rather than rejecting) key themes like identity and alliance.

6.3 Summary

The above genealogy of dissent has completed the picture of Australia's 'war on terror' discourse between 1996 and 2007. Foucault's loose theory of resistance – gleaned from a number of his later works – provided the theoretical basis for understanding the struggle between power and freedom in the 'war on terror' discourse. And a number of key conclusions can be drawn from the study.

Firstly, the struggle between power and resistance was vehement throughout the life of the discourse, which supports Foucault's claim that power and freedom coexist even in the most unequal power relations. Despite the dominance of the 'war on terror' discourse, potential for dissent and change was ever-present. The Government was well aware of this dynamic and swiftly marginalised criticism when it arose, and even sometimes in anticipation of it arising – a crucial buttressing tactic.

Secondly, the most popular and successful resistance tactic was overwhelmingly 'harnessing hegemony': appropriating the terms of the discourse in service of dissent or change. 'Challenging hegemony', i.e. rejecting the terms of the discourse in service of dissent or change, was perhaps wisely avoided by actors opposing the dominant line. On

the few occasions this tactic was employed – such as the Big Day Out flag ban following the Cronulla Riots, it backfired simply because the discursive structure was so strong. As I outlined in Chapter Two, Howard, as a strongly ideological politician, had been laying the foundations for Australia's 'war on terror' well before anyone knew the twin towers would fall. Australian involvement in the US-led 'war on terror' provided a vehicle for his broader social project encompassing a hostility to multiculturalism, an obsession with the American alliance, and a desperation to preserve and foster a conservative narrative of the Australian achievement. Whether there was a conscious recognition of this by the relevant actors is difficult to measure, but it supports Foucault's (2003a, 37) assertion that escaping a 'domination of truth' is rarely achieved by playing a different game, but more often by 'playing the same game differently'.

Thirdly, resistance was most likely at moments where contradictions or cracks were evident in the discourse. That does not mean that discourses must necessarily contain inconsistencies before resistance is possible – indeed as Foucault insists, the possibility for resistance is always present – it may mean that some actors cease to think the way they have previously thought and therefore no longer accept the subject position imposed upon them by the discourse (Patton, 1998). This could also be conceived as a breakdown in resonance derived from dominant representations.

Those who initiated dissent in the instances covered above tended to be privileged actors such as politicians, legal experts, civil libertarians and opinion makers; privileged in the sense of their access to a wide audience and media exposure. But the transversal nature of modern dissent, as theorised by Bleiker (2000) makes it difficult to claim definitively that resistance was instigated by these actors, particularly given the availability of communication tools like the internet. Either way, 'ordinary' voices actively resisted the discourse via the use of public forums, letters to the editor, talkback radio, the internet, protests, public inquiries and opposition campaigns.

The fourth conclusion that can be drawn from this Chapter is that the media played an important role in the struggle between power and resistance. Evidence showed that conservative media such as the News Limited press tended to reinforce the dominant discourse, whereas moderate media such as the Fairfax group tended to allow more space for dissenting views. Overall, the Australian media were instrumental in reinforcing

dominant representations in covering the ‘war on terror’ and infrequently spoke outside the discourse unless there was a pre-existing tide of opposition (read: market), as in the case of Iraq or the Hicks’ case after 2005.

The final finding relates to the broader discursive impact of the instances of dissent covered in this Chapter. There was obviously not a revolution or abandonment of the ‘war on terror’, but was there a ‘transformation of values’ of the sort Bleiker (2000) (drawing on Foucault) claims is instrumental in facilitating a long term and tangible enlargement in the sphere of positive freedom? Was there a reduction of or disassociation from forms of domination (Patton, 1989) brought about by the ‘war on terror’?

Although these are very difficult outcomes to measure, the genealogy of dissent revealed three things in this regard. First, that each time there was a public contest between power and resistance it brought the discourse to public account, and although power may have ‘won the round’ in a strict sense, the discursive effect is a sort of chipping away at the discourse and the constructions that legitimate it. With each contest, seeds of doubt are sown in the mind of various actors and the legacy is a greater sense of awareness of the conditions of their existence and by logical consequence, an increase in the sphere of positive freedom.

Second, statistics show a pattern of declining support for the ‘war on terror’. Just prior to the end of the Howard Government’s reign, 50% of Australians opposed the war in Afghanistan (AAP, 2007) – the military front line of the global ‘war on terror’, a significant change from the 12% opposed at the outset of the war (Goot, 2002, 73). Opposition has steadily increased since the fall of the Howard Government: by 2008 56% were opposed to the war in Afghanistan (Dorling, 2008), and by 2011, 20% of Australians felt the ‘war on terror’ was being won and only 4% saw terrorism as the most important issue facing the country (‘Most think war on terror failing, poll’, 2011).

Third, what the genealogy of dissent revealed was that each instance of resistance exposed the more dangerous elements of the ‘war on terror’ discourse. Dissent relating to Bali exposed the possibility that military responses to terrorism are counterproductive and may in fact incite terrorism; those who spoke out against LOFA revealed the possibility that there was a hidden agenda tied to Howard’s ‘war on terror’; opponents of the Iraq war discredited the ‘at all costs’ approach to the US-alliance; those who spoke out against the

ATB#205 showed how nonchalantly a Schmittian ‘state of exception’ can be invoked and how willingly hard fought civil liberties can be sacrificed; people who stood up after the Cronulla Riots insisted that the roots of violence and hatred were not alcohol and heat but something deeper; and advocates for detainees like Habib, Hicks and Haneef exposed the willingness of a Government to sacrifice the individual for political gain.

What this indicates in closing is that the most dominant discourses can be resisted and that acts of dissent are significant in the bigger picture even though they may not lead to immediately noticeable change. In Australia’s ‘war on terror’ discourse a range of actors resisted normalisation and rejected unwanted forms of identity by capitalising on inconsistencies in the discourse – often brought about by a gulf between rhetoric and reality – and ‘playing the same game differently’, or harnessing hegemony. The result was a slow transformation of values and gradually declining support for Australian involvement in the global ‘war on terror’.

7

Conclusion: from Self to Other

The world is my country, all (hu)mankind are my brethren, and to do good is my religion

- Thomas Paine, 1791[121]

Language is constitutive of our world. It can unite or divide, liberate or enslave, inspire or discourage, persuade or invite incredulity. The story of Australia's 'war on terror' discourse has evidenced the power of language, and has demonstrated the far reaching political, social and normative implications of language and of non-linguistic forms of communication. The discourse was found to be fashioned around specific, historically meaningful representations of threat and identity and it was found to be dominant and 'dangerous'. In concluding, it is pertinent to consider what a less dangerous approach might have looked like had Howard's utterances been different. In addition, key findings of the thesis will be highlighted and consideration given to what questions remain or what aspects of the research might warrant further investigation.

The thesis set out to understand firstly how the discourse was constructed such that Australian involvement in the US-led 'war on terror' was possible. The question was deliberately structured to ask 'how possible' in order to give the research a post-positivist foundation and to better enable analysis of the relations of power that inhere in discourse. There were a number of findings relating to this first question.

Genealogy revealed the architecture of the discourse, and evidenced that little has changed in the way security has been conceptualised in Australia over time. A high level of intertextuality – where discourses contain echoes of other discourses – was also evident throughout the analysis. Themes of violence, fear, statism and exclusion have been prevalent at key periods in Australia's security past, and they were resurrected as part of the Howard Government's justification for Australian involvement in the 'war on terror'.

[121] *Rights of Man*.

In other words, the discourse didn't represent a significant epistemic break from the past, so the kinds of representations used in talking about security were ones with a level of familiarity and meaning that better enabled the subjective choices of the Howard Government appear to the public as 'common sense'. Because of the prevalence of the themes mentioned above, and their associated impacts: community division and hostility, the violation of civil liberties and human rights and the suppression of discussion and debate, the discourse can be characterised as 'dangerous'. 'Dangerous' in this context is inspired by Foucault (1983, 231), who said: '(m)y point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad'. Discourses that have a greater degree of domination and leave little room for choice and change are more dangerous according to Foucault (1983). As such, Australia's 'war on terror' discourse has been shown in this analysis to be 'dangerous'. At various points throughout the analysis the discourse was also shown to be dangerous on three main fronts. Firstly, because it legimitised violence, statism and exclusion; secondly, because it closed the space for political debate and discussion; and thirdly, because the policy platform behind the discourse did not actually function to reduce the incidence of international terrorism.

Another key finding of the analysis was that the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia was an elite-led project. Howard restructured Cabinet to permit greater personal control over matters of security and defence (Dodson, 2005; Howard, 2010, 238). The genealogy confirmed that Howard made the decision to invoke the ANZUS treaty independently, and the analysis of language showed that Howard shaped key representations that were in turn reinforced by his senior ministers.

The third major finding in this thesis centres on the main representations that characterised, reinforced and upheld the discourse. In all key periods in the discourse, representations of threat dominated. Threat was constructed via reference to the centrality of sovereignty, geographical isolation, Australia's military history – particularly past dangers overcome and the continued importance of the American alliance in this regard. Identity was the other key representational theme used by Howard to justify Australian involvement in the 'war on terror'. In all instances identity was relational, that is identities were constructed by reference to another identity such that there was always a positive identity in need of securing juxtaposed against a lesser identity, or an Other. In Australia's

‘war on terror’ discourse, these representations of identity were intertextual. Constructions of the Muslim Other, for instance, drew on Orientalist discourses and painted Muslims to be dangerous, erratic, unethical, prone to mob behaviour, and increasing in number. Whereas the good Self was fashioned around existing narratives of Anglo-Celtic superiority and often conjured the heroism and sacrifice of the Anzac digger. Representations of threat and identity worked in tandem in the discourse, and some constructions – such as ‘the Australian way of life’ simultaneously invoked both themes. Invoking notions of threat and identity as Howard did reminds Australians of our historical and present vulnerabilities, and in turn functions to legitimate policy choices and dictate who has a right to expect security.

Another effect of constructions of identity in Australia’s ‘war on terror’ discourse was to deny particular actors the ability to speak. This points to a fourth key finding of the research, that marginalising criticism – often before it even emerged – aided the discourse’s dominance. There were many strategies used to sideline critics of the Government’s position or representations: invoking the ‘national interest’, or speaking of something as a ‘national security’ issue implied the issue was above politics and needn’t be subject to debate or discussion; the claim that the country needs to ‘speak with one voice’ meant that it was almost impossible for the political opposition to advance an alternative; demanding that we ‘support our troops’ discredited those who dared question military action; and demonising opponents as unpatriotic, as dangerous or as terrorist sympathisers was – in a patriotic and fearful atmosphere – often a foolproof method of shutting out an unwanted voice. The result of this strategy of marginalisation was that voices of opposition or people who questioned the Government’s approach found it very difficult to be heard. Particularly in the early stages of the discourse, critical thought was confined to opinion pages and alternative media and therefore seen as views of the fringe.

So the sidelining of critique was a self-sustaining reinforcement measure, if you like: ideas that differed from the dominant discourse were prevented from gaining traction in the community because they were shut down before they could be seen as legitimate. Hindering debate further was the way that the mainstream media reinforced the Government’s message – the fifth key finding of this thesis. Disseminating the Government’s message by the most sympathetic mediums possible was an obvious

strategy underpinning the strength of the 'war on terror' discourse. Out of the items (interviews, speeches and press releases) attributable to Howard analysed in this research, approximately 25% were interviews with talkback radio. This is important because presenting information to the public via a less-investigative media like talkback radio – which is geared towards simplicity and conservatism – reduces the likelihood of negative coverage and increases the chance that the message will be accepted by the audience (Adams & Burton, 1997). Beyond talkback radio, the mainstream media in Australia more generally tended to support and repeat the Government's representations in relation to the 'war on terror' (Simms & Wurhurst, 2002; Wright-Neville, 2005). Sympathetic media coverage was therefore seen to play a significant role in ensuring the dominance of the 'war on terror' discourse in Australia. The role of popular media and popular culture was not explored in this thesis, and though excellent analyses of this exist in reference to the United States' experience[122], the examination of the role of popular culture in relation to Australia's 'war on terror' is an area warranting greater research.

A crucial part of the thesis was understanding what dissent was leveled at the discourse; what form it took, who pioneered it and the conditions in which acts of resistance were most successful. The conclusive finding was that harnessing hegemony, or undermining the discourse by using the terms of the discourse itself, was the most successful strategy of resistance against this very dominant discourse. Those who spoke out against the discourse with the greatest level of success (measured by the extent to which their argument gained some public attention and affected a change in views) did so by capitalising on inconsistencies or contradictions in the discourse. This was especially evident in relation to military intervention in Iraq: opponents seized on the opportunity to portray intervention as not in the 'national interest' and as encouraging rather than discouraging terrorism. It was also found that those who generated dissent tended to be privileged actors; that is that they had access to a broad audience (including the media). The implications of this finding are certainly not that dissent in any other circumstance is impossible, but rather that in the instance of the 'war on terror' discourse, its deeply

[122] See Croft, S. (2006) *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

entrenched and popular nature meant that opponents needed to be strategic in order to be heard.

A somewhat incidental finding bared out by the research related to John Howard. To say he used language to further his political agenda isn't new[123] but this thesis provided very compelling empirical evidence that Howard used Australian involvement in the 'war on terror' as a vehicle for the promotion of his particular narrative of Australia and the Australian community. It's perhaps important to qualify that the research doesn't indicate that Howard was necessarily malicious or conniving in pursuing his social agenda – rather they appear to be genuinely held beliefs about how Australia should be. Nevertheless, this narrative left a legacy of division and confusion and was essentially a narrative for another era. A cursory glance through the pages of Howard's political manifesto 'Future Directions' – in fact its cover image alone (see Appendix 7.1 on p.360) – is testament to that.

What this social agenda looked like is the subject of fairly widespread consensus – at least in the academic community. It involved reverence for the traditional family, adherence to the doctrine of individual enterprise, an unwavering loyalty to the American alliance, commitment to the Monarchy, enthusiasm for Australia's history and achievements and symbols that positively reflect that, hostility to multiculturalism as a policy, and a firm belief in a unified Australia that emphasised commonalities amongst people as opposed to diversity[124]. Howard pursued this agenda with great fervor

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[123] See, for instance, Dyrenfurth, N. (2005) 'Battlers, Refugees and the Republic: John Howard's Legacy of Citizenship', *Journal of Australian Studies*, no.84, pp.183-196.; Johnson, C. (2007) 'John Howard's 'Values' and Australian Identity, *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol.42, No.,2, pp.195-209.; Hage, G. (2001) 'The Politics of Australian Fundamentalism: Reflections on the Rule of Ayatollah Johnny', *Arena Magazine*, issue 51, Feb-March, pp.27-31.

[124] On Howard's social agenda in his own words see: Howard, J. (2010) *Lazarus Rising: A Personal and Political Autobiography*. Harper Collins: Pymble.; Howard, J. & Sinclair, I. (1988) *Future Directions: It's time for plain thinking*. Authorised by The Liberal Party of Australia & The National Party of Australia. For analysis by others see, for instance: Markus, A. (2001) *Race: John Howard and the remaking of Australia.* Allen & Unwin: Crows Nest. Dyrenfurth, N. (2005) 'Battlers, Refugees and the Republic: John Howard's Legacy of Citizenship', *Journal of Australian Studies*, no.84, pp.183-196.; Johnson, C. (2007) 'John Howard's 'Values' and Australian Identity, *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol.42, No.,2, pp.195-209.; Hage, G. (2001) 'The Politics of Australian Fundamentalism: Reflections on the Rule of Ayatollah Johnny', *Arena Magazine*, issue 51, Feb-March, pp.27-31.; Garran, R. (2004) *True Believer: John Howard, George Bush & the American Alliance*. Allen & Unwin: Crows Nest.; Curran, J. (2004) *The Power of Speech: Australian Prime Ministers Defining the National Image*. Melbourne University Press: Melbourne.; Manne, R. (ed) (2004) *The Howard Years*. Black Inc. Agenda: Melbourne.; Brett, J. (2005) 'Relaxed and Comfortable: The Liberal Party's Australia', *Quarterly Essay*, Issue 19.

throughout his time in office, and as many excerpts sited in this thesis indicate, discussions about security were as good a chance as any to promote his vision to the public. The following provides a good example of how Howard could discuss a security issue while touching on the importance of family, the American alliance, history and unity:

> The terrorists will be defeated if we hang on to our essential Australian mateship, (if) we treat each other decently and we work with our friends and our allies around the world to make certain that we work this out. Australians have (a) great capacity to pull together in adversity, it is one of the greatest things we have, our egalitarian sense of mateship gives us that character, almost above all other people (Howard, 14/10/01, Great Debate).

The implications of this finding are three-fold. It firstly reinforces the reality that security is a construction and the policies pursued in the name of security are based on choices and assumptions – not inevitability. It also underlines the importance of being skeptical and asking questions of our leaders' decisions regarding security, since their motivations may not always be transparent. Finally it is evidence that the office of Prime Minister in Australia is a bully pulpit; a platform from which an agenda can be effectively pursued, thanks to the privileged access to the public and the institutional authority of the position. The quote that opened this thesis showed that Howard believed his position to be a bully pulpit, and he was unashamed in using it to further his beliefs about what was good for the country.

These findings naturally give rise to the question of what might have been had Howard not pursued his socio-political agenda via the 'war on terror', or if someone entirely different had been Prime Minister on 11th September 2001. Even from a post-structural perspective it is difficult to face the kinds of findings this thesis has yielded without considering more hopeful paths. In fact it is entirely appropriate and fitting for a post-structural account of discourse to consider positive change agendas, given certain principles are observed. That is that the goal is not replacing the discourse with another, potentially *more* dangerous one, but rather minimising domination and maximising opportunities for change and choice.

The previous Chapter demonstrated how the theory of Foucault is more agentic than it is often given credit for. Beyond Foucault, theorists such as Edward Said, Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler have shown how post-structural analysis of discourse can be

reconciled with a positive change agenda[125]. What is common in the approaches of these theorists is the insistence that we must always have the maximum amount of space for imagining new ways of alleviating suffering and domination. Their concern is that 'better ways of doing things' often take the form of a new regime of truth, which by definition closes off thinking space, no matter how 'emancipatory' or ethical its contents. This doesn't, however, close off the possibility for agency, in fact amongst these authors there is a clear commonality in what they see as the starting point for a positive change agenda: consideration for the Other.

For Said, moving beyond one's own experience to the experience of others is the key to change. The goal, he says, is to transform from a unitary identity to an identity that includes the Other without suppressing difference (Said & Jhally, 1998). Similarly, Derrida argues for abandonment of the liberal notion of toleration which implies a retention of power in favour of 'hospitality… open to someone who is neither expected not invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign *visitor*, as a new *arrival*, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other (Derrida, 2003, 128-9). In *Precarious Life: the powers of mourning and violence* (2004) Judith Butler claims that reimagining the Other – not just even if, but particularly if that Other is a violent 'terrorist' – as human is pivotal if we are to live in a less violent, more just world.

A number of scholars have made similar claims when considering a more hopeful path in an Australian context. Carol Johnson (2005, 56) suggests that the desire for change on a large scale comes from understanding and empathy for the Other. She also makes the point that socially conservative political narratives deliberately create division and hostility in order to prevent change (Johnson, 2005, 56). Carmen Lawrence (2006, 127) advances a similar claim in *Fear and Politics*, lamenting that fear creates an 'atomised citizenry' and calling on us to 'think for ourselves' in order to facilitate trust in society and in turn, social change. An ethics of 'care' is promoted by Ghassan Hage (1998); care for the nation, for the Self and for Others as a replacement for 'worry' which he claims has dominated

[125] See Said, E. (2003) *Orientalism*. Penguin: London.; Butler, J. (2004) *Precarious Life: the Powers of Mourning and Violence*. Verso: New York.; Derrida, J. (2003) 'Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides: a Dialogue with Jacques Derrida', in Borradori, G. (ed) *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida.* University of Chicago Press: Chicago, pp.85-136.;

political discourse in Australia. In *Against Paranoid Nationalism* (2003, 151), he extends this notion of caring to encourage a focus on the Other as a gift:

> Perhaps the foundation of all ethical practices, and certainly the foundation of any social ethics, is precisely this: relating to the presence of the other as gift. Why is the other's presence a gift? Because the other, through my desire to interact with him or her, offers me, by making it visible, my own humanity.

In a slightly different vein, Suvendrini Perera (2002, 17) suggests that a universalist discourse of human rights offers a framework for positive change insofar as it enables a focus on the marginalised, the Other.

If then, the key to a more hopeful path is a meaningful shift of focus from Self to Other, the question becomes how we might realise it in practice. Obviously this is a complex question whose detailed consideration is well beyond the scope of this conclusion. But thinking about how things might have been different to the dangerous discourse detailed in this thesis is incomplete without considering how we might get to that different place. To that end I offer some closing observations based on the scholarship of a few of the many who have pondered this question. Perera (2002, 17) recognises that a universalist discourse of human rights carries with it a vexed history, and for reasons outlined earlier its essentialist underpinnings also make it problematic from a poststructuralist perspective. Derrida (2003) considers Cosmopolitanism a hopeful path of sorts. Despite his reservations about the prospect of a World Government, he claims that Cosmopolitanism is essentially the best option on the table, and that it may offer a means by which we feel more inclined towards 'hospitality' to the Other. Importantly, this is on the proviso that it is an open regime geared towards self-reflexivity. He says:

> (w)e must also try to adjust the limits of this tradition to our own time by questioning the ways in which they have been defined and determined by the ontotheological, philosophical and religious discourses in which this cosmopolitical ideal was formulated (Derrida, 2003, 130).

The dangers of imposing a West-centric version of Cosmopolitanism is an obvious risk in this regard. Indeed the doctrine of neo-conservatism – the dangers of which were outlined in Chapter Two) has been characterised as a variation of Wilsonianism (Mearsheimer, 2005) which can be attributed to Kant in much the same way as Cosmopolitanism. But Andrew Linklater's (2002) suggestion that any Cosmopolitan project be geared towards

the eradication of unnecessary human suffering perhaps represents – alongside Derrida's demand for self-reflexivity – a cautious but hopeful path for normative change. Indeed, Linklater advocates a 'thin' conception of Cosmopolitanism, or a vision of Cosmopolitanism as a guiding principle for ethical existence in the world rather than a totalising vision for the future (Linklater, 1998, 48). The cornerstone of this vision, he says, is '(a) concern with the unjust systems of exclusion which restrict the opportunities of subordinate groups' (Linklater, 1998, 48).

To return to the 'war on terror' discourse, based on the above a less dangerous path might have looked like this: the attacks of 11th September were viewed as a crime committed by human beings, who were in turn tried for that crime in accordance with the law. Immediate and lengthy consideration was given as to why such attacks were perpetrated. The political response was fashioned via consultation and open dialogue between many nations, and was crafted to respect and preserve civil, legal and human rights and uphold democratic principles. Information about the issue was conveyed to the public transparently and in language that was not polarising or inflammatory. Throughout the process, the human consequences of key decisions were the utmost consideration, and sovereign states maintained a healthy respect for international institutions[126].

This sort of vision isn't fanciful. The political infrastructure exists and the planet yearns for a form of praxis that addresses human suffering and its many sources first and foremost. All that is needed is the will to move from Self to Other, beyond the short-term political gain that is drawn from discourses of exclusion, fear and violence. What this thesis has demonstrated is that there is promise in at least one significant act of dissent, one act of 'hospitality', or 'caring', or 'empathy'; for it is these acts that initiate the kind of transformation of values that can lead to positive, normative change.

[126] because, as Derrida (2003, 114-15) points out, no matter their failings or imperfections they are the closest thing to a check on sovereign states in existence, and because inside them inheres the possibility of a universal sovereignty or citizenship.

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Appendix 2.1

Letter from Project for the New American Century pledging support for the 'war on terror' sent to President George W. Bush.

September 20, 2001

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President,

We write to endorse your admirable commitment to "lead the world to victory" in the war against terrorism. We fully support your call for "a broad and sustained campaign" against the "terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them." We agree with Secretary of State Powell that the United States must find and punish the perpetrators of the horrific attack of September 11, and we must, as he said, "go after terrorism wherever we find it in the world" and "get it by its branch and root." We agree with the Secretary of State that U.S. policy must aim not only at finding the people responsible for this incident, but must also target those "other groups out there that mean us no good" and "that have conducted attacks previously against U.S. personnel, U.S. interests and our allies."
In order to carry out this "first war of the 21st century" successfully, and in order, as you have said, to do future "generations a favor by coming together and whipping terrorism," we believe the following steps are necessary parts of a comprehensive strategy.

Osama bin Laden
We agree that a key goal, but by no means the only goal, of the current war on terrorism should be to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, and to destroy his network of associates. To this end, we support the necessary military action in Afghanistan and the provision of substantial financial and military assistance to the anti-Taliban forces in that country.

Iraq
We agree with Secretary of State Powell's recent statement that Saddam Hussein "is one of the leading terrorists on the face of the Earth…." It may be that the Iraqi government provided assistance in some form to the recent attack on the United States. But even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism. The United States must therefore provide full military and financial support to the Iraqi opposition. American military force should be used to provide a "safe zone" in Iraq from which the opposition can operate. And American forces must be prepared to back up our commitment to the Iraqi opposition by all necessary means.

Hezbollah
Hezbollah is one of the leading terrorist organizations in the world. It is suspected of having been involved in the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Africa, and implicated in the

bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. Hezbollah clearly falls in the category cited by Secretary Powell of groups “that mean us no good” and “that have conducted attacks previously against U.S. personnel, U.S. interests and our allies.” Therefore, any war against terrorism must target Hezbollah. We believe the administration should demand that Iran and Syria immediately cease all military, financial, and political support for Hezbollah and its operations. Should Iran and Syria refuse to comply, the administration should consider appropriate measures of retaliation against these known state sponsors of terrorism.

Israel and the Palestinian Authority
Israel has been and remains America’s staunchest ally against international terrorism, especially in the Middle East. The United States should fully support our fellow democracy in its fight against terrorism. We should insist that the Palestinian Authority put a stop to terrorism emanating from territories under its control and imprison those planning terrorist attacks against Israel. Until the Palestinian Authority moves against terror, the United States should provide it no further assistance.

U.S. Defense Budget
A serious and victorious war on terrorism will require a large increase in defense spending. Fighting this war may well require the United States to engage a well-armed foe, and will also require that we remain capable of defending our interests elsewhere in the world. We urge that there be no hesitation in requesting whatever funds for defense are needed to allow us to win this war.

There is, of course, much more that will have to be done. Diplomatic efforts will be required to enlist other nations’ aid in this war on terrorism. Economic and financial tools at our disposal will have to be used. There are other actions of a military nature that may well be needed. However, in our judgement the steps outlined above constitute the minimum necessary if this war is to be fought effectively and brought to a successful conclusion. Our purpose in writing is to assure you of our support as you do what must be done to lead the nation to victory in this fight.

Sincerely,
William Kristol
Richard V. Allen Gary Bauer Jeffrey Bell William J. Bennett
Rudy Boshwitz Jeffrey Bergner Eliot Cohen Seth Cropsey
Midge Decter Thomas Donnelly Nicholas Eberstadt Hillel Fradkin
Aaron Friedberg Francis Fukuyama Frank Gaffney Jeffrey Gedmin
Reuel Marc Gerecht Charles Hill Bruce P. Jackson Eli S. Jacobs
Michael Joyce Donald Kagan Robert Kagan Jeane Kirkpatrick
Charles Krauthammer John Lehman Clifford May Martin Peretz
Richard Perle Norman Podhoretz Stephen P. Rosen Randy Scheunemann
Gary Schmitt William Schneider, Jr. Richard H. Shultz Henry Sokolski
Stephen J. Solarz Vin Weber Leon Wieseltier Marshall Wittmann
http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm 9/11/11

Appendix 3.1

An abbreviated version of Opposition Leader (ALP) Arthur Calwell's speech to the House of Representatives on Vietnman, 4 May 1965 (cited in Warhaft, 2004, 117-123).

The Government's decision to send the First Battalion of the Australian Regular Army to Vietnam is, without question, one of the most significant events in the history of this Commonwealth...

The over-riding issue which this parliament has to deal with at all times is the nation's security. All our words, all our policies, all our actions, must be judged ultimately by this one crucial test: what best promotes our national security, what best guarantees our national survival? It is this test which the Labour Party has applied to this Government's decision. We have, of course, asked ourselves other related questions, but basically the issue remains one of Australia's security. Therefore, on behalf of all my colleagues of Her Majesty's Opposition, I say that we oppose the Government's decision to send 800 men to fight in Vietnam. We oppose it firmly and completely.

We regret the necessity that has come about. We regret that as a result of the Government's action, it has come about. It is not our desire, when servicemen are about to be sent to distant battlefields, and when war, cruel, costly and interminable, stares us in the face, that the nation should be divided. But it is the Government which has brought this tragic situation about and we will not shirk our responsibilities in stating the views we think serve Australia best. Our responsibility, like that of the Government, is great but, come what may, we will do our duty as we see it and know it to be towards the people of Australia and our children's children. Therefore, I say, we oppose this decision firmly and completely.

We do not think it is a wise decision. We do not think it is a timely decision. We do not think it is the right decision. We do not think it will help the fight against Communism. On the contrary, we believe it will harm the fight in the long term. We do not believe it will promote the welfare of the people of Vietnam. On the contrary, we believe it will prolong and deepen the suffering of that unhappy people so that Australia's very name may become a term of reproach among them. We do not believe that it represents a wise or even intelligent response to the challenge of Chinese power. On the contrary, we believe it mistakes entirely the nature of that power, and that it materially assists China in her subversive aims. Indeed, we cannot conceive a decision by this Government more likely to promote the long term interests of China in Asia and in the Pacific. We of the Labour Party do not believe that this decision serves, or is consistent with, the immediate strategic interests of Australia. On the contrary, we believe that, by sending one quarter of our pitifully small military strength to distant Vietnam, this Government dangerously denudes Australia and its immediate strategic environs of effective defence power. Thus, for all these and other reasons, we believe we have no choice but to oppose this decision in the name of Australia and Australia's security...

The Government will try, indeed it has already tried, to project a picture in which once the aggressive invaders from the North are halted, our men will be engaged in the exercise of picking off the Vietcong, themselves invaders from the North and stranded from their bases and isolated from their supplies. But it will not be like that at all. Our men will be fighting the largely indigenous Vietcong in their own home territory. They will be

fighting in the midst of a largely indifferent, if not resentful, and frightened population. They will be fighting at the request of, and in support, and presumably, under the direction of an unstable, inefficient, partially corrupt military regime which lacks even the semblance of being, or becoming, democratically based. But, it will be said, even if this is true, that there are larger considerations - China must be stopped, the United States must not be humiliated in Asia. I agree wholeheartedly with both those propositions.

But this also I must say: our present course is playing right into China's hands, and our present policy will, if not changed, surely and inexorably lead to American humiliation in Asia. Communist China will [p.1105] use every means at her disposal to increase her power and influence. But her existing military machine is not well adapted to that objective. It is not so at this moment and it may not be so for the next ten years. Therefore, she chooses other means. Yet we have preferred to look at China mainly in terms of a military threat and have neglected to use other, far more effective weapons at our disposal, or, because of our pre-occupation with the military threat, we have used those weapons badly and clumsily. We talk about the lesson of Munich as if we had never learnt a single lesson since 1938.

Pre-occupied with the fear of a military Munich, we have suffered a score of moral Dunkirks. Pre-occupied with the military threat of Chinese Communism, we have channelled the great bulk of our aid to Asia towards military expenditure. Pre-occupied with the idea of monolithic, imperialistic Communism, we have channelled our support to those military regimes which were loudest in their professions of anti-Communism, no matter how reactionary, unpopular or corrupt they may have been. Pre-occupied with fear of Communist revolution, we have supported and have sought to support those who would prevent any sort of revolution, even when inevitable; and even when most needful. Pre-occupied with socalled Western interests, we have never successfully supported nationalism as the mighty force it is against Communism. We have supported nationalism only when it supported the West, and we have thereby pushed nationalism towards Communism. Pre-occupied with the universality of our own Christian beliefs, we have never tried to understand the power of the other great religions against Communism.

Each of these pre-occupations has worked for our defeat in Vietnam, and is working now for our defeat in Asia, Africa and South America. And herein lies one of the greatest dangers of the Government's decision on large-scale military commitments. It binds and obscures the real nature of the problem of Communist expansion. It lends support and encouragement to those who see the problem in purely military terms, and whose policies would, if ever adopted, lead to disaster...

We are not impotent in the fight against communism. We are not powerless against China, if we realise that the true nature of the threat from China is not military invasion but political subversion. And that threat, if we believe for one moment in our own professions, and in our own principles, we can fight and beat. But to exhaust our resources in the bottomless pit of jungle warfare, in a war in which we have not even defined our purpose honestly, or explained what we would accept as victory, is the very height of folly and the very depths of despair...

By its decision, the Australian Government has withdrawn unilaterally from the ranks of the negotiators, if indeed it was ever concerned about them. Our contribution will be negligible, militarily. But we have reduced ourselves to impotence in the field of

diplomacy. We should have been active in the field of diplomacy for a long time. But we have done nothing in that field of affairs...

Australia's aim should have been to help to end the war, not to extend it. We have now lost all power to help end it. Instead, we have declared our intention to extend it, insofar as lies in our power. We have committed ourselves to the proposition that Communism can be defeated by military means alone and that it is the function of European troops to impose the will of the West upon Asia. These are dangerous, delusive and disastrous propositions. The Prime Minister pays lip service to President Johnson's call for a massive aid programme, financed by all the industrialised nations, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But it is clear that the right honourable gentleman's real thinking, and that of his Government, run along the narrow groove of a military response...

How long will it be before we are drawing upon our conscript youth to service these growing and endless requirements? Does the Government now say that conscripts will not be sent? If so, has it completely forgotten what it said about conscription last year? The basis of that decision was that the new conscripts would be completely integrated in the Regular Army. The voluntary system was brought abruptly to an end. If the Government now says that conscripts will not be sent, this means that the 1st battalion is never to be reinforced, replaced or replenished. If this is not so, then the Government must have a new policy on the use of conscripts - a policy not yet announced. Or, if it has not changed its policy, the Government means that the 1st battalion is not to be reinforced, replaced or replenished from the resources of the Regular Army. Which is it to be? There is now a commitment of 800. As the war drags on, who is to say that this will not rise to 8,000, and that these will not be drawn from our voteless, conscripted 20 year olds? And where are the troops from America's other allies? It is plain that Britain, Canada, France, Germany and Japan, for example, do not see things with the clear-cut precision of the Australian Government.

I cannot close without addressing a word directly to our fighting men who are now by this decision, committed to the chances of war: our hearts and prayers are with you. Our minds and reason cannot support those who have made this decision to send you to this war, and we shall do our best to have that decision reversed. But we shall do our duty to the utmost in supporting you to do your duty. In terms of everything that an army in the field requires, we shall never deny you the aid and support that it is your right to expect in the service of your country. To the members of the Government, I say only this: if, by the process of misrepresentation of our motives, in which you are so expert, you try to further divide this nation for political purposes, yours will be a dreadful responsibility, and you will have taken a course which you will live to regret.

And may I, through you, Mr Speaker, address this message to the members of my own Party - my colleagues here in this Parliament and that vast band of labour men and women outside: the course we have agreed to take today is fraught with difficulty. I cannot promise you that easy popularity can be bought in times like these; nor are we looking for it. We are doing our duty as we see it. When the drums beat and the trumpets sound, the voice of reason and right can be heard in the land only with difficulty. But if we are to have the courage of our convictions, then we must do our best to make that voice heard. I offer you the probability that you will be traduced, that your motives will be misrepresented, that your patriotism will be impugned, that your courage will be called

into question. But I also offer you the sure and certain knowledge that we will be vindicated; that generations to come will record with gratitude that when a reckless Government willingly endangered the security of this nation, the voice of the Australian Labour Party was heard, strong and clear, on the side of sanity and in the cause of humanity, and in the interests of Australia's security.

Let me sum up. We believe that America must not be humiliated and must not be forced to withdraw. But we are convinced that sooner or later the dispute in Vietnam must be settled through the councils of the United Nations. If it is necessary to back with a peace force the authority of the United Nations, we would support Australian participation to the hilt. But we believe that the military involvement in the present form decided on by the Australian Government represents a threat to Australia's standing in Asia, to our power for good in Asia and above all to the security of this

Appendix 4.1

The construction of existential threat vis-à-vis Tampa.

..it has to be understood by the Australian public, and I hope it is, that a country like Australia with a large coastline and being very attractive, if the view becomes entrenched around the world that it's easy to get into this country we will have an **enormous problem**. We will have an **unbelievable problem** in trying to **control our borders** (Howard, 28/8/01, radio interview, 3AW).

.. it should be understood that we are dealing here with a situation where increasingly our capacity in practice to **control the entry of people into this country is being undermined** by the increasing **flow of unauthorised arrivals**… (it is) **our undoubted right as a nation expected of us by our people to control the entry of people** into this country (Howard, 28/8/01, radio interview, 3AW).

Appendix 4.2

Cited in McAllister, 2003, 447.



Figure 1. Voting intention, January–November 2001.
Source: Goot (2002).

Appendix 4.3

National interest references in relation to the Tampa.

I've.. got to defend the **national interest** and it is clearly not in **Australia's national interest** to continue saying to the world, we are an easy target (Howard, 30/8/01, radio interview, 2UE).

We don't retreat in any way from what we've done. It was the right thing to do , it was the legal thing to do, it was the thing to do in **Australia's national interest** (Howard, 30/8/01, doorstop interview, Parliament House).

These are things where you have to communicate you view as to the **national interest**. We took the stance we did in the unexpected circumstances that arose because we thought that stance best served **Australia's long term interests** (Howard, 4/9/01, speech, Burwood).

Appendix 4.4

‘Protecting our borders’ rhetoric.

I can assure your listeners Alan that we will be taking all the steps that are available to us legally to fully **protect our borders** (Howard, 17/9/01, radio interview, 2UE).

My view is that **every country has a right to fully protect its borders** (Howard, 19/9/01, radio interview, AM Programme).

…it’s part of the **sovereign right of the government to determine who comes to this country and on what term**s (Howard, 19/9/01, radio interview, 5DN).

Appendix 4.5

Language of conflict and war following 11th September attacks.

(The American people will) be more determined than ever to find out who did this and to **visit justice upon them** which they are perfectly **entitled** to do and the world will hope they will do it (Howard, 12/9/01, radio interview, 2UE).

...what was done yesterday was an **act of war** against the United States and the Americans are entitled to, having properly identified those responsible, are **entitled to retaliate** (Howard, 12/9/01, press conference).

Appendix 4.6

Lack of immunity from terrorism.

This could easily have been an attack on a large building in a major Australian city. I don't share the complacent view of some that this can't happen in Australia. I think it can (Howard, 16/9/01, television interview, 60 Minutes).

... **nobody should imagine that this country is immune** either now or in the future from some kind of terrorist attack.. (Howard, 12/9/01, television interview, Sunrise).

Appendix 4.7

Closeness of the alliance.

It is very important at a time like this that America knows that **she's got friends** (Howard, 12/9/01, press conference).

..there's no point in a situation like this being an 80% **ally**. You are either a 100% **ally** of a country that was a 100% **ally** of Australia's in World War II and made the difference between Australia's survival or going under to the Japanese assault. We have to remember it. We have to remember the history that America came to our aid. We have been **close allies** ever since (Howard, 19/9/01, radio interview, AM Programme).

Appendix 4.8

New era rhetoric.

I am not saying that **we are now entering an era** that is going to be the same as the Cold War, but I was just making the point that **it's different, it feels different**, and it's something that we have to accept may be **different** (Howard, 12/9/01, press conference).

The world has changed forever in relation to certain things as a result of this event. I don't think there's any doubt about that. I'm not the (first) person to have said it and I won't be the last. **It has changed** (Howard, 16/9/01, television interview, 60 minutes).

Everybody has to accept that any nation is more vulnerable in the **new unhappy era** in which we now find ourselves (Howard, 2/10/01, press conference).

Appendix 4.9

Implicating the Anzac myth.

...**we have never been reluctant to defend** the principles of freedom and the principles of democracy in association **with our allies** (Howard, 7/10/01, address).

..I know that Islamic people around the world, not least Australians of Islamic faith, to whom I again extend a hand of fellow Australian citizenship and **mateship** as united as other Australians of different faiths and indeed of no faiths are in wanting this country to **stand beside our American friends and American allies**.. they need to support and the understanding of their **friends** (Howard, 8/10/01, press conference, Melbourne).

Appendix 4.10

Positive self presentation:

..most Australians are responding, I believe, quite magnificently. They're being **open** and **tolerant** and not seeing people of Islamic faith as being in any way associated with terrorism... There are a **few people on the fringes**, and they're the people we're trying to influence in what we say and what we do. But **the great majority of us**, and as always, are responding in a very **decent**, **open** fashion (Howard, 16/10/01, radio interview, 5AN).

..it's very important that we continue to practice our **open** and **cohesive** and **tolerant** approach to people of all different backgrounds (Howard, 3/11/01, radio interview, 2ME).

Appendix 4.11

‘Way of life’ rhetoric:

I mean, we have to see this as being an **attack on the sort of life we all believe in**. We can’t pretend we’re an island on something like this (Howard, 12/9/01, radio interview, 2UE).

...there is really no alternative, what is **at stake** here is the defence of the **common way of life** and **set of values** and there comes a time when you do have to **make a stand** (Howard, 8/10/01, radio interview, 3AW).

Well the **history of the last 100 years** has told us that **the greatest threat** normally arises when you don’t do anything in the face of **unprincipled** or **unacceptable behaviour** (Howard, 2/10/01, press conference, Sydney).

Appendix 4.12

Above politics:

We haven't been requested to provide any military assistance, but **obviously** if we were asked to help we would (Howard, 12/9/01, press conference).

Well there **obviously** will be military action involved. That's **self evident** (Howard, 29/9/01, press conference).

It's a very **necessary** thing. We have **no alternative**... and that's why I've offered Australian involvement and Australian assistance (Howard, 8/10/01, radio interview, 2GB).

When military forces go abroad they go in the name of Australia, they don't go abroad in the name of one side of politics and **I don't want this to become an issue that gets caught up with partisan politics**. **It's not in Australia's interests to have this being caught up in partisan politics** (Howard, 8/10/01, radio interview, 2GB).

Appendix 4.13

Expressing anger after the 2002 Bali bombings:

...Australians have every right to be **deeply angered** by what has happened.. This is a brutal murder of people without any justification and I know that my fellow Australians will feel **a very deep sense of anger** and **will want the government to do everything it humanly can to find the people who murdered their fellow citizens** (Howard, 14/10/02, television interview, A Current Affair).

...the Australian people are very tough, they're very resilient, they will be **angry**, they will be **determined** and **they will want every effort taken** by their government in cooperation with the Indonesian Government **to find the people who did this and bring them to justice**.. .there will be a **very deep sense of burning anger** in my country about what has happened (Howard, 14/10/02, television interview, CNN).

Appendix 4.14

Terrorism as everywhere:

But what we have to understand is that **terrorism can touch anybody anywhere at any time**, **no matter who they are**. That was the message that came out of 11 September lat year and, sadly, it's a message that comes out of this because this is on our doorstep.. (Howard, 13/10/02, television interview, 60 Minutes).

...in theory **every building, every asset is a potential target**. **Wherever people gather, be at a club, a theatre, a church, a leagues club**, whatever, **they are all in theory potential targets** (Howard, 14/10/02, television interview, Channel Ten News).

...not only as a result of what occurred in Bali, but now ever since the 11th of September last year, there has been a different atmosphere as far as possible terrorism in Australia is concerned. And **this country is at risk**. **It could happen here**. **The likelihood of it happening here is greater now** than it was before the 12th of October and everybody should be aware of that (Howard, 1/11/02, radio interview, 3AW).

Appendix 4.15

Howard declares we must fight terrorism:

...**the war against terrorism must go on** in an uncompromising and unconditional fashion. **Any other course of action would be folly**. Retreat from the war against terrorism will not purchase for the retreaters immunity against the attacks of the terrorists. That has been the experience of the last year; that has been the experience of mankind through history. **You will not escape the reach of terrorism by imagining that if you roll yourself into a little ball you will not be noticed**, because terrorism is not dispensed according to some hierarchy of disdain.. (Howard, 14/10/02, address).

...we must also accept that **this country must take whatever measures are necessary** – all of us must accept this – that **whatever measures are necessary to keep terrorism off our soil** (Howard, 8/11/02, radio interview, 2MSM).

Appendix 4.16

Australia as a member of the West:

...we will be a part of it (the war against terrorism) until it is won because we are vulnerable as all other **western** countries are. This is a campaign of terror against **our civilisation** and against the kind of **open society** that we have... That is what the terrorists despise. Because we are part of an **open society** and we are a **free** people... (Howard, 16/11/02, doorstop interview).

The real message out of this is that there are fanatical extreme Islamic groups that hate what we, in the **Western world**, represent. They hate **our freedom**, they hate **our openness**, they hate the fact that we give **equality to women** – a whole lot of things we stand for.. (Howard, 20/11/02, television interview, A Current Affair).

Appendix 4.17

Images from the 'Look out for Australia' package:

Let's look out for Australia

Protecting our way of life from a possible terrorist threat

Who to contact and when

24-hour National Security Hotline 1800 123 400

Call to report suspicious activity that may be a sign of terrorism and need investigation by security agencies.

For TTY users the number is 1800 234 889

Emergency services 000

For police, fire or ambulance response to an emergency situation.

Your local police

Call to report a crime or for general advice on security in your community.

Translating and Interpreting Service 131 450

If you wish to report suspicious activity and do not speak English well, call the Translating and Interpreting Service and ask them to contact the 24-hour National Security Hotline and interpret for you.

Record other important details here

Local police

Nearest hospital

Local doctor

State Emergency Service

Local council

Water provider

Electricity provider

Gas provider

Your key contact

Location of water meter

Location of electricity switchboard

Location of gas meter

Other useful numbers (eg school, vet, neighbours)

Authorised by the Commonwealth Government, Capital Hill, Canberra.
Written by Senator the Hon Eric Abetz, Special Minister of State. Printed by Amcia Pty Ltd Artarmon NSW 2064

Images scanned from author's copy of 'Let's look out for Australia'.

Appendix 5.1

Howard Government members using ‘the national interest’ rationale for involvement in Iraq.

...what happens in Iraq, such as the stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons and the manufacturing of nuclear capacity, stands as a real threat to Australia’s own **national interest** (Member for Ryan Michael Johnson, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 11/2/03, p.11534).

In the end I believe that the government’s decision is being taken in the best interests of international security and in the **best interests of Australia** (Member for Leichhardt Warran Ensch, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 19/3/03, p.12881).

The Australian government will continue to make the tough decisions—and there is none as tough as this—in our **national interest**. We will continue to do so because we believe it is the right thing to do, and I support the Prime Minister for his principled stand in this difficult matter (Member for Hughes, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 19/3/03, p.12924).

It is clearly in Australia’s **national interest** to involve itself in a war in the Middle East in order to protect its own people (Member for Sturt Christopher Pyne, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 19/3/03, p.12940).

The government has made its position quite plain—there is no doubt or ambiguity about it—and it is pursuing the **national interest** as I believe all people would expect it to (Member for Gwydir & Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 10/2/03, p.11243).

Australia has pursued the issue of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction with the strongest of convictions that to do so is in our **national interest** (Member for Mayo & Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 18/3/03, p.12534).

If it comes to military action the cause will be just, both morally and legally, and Australia will have acted in its **national interest** (Member for Lyne & Minister for Trade Mark Vaile, Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 18/3/03, p.12540).

It's a huge decision for Government to take. It's by far the most serious decision a Government will ever take. And we take a great deal of care and deliberation. But in the end you - as the Prime Minister has said - you make decisions that you believe are in the Australian **national interest**. And you live by the decisions. In terms of public support, I don't think... there are obviously different political views within the Australian community as there is on all issues (Minister for Defence Senator Robert Hill, doorstop interview, Perth, 24/1/03).

Appendix 5.2

Howard warns of the perils of appeasement.

I just **remind you of history** that sometimes in the past nations have walked away from difficult situations out of a concern about the cost only to find that the ultimate cost of that walking away is infinitely greater in human life and human suffering (Howard, 30/1/03, radio interview, AM).

But the **history of the world** is replete with examples of the community of nations steeping back from dealing with a difficult issue through fear of the immediate consequences only in the fullness of time to have to confront the issue eventually at an infinitely greater cost (Howard, 7/2/03, radio interview, 2GB).

...you can draw some **lessons from that period** (WWII) and one of those lessons is that if you walk away from problems hoping they'll disappear, you're wrong, and one day they'll come back to bite you in an even bigger way than you thought would be the case when you first confronted them (Howard, 9/3/03, television interview, TV One).

Appendix 5.3

Howard Government members using historical analogy in relation to Iraq.

...only a fool would support a policy of **appeasement** (Member for Mayo & Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer, cited in 'Downer gives support for attack on Iraq', 2002).

There are problems in the world today, just as there were in **1915**. You can't turn your back on them... and young Australians, even today, are serving in the Middle East because they want to make a difference, they want to address some of these problems. And **you think back** how their grandfathers and great-grandfathers would have felt the same in **1915** (Member for Higgins & Treasurer Peter Costello, cited in McKenna, 2007).

Had those hijackers or those who committed **the Bali atrocity** been able to access biological, chemical or—God forbid—nuclear weapons, there can be little doubt that **there would have been far more devastating consequences** (Member for Bradfield & Minister for Education, Science & Training Brendan Nelson, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 12/2/03, p.11752) .

Australia is a close ally of the United States. No nation is more important to our long-term security. **Australians will never forget the vital assistance we received from the United States during World War II**. Our value systems while far from identical are nonetheless similar. We share common democratic values. We have made common cause in the fight against terrorism. Australia and the United States have a common interest in preventing the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons (Minister for Defence Senator Robert Hill, in Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 4/2/03, p.8210).

Appendix 5.4

Howard asserts the Self's hatred of military conflict.

I don't want military conflict, I hate military conflict, all Australians do and it is in this country's interest that their Government and their Prime Minister work very hard with others to ensure that we resolve this very difficult issue through the United Nations (Howard, 13/9/02, radio interview, 3AW).

People make the mistake that **George Bush** is just hankering after a war, he's not. He **doesn't want a war any more that you and I do** and these people who run around saying, oh, because Howard's got this view or Bush has got that view or Blair has got another view they're warmongers, **nobody wants war, I hate it, it's horrible** (Howard, 23/1/03, radio interview, 2UE).

Nobody wants military conflict. I hate war. War is an abomination (Howard, 6/2/03, television interview, Today Tonight).

...**everybody is opposed to war**. The people who are disagreeing with the United States and Great Britain and Australia on this issue o not have a mortgage on the hatred of war. **That is a false moral assumption. We all hate war** (Howard, 16/2/03, television interview, Sunday Sunrise).

...**everybody hates war**, and those rallies at the weekend were called anti-war rallies. **I'm anti-war, you're anti-war, everybody hates war**. But there are **some times**, occasions where **you've got to take a stand** (Howard, 18/2/03, television interview, Today Show).

Nobody likes war, I mean **I'm a no war man too, we all are**. **Everybody hates war**. People who criticise what I'm doing think they have a monopoly on a detestation of military conflict. **But what is the alternative?** (Howard, 19/3/03, radio interview, 2UE).

Appendix 5.5

Government members reinforce Howard's construction of the identity of the Self.

all of us **prefer peace** over war. If you were to ask me and my wife and my children, **we certainly are in favour of peace** over war. But this situation isn't quite as simple as that (Member for Mayo & Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, 17/2/03, radio interview, 2UE).

This is not because **we** believe that a further Security Council resolution is needed for **legal** reasons but because **we** believe that it would help garner and build international support—in fact, the very international support and solidarity that might maximise our chances of securing the very **peaceful** outcome that we say we are all looking for (Member for Gwydir & Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 10/2/03, p.11243).

We believe that unfortunately this is the only alternative we're left with now. That **if we were all to back off,** the Americans, the British, Australia, the other countries that are supporting the coalition, **we were all to walk away from this, then that would have enormous long term consequences for global security** (Downer, 17/2/03, radio interview, 2UE).

...**we have to face up** to those maverick states that continue to cheat. **We must be prepared to enforce the will of the international community**. Iraq now presents **a crucial test of our resolve** (Downer, 17/2/03, address to The Sydney Institute).

Iraq has not changed —but we have. We now understand, after the events in Bali and those of 11 September 2001, that we are living in a world where unexpected and devastating terrorist attacks on **free and open societies** can occur in ways that we have never imagined possible (Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Hill, in Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 4/2/03).

That is why I believe the world community—the whole of **the civilised world**—has an interest in the ending of that program and an interest in ensuring that the program is not resumed. Australia has an interest in a **civilised world order**. Australia has an interest in the dismantling of weapons which in the hands of terrorists or in the hands of an outlaw regime could threaten the international order. (Member for Higgins & Treasurer, Peter Costello, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 18/9/02, p.6545).

Appendix 5.6

Howard government members discursively reinforcing Saddam Hussein / Iraq / the Iraqi regime as the barbaric enemy Other.

As the House will recall, last week I gave some examples to the House of Saddam Hussein's **gruesome** history of systematic and **egregious human rights abuses**. I will draw attention to Saddam Hussein's **horrific treatment** of Iraq's two ethnic and religious minorities, the Marsh Arabs and the Kurds, to underline the **hideous** depths and sheer scope of his **brutality**. **It is a case study of evil** (Member for Mayo & Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 10/2/03, p.11244).

Sanctions can be a very powerful instrument of persuasion but have little influence over a **dictator who cares nothing for the wellbeing of his people**. The **brutal** treatment by Saddam Hussein of his own people can be seen through his **cruel** and **cynical manipulation** of the oil for food program developed by the United Nations (Minister for Defence Senator Robert Hill, in Commonwealth of Australia Senate Hansard, 4/2/03).

Saddam Hussein has taken the same **bloodthirsty** approach to unions and unionists that he has taken to the Kurds, to the Marsh Arabs and to people in neighbouring countries—indeed, to anyone who questions his absolute power. Almost Saddam Hussein's first act on assuming power was to personally **execute** dozens of Iraq's leading citizens... (Member for Warringah & Minister for Employment and Workplace Relation, Ton Abbott, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 4/3/03, p.12109).

The *Washington Post* recently reported that, based on UNICEF estimates, the ongoing policy of appeasement with **Iraq** backed by the United Nations—the sanctions—**kills about 5,000 Iraqi children per month.** That is about 60,000 a year, and that is not counting the numbers who have their **tongues cut out** et cetera by Saddam, his sons and their henchmen. This is an ongoing thing that we are talking about here, and at some stage it has to stop (Member for Leichhardt & Parliamentary Secretary Warren Entsch, in Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Hansard, 19/3/03, p.12881) .

Appendix 5.7

Howard's construction of threat in the justification of the ATB#205.

Threat: In ASIO's recently released annual report a warning is contained that specifically cites the **threat** of home-grown terrorism (Howard, 2/11/05, media release).

These laws are designed to protect the Australian community at a time of unprecedented and different **threat** (Howard, 26/9/05, radio interview, AM Program).

[t]he possibility of terrorist attacks is there all the time (Howard, 8/9/05, joint press conference).

Not immune: [t]his country has **never been immune** from a possible terrorist attack. That remains the situation today and it will be the situation tomorrow (Howard, 8/11/05, press conference).

I just say again that nobody should assume for a moment, nobody should be so complacent as to imagine that we are in any way **immune** from a terrorist attack (Howard, 8/11/05, press conference)

We are **not immune**. Just because some arrests have been made and some charges laid, that doesn't end the matter. And sadly it's an issue we will have to live with for a very long time into the future (Howard, 9/11/05, radio interview, 2GB).

New era: **[w]e're not dealing with a conventional challenge**, we're dealing with a challenge the like of which our societies haven't seen before and we therefore need some laws of unprecedented toughness (Howard, 26/9/05, radio interview, AM Program).

[w]e are living in different times, and anybody who thinks that we're not, is frankly, out of touch with reality (Howard, 3/11/05, radio interview, 2UE).

But life is **never riskless** and there's always the risk of accident, tragedy, injury, death as we go about our daily lives, I don't want to sound too gloomy, but it's just something you factor in. A lot of people, an earlier generation, grew up worrying about whether we'd all be annihilated in a nuclear war (Howard, 3/11/05, radio interview, 2UE).

My duty: I ask my fellow Australians to understand that we are doing everything we can in a **difficult situation** to **protect the public** (Howard, 2/11/05, joint press conference)

I'm asking the Australian public and the Australian Parliament to accept that we are acting in a **bona fide** way to **do the right thing by the country** (Howard, 2/11/05, joint press conference).

Am I to compromise what capacity our police might have to catch people who are wanting to do damage to our community? Do I do that? Or do I maintain the position I'm maintaining now, which obviously, over time, makes me subject to a lot of criticism, and I'm going to maintain that position because that is **my duty** (Howard, 4/11/05, radio interview, 3AW).

I made a judgment. I don't retract or retreat from that judgment (Howard, 4/11/05, radio interview, 3AW).

Appendix 5.8

Howard's representation of the good Self as the 'Australian community' in speeches and interviews relating to the ATB#205.

I am still looking after the interests of the **community** (Howard, radio interview, 3AW, 4/11/05).

Now why when a person poses a broader risk to the **Australian community** as a whole should there not be a capacity to deal with the same issue in an equivalent way (like the use of apprehended violence orders)? (Howard, joint press conference, 8/9/05).

I think we're now going to have in Australia a legislative framework, and an administrative framework that means **our community** is safer as it faces the challenges of the future (Howard, joint press conference, 27/9/05).

[w]e are in a stronger and better position to give peace of mind to the **Australian community**. And that is our responsibility...(Howard, joint press conference, 27/9/05).

Appendix 5.9

Initiatives to involve the public in counter-terrorism.

If you see something, say something.

Fact Sheet

Is Melbourne's public transport system a terrorist target? Is it vulnerable to terrorist attack?

Cities of Melbourne's size across the globe are increasing security measures. While we do not believe that Melbourne is a specific target, we would be foolish not to prepare for an incident. This initiative has been planned for some time.

If there is no specific threat, why focus this campaign on public transport?

Every weekday about 1 million trips are taken on Melbourne's public transport system. These passengers can help to watch out for suspicious activity. The government provides the personnel, the resources, the training and the equipment to respond to a range of threats, but we all need to play a part in keeping Victoria safe.

Basing a campaign on public transport is an efficient way to get the safety message to a large number of people. This is a logical first step in raising awareness and getting people to report suspicious activity.

What activity should staff or the public report?

Any activity that is suspicious or out of the ordinary. These include:

- Unattended packages;
- Suspicious activities; and
- Individuals or groups:
  - Showing significant interest in the location of CCTV cameras and control areas
  - Taking pictures of or notes about public transport security measures
  - Remaining in vehicles outside buildings for long periods of time.

Who can report suspicious activity?

Anyone can report suspicious activity. Transport commuters who regularly travel between locations are ideally placed to observe suspicious activity and report information. Transport staff are encouraged to observe and report suspicious activity.

What does the campaign involve, how much will it cost and how long will it run?

The first phase of the campaign will run until Christmas and involves posters at stations, in buses and on trams, advertising in MX and at 150 bus and tram shelters. Public transport staff will be issued with badges to aid identification by the public. The campaign is costing approximately $200,000.

Further measures will be explored as the campaign continues.

What other measures will accompany this initiative?

This is part of a series of activities by the Victorian Government working in partnership with industry to continue to improve public safety and security.

The government is examining through expert independent review a range of measures to enhance transport security.

Will this create any delay or disruption in the system?

The security of the transport system and the Victorian public is paramount. Some services may be delayed or cancelled as suspicious activities are investigated. We apologise for that and ask people to be patient and bear with us as we work to keep the system as safe as possible.

The operators will do their level best to ensure that customers are kept informed as much as possible of changes to services. The operators will not be penalised under the performance regime for any such disruption.

A Victorian Government initiative

See Something Say Something was created by the New York Metropolitan Transport Authority and Korey Kay and Partners. Used with permission.

Page one of Victorian Government Metlink initiative. Retrieved from http://www.metlinkmelbourne.com.au/assets/images/PDFs/If-you-see-something-say-something-factsheet.pdf 8 April 2008.

NSW Government public transport initiative. Retrieved from http://www.secure.nsw.gov.au/userdata/images/1_4_1_B.jpg 8 April 2008.

Should I Report It?

An easy Checklist for owners and operators of facilities to identify suspicious behaviour

Is the person TAKING NOTES of security vulnerabilities?

Operatives often make notes of security vulnerabilities when planning an attack. Areas of interest include event timings, parking areas, security arrangements and hiding spots.

Case History - In 2001 US forces in Afghanistan discovered documents containing information about the Yishun Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) station in Singapore and a shuttle bus service which ferried US military personnel to the station. The documents recorded details of the frequency of the shuttle bus timings and the surrounding traffic environment. It is believed the information was part of a 1999 Jemaah Islamiah plot to attack the MRT.

Is the person videotaping and photographing subjects which have NO CREDIBLE PHOTOGRAPHIC INTEREST?

Operatives place a high value on video and photographic surveillance during the planning stage.

Case History – In 2000 Jack Roche filmed the Israeli Embassy in Canberra, particularly the gates and security facilities. Roche also filmed the building housing the Israeli Consulate in Sydney. The footage was to be used by Jemaah Islamiah and Al Qaeda to plan an attack. The subjects of the footage would ordinarily be of little interest to tourists or passers by.

Is it obvious the person does not have A LEGITIMATE REASON for being in an area?

Surveillance operatives may need to put themselves in suspicious situations to get the intelligence they need to plan an attack.

Case History – Four Jemaah Islamiah members conducted surveillance of water pipelines from Malaysia to Singapore. Posing as joggers, they travelled to the Bukit Timah Reserve. Two members acted as look outs while the others took photographs of the pipeline. This behaviour would have looked suspicious to passers by.

Is the person COLLECTING INFORMATION from promotional literature or inquiring about security?

History shows operatives place a high value on open source information about a target available either from the media, Internet or the target itself.

Case History – One month before the Sydney Olympic Games, New Zealand Police investigating a people smuggling ring discovered evidence suggesting a conspiracy to attack Luces Heights. The lounge room of a suspect had been converted into a virtual command centre, complete with conference table and maps. A Sydney street map was found with the site of the reactor and access/exit routes highlighted.

Is the person travelling erratically and without any apparent LEGITIMATE PURPOSE?

Operatives sometimes travel erratically passed targets because it is often difficult to obtain clear vision on the first attempt.

Case History – When filming the Israeli Embassy in Canberra, Jack Roche drove by the building several times. On one occasion he stopped, reversed and remained stationary for a period of time to gain better vision of the building and compound.

Does the person appear to be TESTING SECURITY?

Operatives will usually test security before an attack.

Case History – The four suicide bombers involved in the London bombings reportedly staged a dummy run before the July 2005 attacks. The bombers visited their designated targets on the London Underground train system in late June. This reconnaissance was later discovered by officers reviewing security camera footage.

If you answer YES to any of the above… report the incident.

An initiative of the Western Australia Police – Critical Infrastructure Unit

Western Australia Police initiative. Retrieved from http://www.ossec.dpc.wa.gov.au/Documents/Should_I_Report_It.pdf 8 April 2008.



Joint initiative of the Australian Trucking Association & The Australian Department of Transport & Regional Services. Retrieved from http://www.atatruck.net.au/security/security%20awareness%20-%20poster.pdf 10 April 2008.

Appendix 5.10

The poster required to be prominently displayed in classrooms from February 2005 as part of The Howard Government's *National Framework for Values Education* program.

Retrieved from
http://www.valueseducation.edu.au/values/val_national_framework_for_values_education,8757.html 10 April 2008.

Appendix 5.11

The Australian flag at the Cronulla Riots, 11 December 2005.

Retrieved from http://flickr.com/photos/warrenhudson/72304385/ 11 August 2009.

Retrieved from http://flickr.com/photos/warrenhudson/72304385/ 11 August 2009.

Retrieved from http://ninglun.wordpress.com/2007/01/23/frothing-at-the-mouth-over-the-aussie-flag/11 August 2009.

Retrieved from http://resources2.news.com.au/images/2006/11/27/va1237223221474/cronulla-riots-5316304.jpg 11 August 2009.

Retrieved from http://flickr.com/photos/warrenhudson/72303831/ 11 August 2009.

Appendix 5.12

Representations of the war on terror as a ‘new era’ in the Habib, Hicks and Haneef cases.

I mean **there's a situation** where people who are combatants in a conflict and then are detained are **held in detention until the end of that conflict**.... Now, **in those circumstances** people are **detained** until there's some process worked through on what to do with them (Downer on Habib, 28/1/05, doorstop interview).

Different war altogether. The conventional view of war until the war on terrorism was of Army’s rolling across borders... We’re not dealing with that anymore, **we’re dealing with a borderless war** where the enemy is not an army and therefore many of the conventional understandings about surrender and hostilities and who’s a combatant and whether you’re a lawful combatant, or an unlawful combatant, I know this sounds all very technical but this is tied up in the debate about David Hicks. **All of those things are different now** (Howard on Hicks, 15/8/05, radio interview, ABC).

You know, what you can't do is let people who you are very concerned may commit acts of terrorism and kill people out on the streets. And, I can understand that. **There's a war against terrorism**, and in war, **holding the enemy prisoner of course, is quite legitimate** (Downer on Hicks, 11/5/06, doorstop interview, Canberra).

He is in military detention. **He is not in a situation where he is arrested for having committed a crime in a civil situation. This is a military situation**. The hostilities continue and the Australian Government has indicated to the American Government that they regard it as **appropriate that he continue to be detained in military custody while the hostilities continue** (Williams on Hicks, 17/1/02, doorstop interview, Perth).

We are in a changed environment (Ruddock on Hicks, 22/1/04, press conference).

Well **we are facing new situations and new circumstances**. It’s a regretful occurrence in the world in which we live today that we have got people involved in terrorism offences. **In the past we didn’t have this sort of situation. We have to be able to adapt to it if we’re going to maintain the security of the country** (Andrews on Haneef, 18/7/07, radio interview, 2SM).

Appendix 5.13

Australia as ‘not immune’ from terrorism in language relating to Habib, Hicks & Haneef.

Look, **if it was a matter that you could roll yourself up into a sufficiently small ball** and nothing would, would affect you or your people, or others; **wouldn't you do it**? But I don't, **I don't think that is possible**. I mean, the fact is that what we're talking about is a response to some of the most dastardly acts that we have ever seen. **There is terrorism. It's real,** and even countries that, like Canada, that have only been engaged in some aspects of the response, have found that their limited engagement hasn't protected them from potential acts of terrorism (Ruddock on Hicks, 9/6/06, ABC Radio National).

...anybody who has allegedly been involved in an organisation like al-Qaeda, which is the world's most **evil terrorist organisation**, is somebody who is of **great concern to the Australian Government**, and **our priority is the protection the Australian people**. Thank you (Downer on Habib, 28/1/05, doorstop interview).

It’s a regretful occurrence in the world in which we live today that we have got people involved in **terrorism** offences. In the past we didn’t have this sort of situation. **We have to be able to adapt to it if we’re going to maintain the security of the country** (Andrews on Haneef, 18/7/07, radio interview, 2SM).

Appendix 5.14

Ruddock and Downer make reference to Bali in order to stress the point that Australia is not immune from terrorism.

And the threat of terrorism, which we have seen tragically take the lives of so many people here in the United States, of many citizens from around the world in many other parts of the world, and also the **Australians who lost their lives in Bali**, I think demonstrates the importance of the efforts that are being undertaken in relation to dealing with counter-terrorism (Ruddock on Hicks & Habib, 30/1/04, press conference).

I personally have **seen the consequences on the ground in Bali** and in our Australian Embassy, for **Australians of terrorist attacks** and if any Australian gets involved in terrorist activities, they get no sympathy from us (Downer on Hicks, 31/3/07, radio interview, ABC AM).

Appendix 5.15

Depictions of Habib, Hicks and Haneef as guilty terrorists.

"200 people have been released however the US Government believes that **a number of the detainees they released have returned to terrorism, demonstrating the dilemma faced by the US in considering such releases**." Now they are not my words they were Jack Straw's words in the House of Commons (Ruddock on Habib, 27/1/05, radio interview, 2UE).

...we don't want him to return to Afghanistan or Pakistan and to be **engaged in activities** which, you know, **terrorists get involved in** (Ruddock on Habib, 27/1/05, radio interview, 2UE).

I indicated at the time that he was repatriated to Australia that he would continue to be **of security interest**. The reason that he has not been charged as yet under Australian law is that some of the offences that, or the **activities** rather that he is alleged to have **undertaken** were not **criminal** at the time they were undertaken, although similar activities are now **crimes** under Australian law (Howard on Habib, 7/2/05, radio interview, 2GB).

...where we come from, is that we think terrorist organisations are **killers** and any **Australian who gets involved with a terrorist organisation**, who goes off **training with Al Qaeda** and **fighting with** (inaudible) **jihad** and so on, **Laskar-e-Toiba** rather, they're going to get into trouble. People, if I could say this, **people should not get involved in the most egregious and evil terrorist organisations in the world**. They shouldn't do it (Downer on Hicks, 17/7/06, doorstop interview).

I reasonably **suspect that Dr Haneef is associated with** people involved in criminal conduct, namely the alleged **terrorists** in the UK (Andrews on Haneef, 17/7/07, radio interview, 2GB).

Appendix 5.16

Howard and Ruddock insist that Haneef is entitled to the presumption of innocence, but insist that extraordinary detention measures are necessary in this new era of terrorism.

....the person in question being **entitled to a knowledge in the community that he is not currently charged with any offence**, he's being lawfully detained for questioning in connection with matters that occurred in Britain, of which the public is well aware, but **we should not jump to any conclusions or impute any guilt at this stage**... These are new laws..This is new territory **but it's territory that we'll have to get use to** for many years into the future because **dealing with terrorism** is not something that's going to be disposed of in a matter of months or even a few years, it's going to be a **long struggle**, it's a **different struggle**, it's a **new struggle**, it's a **new and different kind of enemy** and **we have to use new and different techniques.** And **people who imagine that we can use the techniques of earlier struggles and succeed are deluding themselves** (Howard, 9/7/07, doorstop interview).

I have affirmed time and time again that **people are entitled to a presumption of innocence**. But in relation to the handling of these matters let me emphasise again the points that I think are relevant... The fact is that police under the Commissioner of Police are an independent body. They investigate those matters that they form a judgement constitute a potential threat to the Australian community through breach of law. And it is a **new factor** that law enforcement today goes to trying to **deal with terrorist issues before terrorist acts occur rather than simply investigating them after people have lost their lives,** and I believe that the Australian Federal Police are a very professional, independent body that go about their work **protecting the Australian community** and do so in a thoroughly professional way (Ruddock, 18/7/07, press conference, Canberra).

Appendix 5.17

Constructions of Hicks as a terrorist juxtaposed against positive identities.

He was captured in a situation of **conflict with forces that the coalition against terrorism was fighting** (Williams, 14/1/02, doorstop interview, Perth).

You have to be realistic about the nature of the potential **threat** that the prisoners who have been transferred to Cuba represent. They have been **trained to be terrorists and to act in accordance with the objective of al-Qaida**. That **makes them about as dangerous as a person can be in modern times** (Williams, 14/1/02, doorstop interview, Perth).

They have included among prisoners taken in Afghanistan, people who **commit suicide in order to take out opposition forces**. And they have some prisoners have **killed guards in prisons in Pakistan**. Potentially, they are **very, very dangerous people** (Williams, 17/1/02, ABC 7:30 Report).

He is an **Australian citizen**, albeit one who has **behaved**, in our view, **very foolishly** (Downer, 22/3/02, doorstop interview).

...the opposition doesn't seem to think it's important that somebody is facing charges which include **conspiracy to commit war crimes** and alleged - and **attempted murder**. You know, I differ from the opposition. I think they are **incredibly serious charges that are being brought against Mr Hicks**....For me, Mr **Hicks is no hero** (Downer, 26/9/05, press conference, Adelaide).

He knowingly joined the Taliban and Al Qaeda. **I don't have any sympathy for any Australian who's done that** (Howard, 25/1/02, radio interview, 3AW).

Appendix 6.1

Viral email urging Australians to return LOFA mail-out. Received by this author on 5 February 2003.

Subject: Return Howard's mailout
>
> As you are probably aware, over the next fortnight the
> Federal Government is sending a mailout to every
> household in Australia. In this pack is a letter from
> our illustrious Prime Minister, a booklet on how to
> help the government "fight terrorism" and a fridge
> magnet (!)
>
> Today, Brisbane's Lord Mayor, Jim Soorley, made the
> eminently sensible suggestion that Australians who did
> not support the Howard government's backing of
> America's war should simply return the package to
> sender.
>
> I, for one, think it's a fantastic opportunity to show
> Mr Howard that not all Australians think the way he
> does. If you agree as well, I urge you to:
>
> 1. Watch out for the package when it arrives, mark it
> "Return to Sender" and drop it in the nearest mailbox.
> You may also want to add a personal anti-war message
> to it.
>
> 2. Please forward this email to as many people as you
> think might be interested in joining this protest. Mr
> Howard's mailout is already on its way to practically
> every Australian - but email can still beat it!

Appendix 6.2

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation's (ABC) 'The Chaser' and John Clarke and Bryan Dawe satirise the LOFA campaign on CNNNN and The 7:30 Report, respectively.

Govt launches National Security Oven Mitts

CNNNN anchor Craig Reucassel explains why it's now OK to be alarmed.

Despite the Federal Government's heroic effort to equip every home in Australia with an anti-terrorism fridge magnet, the scourge of terrorism has not yet been entirely eradicated. As a result, incoming Attorney-General Phillip Ruddock launched a new initiative to safeguard the nation's kitchens, the National Security Oven Mitt.

The mitts feature a mine of useful information, including the Government's updated terrorism hotline number, 1900-PANIC-TIME. It also gives clear and concise advice on important security matters such as interrogating a neighbour without breaking the Geneva Convention.

Promoted with a new multimillion-dollar advertising campaign featuring CNNNN anchor Craig Reucassel, the new mitts are the centrepiece of a new campaign that updates the government's now-famous 'Be alert, not alarmed' mantra.

"We felt a more fitting slogan in these even more uncertain times was "OK, Be Alarmed"," Reucassel said.

The award-winning journalist believes the new antiterrorism device will help Australians to both sleep more safely at night and take hot trays out of the oven without burning themselves.

He advised everyone to keep their mitts on at all times, and warned that "if things don't fit, check your mitt."

(The Chaser, 2003).
Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/cnnnn/news/s958733.htm 12 March 2011

KERRY O'BRIEN: And, for the last word this week, John Clarke and Bryan Dawe examine the contents of the Government's new anti-terrorism package of advice to householders.

JOHN CLARKE AS JOHN HOWARD; BRYAN DAWE AS THE INTERVIEWER.

INTERVIEWER: Mr Howard, thanks for your time.
JOHN HOWARD: Good evening, Bryan, very good to be with you.
INTERVIEWER: I wonder if I could ask you about this terrorist package that you're sending out to Australian households.
JOHN HOWARD: Yes, by all means. I'm not sure that everybody has received the package yet.
INTERVIEWER: Well, I got mine.
JOHN HOWARD: You've got yours, good.
INTERVIEWER: I've got it here. I wonder if we can just go through it.
JOHN HOWARD: Certainly, yes.
INTERVIEWER: Could you tell me what this is?
JOHN HOWARD: This is just a letter, Bryan, to Australians explaining the geopolitical position and counselling them not to worry too much, not to panic.
INTERVIEWER: Not to worry unnecessarily.
JOHN HOWARD: No, don't be too alarmed.
INTERVIEWER: And what's it called again?
JOHN HOWARD: You can see what it's called. It's called "Look out! There's A Terrorist Behind You With An Axe".
INTERVIEWER: And this is a fridge magnet?
JOHN HOWARD: It's a fridge magnet, Bryan, yes.
INTERVIEWER: And what's it for?
JOHN HOWARD: For sticking on the fridge.
INTERVIEWER: But why?
JOHN HOWARD: So you don't get attacked by terrorists.
INTERVIEWER: What do terrorists look like?
JOHN HOWARD: See, that's the difficulty. We don't know what terrorists look like. This is the point.
INTERVIEWER: Mr Howard, how are we going to avoid terrorists if we don't know what they look like?
JOHN HOWARD: Well, they look like anyone else, Bryan. This is one of the difficulties.
INTERVIEWER: And have you seen any?
JOHN HOWARD: Have I seen terrorists?
INTERVIEWER: Yeah.
JOHN HOWARD: No, I've got a fridge magnet.
INTERVIEWER: So these act like a garlic -
JOHN HOWARD: They won't come near you if you've got a fridge magnet.
INTERVIEWER: Really? And what's this thing here?
JOHN HOWARD: That's just a whistle, Bryan.
INTERVIEWER: For attracting -
(Blows whistle) JOHN HOWARD: I beg your pardon?
INTERVIEWER: …attracting attention?
JOHN HOWARD: I don't need to attract attention, thanks, Bryan. I've got the media where I want them. It's going pretty well.
INTERVIEWER: What's this thing here?
JOHN HOWARD: That's a disguise - a very good one, in my view. An excellent disguise. Everyone will be getting one of these.
INTERVIEWER: Mr Howard, that's a Groucho Marx mask.
JOHN HOWARD: Yes, and a very good one, in my view, Bryan.
INTERVIEWER: And what about this item?
JOHN HOWARD: That is a thing for finding studs in a wall, Bryan, and that is obviously a rubber band and that is two tickets to a Frank Ifield concert.
INTERVIEWER: 1963.
JOHN HOWARD: It hasn't happened yet, but hang on to them.
INTERVIEWER: Mr Howard, you've spoken to President Bush many times.
JOHN HOWARD: Yes, I have.
INTERVIEWER: And what does he say to you?
JOHN HOWARD: Hang on a minute, I haven't finished yet.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, sorry, go ahead.
JOHN HOWARD: Go ahead what?
INTERVIEWER: When you talk to the President, what does he say to you?
JOHN HOWARD: I just told you what he says to me.
INTERVIEWER: I haven't finished yet?
JOHN HOWARD: Yep.
INTERVIEWER: Mr Howard have you asked him how you deal with someone you suspect of using weapons of mass destruction when you're using weapons of mass destruction -
JOHN HOWARD: No, Bryan, it didn't come up. We're discussing things of considerable moment.
INTERVIEWER: Have you also asked him how the UN can act as the ultimate authority if someone's telling them what to do?
JOHN HOWARD: Listen to this. This is not bad. You'll enjoy this. Did you hear the one about the woman who backed into an aircraft propeller?
INTERVIEWER: No. What happened?
JOHN HOWARD: Disaster! That's quite good, isn't it?
INTERVIEWER: Mr Howard -
JOHN HOWARD: It's very good, Peter.
INTERVIEWER: Mr Howard, has President Bush said anything logical about the war yet?
JOHN HOWARD: I don't know, Bryan.
INTERVIEWER: Why not?
JOHN HOWARD: I've got a fridge magnet.
INTERVIEWER: It keeps logic away as well?
JOHN HOWARD: Why do you think we're sending them out to Australians, Bryan?
That's the last thing we want - a bit of logic in the community.
INTERVIEWER: Mr Howard, thanks for your time.
JOHN HOWARD: Don't thank me, son. No, put the funny party hat on and we'll sing the song together.
INTERVIEWER: The song?
JOHN HOWARD: Yep.
INTERVIEWER: 'Yankee Doodle Dandy'?
JOHN HOWARD: Yep, come on, you're an Australian, aren't you?
(Sings) * Yankee McDoodle went to town, riding on a - * what's that word?
INTERVIEWER: Pony.
JOHN HOWARD: *..pony, he stuck his head up - * Oh!
INTERVIEWER: Thank you.

(Clarke & Dawe, 2003).
Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2003/s778702.htm 11 March 2010.

Appendix 6.3

NSW Police launch a manhunt for 20 persons of interest in relation to the Cronulla Riots, cementing the dominant claim that it was a ‘law and order’ issue, rather than a race issue.

WANTED - The men police are hunting over the Cronulla riots

Daily Telegraph (Sydney, Australia) - Thursday, March 9, 2006
Author: KATE MURRAY, MATP
THESE are the faces of hatred police want the public to help bring to justice over the Cronulla race riot.

Strike Force Enoggera took the unprecedented step yesterday of releasing photos of thugs still at large after the December 11 riot, as well as video of Lebanese youths involved in reprisals the following night.

The above images are all of white Australians -- the footage of Arabic youths, published today on Page 4, is of such poor quality it is unlikely those responsible for the reprisal attacks will be caught.

Task force chief Detective Superintendent Ken McKay said last night he was confident ``a majority'' of the suspects would be caught. ``This is a last resort for us to try to clean up the last part of the investigation,'' he said.

Appendix 6.4

Protesters at anti-racism rallies in Sydney and Melbourne rework the meaning of the flag in response to its use during the Cronulla Riots.

Retrieved from http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2005-12/18/article01.shtml 11 August 2009.

Retrieved from http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/TfC/issue/view/39 11 August 2009.[127]

[127] For a detailed analysis of this particular silent protest, see Perera (2006, 65).

Appendix 6.5

Haneef being transported from a Brisbane watchhouse.

Retrieved from http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/news/national/timeline-of-haneef-case/2007/07/27/1185339252837.html 4 August 2010

Appendix 6.6

The photo of Hicks used prominently in the early stages of the case:

Retrieved from http://www.news.com.au/national/al-qaeda-who-david-hicks-says-he-had-no-idea/story-e6frfkvr-1226060676986 4 August 2010.

Photos of Hicks used most often after 2005:

Retrieved from http://www.news.com.au/features/hicks-ready-to-die-a-martyr/story-e6frflfr-1111115167355 4 August 2010



Retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2006/05/06/1146335967064.html 4 August 2010.

Appendix 6.7

David Hicks aged 9. Picture used by the Getup! ‘Bring David Hicks Home’ campaign in 2007.

Retrieved from http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2007/02/04/1170523960971.html 18 March 2010.

Appendix 7.1

The front cover of John Howard's policy manifesto of 1988, co-authored by Ian Sinclair (then leader of the National Party). Copy provided by The Liberal Party of Australia, Barton ACT.